Sed contra: quia, ut dicit Gregorius, benedictio Dei dicitur bonorum ejus collatio et eorumdem multiplicatio. Cum ergo Deus legatur Gen. 1 sua opera benedixisse, videtur quod eis dederit virtutes quibus fieret eorum multiplicatio. Hoc autem importat ratio seminalis. Ergo rationes seminales a Deo rebus inditae sunt. On the contrary, as Gregory says, God’s blessing is said to be his conferral and multiplication of his goods. Therefore, since we read in Genesis 1:31 that God blessed his works, it seems that he gave them the powers by which they would be multiplied. But this is what “seedlike principles” implies. Therefore, seedlike principles were implanted by God in things. Praeterea, Deuter. 32:4, dicitur: Dei perfecta sunt opera. Perfectum autem unumquodque est, ut in 4 Meteor., cap. 3, dicitur, quando potest alterum tale producere quale ipsum est. Ergo virtutes quibus hoc fieri possit, rebus attributae sunt, et hae sunt rationes seminales: ergo, etc. Furthermore, Deuteronomy 32:4 says, his works are perfect. But each thing is perfect, as is said in Meteorology 4, when it can produce another of its own kind. Therefore, the powers by which this can be done have been granted to things, and these are the seedlike principles. Therefore, and so on. Respondeo dicendum, quod emanatio creaturarum a Deo est sicut exitus artificiatorum ab artifice; unde sicut ab arte artificis effluunt formae artificiales in materia, ita etiam ab ideis in mente divina existentibus fluunt omnes formae et virtutes naturales. I answer that the emanation of created things from God is like the procession of artifacts from an artisan. Hence just as artificial forms in matter flow forth from the art of an artisan, so also all natural forms and powers flow from the ideas existing in the divine mind. Sed quia, ut Dionysius dicit De div. nom., cap. 2, ea quae sunt causatorum abundanter praeinsunt causis, formae receptae in materia non adaequant virtutem vel artem increatam a qua procedunt; unde apud artificem remanet ex arte sua virtus aliquid aliter operandi circa ipsa artificiata, quibus virtus artis alligata non est, et similiter in virtute divina est ut aliquid rebus creatis addat vel mutet vel abstrahat. But because, as Dionysius says, things that are caused preexist in their causes abundantly, forms received in matter are not equal to the uncreated power or art from which they proceed. Hence from his art, an artisan still has the power to do something in some other way to what he has made, to which thing the power of his art has not been bound. Similarly, it is within God’s power to add, change, or remove something from created things. In duobus autem differt operatio Dei ab operatione artificis. However, God’s activity differs from an artisan’s activity in two ways. Primo ex parte materiae: quia cum artifex materiam non producat, sed ex materia data operetur, potentiam materiae non confert ad recipiendum formas quas materiae inducit, nec inferre in materiam potest; Deus autem, qui totius rei auctor est, non solum formas et virtutes naturales rebus contulit, sed etiam potentiam recipiendi illud quod ipse in materia facere vellet. The first way is on the part of the matter. For since an artisan does not produce matter but rather works with a given matter, he does not confer on the matter the potency to receive the forms that he introduces to the matter, nor can he put this into the matter. But God, who is the author of the entire thing, conferred not only natural forms and powers on things but also the potency for receiving that which he would make in the matter. Secundo ex parte formae: quia formae quas inducit artifex, non producunt sibi similes: quia lectus putrescens non pullulat in lectum, sed in plantam, ut ex 1 Physic. patet: formae autem naturales sibi similes producere possunt; et ideo proprietatem seminis habent, et seminales dici possunt. Formae autem rerum secundum quod in arte divina existunt primordiales esse dicuntur, eo quod ipsae sunt prima principia simpliciter rerum producendarum: potentia autem quae rebus indita est ad suscipiendum illud in se quod voluntas Dei disponit, rationes obedientiales a quibusdam dicuntur, secundum quas inest materiae ut fieri possit ex ea quod Deus vult. Ipsae autem virtutes in materia positae, per quas naturales effectus consequuntur, rationes seminales dicuntur. The second way is on the part of the form, because the forms that the artisan introduces do not reproduce themselves; for a couch that putrefies does not sprout into a couch but into a plant, as