Quaestio 1 Question 1 De creatione ejus ex parte animae The constitution of the human soul Circa primum quaeruntur tria: Concerning the first, three questions are asked: primo utrum anima humana sit de essentia divina; first, whether the human soul is of the divine essence; secundo si non, utrum sit de aliqua materia creata; second, if not, whether it was created from some matter; tertio utrum anima extra corpus creata sit. third, whether the soul was created outside the body. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum anima humana sit de essentia divina Whether the human soul is of the divine essence Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit de essentia divina, To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the soul is of the divine essence. per id quod habetur Genes. 2:7; inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae. Sed illud quod inspirat aliquid, flatum de se emittit. Ergo anima est de essentia Dei. Obj. 1: For it is related: he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (Gen 2:7). But that which breathes something emits breath from itself. Therefore, the soul is of the essence of God. Praeterea, dicitur Act. 17:28: nos enim genus Dei sumus. Hoc autem non convenit homini nisi secundum animam, qua ab aliis sensibilibus secernitur. Ergo videtur quod anima sit de genere naturae divinae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is said: for we are indeed his offspring (Acts 17:28). But this is only true of man with respect to his soul, by which he is set apart from other sensible things. Therefore, it seems that the soul is of the offspring of the divine nature. Praeterea, cum naturalis operatio consequatur naturam, oportet ea quae in operatione conveniunt, in natura vel essentia convenire. Sed anima rationalis convenit in operatione intellectus cum Deo, ut Philosophus, in 10 Ethic., cap. 8 vel 12, dicit. Ergo communicat cum ipso in essentia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, since natural activity follows on nature, things that agree in activity must agree in nature or essence. But the rational soul agrees with God in intellectual activity, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10. Therefore, it has an essence in common with him. Praeterea, omne quod intelligitur, intelligitur per similitudinem vel identitatem; oportet enim quod intellectus in actu sit intellectum in actu, quod non contingit, nisi vel quia sunt idem per essentiam, sicut Deus seipsum intelligit, vel quia similitudo intellecti recipitur in intelligente, ut perfectio ejus. Sed intellectus noster intelligit Deum, et similiter materiam primam. Ergo vel per similitudinem, vel per identitatem. Sed hoc non potest esse per similitudinem abstractam ab eis, quia a simplicissimo nihil potest abstrahi. Ergo oportet quod intelligat ipsa per identitatem; et sic est idem per essentiam Deus, et materia prima, et anima intellectiva. Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is understood is understood through likeness or identity. For the intellect in act must be the understood in act, which only occurs either because they are the same essentially, as when God understands himself, or because a likeness of the thing understood is received in the one who understands as his perfection. But our intellect understands God, and likewise prime matter. Therefore, this occurs either through likeness or through identity. But it cannot be through a likeness abstracted from them, since nothing can be abstracted from what is most simple. Therefore, it must understand them through identity. And so, God, prime matter, and the intellective soul are the same essentially. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt penitus idem. Sed intellectus, et materia prima, et Deus sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo sunt penitus idem. Probatio mediae quantum ad secundam partem: quia prima constat. Quaecumque differunt, aliqua differentia differunt; sed omne quod differt ab altero aliqua differentia est compositum ex differentia et quodam alio. Cum ergo praedicta tria sint penitus simplicia, videtur quod nullo modo differant. Obj. 5: Furthermore, whatever things exist and in no way differ are thoroughly the same. But the intellect, prime matter, and God exist and in no way differ. Therefore, they are thoroughly the same. Proof of the middle premise, with regard to the second part, since the first part is obvious: any things that differ, differ by some difference. But everything that differs from another by a difference is composed of the difference and something else. Therefore, since the aforementioned three things are thoroughly simple, it seems that they differ in no way. Praeterea, illud quod participatur ab esse cujuslibet rei est de essentia cujuslibet rei. Sed, sicut dicit Dionysius in 4 cap. De divin. nomin., participatione divinae bonitatis anima et omnes aliae res sunt, et bonae sunt. Ergo videtur quod divina bonitas sit essentia cujuslibet animae et cujuslibet rei. Sed divina bonitas est sua essentia. Ergo essentia divina est ipsa essentia animae, vel aliquid ejus. Obj. 6: Furthermore, that which is participated in by the being of any given thing pertains to the essence of each and every reality. But, as Dionysius says, it is by a participation in the divine goodness that the soul and all other realities exist and are good. Therefore, it seems that the divine goodness is the essence of any soul and any reality. But the divine goodness is its essence. Therefore, the divine essence is the very essence