Quaestio 2 Question 2 Utrum anima extra corpus creata sit The creation of the human soul Tertio quaeritur utrum anima extra corpus creata sit; Third, the question is asked whether the soul was created outside the body. et circa hoc quaeruntur duo: Two questions are asked concerning this: Primo utrum sit una anima vel intellectus omnium hominum, quasi quaedam substantia separata in omnia corpora influens; first, whether there is a single soul or intellect of all men, as a kind of separated substance exercising an influence on all bodies; Secundo si sint plures, utrum sint in corpore, an extra corpus creatae. second, if there is more than one, whether they were created in the body or outside the body. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum anima rationalis vel intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus Whether the rational soul or intellect is numerically one in all men Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis vel intellectus sit unus numero in omnibus hominibus. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the rational soul or the intellect is numerically one in all men. Nulla enim forma multiplicatur secundum esse ad divisionem materiae, nisi forma materialis. Sed intellectus, ut in 3 De anima, probatur, non est forma materialis, cum non sit actus corporis cujusdam: quod ex ipso suo actu probatur, quia cognoscit omnes formas materiales; quod non posset esse, si aliquam earum haberet in natura sua, vel determinaretur ad eam ex corpore cujus esset actus: sicut virtus visiva non cognosceret omnes colores, si pupilla, quae est organum ejus, haberet determinatum colorem. Ergo intellectus non multiplicatur secundum esse ad divisionem materiae; et ita manet unus in omnibus individuis humanae speciei, qui non nisi per materiam dividuntur. Obj. 1: For no form is multiplied in being on the basis of the division of matter except a material form. But the intellect, as is proved in On the Soul 3, is not a material form, since it is not the act of a body. This is proved from its very act, since it knows all material forms, which could not be the case if it had one of them in its own nature or were determined to it from the body whose act it were, just as the power of sight would not know all colors if the pupil, which is its organ, had a determinate color. Therefore, the intellect is not multiplied in being on the basis of the division of matter. Thus, it remains one in all individuals of the human species, which are only divided through matter. Praeterea, impossibile est quod principium sit materialius quam principiatum, quia principium oportet esse simplicius. Sed, sicut ab omnibus conceditur, aliquae sunt potentiae animae rationalis quae non sunt actus corporis cujusdam, nec organis affixae, cujus principium et radix est ipsa essentia animae. Ergo videtur quod nec ipsa anima rationalis corpori uniatur per essentiam suam sicut actus ejus; et ita sequitur, ut videtur, quod ad divisionem corporum, anima rationalis non distinguatur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is impossible for the principle to be more material than what flows from the principle, since the principle must be more simple. But, as everyone concedes, there are some powers of the rational soul that are not acts of a body and are not connected to organs, and the principle and root of these powers is the very essence of the soul. Therefore, it seems that neither is the rational soul itself in its essence united to the body as its act. Thus, it seems to follow that the rational soul is not distinguished on the basis of the division of bodies. Praeterea, omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis, et non per modum sui, ut ex Dionysio et ex lib. De causis habetur. Si ergo intellectus individuetur ad divisionem corporis, ut sit alius diversorum, oportet quod formae intellectuales in eo receptae, etiam sint individuatae: ex quo videntur sequi duo inconvenientia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is received in another is received in it after the mode of the receiver and not after its own mode, as we find in Dionysius and the Book of Causes. Therefore, if the intellect is individuated on the basis of the division of the body such that there would be a different one for different bodies, then the intellectual forms received in it would also have to be individuated. But from this there seem to follow two unsuitable consequences. Unum est, cum nullum particulare sit intellectum in actu, sed in potentia, quod hujusmodi species non erunt intelligibiles in actu, sed indigebunt intelligi per alias species, et sic in infinitum procedetur. One is that, since no particular is understood actually, but rather potentially, species of this sort will not be intelligible actually, but they will stand in need of being understood through other species, leading to an infinite regress. Aliud est quod erit idem modus recipiendi formas in materia prima et in intellectu possibili, quia utrobique recipiuntur ut sunt istae, et non ut sunt formae simpliciter: et ita, sicut materia prima non cognoscit formas quas recipit, ita nec intellectus possibilis, ut videtur. The other is that there will be the same mode of receiving forms in prime matter and in the potential intellect, since in