is clear from the Physics 1. But natural forms can reproduce themselves. Thus, they have the property of a seed and are called “seedlike.” Now, the forms of things as existing in the divine art are called “primordial” because they are, simply speaking, the first principles of things to be produced. The potency that has been implanted in things for receiving into themselves that which the will of God decrees is called “obediential principles” by some, based on which matter has the ability to become what God wills it to be. Finally, the actual powers placed in matter, which give rise to natural effects, are called “seedlike principles.” Sed quid sint secundum rem seminales rationes, a diversis diversimode assignatur. Quidam enim dicunt quod forma speciei non recipitur in materia nisi mediante forma generis; adeo quod est alia forma numero per quam ignis est ignis, et per quam ignis est corpus. Illa ergo forma generalis incompleta ratio seminalis dicitur: quia propter talem formam inest materiae quaedam inclinatio ad recipiendum formas specificas. Hoc autem non videtur esse verum: quia omnis forma quae advenit post aliquod esse substantiale est forma accidentalis. Si enim post esse in genere substantiae constitutum advenit, ergo, ea recedente, adhuc remanet individuum in genere substantiae; quod est contra rationem formae substantialis, sicut dicitur in 2 De anima. Et praeterea, cum omnis forma det aliquod esse, et impossibile sit unam rem habere duplex esse substantiale, oportet, si prima forma substantialis adveniens materiae det sibi esse substantiale, quod secunda superveniens det esse accidentale: et ideo non est alia forma qua ignis est ignis, et qua est corpus, ut Avicenna vult, Suffic., lib. 2, cap. 3. Et si Commentator dicat in 2 Metaph., cap. 3, genus non esse materiam, sed formam mediam inter materiam et ultimam formam; hoc non dicitur ad significandum ordinem formarum secundum rem, sed secundum rationem: quia genus quamvis significet totum, ut Avicenna dicit, significat tamen ut indistinctum, et ita propinque se habet ad rationem materiae. Et praeterea sequeretur quod res signata per genus esset pars speciei constitutae per formam superadditam, et ita de specie praedicari non posset. Nec etiam hoc convenit secundum intentionem Augustini: quia ex virtute formae generalis non necessario sequitur forma specialis; unde non est talis virtus secundum quam necesse sit fieri, sed secundum quam fieri potest. But different people hold different views about what “seedlike principles” are in reality. For some say that the form of a species is only received in matter through the mediation of the form of the genus, even going so far as to say that the forms through which fire is fire and through which fire is a body differ numerically. Therefore, the incomplete general form is called a “seedlike principle,” since on account of such a form there is in matter a certain inclination to receive specific forms. But this does not seem to be true, because every form that comes after a substantial being is an accidental form. For if it comes after being that is constituted in the genus of substance, then, when it withdraws, the individual still remains in the genus of substance—which is contrary to the account of substantial form, as is said in On the Soul 2. Moreover, since every form gives some being, and it is impossible for a single thing to have two substantial beings, if the first substantial form coming to matter gives it substantial being, then the second coming on top of the first must give incidental being. Thus, there are not different forms by which fire is fire and by which it is a body, which is Avicenna’s opinion. And if the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 2 that genus is not matter but rather an intermediate form between matter and the final form, this is not meant to signify the order of forms in reality but rather conceptually. For genus, although it does signify the whole, as Avicenna says, nevertheless signifies it as indistinct, and is thus closely related to the account of matter. Besides, it would follow that the thing designated through the genus would be part of a species constituted through a superadded form, and thus it could not be predicated of the species. Nor does this fit with Augustine’s intention, since the specific form does not necessarily follow from the power of a general form. Hence it is not the sort of power from which a thing must necessarily come about, but rather from which it is able to come about. Ideo alii dicunt