of the soul or something belonging to it. Sed contra, illud quod est in se tantum actus non est possibile ad speciem alteram, vel ad esse aliud. Sed essentia divina est actus purus, cui nulla potentia permiscetur. Ergo non est possibilis ad hoc ut transformetur in naturam animae vel alicujus alterius, vel additionem aliquam recipiat. On the contrary, that which in itself is only act is not in potentiality to another species or to another being. But the divine essence is pure act, with which no potency is mixed. Therefore, it does not have the possibility of being transformed into the nature of the soul or of any other thing, or of receiving any addition. Praeterea, ei quod est actus purus non admiscetur aliqua privatio: quia privatio est ejus quod est natum haberi, et nondum habetur. Sed animae adjunguntur multi defectus vel privationes, ut ignorantia, malitia, et hujusmodi. Ergo anima non est de essentia divina. Furthermore, that which is pure act does not have any admixture of privation. For a privation is of something made to be possessed but is not yet possessed. But many defects or privations are present in the soul, such as ignorance, malice, and things of this sort. Therefore, the soul is not of the divine essence. Respondeo dicendum, quod quorumdam antiquorum philosophorum error fuit, quod Deus esset de essentia omnium rerum: ponebant enim omnia esse unum simpliciter, et non differre, nisi forte secundum sensum vel aestimationem, ut Parmenides dixit; et illos etiam antiquos philosophos secuti sunt quidam moderni, ut David de Dynanno. Divisit enim res in partes tres, in corpora, animas et substantias aeternas separatas; et primum indivisibile, ex quo constituuntur corpora, dixit “yle”; primum autem indivisibile, ex quo constituuntur animae, dixit “noym,” vel mentem; primum autem indivisibile in substantiis aeternis dixit “Deum”; et haec tria esse unum et idem: ex quo iterum consequitur esse omnia per essentiam unum; quod et sensui contradicit, et a philosophis sufficienter improbatum est. I answer that it was the error of certain philosophers of old that God is of the essence of all things. For they held that all things are simply one and do not differ, except perhaps in sense appearance or in our estimation, as Parmenides said. And some moderns, too, have followed those ancient philosophers, such as David of Dinant. For he divided things into three parts: bodies, souls, and eternal separated substances. The primary-indivisible by which bodies are constituted, he called hule (“matter”). But the primary-indivisible by which souls are constituted, he called nous or “mind.” And the primary-indivisible in eternal substances, he called “God.” These three are one and the same thing, from which again it follows that all things are essentially one. In point of fact, this position both contradicts the senses and has been sufficiently disproved by philosophers. Alii vero minus errantes dixerunt Deum esse non quidem essentiam omnium, sed substantiarum intellectivarum, considerantes similitudinem operationis, et dignitatem intellectus, et immaterialitatem ejus; quod ortum habere potuit ex opinione Anaxagorae, qui posuit intellectum moventem omnia; et fulcimentum habere potuit ex auctoritate Genesis 1, inducta, male intellecta. Hoc etiam fidei contrariatur, et philosophorum dictis, qui substantias intellectuales in diversis ordinibus constituunt, et intellectum humanum ultimum in ordine omnium intellectualium, inter quos primum ponunt intellectum divinum: et hunc quidem esse omnino immobilem, et fides tenet, et ratio demonstrat; anima autem humana aliquo modo variabilis est, scilicet secundum virtutem et vitium, et scientiam et ignorantiam. Others, erring less, said that God is not the essence of all things, but rather of intellective substances, in regard to the likeness of the activity of intellect, its dignity, and its immateriality. This could have its origin from the opinion of Anaxagoras, who posited an intellect that moves all things. And it could have garnered some support from the text of Genesis 1, poorly understood. This too is contrary to the faith as well as to the statements of philosophers, who classify intellectual substances into different orders and place the human intellect as last in the order of all intellectual things, among which they place the divine intellect as first. Faith holds and reason demonstrates that the divine intellect is altogether unmovable. However, the human soul is in a way variable, namely, with respect to virtue and vice, as well as knowledge and ignorance. Horum autem omnium errorum et plurium hujusmodi unum videtur esse principium et fundamentum, quo destructo, nihil probabilitatis remanet. Plures enim antiquorum ex intentionibus intellectis judicium rerum naturalium sumere voluerunt: unde quaecumque inveniuntur convenire in aliqua intentione intellecta, voluerunt quod communicarent in una re: et inde ortus est error Parmenidis et Melissi, qui videntes ens praedicari de omnibus, locuti sunt de ente sicut de una quadam re, ostendentes ens esse unum et non multa, ut eorum rationes indicant in 1 Physic. recitatae. Now, all these errors and many others of this kind seem to have a single principle and foundation. Once this is destroyed, no probability remains. For many of the ancients wished to judge natural things from intellectual concepts. Hence they supposed that, wherever things are found to agree in an intellectual concept, they share in a single reality. Hence there arose the error of Parmenides and Melissus. For they observed