Sed contra, immortalitas corporis consequitur libertatem arbitrii, secundum ejus diversum statum. Sed in omnibus statibus est eadem libertas arbitrii. Ergo eadem est immortalitas corporis in primo et ultimo resurgentium statu. On the contrary, the immortality of the body follows on the freedom of the will in keeping with its different states. But in all states there is the same freedom of the will. Therefore, there is the same immortality of the body in the first state as in the final state of the resurrected. Praeterea, una et eadem potentia est quae prius disposita est, et postmodum efficitur necessitas. Sed corpus hominis in primo statu erat immortale, quasi secundum potentiam dispositam, tantum eo quod poterat mori et non mori; in ultimo vero statu erit immortale secundum potentiam quae est necessitas ad vitam, quia impossibile erit mori. Ergo est una et eadem immortalitas. Furthermore, it is one and the same potency that is first disposed and then afterwards rendered a necessity. But the body of man in his first state was immortal as though with respect to a disposed potency alone, due to the fact that he was able to die and not to die, while in his final state he will be immortal in respect of a potency that is the necessity of living, since it will be impossible for him to die. Therefore, it is one and the same immortality. Respondeo dicendum, quod immortalitas dicit potentiam quamdam ad semper vivendum et non moriendum. Haec autem potentia in natura humana ex parte corporis non invenitur, nisi imperfecta, quasi potentia obedientiae tantum; eo quod per principia naturae vitae sempiternitas haberi non potest; sed complementum hujus potentiae est ex aliquo divino munere gratis collato. Sic ergo immortalitas dupliciter considerari potest: vel quantum ad potentiam incompletam naturalem, et sic est una et eadem immortalitas, sicut una et eadem natura; vel quantum ad munus gratiae, quod est quasi formale complens dictam potentiam, et sic invenitur differentia utriusque immortalitatis et impassibilitatis: quia prima fuit per gratiam innocentiae, ultima vero erit per donum gloriae. In primo enim statu talis erat victoria animae super corpus ut nihil in corpore fieri posset quod animae adversaretur; sed in ultimo statu amplior erit victoria in hoc quod proprietates animae quodammodo in corpus redundabunt, ut corpus agile, et lucidum, et spirituale efficiatur, et impassibile. I answer that immortality indicates a certain potential to live forever and not die. But this potential is not found in human nature on the side of the body, except imperfectly, as if by obediential potency alone, since everlasting life cannot be had through the principles of nature. Rather, the completion of this potency comes from a divine gift gratuitously conferred. And so, immortality can be considered in two ways: either with regard to incomplete natural potency, and in this way, there is one and the same immortality just as there is one and the same nature; or with regard to the gift of grace, which is like the formal element completing the aforementioned potency. And in this way, we find a difference between the two immortalities and impassibilities, since the first was through the grace of innocence whereas the final will be through the gift of glory. For in the first state the soul’s dominance over the body was such that nothing in the body could happen that would be adverse to the soul. But in the last state the dominance will be greater, inasmuch as the properties of the soul will in a certain way overflow into the body such that the body will be rendered agile, bright, and spiritual, as well as impassible. Et per hoc patet responsio ad utramque partem. Reply Obj. 1–4, Sed Contra: And through this, the reply to each part is clear. Expositio textus Exposition of the text In primo statu fuit corpus hominis animale. Videtur quod tale etiam erit in tertio statu, cum animal genus hominis sit, et semper de specie praedicetur. In the first state, the human body was animalistic. It seems that it will also be such in the third state, since “animal” is the genus of man and should always be predicated of its species. Et dicendum quod differt animal et animale quantum ad nominis significationem: quia animal nominat naturam generis, quae a specie nunquam removetur, unde semper homo dicetur animal; sed animale dicit aliquod denominatum ex natura animalis. Cum autem denominatio proprie sit ab eo quod est formale et perfectivum rei, illi tantum esse animale competit in quo proprietates animalis quantum ad aliquod dominantur. Hae autem sunt in quibus homo cum aliis animalibus convenit: et ideo qui brutales motus sequitur, id est passiones sensitivae partis, animalis homo ab Apostolo dicitur, 1 Corinth. 