quod cum omnes formae, secundum Philosophum, De gener. animal., lib. 2, cap. 3, de potentia materiae educantur, oportet ipsas formas praeexistere in materia incomplete, secundum quamdam quasi inchoationem; et quia non sunt in esse suo perfectae, non habent perfectam virtutem agendi, sed incompletam; et ideo non possunt per se exire in actus, nisi sit agens exterius quod excitet formam incompletam ad agendum, ut sic cooperetur agenti exteriori; aliter enim non esset generatio mutatio naturalis, sed violenta: quia, ut in 3 Ethic., cap. 1, dicitur, violentum est cujus principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo. Has ergo virtutes incompletas in materia praeexistentes rationes seminales dicunt, quia sunt secundum esse completum in materia, sicut virtus formativa in semine. Thus, others say that since all forms, according to the Philosopher, are brought forth from the potency of matter, the forms themselves must preexist in matter in an incomplete manner, with reference to a kind of inception, as it were. Because they are not complete in their being, they do not have a complete, but rather an incomplete, power of acting. Thus, they cannot emerge into act by themselves, unless there is an external agent that stirs up the incomplete form to act such that in this way it works together with the external agent. For otherwise generation would not be natural change but instead violent. For, as is said in the Ethics 3, the violent is that whose principle is from without, without any concurrence from the one undergoing it. Therefore, they call these incomplete powers preexisting in matter “seedlike principles,” since they are in matter as regards their complete being as the formative power is in a seed. Hoc autem verum non videtur: quia quamvis formae educantur de potentia materiae, illa tamen potentia materiae non est activa, sed passiva tantum; sicut enim ut Commentator dicit in 8 Physic., in motu locali oportet esse aliud movens et motum, ita etiam in motu alterationis; et ponit exemplum quod, quando corpus naturaliter sanatur, cor est sanans, et alia membra sanata; et ideo sicut in corporibus simplicibus non dicimus quod sint mota ex se secundum locum, quia ignis non potest dividi in movens et motum, ita etiam non potest esse alteratum ex se, quasi aliqua potentia existens in materia aliquo modo agat in ipsam materiam in qua est, educendo eam in actum. Sed utrumque contingit in animatis, quia sunt mota secundum locum ex se, et etiam alterata, propter distinctionem organorum vel partium, quarum una est movens et alterans, et alia mota et alterata; et ideo non hoc modo potest accipi virtus seminalis in aliis rebus sicut in habentibus animam. But this does not seem to be true. For even though forms are brought forth from the potency of matter, nevertheless this potency of matter is not active but only passive. For, as the Commentator says on the Physics 8, just as in local motion the mover and the moved must be different, so it is in the motion of alteration. He gives the example that when a body is naturally healed the heart is the healer and the other members are the healed. Thus, just as in simple bodies we do not say that they are moved locally of themselves, since fire cannot be divided into mover and moved, so also it cannot be altered of itself, as if a potency existing in matter in some way would act on the very matter in which it is, reducing it to act. But both occur in animate things, since they are moved locally of themselves, as well as altered, due to the distinction between organs or parts, of which one is what moves or alters while the others are moved or altered. Thus, a seedlike principle cannot exist in other things in the same way as it does in things that have a soul. Nec tamen sequitur, si in materia est potentia passiva tantum, quod non sit generatio naturalis: quia materia coadjuvat ad generationem non agendo, sed inquantum est habilis ad recipiendum talem actionem, quae etiam habilitas appetitus materiae dicitur et inchoatio formae. Non enim eodem modo omnes motus naturales dicuntur, ut in 2 Physic. et in 1 Caeli et mundi, Commentator dicit; sed quidam propter principium activum intus existens, ut motus localis gravium et levium; et quidam propter principium passivum quod est secundum potentiam ab agente naturali natam in actum educi, ut in generatione et alteratione simplicium corporum: unde et natura dividitur in materiam et formam. Even so, it does not follow that, if in matter there is passive potency alone, then there is not natural