Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non crediderunt Deum falsum dixisse, hoc enim simpliciter infidelitatis fuisset, sed crediderunt forte alio modo intelligendum fore et metaphorice, et ad aliud significandum dictum. Reply Obj. 1: They did not believe that God had said something false (for this would have belonged to infidelity simply). Rather, they believed, perhaps, that what he said should be understood in some other way, and metaphorically, and for signifying something else. Vel dicendum, quod ex ipsa elatione qua illud quod promittebatur appetebant, oculus mentis impeditus fuit ne actualiter veritatem divini dicti attenderent, secundum quod omnis malus aliquo modo ignorans est. Sed talis ignorantia vel dubietas, etiam credendorum, infidelitatem non facit. Or it may be said that from the very self-exaltation by which they desired what was promised, the eye of the mind was impeded from actually attending to the truth of what God said, insofar as every wicked person is in some way ignorant. But such ignorance or doubtfulness, even of things that must be believed, does not produce infidelity. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ordo compositionis est contrarius ordini resolutionis: quia quod est primum in compositione est ultimum in resolutione: et ideo non sequitur quod si fides est prima in compositione aedificii spiritualis, infidelitas sit prima in resolutione ejusdem. Reply Obj. 2: The order of assembly is contrary to the order of disassembly. For what is first in assembly is last in disassembly. Thus, it does not follow that if faith is first in the assembly of the spiritual building then infidelity is first in its disassembly. Ad tertium dicendum, quod inobedientia dupliciter sumitur: quandoque enim est speciale peccatum, quando scilicet ex contemptu praecepti aliquis specialiter peccat; quandoque autem sumitur prout est conditio generalis consequens omne peccatum mortale; cum enim praeceptum legis actus omnium virtutum ordinet, consequens est ut quodlibet vitium transgressionem annexam praecepti habeat et inobedientiam: et sic dicitur, loc. cit.: per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi. Reply Obj. 3: Disobedience is taken in two ways. Sometimes it is a specific sin, namely, when someone sins specifically out of contempt of a precept. But sometimes disobedience is taken as being a general condition consequent upon every mortal sin. For since a precept of law orders the acts of all the virtues, the consequence is that any vice has a connected transgression of a precept, and thus disobedience. This is the way in which it is said: by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners (Rom 5:19). Ad quartum dicendum, quod motivum gulae non fuit principale motivum, sed secundarium, et ordinatum ad aliud, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: The motive of gluttony was not the principal motive but was, rather, secondary and ordered to another, as has been said. Ad quintum dicendum, quod non peccavit mulier in hoc quod appeteret scientiam eorum quae ad ipsam non pertinebant, quia hoc curiositas fuisset; sed in hoc quod in scientia eminentiam desideravit, ut in hoc quodammodo Deo aequaretur. Reply Obj. 5: The woman did not sin in this, that she desired knowledge of things that did not pertain to her, since this would have been curiosity. Rather, she sinned in this, that in that knowledge she desired an eminence that would in a certain way make her equal to God. Ad sextum dicendum, quod non tenebatur tunc conferre, quia etiam sine collatione poterat tentationi resistere. Reply Obj. 6: Man was not at that time bound to give such consideration, since he could have resisted the temptation even without such consideration. Vel dicendum melius quod fuit ibi omissio, non prout est speciale peccatum, sed prout est consequens omne peccatum: in omni enim peccato commune est hoc quod aliquis non facit quod in se est ad resistendum peccato, quod si faceret, non peccaret. Or we may better say that there was in this case an omission, not as a specific sin, but as the omission that is consequent upon every sin. For every sin has in common the fact that someone does not do what is in him to resist the sin, which, if he were to do, he would not sin. Ad septimum dicendum, quod cupiditas tripliciter sumitur. Uno modo prout est speciale peccatum, et habet materiam specialem, scilicet bona ad usum vitae pertinentia, prout possidentur: et sic non est radix omnis peccati, nisi secundum quod infra Magister dicit, quod non est aliquod genus peccati quod non interdum ex avaritia oriatur. Secundo modo dicitur cupiditas, ut est generale peccatum, prout est immoderatus appetitus habendi quodcumque, vel scientiam, vel possessionem, vel quodlibet aliud: et hoc modo supra Magister dixit in primo peccato hominis esse avaritiam: et hos duos modos ponit Augustinus, 11 Super Genes., cap. 15. Tertio modo, prout non est peccatum, sed radix peccati, prout dicit quamdam pronitatem appetitus ut inclinetur ad aliquid inordinate appetendum in actu. Et constat quod primo modo, ut cupiditas est speciale peccatum, homo ex avaritia non peccavit. Reply Obj. 7: Cupidity is taken in three ways. In one way, it is taken as being a specific sin, having specific