Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum anima humana sit constituta ex aliqua materia Whether the human soul is constituted of any matter Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima ex aliqua materia constituta sit. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the soul is constituted of some matter. Omne enim quod est hoc aliquid in natura, est compositum ex materia, ut in 2 De anima patet. Sed anima rationalis est hujusmodi: quia est per se sine corpore existens, ab alia anima ejusdem speciei numero distincta. Ergo, etc. Obj. 1: For everything that is a this-something in nature is composed of matter, as is clear in On the Soul 2. But the rational soul is such a thing. For it is a thing existing on its own without the body, and is distinct numerically from another soul of the same species. Therefore, and so on. Praeterea, in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, oportet materiam inveniri, cum proprietates rei a re non separentur. Sed in anima inveniuntur quaedam proprietates materiae, ut subjici, recipere, pati, et hujusmodi. Ergo videtur quod sit ex materia composita. Obj. 2: Furthermore, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter must be found, since the properties of a thing are not separated from the thing. But certain properties of matter are found in the soul, such as to underlie, to receive, to undergo, and things of this sort. Therefore, it seems that the soul is composed of matter. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in 2 Metaph., necesse est imaginari materiam in re mota. Sed animae mutabilitas ostenditur ex hoc quod vitiis et fallaciis deformis redditur; formatur autem virtutibus veritatisque doctrina, secundum Augustinum, 7 Super Genes. ad litt., cap. 6. Ergo in anima est materia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 2, it is necessary to imagine matter in a thing that is moved. But the mutability of the soul is shown from the fact that it becomes deformed by vices and fallacies, whereas it is formed by virtues and learning the truth, according to Augustine. Therefore, there is matter in the soul. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in 8 Metaph., nullius agentis actio terminatur nisi ad compositum. Sed actio creantis Dei terminatur ad animam, quam in esse producit. Ergo est ex materia et forma composita. Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 8, no agent’s action is terminated except in a composite. But God’s creative action is terminated in the soul, which he brings into being. Therefore, it is composed of matter and form. Praeterea, nihil vivit seipso nisi Deus. Sed anima non tantum vivificat corpus, sed etiam vivit. Ergo seipsa non vivit, sed aliquo sui. Sed omne illud in quo est principium vitae et recipiens vitam, est ex materia et forma compositum. Ergo, etc. Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing lives by itself except God. But the soul not only gives life to the body but also lives. Therefore, it lives not by itself, but by something belonging to it. But everything in which there is a principle of life and something that receives life is composed of matter and form. Therefore, and so on. Praeterea, in omni creato differt quod operatur et quo operatur: quia solum primo agenti convenit per essentiam agere; aliis autem per participationem alicujus quod ad essentiam additur. Sed anima habet operationes proprias, et sic illis operationibus ipsa est operans. Ergo non est quo operatur: et sic non videtur esse forma simplex, sed materiam habens: quia forma est principium quo operatio producitur. Obj. 6: Furthermore, in every created thing, what works and that by which it works differ. For it belongs only to the first agent to act by its essence, whereas others act by participation in something that is added to the essence. But the soul has proper activities, and so it is the thing that works by these activities. Therefore, it is not that by which it works. Thus, it does not seem to be a simple form, but rather one possessing matter. For form is the principle by which an activity is produced. Sed contra, quanto aliquid est propinquius uni primo et simplici, tanto magis est unum et simplex, ut in lib. De causis dicitur. Sed inter formas naturales anima Deo est propinquior. Ergo cum aliae formae sint simplices, multo fortius anima. On the contrary, the closer something is to the one first and simple being, the more it is one and simple, as is said in the Book of Causes. But among natural forms, the soul is closer to God. Therefore, since other forms are simple, all the more so is the soul. Praeterea, formae substantialis non est forma substantialis, sicut nec qualitatis qualitas. Sed omne quod habet materiam habet etiam substantialem formam