Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Diabolus ex invidia, et in forma serpentis tentaverit Evam Whether the devil tempted Eve out of envy and in the form of a serpent? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur non fuisse talis tentationis progressus, qualis in littera describitur. Invidia enim respectu superioris est; unde dicitur Job 5, 2: parvulum occidit invidia. Sed Adam non erat superior daemone, ad minus reputatione daemonis, qui fuit superbissimus. Ergo non est ex invidia stimulatus ad tentandum. Obj. 1: To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the stages of temptation were not as they are described in the text. For envy is with respect to a superior. Hence it is said: envy slays the little one (Job 5:2). But Adam was not superior to the demon, at least in the demon's own estimation, since he was exceedingly prideful. Therefore, there is no motive to temptation due to envy. Praeterea, in primo statu anima corpori omnino imperabat. Ergo diversitas quae erat ex parte corporis, nullo modo in animam redundabat. Sed mulier differebat a viro secundum corporis dispositionem; unde philosophus in 10 Metaph. dicit, quod mas et femina differunt differentiis materialibus. Ergo tunc temporis non oportebat quod femina esset minus sapiens vel fortis quam vir; et ita nulla ratio videtur quare per mulierem ad virum tentando transierit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the first state the soul altogether had command over the body. Therefore, the differences on the part of the body in no way overflowed into the soul. But woman differed from man in disposition of body. Hence the Philosopher in Metaphysics 10 says that male and female differ by material differences. Therefore, there was at that time no necessity for the woman to be less wise or strong than the man. And thus, there seems to be no reason why the devil would have proceeded in tempting the man through the woman. Praeterea, tentatio est assimilatio boni ad fallendum, ut Cassiodorus super Psalmos dicit. Si ergo iniquus persuasor tentare hominem disponebat, formam boni persuasoris, scilicet angeli, assumere debuit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, temptation is a resemblance to the good in order to deceive, as Cassiodorus says in On the Psalms. Therefore, if that iniquitous persuader arranged to tempt man, he should have assumed the form of a good persuader, namely an angel. Si dicatur, quod non fuit permissus, ne homo quasi violenter deciperetur; contra. Ad pium custodem pertinet magis infirmis majoris defensionis auxilium exhibere. Cum ergo post peccatum, quando natura humana est infirmior, non cohibeatur Satanas quin in angelum lucis se transformet, ut dicitur 2 Cor. 10, multo minus tunc cohiberi debuit. Obj. 4: If it is said that he was not permitted to do so lest man be deceived, as it were, violently, then on the contrary: it pertains to a pious guardian to offer the help of greater defense to those who are weaker. Therefore, since after sin, when human nature is weaker, Satan is not prevented from transforming himself into an angel of light, as it says (2 Cor 11:14), all the more should he not have been prevented then. Praeterea, consideratio praecepti in actu a peccato retrahit; et sic tentationis effectum impedit. Si ergo tentator ad trahendum in peccatum venerat, videtur quod inconvenienter mulierem in memoriam praecepti adduxerit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, actually considering the precept withdraws one from sin, and in this way impedes the effect of temptation. Therefore, if the tempter came for the purpose of leading into sin, it seems unfitting that he quoted the precept to the woman, recalling it to her memory. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. 2, 24: invidia Diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum. Et ita videtur quod ex invidia Diabolus commotus fuerit ad tentandum. On the contrary, it is said: through the devil's envy death entered the world (Wis 2:24). And thus, it seems that the devil was moved to tempt out of envy. Praeterea, ut Augustinus dicit, ordo tentationis interioris qui in nobis nunc agitur, repraesentat ordinem tentationis in primis parentibus servatum. Sed in nobis tentatio a sensualitate incipit, et per inferiorem rationem in superiorem producitur. Cum ergo sensualitas serpentem repraesentet, et inferior ratio mulierem, et superior virum; videtur quod decentissimus fuit talis ordo tentationis in primo peccato, ut in eo possit peccatorum sequentium similitudo ostendi. Furthermore, as Augustine says, the order of internal temptation that now exists in us represents the order of temptation found in our first parents. But in us temptation begins from sensuality and is lead to higher reason through lower reason. Therefore, since sensuality represents the serpent, lower reason the woman, and higher reason the man, it seems that such an order of temptation in the first sin was most appropriate, so that in it a likeness of the sins to follow might be shown. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Magister dixit, 7 dist., daemones quaedam possunt per naturae suae potestatem quae non possunt propter Dei vel angelorum cohibitionem; ita etiam et eorum astutia intellectus et nequitia voluntatis in multis impeditur, ut non faciant omne quod volunt, etiam quod ad finem suae intentionis conveniens astute vident; unde in tentatione primorum parentum Diabolus aliquid fecit quod voluit, ut scilicet a muliere tentationem inciperet, et ut aliena forma veniret; quod autem in forma serpentis veniret, non sponte elegit, sed ex permissione divina, quae eum alias species, in quibus magis posset latere, assumere prohibebat, ut in littera dicitur. I answer that, as the Master has said, demons are capable of some things through the power of their nature that they cannot do because God or the angels prevent them. So, too, their keenness of intellect and wickedness of will are impeded in many cases such that they do not do everything they wish, even what they keenly see to be fitting for their intended end. Hence in the temptation of our first parents, the devil did something he wished to do, namely, he began the temptation with the woman and came under the guise of a strange form. However, the fact that he came in the form of a serpent was not something he chose on his own, but rather was from the divine permission, which prohibited him from assuming other appearances under which he could hide more effectively, as it says in the text. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Diabolus homini invidebat, quem sibi superiorem futurum putabat, si illuc ascenderet unde ipse descenderat; et in hoc ipso jam superiorem quod ad bonum illud habendum paratus erat homo quod ipse daemon in perpetuum amiserat: nec in hoc aliquid ejus superbiae derogatur, quia superbia potius est in appetitu excellentiae quam in aestimatione, nisi prout aestimatio ex appetitu excellentiae nascitur, qui oculos mentis claudit. Unde superbi frequenter alios se superiores in multis aestimant, qui tamen multa sibi magis digna esse cogitant, propter alia bona in quibus alios excedere videntur: et ideo ex ipsa superbia invidiae zelus oritur. Unde dicit Augustinus: amando quisque excellentiam suam, vel paribus invidet quod ei coaequantur, vel inferioribus ne sibi coaequentur, vel superioribus quod eis non coaequetur. Reply Obj. 1: The devil envied the human being, whom he reckoned was going to be higher than him, if humans should ascend to the place from which he himself had descended. And in this respect he regarded the human as already superior, since the human was prepared for the possession of the good that the demon had lost forever. Nor does this take away anything of his pride, since pride is in the desire for excellence rather than the perception of it, except insofar as perception is born from the desire for excellence, which closes the eyes of the mind. Hence the proud frequently perceive others as superior to themselves in many things, yet think that those things are owed much more to themselves on account of other goods in which they seem to excel others. And thus, it is from pride itself that the zeal of envy arises. Hence Augustine says: by loving his own excellence, each one either envies his equals because they are regarded as equal to him, or his inferiors lest they be regarded as equal to him, or his superiors because he is not regarded as equal to them. Ad secundum dicendum, quod alia est obedientia corporis ad animam in primo statu, et alia in ultimo. In primo enim statu sic erat subjectum corpus animae ut nihil in corpore contingere posset quod contra bonum animae foret vel quantum ad esse vel quantum ad operationem; nec tamen removebatur quin etiam tunc secundum diversitatem corporum diversa fuisset dignitas animarum, cum oporteat animae ad corpus proportionem esse, ut formae ad materiam, et motoris ad motum: et ideo mulier, etiam quantum ad animam viro imperfectior erat. In ultimo vero statu talis erit subjectio ut etiam qualitas corporis sequatur virtutem mentis; unde secundum diversitatem meritorum erit anima unius alia dignior, et corpus gloriosius; unde non erit differentia propter sexum diversum. Reply Obj. 2: The obedience of the body to the soul in the first state is one thing, and its obedience in the last state is another. For in the first state the body was subject to the soul in such a way that nothing could occur in the body that would be contrary to the good of the soul, either with regard to existence or with regard to activity. Yet this does not take away the fact that even at that time there would have been differences in the dignity of souls on the basis of bodily differences, since there must be a proportion of soul to body, as of form to matter and of mover to moved. And thus, woman was more imperfect than man even with regard to the soul. However, in the last state the subjection will be such that the quality of the body also follows on the virtue of the mind. Hence it will be on the basis of the differences of merit that the soul of one will have greater dignity than other and one body will be more glorious than another. Hence there will not then be a difference due to sexual differences. Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut in littera dicitur, aliam speciem in qua appareret, et praecipue boni angeli, libenter elegisset; sed permissus non fuit. Reply Obj. 3: As it says in the text, he would readily have chosen another appearance in which to appear, especially that of a good angel, but he was not permitted to do so. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis homo in primo statu esset fortior, tamen post peccatum factus est cautior per experientiam mali; unde fraudibus hostis quas quotidie experitur, melius resistere novit; vel quia in poenam peccati hoc consecutum est, ut homo, qui Diabolo se sponte subjecit, violentius ab eo impugnetur. Reply Obj. 4: Even though in his first state a person would have been bolder, after sin he became more cautious through the experience of evil. Hence a person knows better how to resist the deceptions of the enemy that he daily experiences. Or else it is because it followed as a penalty of sin that the human being, who of his own accord subjected himself to the devil, would be more violently assaulted by him. Ad quintum dicendum, quod, secundum philosophum in 3, et in 7 Ethic., omnis malus quodammodo ignorans est: oportet enim quod existimatio rationis in peccante corrumpatur, quia malum pro bono eligit. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter; vel in universali, vel in particulari. Rectam autem aestimationem in particulari corrumpit delectatio, ut philosophus, in 6 Ethic., dicit; et etiam aliae passiones, quae tunc inesse homini non poterant praeter regulam rationis; et ideo oportuit ut in universali aestimatio corrumperetur; et ideo praeceptum ad memoriam reduxit tentator, ut aestimationem rectam falsis suasionibus corrumperet, et sic ad peccandum inclinaret. Vel dicendum, ut dicit Augustinus, 11 super Genes., quod ideo prius interrogavit serpens, et respondit haec mulier, ut in praevaricatione esset inexcusabilis, nec ullo modo dici posset, illud quod praeceperat Deus, oblitam fuisse mulierem; quamquam et oblivio praecepti, maxime unius, et tam necessarii, ad maximam culpam damnabilis negligentiae pertineret. Verumtamen evidentior ejus transgressio est, cum memoriae retinetur, et tamquam in illo Deus assistens praesensque contemnitur. Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher in Ethics 3 and 7, every wicked person is in a certain way ignorant. For in one sinning the reason's judgement must be corrupted, since it chooses evil in place of good. Now, this occurs in two ways: either as regards the universal or as regards the particular. As the Philosopher says in Ethics 6, right judgment of the particular is corrupted by delight as well as other passions, which could not have existed in humans at that time apart from the rule of reason. And thus, it would have to have been that judgment was corrupted as regards the universal. And thus, the tempter called the precept back to memory in order to corrupt right judgment by false persuasions and in this way incline to sin. Or we may say, as Augustine says, that the serpent first asked and the woman responded so that the woman would be without excuse in trespassing and so that it could not in any way be said that she had forgotten what God had commanded, although even forgetting the precept, most of all this one and most necessary precept, would have pertained to the greatest fault of damnable negligence. Nevertheless, the transgression of the precept is more evident by being held in memory, and God, as being present and offering assistance in the very precept, is himself spurned. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum peccatum Adae fuerit gravius omnibus aliis peccatis Whether the sin of Adam was graver than all other sins? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum Adae gravius fuerit omnibus aliis peccatis. Quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, in Lib. 14 de civitate Dei, magna est enim in peccando iniquitas, cui tanta est in non peccando facilitas. Sed Adam facilius potuit vitare peccatum quam aliquis sequentium. Ergo ipse gravius peccavit. Obj. 1: To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the sin of Adam was graver than all other sins. For, as Augustine says in The City of God: one who has great ease in not sinning has great iniquity in sinning. But Adam was more easily able to avoid sin than anyone who followed him. Therefore, he sinned more gravely. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod ex hoc aliquid est malum, quia adimit bonum. Sed peccatum primi hominis plus de bono ademit, totam naturam humanam corrumpens, quam aliquod peccatorum sequentium. Ergo pejus aliis fuit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that something is evil due to the fact that it takes away from the good. But the sin of the first man took away more from the good than any subsequent sins have, by corrupting the whole of human nature. Therefore, it was worse than the rest. Praeterea, majori culpae major poena debetur. Sed peccatum Adae gravissime punitum fuit a Deo, quia ad omnes posteros ejus poena extenditur. Ergo gravius aliis fuit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a greater fault is due a greater punishment. But Adam's sin was punished most severely by God, since the punishment extends to all his descendants. Therefore, it was graver than the rest. Praeterea, videtur quod etiam irremissibile fuerit. Quia bonum gratiae excedit bonum naturae. Angelus autem per peccatum a statu naturalium tantum cecidit, secundum opinionem illorum qui dicunt eos in naturalibus