matter, namely, goods pertaining to usefulness for life insofar as they are possessed. In this way, it is not the root of all sin, except as the Master says below, that there is no genus of sin that does not at times arise from avarice. In the second way, cupidity is spoken of as a general sin, being the immoderate desire for possessing anything, whether knowledge, or a possession, or anything else. This is the way in which the Master said above that in man’s first sin there was avarice. And these are the two ways that Augustine posits. In the third way, cupidity is taken not as a sin but as the root of sin, indicating a kind of propensity of the appetite inclining to something actually and inordinately desired. And it is obvious that man did not sin out of avarice in the first way, there understanding cupidity as a specific sin. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum peccatum hominis fuerit hoc quod appetierit esse sicut Deus Whether man’s sin was that he desired to be just like God Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum hominis non fuerit in hoc quod appetiit esse sicut Deus. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that man’s sin was not that he desired to be just like God. Completa enim voluntas prudentis de impossibili esse non potest, et praecipue de illo quod in apprehensionem non cadit. Sed aliquam creaturam esse sicut Deus est impossibile, nec intellectu capi potest. Ergo hoc modo non appetiit, cum prudentiam et reliquas virtutes haberet, ut infra Magister dicit. Obj. 1: For a prudent person cannot have a complete will for what is impossible, especially what does not fall within apprehension. But it is impossible for a created thing to be just like God, and this cannot even be grasped by the intellect. Therefore, since he had prudence and the rest of the virtues, he did not desire in this way, as the Master says below. Si dicatur, quod non appetiit esse sicut Deus per aequalitatem, sed per similitudinem, Obj. 2: One might say that he did not desire to be just like God by way of equality, but instead by way of likeness. contra. Sicut dicit Augustinus, Conc. 8 in Ps. 118, amor est eorum quae non habentur. Cum ergo homo in sui creatione ad Dei similitudinem factus sit, videtur quod hoc homo non appetiit. On the contrary, as Augustine says, love pertains to things that are possessed, but desire pertains to things that are not possessed. Therefore, since man was made after the likeness of God at his creation, it seems that man did not desire this. Praeterea, constat quod malum per experientiam Deus scire non potest. Sed scientia boni et mali intelligitur de malo per experientiam, quae prius erat per cognitionem tantum. Ergo videtur quod ex hoc quod appetiit scientiam boni et mali, Dei similitudinem non affectavit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is obvious that God does not know evil through experience. But the knowledge of good and evil is understood to mean evil by experience, which was previously through knowledge alone. Therefore, it seems that from the fact that he desired knowledge of good and evil, he did not aspire to likeness to God. Praeterea, Philosophus, dicit 10 Ethic., quod debemus nos in divina trahere quantum possumus: quia ipse nobis divina non invidet, ut quidam poeta mentiebatur. Dionysius autem, 5 De div. nom., et Augustinus, 7 De Trinit., cap. ult., dicunt quod ad Deum acceditur non loco, sed similitudine. Cum ergo ad ipsum accedere debeamus, ut in Psal. 33:6, dicitur: accedite ad eum, et illuminamini, videtur quod non peccavit in hoc quod Dei similitudinem appetiit. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 that we should draw ourselves up into the things of God as much as we are able. For he does not begrudge us what is divine, as a certain poet lied. Now, Dionysius and Augustine say that one approaches God not in place but in likeness. Therefore, since we should approach him—as it is said, come to him and be enlightened (Ps 34:5 [33:6])—it seems that he did not sin in desiring likeness to God. Praeterea, nullus peccat in appetendo illud quod naturaliter desiderat. Sed omnes homines, ut Philosophus dicit in prooem. Metaph., natura desiderant scire. Cum ergo non appetiit divinam similitudinem nisi in scientia, ut verba serpentis ostendunt, videtur quod in appetendo Dei similitudinem non peccavit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one sins in desiring what he naturally desires. But all men, as the Philosopher says, by nature desire to know. Therefore, since he desired the divine likeness only in knowledge, as the serpent’s words show, it seems that in desiring likeness to God he did not sin. Sed contra est quod in littera dicitur per Augustinum, Super Psalm. 70: qui perverse vult esse sicut Deus, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut diabolus et homo. Hoc etiam videtur ex improperio Dei, quod Genes. 