dantem esse materiae. Cum ergo anima sit forma substantialis, videtur quod ex materia composita non sit. Furthermore, there is not a substantial form of a substantial form, just as there is not a quality of a quality. But everything that has matter also has a substantial form giving being to the matter. Therefore, since the soul is a substantial form, it seems that it is not composed of matter. Praeterea, Augustinus, 7 Super Genes. ad litt., cap. 6, deducendo per singula, ostendit animam ex materia non esse factam. Non enim potest facta fuisse ex materia spirituali rationali. Quia si natura rationalis ex qua fit, beata fuisset, non in pejus immutata esset, quia materia, cum formatur a Deo, in melius formatur. Si vero misera fuit, oportet quod praecesserit culpa; quod est contra Apostolum, Roman. 9:11: cum nondum aliquid boni egissent aut mali, etc. Si autem nec beata nec misera, tunc usum rationis nondum habebat, sicut in pueritia contingit, et sic otiosa erat. Furthermore, Augustine, by considering all the individual possibilities, shows that the soul is not made from matter. For it could not have been made from rational spiritual matter, since if the rational nature from which it is made had been blessed, it would not have been changed for the worse, because matter, when it is formed by God, is formed for the better. But if it was wretched, then a fault would have had to precede, which is contrary to the Apostle: when they had not yet done any good or evil, etc. (Rom 9:11). But if it was neither blessed nor wretched, then it did not yet have the use of reason, as occurs in childhood, and so was inactive. Similiter nec ex materia spirituali irrationali: quia hoc esset propinquum opinioni quae ponit animarum de corpore in corpus transitum, et pejus adhuc, quia illa positio non dicit animam bestiae in hominem transire, sed e converso. Likewise, it could not have been made from irrational spiritual matter. For this would be close to the opinion that posits the passage of souls from body to body—and worse still, since this position does not say that the soul of a beast passes into a man, but rather the converse. Similiter nec ex materia corporali: non enim ex eodem facta est anima ex quo facta est caro. Et praeterea, cum anima aliquid intelligit, ab omnibus corporalibus se retrahit: quod non contingeret, si de natura corporis esset. Likewise, it could not have been made from bodily matter. For the soul was not made from the same thing as that from which the flesh was made. Moreover, when the soul understands something, it withdraws itself from all bodily conditions, which would not occur if it had the nature of a body. Sed ex omnibus praedictis sic potest argui. Omne quod habet materiam, secundum Augustinum, dicitur ex materia factum, quamvis materia tempore non praecesserit. Si ergo anima non potest dici facta ex materia, ut probatum est, anima materiam non habet. Now from all the aforementioned the following argument can be made. Everything that has matter, according to Augustine, is said to be made from matter, even if matter did not precede it in time. Therefore, if the soul cannot be said to be made from matter, as has been proved, then the soul does not have matter. Respondeo dicendum, quod mihi non videtur in anima vel in aliqua spirituali substantia aliquo modo esse materiam; sed ipsas esse simplices formas et naturas, quamvis quidam aliter dicant. Et praeter alias rationes quibus hoc de angelis impossibile videtur, ut supra, distinct. 4, dictum est, etiam quadam speciali ratione materia a ratione animae secluditur; I answer that it does not seem to me that there is matter in the soul or in any spiritual substance in any way. Rather, it seems they are simple forms and natures, even though some say otherwise. Besides the other reasons for which this seems impossible in the case of the angels, as has been said above, matter is also excluded from the account of the soul for a special reason. cum enim anima sit forma corporis, oportet quod vel secundum totam essentiam suam sit corporis forma, vel secundum partem essentiae suae. Si secundum essentiam suam totam, impossibile est quod pars essentiae suae sit materia: quia id quod in se est potentia pura, non potest esse forma vel actus alicujus; omnis autem potentia in genere substantiae est potentia pura, quia est immediatum subjectum substantialis formae et generationis, ut in 1 De gener. dicitur. For since the soul is the form of the body, it must be the form of the body either with respect to its whole essence or with respect to part of its essence. If it is with respect to its whole essence, then it is impossible that part of its essence is matter. For that which in itself is pure potency cannot be the form or act of something. But