2. Quia ergo in primo statu hominem oportebat occupari circa opera nutritivae et generativae, sine quibus vitam conservare non poterat; ideo animalem vitam dicebatur habere. It should be said that the words “animal” and “animalistic” differ in meaning. For “animal” names the nature of the genus, which is never removed from a species; hence man will always be called an “animal.” But “animalistic” indicates something named after the nature of an animal. However, since naming is properly based on what is formal and perfective of a thing, “animalistic” only belongs to that in which the properties of an animal dominate in some regard. But these are the things that man has in common with other animals. Thus, one who follows brute motions, that is, the passions of the sensitive part, is called an animalistic man by the Apostle (1 Cor 2:14). Therefore, because in his first state man had to be occupied with the works of the nutritive and generative parts, without which he could not preserve life, he was said to have an animalistic life. Corpus propter peccatum mortuum est. Videtur hoc esse falsum, et expositio insufficiens quae adjungitur: quia quod in futurum necessarium est, nondum tamen dicitur esse factum: ergo etsi ex peccato necessitatem mortis homo incurrat, non tamen corpus ejus mortuum dici debet. ‘The body is dead because of sin.’ This seems to be false, and the adjoined explanation insufficient. For what must necessarily happen in the future is still not yet said to be done. Therefore, even if due to sin man incurs the necessity of death, his body should not be called “dead.” Et dicendum, secundum quosdam, quod homo post peccatum est in continuo actu deficiendi usque ad mortem, secundum quod dicitur Sapient. 5:13: nati continuo desivimus esse; et ideo statim homo mortuus potest dici. Sed hoc videtur redire in opinionem Heracliti, qui ponebat omnia moveri semper: volebat enim omnem transmutationem quae in longo tempore contingit, puta augmenti, dividere secundum omnes particulas temporis, ut in qualibet parte temporis esset assignare aliam partem motus, sicut est in motu locali, qui solus proprie et vere continuus est, ut in 8 Physic. Commentator dicit, et hoc satis a philosophis improbatur. According to some it should be said that man after sin is in a continuous act of failing all the way up to death, in keeping with what is said in Wisdom 5:13: we also, as soon as we were born, ceased to be. Thus, man can be called “dead” right away. But this seems to return to the opinion of Heraclitus, who posited that all things are always in motion. For he was of the opinion that every transmutation that occurs over a long time—for example, growth—divides with respect to all the particles of time such that in any part of time we could assign a part of motion, as is true of local motion, which alone is properly and truly continuous, as the Commentator says on the Physics 8. This is sufficiently disproved by philosophers. Praeterea non est possibile quod duo motus contrarii sint continui; unde cum generatio et corruptio sint contraria, oportet inter tempus generationis et corruptionis ejusdem rei esse aliquod tempus in quo non corrumpitur nec generatur. Et praeterea adhuc non debet dici mortuum, sed mori. Moreover, it is not possible for two contrary motions to be continuous. Hence since generation and corruption are contraries, between the time of the generation and the corruption of the same thing, there must be a time in which it is neither being corrupted nor being generated. Besides, it still should not be said that he is dead, but instead that he is dying. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod expositio Augustini est sufficiens, ut scilicet ex hoc mortuum dicatur, quia necessitatem mortis habet: quod enim est in futurum necessarium etsi nondum in actu in seipso, est tamen jam determinatum in causa sua, ut quodammodo possit dici esse. Unde et de ortu solis et luminarium, et occasu et eclipsibus fiunt demonstrationes, ut de his quae sunt semper: quia causas determinatas habent, quas non contingit aliquo modo deficere. Unde dicit Augustinus, 9 Super Genes., cap. 10, quod hoc modo dicitur corpus hominis post peccatum mortuum, sicut a medicis homo infirmus desperatus propter impossibilitatem evadendi dicitur mortuus. Quod autem dicitur: continuo nati desivimus esse, non est intelligendum quasi transmutatio corruptionis hominis sit toto tempore vitae ejus in actu: sed vel hoc dicitur propter brevitatem vitae, quod enim parum est, quasi nihil esse videtur, ut dicitur in 2 Physic., vel quia dies ad vitam determinati a Deo continue labuntur. Thus, we should say otherwise that Augustine’s explanation is sufficient, namely, that he is called “dead” due to the fact that he bears the necessity of death. For what is necessarily going to happen, even if not yet actual in itself, is still already determined in its cause such that it can in a certain way be said to exist. Hence too, demonstrations are made regarding the rising of the sun and luminaries, the sunset, and eclipses, as of things that always are, because they have determinate causes that cannot fail in any way. Hence Augustine says in On Genesis 9 that the body of man is called “dead” after sin in the way physicians call a sick man without hope “dead” on account of the impossibility of avoiding death. But where it says, as soon as we were born, we ceased to be, this should not be understood as though man’s corruptive transmutation were actually present throughout his entire lifetime. Rather, either this is said on account of the brevity of life (for what is very short seems as if it were nothing, as is said in the Physics 2), or because the days determined by God for life are continuously slipping away. Quod erat ei de ligno vitae. Videtur quod hoc dictum redeat in fabulas antiquorum, quas Philosophus deridet et improbat in 3 Metaph., qui dicebant deos qui gustaverunt de quodam cibo, factos esse immortales, alios autem remansisse mortales. ‘Which came to him from the tree of life.’ This statement appears to be a return to the myths of the ancients, which the Philosopher derides and disproves in the Metaphysics 3. For they said that the gods who tasted of a certain food became immortal while others remained mortal. Sed dicendum quod non est simile: quia illi fabulose totam causam immortalitatis cibo conferebant; Augustinus vero non intendit quod lignum vitae esset principalis causa immortalitatis, sed quoddam immortalitatem coadjuvans, ut dictum est. But it should be said that the case is not similar. For they mythically conferred the whole cause of immortality on the food. However, Augustine does not intend that the tree of life would be the principal cause of immortality, but rather something providing a kind of assistance to immortality, as has been said. Numquid posset non mori? Ad hujus quaestione solutionem sciendum, quod etsi praeceptum exterius non accepisset, tamen interior ratio dictabat determinato tempore cibum sumendum esse: et ideo, si cibum non assumpsisset tam de illo ligno quam de aliis, contra legem naturalem fecisset, et ideo peccasset, et mortuus fuisset. Would he have the power not to die? To solve this question it should be known that even if he had not received an external precept, internal reason dictated that food should be taken at a determined time. Thus, if he had not consumed food both from that tree and from the others, he would have acted against the natural law and thus would have sinned and would have died. Distinctio 20 Distinction 20 De generatione filiorum Generation of children in the original state of man Divisio textus Division of the text Postquam Magister determinavit de immortalitate Adae per quam esse individui perpetuum conservabatur, hic determinat de generatione filiorum per quam species multiplicatur in individuis. After the Master has addressed Adam’s immortality, through which the being of the individual was preserved perpetual, here he addresses the generation of children, through which the species is multiplied in individuals. Dividitur autem in partes duas: This is divided into two parts. in prima determinat ea quae pertinent ad statum generationis; In the first, he addresses what pertains to the state of generation. in secunda ostendit in quem statum post hoc transferendus erat, ibi: talis erat hominis institutio ante peccatum, secundum corporis conditionem. In the second, he shows into what state man was going to be transferred after this, at such was man’s establishment before sin according to the condition of his body. Prima dividitur in duas: The first is divided into two parts. in prima determinat conditionem generationis ex parte generantis; In the first, he addresses the conditions of generation on the part of the generator. in secunda determinat qualitatem generatorum, ibi: si vero quaeritur quales, si non peccasset homo, filios genuisset . . . responderi potest quod filios parvulos nasci oportebat propter materni uteri necessitatem. In the second, he addresses the qualities of the generated, at but if it is asked what kind of children man would have begotten, if he had not sinned . . . it may be answered that it was required that the children be born small because of the needs of the maternal womb. Circa primum tria facit: Concerning the first, he does three things. primo ostendit modum generationis, quia per concubitum sine pruritu libidinis. First, he shows the manner of generation, that it was through intercourse without the itch of lust. Secundo ostendit generationis principium, quia non in paradiso conjuncti sunt ante peccatum ad generationem, ibi: cur ergo in paradiso non coierunt; Second, he shows when generation began, since in paradise they were not joined together for generation before sin, at ‘and so why did they not have sexual intercourse in paradise?’ tertio inquirit generationis terminum, ibi: de termino vero temporis, quo transferrentur ad spiritualem caelestemque vitam, certum aliquid Scriptura non tradit. Third, he inquires about generation’s end, at but as to the end of time at which they would have been transferred to a spiritual and celestial life, Scripture does not teach anything certain. Si vero quaeritur, quales si non peccasset homo, filios genuisset, etc. Hic inquirit qualitatem generatorum. But if it is asked what kind of children man would have begotten, if he had not sinned. Here he inquires about the qualities of those generated. Et primo quantum ad corpus; First, he inquires with regard to the body. secundo quantum ad animam, ibi: et cum de corpore humano non sit absurdum vel inconveniens hoc existimare, quaeri solet utrum de sensu animae et cognitione veritatis eodem modo sentiendum sit. Second, he inquires with regard to the soul, at and since it is not absurd or unsuitable to hold this view concerning the human body, it is usual to ask whether the same is to be thought concerning the sense of the soul and the knowledge of truth. Circa primum duo facit: Concerning the first, he does two things. primo determinat qualitatem natorum in primo statu; First, he addresses the qualities of children in the first state. secundo movet quasdam objectiones, ibi: ad hoc autem opponitur. Second, he raises certain objections, at but the following objection is made to this. Circa primum tria facit: Concerning the first, he does three things. primo movet quaestionem; First, he raises the question.