3:22, ponitur: ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est. On the contrary, in the text Augustine is cited as saying: one who perversely wishes to be as God, perversely wishes to be like God, as in the case of the devil and man. This is even seen from God’s reproach: behold, the man has become like one of us (Gen 3:22). Respondeo dicendum quod homo quantum ad aliquid appetiit esse sicut Deus: quantum vero ad aliquid non. Si enim “sicut” dicat aequalitatem in aliqua perfectione, sic homo noluit quod ipse haberet tantam scientiam, vel potentiam, vel bonitatem quantam habet Deus: quia hoc ipsum impossibile et incogitabile est; sed quantum ad aliquem modum habendi voluit Deo parificari tam homo quam diabolus, ut scilicet uterque haberet perfectionem sibi datam, sicut habet Deus secundum aliquem modum; sed differenter: quia superbus angelus appetiit talem aequalitatem in potestate, sed homo in scientia. I answer that in one respect man desired to be like God, though in another respect he did not. For if “like” indicates equality in any perfection, then in this way, man did not wish to have as much knowledge, power, or goodness as God has, since this is impossible and unthinkable. But as regards a manner of possession, both man and the devil willed to be put on par with God—that is, that both would have the perfection given to them as God has it in a certain manner, though man and the devil desired this differently. For the proud angel desired this kind of equality in power, while man desired it in knowledge. Cujus ratio est, quia primus angelus inter alias creaturas excellentior erat; unde quodammodo ex ordine suae naturae influentiam super alias creaturas habebat. Voluit ergo dignitati suae naturae innixus, ut ipse principium quoddam creaturarum sequentium existeret per gubernationis et causalitatis cujusdam modum, tamen sub primo principio a quo suam potentiam recognoscebat, sed hoc secundum dignitatem naturae suae adipisci praesumebat, non ex divino munere superaddito. Homo vero qui creaturis inferioribus superpositus erat, ut eas regeret et eis uteretur, non tam per potentiam quam per prudentiam, hoc modo appetiit ut per naturae suae conditionem et ligni prohibiti edulium tantam scientiae plenitudinem consequeretur ut ex lumine propriae rationis, quod tamen a Deo sibi collatum esse credebat, et seipsum regeret in omnibus, et inferiora sibi subjecta. Unde Augustinus dicit Super Psal. 70, ubi supra, quod noluit ut servus teneri praecepto quasi ab alio regulatus per lumen naturali lumini superadditum. Et hoc etiam verba serpentis ostendunt, qui promisit scientiam boni et mali, quod ad actiones pertinet, et ad gubernationem rerum. The reason for this is that the first angel was most excellent among other created things. Hence in a certain way it had an influence on other created things by the order of its nature. And so, relying on the dignity of its nature, it wished to exist as a kind of principle of subsequent creatures by a mode of governance and a certain causality. Still, it willed to be under the first principle, which it recognized to be the source of its power, but it presumed to get this on the basis of the dignity of its nature, not from an additional gift of God. But man, who was placed over lower creatures to rule them and to make use of them, not so much through power but through prudence, desired to obtain such great fullness of knowledge through the condition of his own nature, and through the eating of the forbidden tree, that by the light of his own reason (which he nevertheless believed was conferred on him by God) he would rule himself in all matters as well as the lower things subject to him. Hence Augustine says that he did not wish to be a servant bound by precept, as though ruled by another through a light added to his natural light. And the words of the serpent show this as well, since it promised knowledge of good and evil, which pertain to actions and to the governance of things. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod elatio intantum caecat oculos mentis ut illud aestimet esse possibile quod possibile non est; unde potuit esse ut ad verba serpentis homo excellentiam inordinate appeteret in communi, ex illo appetitu ratio excaecata, perversum judicium de impossibili proferret, et sic appetitus declinaret ad hunc excellentiae modum. Reply Obj. 1: Self-exaltation blinds the eyes of the mind so much that it esteems possible what is not possible. Hence it could have been that at the serpent’s words man inordinately desired excellence in general, while reason was blinded by that desire, he rendered a perverse judgment about the impossible, and so his appetite inclined to this manner of excellence. Vel dicendum, quod aequalitatem aequiparantiae, quod impossibile est et cogitari non potest, non appetiit, sed assimilationem quamdam, ut dictum est, quam cogitare potuit. Or we may say that he did not desire equality of equivalence (which is impossible and cannot be conceived of in thought), but rather a kind of assimilation, as has been said, which he was able to conceive in thought. Ad secundum dicendum, quod similitudinem naturalis dignitatis quam in creatione accepit appetendo non peccavit, sed super hoc appetendo aliam similitudinem, ut scilicet sicut Deus lumine suae naturae omnia regit et gubernat, ita etiam homo per naturale lumen rationis sibi subdita gubernaret, et seipsum sine adjutorio exterioris luminis. Reply Obj. 2: He did not sin by desiring the likeness of natural dignity that he received at his creation, but rather, by desiring another likeness above this, namely, that as God by the light of