tantum creatos; homo autem etiam a statu gratiae cecidit. Cum ergo tantum casus sit gravior quantum gradus est altior, videtur quod irremissibilius fuerit peccatum Adae quam etiam daemonis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that it was even unforgivable. For the good of grace exceeds the good of nature. Now, the angels fell through sin from a state of natural endowments alone, according to the opinion of those who say that they were only created in a state of natural endowments, whereas man fell even from the state of grace. Therefore, since the higher the level the graver the fall, it seems that Adam's sin was even more unforgivable than that of the demons. Praeterea, bonum est potentius quam malum. Sed Adam per peccatum totam naturam humanam corrupit, quia in eo originaliter erat. Si ergo poenitere potuisset, et sic remedium peccati sui habere, videtur quod totam naturam humanam reintegrare potuisset: quod falsum est, quia hoc solus filius Dei potuit. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 5: Furthermore, good is more potent than evil. But Adam corrupted the whole of human nature through sin, since it was in him as its origin. Therefore, if he could have repented and in this way obtained a remedy for his sin, it seems that he could have reintegrated the whole of human nature. But this is false, since only the Son of God could do this. Therefore, the same follows as before. Sed contra, illud quod habet plures rationes mali, magis est malum. Sed Adam peccavit faciendo illud quod erat malum, solum quia prohibitum; multi autem peccant faciendo illud quod est utroque modo malum, et secundum se, et quia prohibitum. Ergo videtur quod multorum peccata graviora sint peccato Adae. On the contrary, that which has more reasons why it is evil is more evil. But Adam sinned by doing what was evil only because it was prohibited, whereas many sin by doing what is evil in both ways: both in itself and because it is prohibited. Therefore, it seems that there are many whose sins are graver than the sin of Adam. Praeterea, peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, gravius est peccato quod est per ignorantiam. Sed peccatum primum hominis fuit quodammodo per ignorantiam, ut infra patebit. Ergo videtur quod eo multa graviora sint, quae ex certa malitia perpetrantur. Furthermore, a sin out of certain malice is more grave than a sin through ignorance. But man's first sin was in a certain way through ignorance, as will be clear below. Therefore, it seems that there are many sins graver than it, which are perpetrated out of certain malice. Respondeo dicendum, quod in peccato possunt multa considerari, ex quibus peccatum gravitatem trahere potest; et contingit quod illud peccatum quod secundum unum est gravius, secundum aliud levius inveniatur. Illud tamen simpliciter gravius considerandum est quod secundum plura et potentiora gravius invenitur, et praecipue secundum speciem peccati: quia quantitas consequens speciem peccati, est peccato essentialior quam quae circumstantias peccati sequitur. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum, quod peccatum Adae quantum ad hoc gravius aliis fuit quod minori tentatione pulsatus cecidit, et quod facilius resistere potuisset; sed quantum ad speciem peccati, et quantum ad alias circumstantias, quae peccatum magis exaggerant, multa graviora peccata sunt secuta. I answer that we can consider many factors in a sin from which it can derive gravity. Sometimes a sin is graver in one respect and lighter in another. But we must consider as graver simply that which is found to be graver in more, and in more important respects, especially with regard to the species of sin. For magnitude following on the species of sin is more essential than magnitude following on the circumstances of sin. Therefore, in this regard we should say that the sin of Adam was graver than others with respect to the fact that he fell when impelled by a lesser temptation, one that he could have more easily resisted. But with regard to the species of sin and other circumstances that can aggravate a sin more, there are many graver sins that have since followed. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Reply Obj. 1: And in this way the reply to the first objection is clear. Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc fuit per accidens quod majorem laesionem intulit, ex hoc scilicet quod naturam integram invenit; unde non sequitur quod gravius ceteris fuerit, quia hoc idem etiam sequentia peccata fecissent, si talem naturam invenissent; sicut et secundum peccatum mortale gratia non privat, quia eam non invenit; sed privaret, si inveniret. Reply Obj. 2: The fact that this sin brought greater harm was incidental, that is, due to its occurrence in an integral nature. Hence it does not follow that it was graver than the rest, since the sins that have followed could also have done the same if they had occurred in such a nature, just as when a mortal sin does not deprive someone of grace because it is not there, though it would deprive him if grace were present. Ad tertium dicendum, quod poena peccati Adae dupliciter dicitur. Una quae debetur sibi inquantum est quoddam singulare peccatum et personale; et sic multis aliis peccatis gravior poena debita