generation. For matter cooperates in generation, not by acting, but inasmuch as it is apt to receive such an action. This aptitude is also called the “appetite” of matter and the beginning of form. For not all natural motions are called “natural” in the same way, as the Commentator says on Physics 2 and On the Heavens 1. Rather, some are called “natural” on account of an active principle existing within, such as the local motion of heavy and light things, while others are called “natural” on account of a passive principle that exists with respect to a potency made such as to be reduced to act by a natural agent, as in the generation and alteration of simple bodies. Hence “nature,” too, is divided into matter and form. Et ideo concedo quod in materia nulla potentia activa est, sed pure passiva; et quod rationes seminales dicuntur virtutes activae completae in natura cum propriis passivis, ut calor et frigus, et forma ignis, et virtus solis, et hujusmodi; et dicuntur seminales non propter esse imperfectum quod habeant, sicut virtus formativa in semine, sed quia rerum individuis primo creatis hujusmodi virtutes collatae sunt per opera sex dierum, ut ex eis quasi ex quibusdam seminibus producerentur et multiplicarentur res naturales. Thus, I concede that in matter there is no active potency, but rather purely passive potency, and that what are called “seedlike principles” are active powers complete in nature with their proper passive powers, such as hot and cold, the form of fire, the power of the sun, and things of this sort. They are called “seedlike” not because of the imperfect being they have, like the formative power in a seed, but rather because such powers were conferred on first individuals created in the works of the six days so that from them, as from seeds, natural things would be produced and multiplied. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hujusmodi virtutes activae in natura dicuntur rationes, non quod sint in materia per modum intentionis, sed quia ab arte divina producuntur, et manet in eis ordo et directio intellectus divini, sicut in re artificiata manet directio artificis in finem determinatum. Reply Obj. 1: Active powers of this sort in nature are called “principles” not because they are in matter after the manner of a concept, but because they are produced by the divine art and there remains in them the order and direction of the divine intellect, just as in a thing made by artifice there remains the direction of the artisan to the determined end. Ad secundum dicendum, quod rationes seminales dicuntur materiae inditae, non quia sint intelligendae praeexistere in materia ante adventum formae completae, quasi pertinentes ad essentiam materiae, vel ad rationem ejus, secundum quod est materia, sed per modum quo etiam formae completae in materia esse dicuntur. Reply Obj. 2: Seedlike principles are said to be implanted in matter not because they should be understood as preexisting in matter before the arrival of the complete form, as if pertaining to the essence of the matter or to its account precisely as matter, but rather after the manner by which complete forms are also said to be in matter. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Anaxagoras ponebat in aere, ex quo generabatur ignis, praeexistere quasdam partes ignis in actu latentes, per quarum exitum et congregationem ignis generari videbatur. Hoc autem nos non ponimus; sed quod in materia aeris praecessit aptitudo ad formam ignis, et in igne generante virtus activa, per quam haec aptitudo in actum reducitur: et hoc non est inconveniens. Reply Obj. 3: Anaxagoras held that in air, from which fire is generated, there preexist some hidden actual parts of fire, through whose coming out and being gathered together fire appeared to be generated. Now, we do not hold this, but instead that there preexists in the matter of air an aptitude for the form of fire, and in the fire that generates there preexists an active power through which this aptitude is reduced to act. And this is not unfitting. Ad quartum dicendum, quod sub rationibus seminalibus comprehenduntur tam virtutes activae quam etiam passivae, quae perfici possunt per agentia naturalia; sicut et in generatione animalis semen extento nomine dicitur non solum sperma, sed etiam menstruum. Reply Obj. 4: “Seedlike principles” include both active and passive powers that can be perfected through natural agents, just as in the generation of an animal not only sperm, but also menses are called “seed” by extension of the name. Ad quintum dicendum, quod concurrentibus omnibus causis naturalibus, ex quibus omnibus una perfecta causa constat, necesse est effectum sequi, nisi aliquid impediat: et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus. Reply Obj. 5: When all the natural causes of which one perfect cause consists come together, it is necessary for the effect to follow unless something impedes it. This is how Augustine is speaking. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum ea quae fiunt praeter rationes seminales sint miracula Whether the things that come about apart from seedlike principles are miracles Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae praeter rationes seminales fiunt, non omnia miracula sint. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that things that come about apart from seedlike principles are not all miracles. In opus enim creationis virtus seminalis naturae non potest, nec tamen opus creationis miraculosum dicitur: quia miracula sunt ad manifestationem gratiae, ut in littera dicitur; ad quod creatio non est ordinata, sed magis ad institutionem naturae. Ergo videtur quod non sit ratio miraculi in hoc quod praeter causas seminales aliquid fiat. Obj. 1: For a seedlike principle of nature is not capable of the work of creation and yet the work of creation is not called “miraculous,” since miracles are for the manifestation of grace, as is said in the text, to which creation is not ordered, being instead ordered to the establishment of nature. Therefore, it seems that the fact that something comes about apart from seedlike causes does not have the account of a miracle. Praeterea, creatio animarum et justificatio impiorum, cum frequenter fiat, miraculosa non est; quia miraculum est aliquod arduum et insolitum, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. De utilitate credendi, cap. 16; et tamen isti effectus praeter rationes seminales producuntur. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the creation of souls and the justification of the wicked, since they happen frequently, are not miraculous. For the miraculous is something difficult and unusual, as Augustine says. Yet, these effects are produced apart from seedlike principles. Therefore, the same follows as before. Praeterea, resurrectio mortuorum, cum in spe fidelium sit, miraculosa non est, quia miraculum est praeter spem admirantis apparens, ut Augustinus dicit; et tamen resurrectio mortuorum per naturam fieri non potest. Ergo non omnia quae praeter virtutem naturae fiunt miracula dicuntur. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the resurrection of the dead, since it lies within the hope of the faithful, is not miraculous, because the miraculous is what appears beyond the hope of one who then wonders at it, as Augustine says. Yet, the resurrection of the dead cannot come about through nature. Therefore, not all things that come about apart from the power of nature are called “miracles.” Praeterea, quaedam quandoque fiunt praeter rationes seminales, quae facultatem naturae non excedunt, sicut quod aqua convertatur in vinum, ut factum legitur Joan. 2. Sed miraculum est supra facultatem naturae apparens, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo videtur quod non omnia quae praeter rationes seminales fiunt miracula sint. Obj. 4: Furthermore, some things sometimes come about apart from seedlike principles that do not exceed the capability of nature, such as the conversion of water into wine, as we read about in John 2:1–11. But a miracle is what appears above the capability of nature, as Augustine says. Therefore, it seems that not all things that come about apart from seedlike principles are miracles. Praeterea, omnes virtutes activae creaturis collatae rationes seminales dici possunt. Sed angeli et homines dicuntur miracula facere. Ergo videtur quod non omnia miracula praeter rationes seminales fiant. Obj. 5: Furthermore, all the active powers conferred on created things can be called “seedlike principles.” But angels and men are said to work miracles. Therefore, it seems that not all miracles come about apart from seedlike principles. Praeterea, monstra in natura contingunt, et praeter intentionem naturae agentis; non tamen miracula dicuntur. Ergo non in hoc consistit ratio miraculi quod est praeter rationes seminales fieri. Obj. 6: Furthermore, monsters occur in nature apart from the intention of the natural agent, and yet they are not called “miracles.” Therefore, the account of miracle does not consist in what comes about apart from seedlike principles. Sed contra, illa opera miraculosa dicimus quae in admirationem divinae virtutis inducunt. Sed mutare cursum solitum naturae non est nisi illius virtutis quae naturam instituit. Ergo ea proprie miracula dici debent quae praeter virtutes activas in natura contingunt. On the contrary, we call those works miraculous that lead to wonderment at the divine power. But to change the usual course of nature belongs only to that power that established nature. Therefore, things should be called properly “miraculous” that occur apart from the active powers in nature. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex verbis Philosophi habetur in principio Metaph., in proem., admiratio ex duobus causatur, scilicet ex hoc quod alicujus effectus causa occulta est, et ex eo quod aliquid in re videtur per quod aliter esse deberet; unde in hoc quod est diametrum quadrati non posse commensurari lateri, admiratio causatur ex hoc quod hujus causa ignoratur, et ex hoc quod ex parvitate linearum videtur quod una alteri commensurari possit. Contingit ergo aliquid esse admirabile simpliciter, et aliquid esse admirabile quoad hunc. Admirabile huic est omne illud cujus causa occulta est sibi, et cui videtur secundum suam aestimationem aliquid obviare, quare non ita esse deberet; quamvis in re nihil sit repugnans, nec causa in se sit nimis occulta; et hoc potest dici mirum illi. Admirabile autem in se est id cujus causa simpliciter occulta est, ita etiam quod in re est aliqua virtus secundum rei veritatem per quam aliter debeat contingere. Hujusmodi autem sunt quae immediate a virtute divina causantur, quae est causa occultissima, alio modo quam se habeat ordo causarum naturalium: sicut quod caecus iterum videat, et quod mortuus resurgat, et hujusmodi: et haec proprie miracula dicuntur, quasi in seipsis et simpliciter mira. I answer that, as related in the words of the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics, wonder is caused by two things: by the fact that the cause of some effect is hidden, and by the fact that there is something in the thing that makes it seem as if it should be otherwise. Hence the fact that the diagonal of a square is not commensurable with its side arouses wonder because its cause is unknown and because, since lines can be so small, it seems that one should be commensurable with the other. And so it happens that in one case something is wondrous simply speaking and in another it is wondrous to a given person. The wondrous to a given person is everything whose cause is hidden to him and which, to his perception, seems opposed to something on account of which it should not be that way, though in reality nothing stands in the way and the cause is not exceedingly hidden in itself. Such a thing can be said to be a wonder to that person. On the other hand, the wondrous in itself is that whose cause is simply hidden, and such that the thing itself really and truly has a power through which the outcome should be otherwise. Now, things of this sort are those that are immediately caused by divine power, which is the most hidden cause, in a way different than the order of natural causes is disposed—for example, a blind person’s seeing again, a dead person’s rising again, and things of this sort. These are properly called “miracles,” being wonders in themselves and simply. Haec autem quandoque sunt supra naturam, quandoque praeter naturam, quandoque contra naturam. Supra naturam dicitur esse miraculum, quando natura non potest in ipsam substantiam facti, sicut divisio Maris Rubri, suscitatio mortui, et hujusmodi. Illa vero dicuntur praeter naturam fieri in quae quidem natura potest quantum ad substantiam facti, sed tamen praeter operationem naturae fiunt jussu divino. Et quod haec dicantur miracula, contingit ex tribus. Now, these are sometimes above nature, sometimes apart from nature, and sometimes against nature. A miracle is said to be “above nature” when nature does not have the power for the substance of the act, as in the case of the parting of the Red Sea, the raising of a dead person, and things of this sort. However, they are said to come about “apart from nature” when nature does have power for them with regard to the substance of the act, but by divine command they come about apart from the activity of the nature. These are called “miracles” on the basis of three things. Primo propter excessum et singularem quemdam modum: sicut ranae productae in Aegypto in tanta multitudine sicut antea visum non fuerat. The first is on the basis of excess and a certain kind of unique mode, as when the frogs were produced in Egypt in such a great multitude as had not been seen before. Secundo propter hoc quod hora determinata contingunt ad invocationem divini nominis, sicut quod manus Jeroboam extensa contra prophetam arefacta fuit, et ara ejus divisa, 3 Reg. 13:4. The second is on the basis of their occurring at a determined time at the invocation of the divine name, as when Jeroboam’s hand, stretched forth against the prophet, was withered and his altar rent in two (1 Kgs 13:4). Tertio quando aliquid universaliter contingit, sicut in Veteri Lege de aqua zelotypiae, Numer. 