every potency in the genus of substance is pure potency, since it is the immediate subject of substantial form and generation, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1. Si autem secundum partem substantiae suae est forma corporis, per quam est in actu, et non secundum alteram quae est materia ejus, sequuntur duo inconvenientia. Unum est quod unus actus numero est forma diversarum materiarum, scilicet materiae corporalis et materiae spiritualis, ex qua essentia animae constituitur. Aliud est quod in potentiis non unius generis est unus actus perficiens; corporalis enim materia et spiritualis non possunt esse unius rationis. Et praeterea illud tantum quod est actus corporis viventis, animam vocamus. Ex simili ratione Avicenna ostendit, in sua Metaph., tract. 9, cap. 4, intelligentias esse simplices. However, if it is with respect to one part of its substance that it is the form of the body, through which it exists actually, and not with respect to another part that is its matter, then two unsuitable consequences follow. One is that one act numerically is the form of different matters, namely, bodily matter and spiritual matter, of which the essence of the soul is constituted. The other is that there is a single perfecting act of potencies that do not belong to a single genus. For bodily matter and spiritual matter cannot have a single account. And, moreover, only what is the act of a living body is that which we call a soul. By a similar argument, Avicenna shows in his Metaphysics that the intelligences are simple. Nec tamen negamus animam rationalem quemdam modum compositionis habere, scilicet ex esse et quod est, ut supra, dist. 3 De angelis, et in 1, dist. 8, de ipsa anima expositum est, qui tamen compositionis modus in aliis formis non invenitur, quia non possunt esse subsistentes quasi in esse suo, sed in esse compositi: et in hoc anima deficit a simplicitate divina. Hoc etiam, in 1, dist. 8, plenius expositum est. Despite all this, we do not deny that the rational soul has a certain kind of composition, namely, the composition of being and what-is, as has been explained above regarding the angels and regarding the soul itself—which mode of composition is, nonetheless, not found in other forms, because they cannot be subsistent as if in their own being, but rather exist through the being of the composite. In this the soul falls short of the divine simplicity. This, too, has been more fully explained. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc aliquid in natura potest dici ex duobus. Aut ex eo quod habet esse subsistens in natura, et sic anima rationalis est hoc aliquid. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod ex materia componatur: hoc enim subsistenti accidit, scilicet ex materia componi. Alio modo potest dici hoc aliquid per hoc quod aliquid quod est pars essentiae suae, individuatur: et sic anima non est hoc aliquid; principium enim individuationis animarum est ex parte corporis, et tamen etiam post separationem corporis remanent individuatae et distinctae, ut in 1 lib. dictum est, dist. 8: et sic accipit Philosophus hoc aliquid in 2 De anima; unde ibi expresse negat animam esse hoc aliquid. Reply Obj. 1: One can speak of a this-something in nature on the basis of two things. One way is because it has being subsisting in a nature, and in this way, the rational soul is a this-something. But it does not follow that it is composed of matter, for to be composed of matter is incidental to what subsists. The other way in which one can speak of a given something is through the fact of a part of its essence being individuated. In this way, the soul is not a this-something, for the principle of individuation for souls is on the side of the body, and yet even after separation from the body they remain individuated and distinct, as has been said. This is the way the Philosopher takes a “this-something” in On the Soul 2. Hence there he expressly denies that the soul is a this-something. Ad secundum dicendum, quod pati et recipere, et omnia hujusmodi, dicuntur de anima et de rebus materialibus aequivoce, ut patet ex Philosopho, in 3 De anima, et ex Commentatore ibidem: unde non oportet quod materia in anima inveniatur; sed sufficit quod sit ibi aliqua potentialitas. Qualis autem illa sit, supra, dist. 3 De angelis, dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: To undergo, to receive, and all such things are said of the soul and of material things equivocally, as is clear from the Philosopher in On the Soul 3 and from the Commentator on the same passage. Hence it is not necessary for matter to be found in the soul. Rather, it suffices that there be some potentiality there. But what sort it is has been said above in the discussion on the angels. Ad