either case they are received as these forms and not as forms simply. Thus, just as prime matter does not know the forms it receives, so it seems neither will the potential intellect be knowable through the forms it receives. Praeterea, quaecumque distinguuntur ad invicem, oportet quod aliquid diversum sit in natura utriusque. Sed cum intellectus nihil sit eorum quae sunt ante intelligere, videtur quod non sit aliquid diversum invenire in eo nisi secundum diversitatem specierum intellectarum. Ergo non differunt intellectus istius et illius per essentiam, sed per species intellectus tantum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are distinguished from each other must have something in the nature of each that is different. But since the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them, it seems that we can find something different in it only according to a diversity of the species being understood. Therefore, the intellect of this and that person do not differ essentially, but only through the intellect’s species. Praeterea, in omnibus substantiis per se existentibus et immaterialibus diversitas secundum numerum redundat in diversitatem speciei: quia si habent esse suum absolutum subsistens, non possunt distingui essentialiter per aliquid quod sit extra essentiam earum, super quod deferantur, sicut formae corporales super materiam delatae. In essentia autem earum non nisi forma, cujus diversitas diversitatem speciei inducit. Sed non est dicere quod intellectus diversorum hominum differant secundum speciem, quia et ipsi homines specie differrent ad diversitatem suarum formarum. Ergo cum anima rationalis sit substantia in se subsistens, alias post corpus non maneret, et etiam sit immaterialis, videtur quod nec etiam numero in diversis hominibus differat. Obj. 5: Furthermore, in all substances that exist by themselves and are immaterial, numerical differentiation results in differentiation of species. For if they have their own absolute subsisting being, they cannot be distinguished essentially through something that is outside their essence on which they are overlaid, as bodily forms are overlaid on matter. However, in their essence there is only form, the diversity of which leads to differentiation of the species. But we cannot say that the intellects of different men differ specifically, because then men themselves would differ in species on the basis of the differences of their forms. Therefore, since the rational soul is a substance subsisting in itself (otherwise it would not remain after the body) and is immaterial, it seems that it does not differ even numerically in different men. Sed contra est, quod impossibile est plurium individuorum esse unam formam numero. Sed anima rationalis est forma cujuslibet hominis: si enim homo haberet esse a substantia sensitivae animae vel nutritivae, non posset in homine inveniri quantum ad suum esse primum unde animalia excederet; quod est inconveniens. Ergo impossibile est unam esse animam rationalem omnium. On the contrary, it is impossible for more than one individual to have a single form numerically. But the rational soul is the form of a given man. For if man had being from the substance of a sensitive or nutritive soul, then nothing could be found in man with regard to his primary being whereby he would surpass the animals, which is unfitting. Therefore, it is impossible that there is only a single rational soul of all men. Praeterea, impossibile est inveniri diversitatem quoad esse secundum in illis quorum nulla est diversitas quoad esse primum: quia diversitas secundarum perfectionum et contrarietas non potest esse simul cum unitate perfectionis primae, quia sic contraria essent in eodem. Sed nos invenimus perfectiones ultimas quantum ad esse secundum, esse in diversis hominibus diversas et contrarias; quorum quidam sunt stulti et quidam sapientes, et quidam vitiosi et quidam virtuosi. Ergo oportet primam perfectionem, scilicet animam, quantum ad esse primum, in diversis variari. Furthermore, it is impossible for differences regarding secondary being to be found in things that have no differences regarding primary being. For differentiation of secondary perfections and contrariety cannot exist simultaneously with unity of primary perfection, since then there would be contraries in the same thing. But we find that the last perfections with regard to secondary being are different and contrary in different men, of whom some are foolish and some wise, some are vicious and some virtuous. Therefore, the primary perfection, namely, the soul, must be varied in different individuals with regard to primary being. Praeterea, anima est forma corporis et motor. Sed in corporibus caelestibus, secundum positionem philosophorum, diversis corporibus assignantur diversi motores. Ergo videtur quod multo fortius in diversis hominibus sint diversae animae. Furthermore, the soul is the form of the body and its mover. But in the heavenly bodies, according to the position of philosophers, different movers are assigned to different bodies. Therefore, it seems that all the more are there different souls in different men. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa unitatem et diversitatem animae rationalis sunt plures philosophorum opiniones, praetermissis illis qui ponunt intellectum esse unum in tota natura intellectuali, vel qui ponunt intellectum esse idem quod divina essentia. I answer that there are several opinions among philosophers concerning the unity and differentiation of the rational soul, even setting aside those who posit that there is a single intellect in all of intellectual nature, or those who posit that the intellect is the same thing as the divine essence. Ad quarum intellectum oportet intelligere, quod distinguitur secundum philosophos triplex intellectus: scilicet intellectus possibilis, intellectus agens et intellectus in habitu: et dicitur intellectus possibilis qui est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes formas intellectas, sicut oculus est in potentia ad recipiendum omnes colores; intellectus autem agens dicitur qui facit intelligibilia in potentia esse in actu, sicut lumen quod facit colores in potentia visibiles, esse actu visibiles; intellectus autem in habitu vel formalis ab eis dicitur quando intellectus possibilis jam perfectus est specie intelligibili, ut operari possit: nulla enim potentia passiva habet operationem nisi per speciem objecti sui perfecta fuerit, sicut visus non videt antequam recipiat speciem coloris. To understand these positions, we have to understand that philosophers distinguish “intellect” into three types: there is the potential intellect, the agent intellect, and the intellect in habit. The intellect which can potentially receive all intelligible forms is called the “potential intellect.” It is like the eye, which can potentially receive all colors. The intellect that actualizes potentially intelligible things is called the “agent intellect.” It is like light, which makes potentially visible colors actually visible. Finally, they refer to the “habitual” or “formal” intellect when the potential intellect is already perfected by an intelligible species such that it is able to work. For no passive potency has an activity unless it has been perfected through the species of its object, just as sight does not see before it receives the species of color. His ergo visis, sciendum est quod in hoc fere omnes philosophi concordant post Aristotelem, 3 De anima, quod intellectus agens et possibilis differunt secundum substantiam, et quod intellectus agens sit substantia quaedam separata, et postrema in intelligentiis separatis, et ita se habet ad intellectum possibilem quo intelligimus, sicut intelligentiae superiores ad animas orbium. Therefore, with these things in mind, one should know that in this matter nearly all philosophers after Aristotle agree that the agent and potential intellects differ substantially, and that the agent intellect is a certain separated substance, the last among the separated intelligences, and stands to the potential intellect whereby we understand just as the higher intelligences stand to the souls of the heavenly spheres. Sed hoc secundum fidem non potest sustineri. Si enim, ut Anselmus probat, lib. 1 Cur Deus homo, cap. 5, reparationem hominis per angelum Deus fieri noluit, ne paritas hominis et angeli in gloria tolleretur, dum angelus homini fieret causa salutis; similiter si poneretur anima nostra secundum naturalem operationem dependere ab aliqua intelligentia vel angelo, non posset rationabiliter sustineri, quod anima angelis par sit in gloria futura, quia ultima perfectio uniuscujusque substantiae est in complemento suae operationis: et ideo uniri cum intelligentia agente ponunt praedicti philosophi ultimam felicitatem hominis. Et ideo quidam Catholici doctores, corrigentes hanc opinionem et partim sequentes, satis probabiliter posuerunt ipsum Deum esse intellectum agentem; quia per applicationem ad ipsum, anima nostra beata est: et hoc confirmant per hoc quod dicitur Joan. 1:9: erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. But this cannot be maintained, according to the faith. For if, as Anselm proves, God did not will that the reparation of man take place through an angel, lest the parity of man and angels in glory be taken away—since then an angel would become the cause of salvation for man. Likewise, if we posit that our soul in its natural activity depends on another intelligence or an angel, then we could not reasonably maintain that the soul is equal to the angels in future glory; for the ultimate perfection of each substance lies in the completion of its activity. Thus, the aforementioned philosophers posit that the ultimate happiness of man is union with the agent intelligence. Therefore, some Catholic doctors, partially correcting and partially following this opinion, have posited with sufficient probability that God himself is the agent intellect, since our soul is blessed through attachment to him. They confirm this through what John 1:9 says, the true light that enlightens every man was coming into the world. De intellectu autem possibili similiter fuit magna diversitas inter philosophos sequentes Aristotelem. Quidam enim dixerunt intellectum possibilem esse diversum in diversis; quidam vero esse unum in omnibus. Moreover there was likewise a great diversity among the philosophers following Aristotle concerning the potential intellect. For some said that the potential intellect is different in different individuals, while others said