fuit. Alia quae debetur sibi indirecte ratione infectionis originalis peccati ex ipso creatae, et sic maxima poena ipsum primum peccatum secuta est. Sed gravitas hujus poenae non commensuratur quantitati primi peccati ut fuit quoddam personale peccatum, sed secundum quod corrumpit naturam. Reply Obj. 3: The punishment of Adam's sin is spoken of in two ways. One punishment is due to it inasmuch as it is an individual and personal sin. And in this way a graver punishment was due to many other sins. The other is due to it indirectly by reason of the original infection of sin created from it. And in this way the greatest punishment followed the first sin. But the gravity of this punishment is not commensurate with the magnitude of the first sin as a personal sin, but rather as corrupting the nature. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis gratia excedat naturam, tamen quia potentia naturalis est quae substantiam actus administrat (qui ex gratia informatur), ideo defectus naturalis boni magis excusat peccati actum quam etiam carentia gratiae: gratia enim non elevat hominem ut statim eliciat actum intellectus deiformis, quod tamen angelus ex natura habet: et ideo magis facit ad irremissibilitatem peccati superioritas naturae quam excessus gratiae. Causa tamen quare peccatum angeli est irremissibile, et non peccatum hominis, supra, in tractatu de angelis, dicta est. Reply Obj. 4: Even though grace exceeds nature, nonetheless because natural potency is what serves the substance of an act (one informed by grace), the lack of a natural good excuses a sinful act even more than lack of grace. For grace does not elevate a man in such a way that he immediately elicits an act of God-like understanding, and yet angels have this by nature. And thus, superiority of nature leads rather to a more unforgiveable sin than abundance of grace. But the reason why an angel's sin is unforgivable and not a man's has been spoken of above in the treatment of the angels. Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut homo per se gratiam amittere potest, nec tamen per se potest gratiam recuperare, quia gratia virtutem naturae excedit: ita etiam homo potuit integritatem innocentiae amittere, quae conditionem naturae excedebat, ut dictum est, nec tamen potuit eam recuperare nisi ille qui supra naturam erat: nam gratia quae postmodum Adae reddita creditur, non nisi ad actus personales se extendebat; unde naturam in illud quod supra se est, elevare non poterat, scilicet in originalem justitiam, et impassibilitatem, quae supra conditionem principiorum naturae humanae erat. Reply Obj. 5: Just as man can lose grace by himself and yet cannot recover grace by himself, since grace exceeds the power of nature, so also man could lose the integrity of innocence, which exceeded the condition of nature, as has been said, and yet was not able to recover it, with the exception of him who was above nature. For the grace that afterwards is believed to have been given to Adam only extended to personal acts. Hence it could not elevate nature to what is above it, namely, to original justice and impassibility, which were above the condition of the principles of human nature. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Adam in statu innocentiae potuerit peccare venialiter Whether in the state of innocence Adam could have sinned venially? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in primo statu venialiter peccare potuit. Dispositio enim praecedit perfectionem. Sed veniale est dispositio ad mortale. Ergo videtur quod prius venialiter quam mortaliter peccaverit. Obj. 1: To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that in the first state Adam could have sinned venially. For disposition precedes perfection. But a venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Therefore, it seems that he sinned venially prior to sinning mortally. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium se habet ad opposita, et praecipue si confirmatum non sit. Sed liberum arbitrium hominis in primo statu confirmatum non erat. Ergo sicut poterat non peccare venialiter, ita etiam poterat peccare venialiter. Obj. 2: Furthermore, free choice stands in relation to opposites, especially if it is not confirmed. But in the first state man's free choice was not confirmed. Therefore, just as he was able not to sin venially, so also he was able to sin venially. Praeterea, quicumque potest id quod plus est, potest illud quod minus est. Sed plus est peccare mortaliter quam venialiter. Cum ergo potuit peccare mortaliter, potuit peccare venialiter. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever can do what is greater can do what is less. But it is greater to sin mortally than to sin venially. Therefore, since he was able to sin mortally, he could also sin venially. Praeterea, mortale peccatum magis repugnat rectitudini et gratiae, quam peccatum veniale. Sed rectitudo innocentiae non impediebat quin mortaliter peccare posset. Ergo multo minus impediebat quin etiam venialiter peccaret. Obj. 4: Furthermore, mortal sin is more opposed to uprightness and grace than venial sin. But the uprightness of innocence did not impede his being able to sin mortally. Therefore, all the less did it impede his ability to sin venially as well.