that “being” is predicated of all things and so spoke of being as if speaking of some single reality, showing that being is one and not many, as their arguments indicate, which are recounted in the Physics 1. Ex hoc etiam secuta est opinio Pythagorae et Platonis, ponentium mathematica et intelligibilia principia sensibilium: ut quia numerus invenitur in his et illis, quae communicant in numero, sicut in quadam essentia una; et similiter quia Socrates et Plato sunt homo, quod sit unus homo per essentiam, qui de omnibus praedicatur. From this, too, followed the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato, who posited mathematical and intelligible principles for sensible things in such a way that, because number is found in these and those that share in number, they are one as in some essence. Likewise, because Socrates and Plato are man, there is one man essentially that is predicated of all. Ex hoc etiam procedunt plures rationes Avicebronis in libro Fontis vitae, qui semper unitatem materiae venatur ex aequali communitate praedicationis. From this, too, proceed several arguments of Avicebron in The Fountain of Life, who is always hunting for unity of matter based on equal commonality of predication. Ex hoc etiam derivatur opinio quae dicit unam essentiam generis esse in omnibus speciebus re, non tantum secundum rationem. From this, too, is derived the opinion that says that the single essence of a genus is in all its species in reality, not only in account. Sed hoc fundamentum est valde debile: non enim oportet, si hoc est homo et illud homo, quod eadem sit humanitas numero utriusque, sicut in duobus albis non est eadem albedo numero; sed quod hoc similetur illi in hoc quod habet humanitatem sicut illud; et intellectus accipiens humanitatem non secundum quod est hujus, sed ut est humanitas, format intentionem communem omnibus: et ita etiam non est necessarium, si in anima est natura intellectualis et in Deo, quod sit eadem intellectualitas utriusque per essentiam, vel quod per quam eamdem essentiam utrumque dicatur ens. But this foundation is exceedingly weak. For it is not necessary that, if this is a man and that is a man, then both must have the same humanity numerically, just as in two white things there is not the same whiteness numerically. Rather, this is likened to that in the fact that it possesses humanity just as that does. And the intellect, taking humanity not insofar as it belongs to this man but precisely as humanity, forms a single concept for all men. Thus, it is not necessary that if there is intellectual nature in the soul and in God, then both must have the same intellectuality essentially, or that through this same essence both are called a “being.” Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, 7 Super Gen., c. 2, illa auctoritas non cogit ponere animam de substantia Dei esse. Primo, quia hoc quod homo flando emittit, est de aere exteriori quem respirando attraxit, non de substantia ejus. Secundo, quia etsi esset de substantia sufflantis, nullo modo esset de substantia animae, etsi etiam poneretur de substantia corporis. Deus autem hoc modo se habet ad totum universum regendo ipsum, sicut anima ad corpus; unde non sequitur animam hominis esse de substantia Dei. Tertio, quia anima tantummodo corpori dominatur, unde flatum non nisi de corpore facere potest; Deus autem est supra omnem naturam; unde non oportet ut de corporalibus elementis animam faciat; sed de nihilo eam creat immensitate potestatis suae; unde figurative dicitur flare, quasi flatum faceret. Isaiae 57:16: omnem flatum ego feci. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says, this text does not compel us to hold that the soul is of the substance of God. This first because that which a man emits by breathing is from the external air that he drew in by breathing, not from his substance. The second is because even if it were of the substance of the breather, it would in no way be of the substance of the soul, even if we said it was from the substance of the body. But God is related to the whole universe as the soul is to the body, namely, by ruling it. Hence it does not follow that the soul of man is of the substance of God. The third is because the soul only has dominion over the body, for which reason it can only produce breath from the body. But God is above all nature. Hence it is not necessary for him to produce the soul from bodily elements. Rather, he creates it from nothing by the immensity of his power. Hence he is figuratively said to breathe, as the one who made breath: I have made the breath of life (Isa 57:16). Ad secundum dicendum, quod dicimur nos esse genus Dei quantum ad animam, non ita quod anima sit de divina essentia, sed quia participat naturam intellectualem quae etiam in Deo est; secundum quod etiam dicitur ad imaginem Dei. Reply Obj. 2: We are said to be the offspring of God with regard to the soul, not in such a way that the soul is of the divine essence, but rather because it participates in intellectual nature, which is also in God. In this respect, it is also said to be according to the image of God. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum anima non habeat eamdem operationem numero quam Deus habet, sed similem, non sequitur quod habeat eamdem naturam, sed similem: nec ex tali similitudine unitas essentiae concludi potest, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Since the soul does not have the same activity numerically that God has, but rather an activity similar to his, it does not follow that it has the same nature as God, but rather a nature similar to his. Nor can we draw the conclusion of unity of essence from such likeness, as has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectus creatus intelligit Deum non per identitatem naturae, sed per unionem ad ipsum, quae est vel per aliquam similitudinem non quidem abstractam, sed effluxam a Deo in intellectum; et hunc modum intelligendi vocat Avicenna, De intellig., cap. 4, per impressionem, dicens intelligentias in nobis esse ex hoc quod impressiones earum in nobis sunt: vel per unionem ad ipsam essentiam lucis increatae, sicut erit in patria. Materia autem prima cognoscibilis est, non per aliquam speciem ab ipsa receptam, sed per analogiam ad formam, ut dicitur in 1 Physic.; et ideo est de illis quae suo defectu perfecte intelligi non valent, ut dicit Boetius in lib. De duabus naturis. Reply Obj. 4: The created intellect understands God not through identity of nature, but through union to him. This union is either through a likeness—not one abstracted, but instead infused by God into the intellect, a mode of understanding that Avicenna calls “through impression,” saying that intelligences are in us from the fact that their impressions are in us—or it is through union to the very essence of the uncreated light, as it will be in our homeland. However, prime matter is knowable, not through a species received from it, but rather by analogy with form, as is said in the Physics 1. Thus, it is among those things that cannot be perfectly understood by reason of a deficiency on their part, as Boethius says in On the Two Natures. Ad quintum dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum in 10 Metaph., non est idem esse diversum et esse differens: quia differens ad aliquid dicitur, unde oportet omne differens, proprie loquendo, aliquo differre; diversum autem absolute dicitur; unde quae diversa sunt, non oportet aliquo diversa esse, sed seipsis: si enim oporteret omnia diversa in aliquo differre, in infinitum abiretur; et ideo oportet devenire ad prima simplicia, quae seipsis diversa sunt, ut patet in differentiis, quibus species distinguuntur. Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 10, to be “other than” and to be “different” are not the same. For “different” is said in reference to something, so everything that differs, properly speaking, must differ in something. But “other than” is said absolutely, so things that are other than one another need not be other than one another by anything except themselves. For if all things that are other than one another had to differ in something, this would go back to infinity. Thus, we must arrive at primary simple things that are other by themselves, as is clear in the case of the differences by which species are distinguished. Si ergo differens stricte sumatur secundum praedictam acceptionem, sic prima propositio falsa est, eo quod aliqua non differunt quae diversa sunt. Idem autem non differenti sed diverso opponitur. Si autem sumatur differens large pro diverso et differenti, sic propositio vera est, sed media est falsa, ut ex praedictis patet. Therefore, if “different” is taken strictly in keeping with the aforementioned manner of understanding, then the first proposition is false, because some things that are other than one another do not differ. But “same” is not opposed to “different,” but to “other than.” However, if “different” is taken broadly for both “other than” and “different,” then in this case the first proposition is true, but the middle is false, as is clear from what has been said. Ad sextum dicendum, quod creaturae non dicuntur divinam bonitatem participare quasi partem essentiae suae, sed quia similitudine divinae bonitatis in esse constituuntur, secundum quam non perfecte divinam bonitatem imitantur, sed ex parte. Reply Obj. 6: Created things are not said to participate in the divine goodness as part of its essence, but rather because they are constituted in being by a likeness to the divine goodness, according to which they imitate the divine goodness, not perfectly, but in part. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum anima humana sit constituta ex aliqua materia Whether the human soul is constituted of any matter Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima ex aliqua materia constituta sit. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the soul is constituted of some matter. Omne enim quod est hoc aliquid in natura, est compositum ex materia, ut in 2 De anima patet. Sed anima rationalis est hujusmodi: quia est per se sine corpore existens, ab alia anima ejusdem speciei numero distincta. Ergo, etc. Obj. 1: For everything that is a this-something in nature is composed of matter, as is clear in On the Soul 2. But the rational soul is such a thing. For it is a thing existing on its own without the body, and is distinct numerically from another soul of the same species. Therefore, and so on. Praeterea, in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, oportet materiam inveniri, cum proprietates rei a re non separentur. Sed in anima inveniuntur quaedam proprietates materiae, ut subjici, recipere, pati, et hujusmodi. Ergo videtur quod sit ex materia composita. Obj. 2: Furthermore, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter must be found, since the properties of a thing are not separated from the thing. But certain properties of matter are found in the soul, such as to underlie, to receive, to undergo, and things of this sort. Therefore, it seems that the soul is composed of matter.