tertium dicendum, quod non requiritur materia ejusdem rationis ad omnes motus: quia ad motum localem non requiritur materia quae sit in potentia ad esse, sed solum quae est in potentia ad ubi. Similiter etiam ad variationem quae est de vitio ad virtutem, vel e converso, non requiritur materia quae sit in potentia ad esse, quasi pars essentiae ipsius mobilis; sed requiritur materia tantum quae sit in potentia ad virtutem, et haec est ipsa substantia animae. Reply Obj. 3: Matter of the same account is not required for all motions. Local motion does not require matter in potency with regard to being, but only matter in potency with regard to place. Likewise, a change from vice to virtue or vice versa does not require matter that is in potency with regard to being as part of the essence of the movable thing itself. Rather, it only requires matter that is in potency with regard to virtue, and this is the very substance of the soul. Ad quartum dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de agente naturali, quod ex materia operatur, ut rationes suae ostendunt, quae ex hoc principio procedunt quod in omni factione oportet esse tria, scilicet ex quo fit, et id in quod factio terminatur, et ipsum faciens: et ex hoc concludit quod fieri non est formarum nisi per accidens. Ista autem principia non concedimus in actione divina per quam animam creat; et ideo non oportet animam, vel aliam substantiam spiritualem a Deo creatam ex materia compositam esse: quia etiam secundum Avicennam, Metaph., tract. 9, cap. 1 et 4, agens divinum non agit per motum ut materiam exigat. Commentator etiam dicit in 11 Metaph., quod actio aequivoce dicitur de actione qua Deus agit, et de actione naturali. Reply Obj. 4: The Philosopher is speaking of a natural agent that works with matter, as his arguments show, since they proceed from the principle that in every bringing-into-being there must be three things: that from which something comes to be, that in which the bringing-into-being is terminated, and that which brings into being. From this he concludes that coming-into-being belongs to forms only incidentally. But we do not concede these principles in the case of the divine action by which God creates the soul. Thus, it is not necessary for the soul or another spiritual substance created by God to be composed of matter. For, according to Avicenna, too, the divine agent does not act through motion in such a way that it needs matter. The Commentator also says on the Metaphysics 11 that action is said equivocally of the action by which God acts and of natural action. Ad quintum dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum, in 2 De anima, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse viventium: unde sicut anima rationalis est, nec est illud quo est: ita etiam vivit, nec est illud quo vivit. Sed sicut illud quo est formaliter, non est aliqua forma quae sit pars essentiae ejus, sed ipsum suum esse; ita id quo vivit formaliter, non est aliqua forma quae sit pars essentiae ejus, sed ipsum suum vivere. Sed id quo est et quo vivit effective, est ipse Deus, qui omnibus esse et vitam influit: in rebus quidem compositis mediante forma, quae est pars essentiae earum, in substantiis autem simplicibus per totam essentiam earum. Deus autem non est nec vivit ab aliquo efficiente principio; sed ipse etiam est suum vivere et suum esse: et in utroque horum deficit anima a perfectione divinae vitae. Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher in On the Soul 2, to live is nothing other than the being of living things. Hence just as the rational soul exists, but is not that by which it exists, so also it lives, but is not that by which it lives. Now, just as that by which it exists formally is not a form that is part of its essence, but rather its very being, so also that by which it lives formally is not a form that is part of its essence, but rather its very living. But that by which it exists and by which it lives efficiently is God himself, who infuses being and life. He does this in composite things by the mediation of form, which is part of their essence, whereas in simple substances he does this through their whole essence. But God neither exists nor lives from an efficient principle. Rather, he himself is also his own living and his own being. In both respects the soul falls short of the perfection of the divine life. Ad sextum dicendum, quod illud quo operatur anima, dupliciter acceptum differt ab ipsa. Operatur enim anima aliquo influente sibi esse, vivere et operari, scilicet Deo, qui operatur omnia in omnibus; quae constat ab anima differre. Operatur etiam naturali sua potentia, quae est principium suae operationis, scilicet sensu vel intellectu: quae non est essentia ejus, sed virtus ab