Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum liberum arbitrium possit cogi Whether free decision can be compelled Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium cogi possit. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that free decision can be compelled. Quod enim immutatur ab aliquo agente cogitur ab illo. Sed, ut dicit Glossa ad Rom., c. 9, Deus potest immutare voluntatem hominum in quodcumque voluerit. Ergo videtur quod voluntas a Deo cogi possit, et ita liberum arbitrium. Obj. 1: For what is changed by an agent is compelled by it. But, as a Gloss on Romans says, God can change the will of men to whatever he wishes. Therefore, it seems that the will can be compelled by God, and so also the free decision. Praeterea, omne agens quod non potest aliter operari quam ab altero sibi determinatur, cogitur ab illo. Sed liberum arbitrium non potest aliter operari quam Deus praescivit vel praedestinavit. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium a Deo cogatur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, every agent that cannot work otherwise than determined for it by another is compelled by that other. But free decision cannot work otherwise than God has foreknown or predestined. Therefore, it seems that free decision is compelled by God. Praeterea, virtus superior potest cogere inferiorem. Sed in ordine universi quaedam virtutes sunt superiores quam liberum arbitrium. Ergo ipsum cogere possunt. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a higher power can compel a lower power. But in the order of the universe there are some powers higher than free decision. Therefore, they are able to compel it. Praeterea, intellectus est altior potentia quam voluntas. Sed intellectus cogitur in demonstrationibus, ut ex 5 Metaph. apparet. Ergo videtur quod etiam voluntas et liberum arbitrium cogi possint. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the intellect is a higher power than the will. But the intellect is compelled in demonstrations, as is apparent from the Metaphysics 5. Therefore, it seems that the will and the free decision can be compelled as well. Praeterea, motus inferiores regulantur secundum motus superiores: quia omne quod non uniformiter se habet, regulatur per aliquid uniformiter se habens. Sed motus liberi arbitrii maxime difformiter se habent. Ergo videtur quod indigeant regulari per actiones uniformiter se habentes. Hujusmodi autem in natura non sunt nisi motus caeli. Ergo per motus siderum regulantur opera liberi arbitrii, et per eorum potentiam cogi possunt: quod patet ex hoc quod astrologi per cursum siderum aliqua de operationibus libero arbitrio subjectis praenuntiant. Obj. 5: Furthermore, lower motions are regulated according to higher motions. For everything that is not uniform is regulated by something that is uniform. But the motions of free decision are supremely non-uniform. Therefore, it seems that they need to be regulated by uniform activities. Now, there are no such motions in nature except the motions of the heavens. Therefore, the works of free decision are regulated by the motions of the stars and can be compelled by their power. This is clear from the fact that, by way of the course of the stars, astronomers announce in advance certain matters pertaining to the activities subject to free decision. Praeterea, omne quod vincitur ab aliquo cogitur ab illo. Sed incontinentes, qui ducuntur passionibus, vincuntur ut ex 7 Ethic. patet. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium cogi possit. Obj. 6: Furthermore, everything that is overcome by another is compelled by it. But the incontinent, who are led by passions, are so overcome, as is clear from the Ethics 7. Therefore, it seems that free decision can be compelled. Praeterea, difficilius est aliquem privare omnino suo actu quam suum actum immutare. Sed usus liberi arbitrii potest per violentiam impediri, ut in phreneticis patet. Ergo etiam videtur quod per violentiam cogi possit ad aliquid agendum. Obj. 7: Furthermore, it is more difficult to deprive someone of his act altogether than to change his act. But the use of free decision can be impeded by violence, as is clear in the case of the insane. Therefore, it also seems that it can be compelled to do something by violence. Sed contra, ut dicit Augustinus contra Tullium, in lib. 5 De civitate Dei, cap. 9, quod est necessarium non est voluntarium. Sed liberum arbitrium in ratione sua voluntarium habet, cum sit facultas rationis et voluntatis. Ergo videtur quod non possit per necessitatem cogi. On the contrary, as Augustine says against Cicero, what is necessary is not voluntary. But free decision holds the voluntary in its own account, since it is the faculty of reason and will. Therefore, it seems that it cannot be compelled by necessity. Praeterea, quidquid cogitur non habet dominium sui actus. Sed ex hoc liberum arbitrium in nobis dicitur quod domini sumus nostrorum actuum. Ergo videtur quod hoc sit contra rationem liberi arbitrii quod cogatur. Furthermore, whatever is compelled does not have mastery of its own act. But we speak of free decision in ourselves precisely from the fact that we are the masters of our own acts. Therefore, it seems that it is contrary to the account of free decision that it be compelled. Respondeo dicendum, quod