5:27, quod post potum illius venter adulterae divino miraculo putrescebat. The third is when something occurs in a universal manner, as in the Old Law concerning the water of jealousy (Num 5:27) that, after being drunk, would turn bitter in the belly of an adulteress by a divine miracle. Contra naturam autem dicitur fieri, quando in re est aliquid contrarium ei quod fit, sicut si grave sursum moveretur, et quod virgo peperit, vel aliquid hujusmodi; ita quod miraculose sequatur actus manente contraria natura, quae scilicet est principium contrarii actus. Finally, a miracle is said to occur “against nature” when there is in the thing something contrary to what happens, as for example if something heavy were to move upwards, the fact that a virgin gave birth, or something of this sort, such that the act follows miraculously while the contrary nature remains intact, namely, that which is the principle of the contrary act. Ad primum dicendum, quod creatio, proprie loquendo, non est opus miraculosum, quia deficit una conditio miraculi: quamvis enim causam occultam habeat, tamen non est in re unde aliter esse deberet: immo esse rerum naturali quodam ordine a primo ente producitur, quamvis non per necessitatem naturae. Reply Obj. 1: Creation, properly speaking, is not a miraculous work, since it lacks one criterion for a miracle. For even though it has a hidden cause, there is no principle in the thing whereby it should be otherwise. Rather, the being of things is by a certain natural order produced from the first being, though not by a necessity of nature. Ad secundum dicendum, quod nec etiam creatio animarum vel justificatio impiorum proprie miracula debent dici: quia quamvis sint praeter rationes seminales agentes ad perfectionem effectus, non tamen sunt praeter eas disponentes: dispositio enim corporis ad receptionem corporis, et praeparatio voluntatis ad susceptionem gratiae, est per virtutem creaturae collatam. Si tamen sine tali praecedente praeparatione vel anima infunderetur vel gratia conferretur, utrumque miraculum dici posset, ut patet in formatione primi hominis, et in conversione Pauli. Nec tamen sequitur ex vi rationis inductae: quia “insolitum,” quod in definitione miraculi ponitur, non dicit raritatem facti, sed excludit solitum cursum naturae; unde si quotidie caeci illuminarentur, nihilominus miraculum esset; quia praeter cursum naturalem, qui nobis est consuetus, contingeret. Reply Obj. 2: Not even the creation of souls or the justification of the impious should properly be called “miracles.” For even though they exist apart from seedlike principles acting to complete the effect, they do not exist apart from them disposing the effect. For the body is disposed for the reception of the soul and the will prepared for the reception of grace through a power conferred on the creature. But if the soul were infused or grace conferred without such a preceding preparation, then both could be called a “miracle,” as is clear in the formation of the first man and in the conversion of Paul. Nor does it follow from the force of the argument cited, since “unusual,” which is included in the definition of “miracle,” does not refer to the rarity of the act, but rather excludes the usual course of nature. Hence if the blind came to see the light every single day, it would still be a miracle, since it would occur apart from the course of nature that is customary for us. Ad tertium dicendum, quod resurrectio miraculosa erit: quamvis enim sit secundum spem gratiae, est tamen supra spem naturae: et haec duplex spes distinguitur in Glossa, Rom. 4:18, super illud: qui contra spem in spem credidit, etc. Reply Obj. 3: The resurrection will be miraculous. For even though it is in keeping with the hope of grace, it is still above the hope of nature. These two kinds of hope are distinguished in the Gloss on the passage: in hope he believed against hope (Rom 4:18).