essentia fluens. Neutro autem modo Deus operatur alio a se, quia a seipso operari habet, et ipse est sua virtus. Non autem dicitur anima operari aliquo quod non sit ipsa, sed pars essentiae suae, sicut corpora naturalia operantur forma quae est pars essentiae eorum, licet mediante aliqua virtute quasi instrumento, sicut ignis mediante calore. Reply Obj. 6: That by which the soul works, taken in either of two ways, differs from it. For the soul works by another’s infusing into it being, living, and working—namely, God, who works all things in all. These things obviously differ from the soul. It also works by its own natural power, which is the principle of its activity, namely, by the senses and the intellect. This is not its essence, but rather a power flowing from the essence. But in neither way does God work by something other than himself, since he has his activity from himself and is himself his own power. But the soul is not said to work by something that is not itself, but is a part of its essence, as natural bodies work by a form that is part of their essence, granted that this is by the mediation of a power as a kind of instrument, as fire works by the mediation of heat. Quaestio 2 Question 2 Utrum anima extra corpus creata sit The creation of the human soul Tertio quaeritur utrum anima extra corpus creata sit; Third, the question is asked whether the soul was created outside the body. et circa hoc quaeruntur duo: Two questions are asked concerning this: Primo utrum sit una anima vel intellectus omnium hominum, quasi quaedam substantia separata in omnia corpora influens; first, whether there is a single soul or intellect of all men, as a kind of separated substance exercising an influence on all bodies; Secundo si sint plures, utrum sint in corpore, an extra corpus creatae. second, if there is more than one, whether they were created in the body or outside the body. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum anima rationalis vel intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus Whether the rational soul or intellect is numerically one in all men Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis vel intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the rational soul or the intellect is numerically one in all men. Nulla enim forma multiplicatur secundum esse ad divisionem materiae, nisi forma materialis. Sed intellectus, ut in 3 De anima, probatur, non est forma materialis, cum non sit actus corporis cujusdam: quod ex ipso suo actu probatur, quia cognoscit omnes formas materiales; quod non posset esse, si aliquam earum haberet in natura sua, vel determinaretur ad eam ex corpore cujus esset actus: sicut virtus visiva non cognosceret omnes colores, si pupilla, quae est organum ejus, haberet determinatum colorem. Ergo intellectus non multiplicatur secundum esse ad divisionem materiae; et ita manet unus in omnibus individuis humanae speciei, qui non nisi per materiam dividuntur. Obj. 1: For no form is multiplied in being on the basis of the division of matter except a material form. But the intellect, as is proved in On the Soul 3, is not a material form, since it is not the act of a body. This is proved from its very act, since it knows all material forms, which could not be the case if it had one of them in its own nature or were determined to it from the body whose act it were, just as the power of sight would not know all colors if the pupil, which is its organ, had a determinate color. Therefore, the intellect is not multiplied in being on the basis of the division of matter. Thus, it remains one in all individuals of the human species, which are only divided through matter. Praeterea, impossibile est quod principium sit materialius quam principiatum, quia principium oportet esse simplicius. Sed, sicut ab omnibus conceditur, aliquae sunt potentiae animae rationalis quae non sunt actus corporis cujusdam, nec organis affixae, cujus principium et radix est ipsa essentia animae. Ergo videtur quod nec ipsa anima rationalis corpori uniatur per essentiam suam sicut actus ejus; et ita sequitur, ut videtur, quod ad divisionem corporum, anima rationalis non distinguatur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is impossible for the principle to be more material than what flows from the principle, since the principle must be more simple. But, as everyone concedes, there are some powers of the rational soul that are not acts of a body and are not connected to organs, and the principle and root of these powers is the very essence of the soul. Therefore, it seems that neither is the rational soul itself in its essence united to the body as its act. Thus, it seems to follow that the rational soul is not distinguished on the basis of the division of bodies.