that it is one in all individuals. Eorum autem qui posuerunt eum diversum esse in diversis, sunt tres opiniones. Among those who posited that it is different in different individuals, there are three opinions. Quidam enim dicunt intellectum possibilem nihil aliud esse quam praeparationem quae est in natura humana ad recipiendam impressionem intellectus agentis; et hanc esse virtutem corporalem consequentem complexionem humanam: et haec fuit opinio Alexandri. Some say that the potential intellect is nothing other than human nature’s preparation to receive an impression of the agent intellect, and that this is a bodily power of man’s constitution. This was Alexander’s opinion. Sed hoc non potest stare etiam secundum intentionem Aristotelis, 3 De anima, qui vult quod intellectus possibilis sit receptivus specierum intelligibilium. Praeparatio autem non est receptiva, sed magis praeparativa: praeparatum autem hac praeparatione est corpus, vel virtus in corpore: et ita illud quod recipit formas intelligibiles esset corpus, vel virtus in corpore: quod Philosophus improbat. But this cannot stand even according to the intention of Aristotle, who is of the opinion that the potential intellect is receptive of intelligible species. Moreover, preparation is not receptive; rather, it is preparatory, and what is prepared by this preparation is the body or a power in the body. Thus, that which receives intelligible forms would be the body or a power in the body, which the Philosopher disproves. Praeterea sequeretur quod intellectus possibilis non esset virtus cognoscitiva. Nulla enim virtus causata ex commixtione elementorum est cognoscitiva: quia sic qualitas elementorum ageret ultra suam speciem, quod est impossibile. Moreover, it would follow that the potential intellect is not a cognitive power. For no power caused by the combining of elements is cognitive, since in this case the quality of the elements would act beyond its species, which is impossible. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod intellectus possibilis nihil aliud est quam virtus imaginativa, secundum quod est nata ut sint in ea formae quae fuerunt intellectae in actu; et haec est opinio Avempace. Thus, others have said that the potential intellect is nothing other than the imaginative power insofar as it is naturally receptive of forms that have been actually understood. This is Avempace’s opinion. Sed hoc etiam est impossibile: quia, secundum Philosophum, in 3 De anima, phantasmata quae sunt in imaginativa, se habent ad intellectum humanum sicut colores ad visum: et ideo oportet quod phantasmata sint moventia intellectum possibilem, sicut color movet visum: unde aptitudo quae est in intellectu possibili ad intelligendum, est similis aptitudini quae est in patiente in potentia, ut sit patiens in actu: aptitudo autem quae est in imaginativa est sicut aptitudo agentis in potentia, ut sit agens in actu. Impossibile autem est quod idem sit movens et motum, et agens et patiens. Ergo impossibile est quod virtus imaginativa sit intellectus possibilis. But this, too, is impossible. For, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 3, phantasms that are in the imaginative power are related to the human intellect as colors are to sight. Thus, phantasms must be movers of the potential intellect, just as color moves sight. Hence the aptitude that is in the potential intellect for understanding is like the aptitude that is in a potential patient to be a patient actually. But the aptitude that is in the imaginative power is like the aptitude of a potential agent to be an agent actually. But it is impossible that the same thing be both mover and moved, agent and patient. Therefore, it is impossible that the imaginative power be the potential intellect. Praeterea, adhuc sequeretur quod virtus recipiens intelligibilia in actu, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, esset utens organo corporali, cum virtus imaginativa habeat determinatum organum. Besides, it would still follow that the power that receives intelligible things actually, which is called the “potential intellect,” would be using a bodily organ, since the imaginative power has a determinate organ. Sciendum est etiam quod, secundum has opiniones, intellectus possibilis generatur generato corpore, et corrumpitur corrupto corpore: et cum non sit differentia intellectus in diversis hominibus nisi intellectus possibilis, quia agens est unus, sequeretur quod illud quod remanet de intellectu ex omnibus hominibus post mortem, esset unum numero, scilicet intellectus agens; et hoc est valde haereticum, quia sic tolleretur retributio meritorum post mortem. As well, it should be known that, according to these opinions, the potential intellect is generated when the body is generated and corrupted when the body is corrupted. Since there is no difference of intellect in different men except the potential intellect, given that the agent intellect is one, it would follow that what remains of the intellect from all men after death would be one numerically, namely, the agent intellect. This is exceedingly heretical, since it would do away with all recompense for merits after death. Et ideo tertia opinio est Avicennae, Tract. de anima, cap. 7, qui ponit intellectum possibilem in diversis