his nature rules and governs all things, so also man would govern things subject to himself and himself through the natural light of reason without the help of an external light. Ad tertium dicendum, quod homo non appetiit mala per experientiam scire, sed per judicium: sed hoc consecutum est ex peccato suo quod malum per experimentum cognosceret; ut sic et daemonis promissio verificaretur impleta, cujus consuetudo est ut dubiis verbis homines fallat, et ut nomen arbori impositum non frustra videatur. Reply Obj. 3: Man did not desire to know evils by experience, but instead by judgment. But it followed from his sin that he came to know evil by experience, so that in this way, when it was carried out, the demon’s promise even came true, whose custom it is to deceive men with doubtful words, and also so that the name given to the tree would not seem to be in vain. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ad Dei similitudinem accedendum est, secundum modum et ordinem unicuique a Deo praestitum; sed qui proprio motu ad Dei similitudinem accesserit, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut Augustinus dicit in littera; omnis enim peccator appetit similitudinem Dei, cum nihil sit appetibile nisi prout ejus similitudinem habet: sed in hoc peccat, quia quaerit ejus similitudinem inordinate, et in quo quaerenda non est. Reply Obj. 4: Likeness to God should be approached in accord with the manner and order offered to each by God. But one who would approach God by his own motion wills to be like God in a perverse way, as Augustine says in the text. For every sinner desires likeness to God, since nothing is desirable except insofar as it has a likeness to him. But in this he sins, since he seeks likeness to him inordinately and in something in which this likeness is not to be sought. Ad quintum dicendum, quod non peccavit in hoc quod scientiam appetiit, sed quia inordinate appetiit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 5: He did not sin in this, that he desired knowledge, but rather because he desired it inordinately, as has been said. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum mulier gravius peccaverit quam vir Whether the woman sinned more gravely than the man Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier gravius quam vir non peccaverit. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the woman did not sin more gravely than the man. Uterque enim elationis vitio peccavit. Sed elatio illa non fuit nisi in hoc quod Dei similitudinem perverse appetierunt. Ergo videtur quod uterque idem appetiit, et aequaliter peccaverunt. Obj. 1: For both sinned by the vice of self-exaltation. But that self-exaltation was only in this, that they perversely desired likeness to God. Therefore, it seems that both desired the same thing and sinned equally. Praeterea, infirmitas peccatum excusat. Sed mulier infirmior fuit viro, propter quod diabolus, ut dictum est supra, eam primo aggressus est. Ergo videtur quod ipsa minus peccaverit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, weakness excuses from sin. But the woman was weaker than the man, for which reason the devil, as was said above, first approached her. Therefore, it seems that she sinned less. Praeterea, propter hoc peccatum daemonis gravius judicatur quam peccatum hominis, quod eminentiorem cognitionem de Deo habebat. Sed vir magis erat praeditus spirituali mente quam mulier, ut in littera significatur. Ergo videtur quod ipse gravius peccaverit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the reason why the demon’s sin is judged graver than man’s sin is that it had more eminent knowledge about God. But the man was more endowed with a spiritual mind than the woman, as it says in the text. Therefore, it seems that he sinned more gravely. Praeterea, regimen mulieris ad virum pertinebat; unde et supra dictum est quod per virum ad mulierem praeceptum delatum est. Ergo videtur quod etiam peccatum mulieris viro imputandum sit, et magis aggravandum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the governance of the woman pertained to the man. Hence it is also said above that the precept was given to the woman through the man. Therefore, it seems that even the woman’s sin should be imputed to the man and reckoned graver. Praeterea, peccare ex consideratione misericordiae divinae, videtur esse peccatum praesumptionis, quae est species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum, quod est gravissimum. Cum ergo vir peccaverit cogitans de Dei misericordia, ut in littera dicitur, videtur quod ipse gravius peccaverit quam mulier. Obj. 5: Furthermore, to sin with regard to the divine mercy seems to be the sin of presumption, which is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, which is most grave. Therefore, since the man sinned by thinking of God’s mercy, as it says in the text, it seems that he sinned more gravely than the woman. Sed contra, peccatum a diabolo pervenit in mulierem, et a muliere in virum. Sed diabolus gravius peccavit quam mulier. Ergo et mulier gravius quam vir. On the contrary, sin came from the devil to the woman and from the woman to the man. But the devil sinned more gravely than the woman. Therefore, the woman also sinned more gravely than the man.