diversum, fundatum in essentia animae rationalis, et non esse virtutem corporalem, et cum corpore incipere, sed non cum corpore finiri. Unde quantum ad intellectum possibilem, ejus opinio est quam tenemus secundum fidem Catholicam, quamvis erret cum aliis de intellectu agente, ut dictum est. Thus, the third opinion is that of Avicenna, who posits that the potential intellect is different in different individuals, founded in the essence of the rational soul, and that it is not a bodily power, and that it begins with the body but is not ended with the body. Hence, with regard to the potential intellect, his opinion is what we hold according to the Catholic faith, even though he errs with the others concerning the agent intellect, as has been said. Eorum autem qui ponunt unum intellectum possibilem in omnibus, duplex est opinio. Una est Themistii et Theophrasti, ut Commentator eis imponit in 3 De anima. Dicunt enim, quod intellectus in habitu, qui est tertius, est unus in omnibus et aeternus, et est quasi compositus ex intellectu agente et possibili, ita quod intellectus agens est sicut forma ejus, et per continuationem intellectus possibilis continuatur etiam in nobis intellectus agens; ita quod intellectus agens est de substantia intellectus speculativi, qui etiam dicitur intellectus in habitu, per quem intelligimus: et hujusmodi signum inducunt, quia illa actio intellectus quae est in potestate nostra pertinet ad intellectum in habitu. Cum ergo abstrahere species a phantasmatibus sit in potestate nostra, oportet quod intellectus agens sit intellectus in habitu sicut forma ejus. Now, in the case of those who posit a single potential intellect in all, there are two opinions. One is that of Themistius and Theophrastus, as attributed to them by the Commentator, commenting on On the Soul 3. For they say that the habitual intellect, which is the third, is one in all, eternal, and is, as it were, a composite of the agent and potential intellect in such a way that the agent intellect is as its form and so, through its connection with the potential intellect, the agent intellect is also connected with us. Thus, the agent intellect is of the substance of the speculative intellect, which is also called the “habitual intellect,” through which we understand. They cite, as a sign of such a thing, that the action of the intellect within our power pertains to the habitual intellect. Therefore, since it is in our power to abstract species from phantasms, the agent intellect must be the habitual intellect as its form. Et ad hanc positionem deducuntur qui ex demonstratione Aristotelis volunt habere, quod intellectus possibilis sit unus in omnibus: quia non est hoc aliquid nec virtus in corpore; et per consequens quod sit aeternus. Et dicunt iterum, quod intellectus agens similiter sit aeternus, et quod impossibile sit effectum esse generabilem et corruptibilem, si agens et recipiens sit aeternum. Unde posuerunt quod species intellectae sunt aeternae; et ideo non contingit quod intellectus, quandoque intelligat et quandoque non, per hoc quod fiant novae species intelligibiles quae prius non fuerunt; sed ex conjunctione intellectus agentis cum possibili, secundum quod continuatur in nobis per impressionem suam. We can include under this position those who, based on Aristotle’s demonstration, hold that the potential intellect is one in all, since it is not a this-something nor a power in the body and, consequently, is eternal. Again, they say that the agent intellect is likewise eternal and that it is impossible for an effect to be generable and corruptible if the agent and receiver are eternal. Hence they posited that species understood are eternal. Thus, the fact that the intellect sometimes understands and sometimes does not occurs because new intelligible species come to be that earlier did not exist. Rather, it occurs from the conjunction of the agent intellect with the potential as connected in us through its impression. Sed hanc opinionem Commentator improbat, ubi supra: quia sequeretur quod formae rerum naturalium quae intelliguntur essent ab aeterno sine materia, et extra animam, ex quo species illae non ponuntur in intellectu possibili ut forma ejus; quia forma intellectus possibilis ponitur ab eis intellectus agens. Sequeretur etiam, cum ultima perfectio hominis sit secundum intellectum in habitu, et prima secundum intellectum possibilem, quod homo non differret ab homine neque secundum ultimam perfectionem, neque secundum primam; et sic esset unum esse et una operatio omnium hominum, quod est impossibile. But the Commentator disproves this opinion. For it would follow that the forms of natural things that are understood would exist from eternity without matter and outside the soul, on which basis these species are not placed in the potential intellect as its form; for they posit that the form of the potential intellect is the agent intellect. It would follow, too, since the ultimate perfection of man is with respect to the habitual intellect, and the first perfection with respect to the potential intellect, that one man would not differ from another either with respect to ultimate perfection or with respect to first perfection. In this case, all men would have a single being and a single activity, which is impossible.