est duplex coactio: quaedam sufficiens, quae compulsio vocatur; quaedam vero insufficiens, quae vocatur impulsio. I answer that there are two kinds of compelling: one is sufficient, which is called “compulsion”; the other is insufficient, which is called “impulsion.” Sciendum est igitur quod in partibus animae quaedam sunt quae compelli possunt: sed dupliciter. Quaedam enim compelluntur ex subjecto, sicut illae vires quae sunt organis affixae: cum enim sine organis operationes habere non possint, compulsis organis, ipsae virtutes prohibentur vel compelluntur, earum actibus violenter extortis. Quaedam vero sunt quae quidem subjecto non compelluntur, quia organis affixae non sunt; compelluntur tamen objecto, sicut intellectus: ipse enim non est actus alicujus partis corporis, ut Philosophus dicit in 3 De anima, et tamen demonstrationis vi cogitur. Thus, it should be known that among the parts of the soul there are some that can be compelled, though in two ways. For some are compelled on the basis of the subject, such as those powers that are attached to organs. For since their activities cannot be had without organs, when the organs are compelled, the powers themselves are restricted or compelled, their acts being violently extorted. But there are others that are not compelled by means of the subject, since they are not attached to organs, but are instead compelled by the object, such as the intellect. For the intellect is not the act of any part of the body, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3, and yet it is compelled by force of demonstration. Voluntas autem neque subjecto cogi potest, cum non sit organo affixa, neque objecto; quantumcumque enim aliquid ostendatur esse bonum, in potestate ejus remanet eligere illud vel non eligere. Cujus ratio est, quia objectum intellectus est verum, objectum autem voluntatis est bonum. Invenitur autem aliquod verum in quo nulla falsitatis apparentia admisceri potest, ut patet in dignitatibus; unde intellectus non potest subterfugere quin illis assentiat. Similiter etiam invenitur aliquod falsum quod nullam veri apparentiam habet, ut patet in oppositis dignitatum; unde illi nullatenus intellectus assentire potest. Similiter etiam si proponatur voluntati aliquod bonum quod completam boni rationem habeat, ut ultimus finis, propter quem omnia appetuntur, non potest voluntas hoc non velle; unde nullus non potest non velle esse felix, aut velle esse miser. Now, the will can be compelled neither by means of the subject, since it is not attached to an organ, nor by means of the object. For however good something is shown to be, it remains in the will’s power to choose it or not to choose it. The reason for this is that the object of the intellect is the true and the object of the will is the good. But we find something true in which no appearance of falsity can be commingled, as is clear in the case of axioms. Hence the intellect cannot help assenting to them. Likewise, too, we find something false that has no appearance of truth, as is clear in the opposites of axioms. Hence the intellect can in no way assent to it. Likewise, too, if a good is proposed to the will that has the complete account of the good, as does the last end, for whose sake all things are desired, the will cannot not will this. Hence no one can not will to be happy or will to be wretched. In his autem quae ad finem ultimum ordinantur, nihil invenitur adeo malum quin aliquod bonum admixtum habeat, nec aliquod adeo bonum quod in omnibus sufficiat: unde quantumcumque ostendatur bonum vel malum, semper potest adhaerere et fugere in contrarium, ratione alterius quod in ipso est, ex quo accipitur, si malum est simpliciter, ut apparens bonum, et si bonum est simpliciter, ut apparens malum; et inde est quod in omnibus quae sub electione cadunt, voluntas libera manet, in hoc solo determinationem habens quod felicitatem naturaliter appetit, et non determinate in hoc vel illo. However, as for those things that are ordered to the last end, we find nothing so evil that it has no good mixed with it, and nothing so good that it is sufficient in every respect. Hence, however good or evil it seems, the will can always cling to it or flee to the contrary by reason of some other aspect that is in it—that is, if it is evil simply, by taking it as an apparent good, and if it is good simply, as an apparent evil. So it is that, in everything that falls under choice, the will remains free, possessing a determination only in the fact that it naturally desires happiness, but not determined to this or that. Quamvis autem cogi non possit, nihilominus tamen potest inclinari ad agendum aliquid per aliquas dispositiones et habitus ex quibus pronior efficitur ad eligendum alteram partem. But even though the will cannot be compelled, it can still be inclined to do something through given dispositions and habits from which it becomes more prone to choose one side over the other. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus operatur in voluntate et in libero arbitrio secundum ejus exigentiam; unde etiamsi voluntatem hominis in aliud mutet, nihilominus tamen hoc sua omnipotentia facit ut illud in quod mutatur, voluntarie velit: et ita coactionis ratio tollitur; alias esset contradictionis implicatio, si diceretur nolle illud in quod mutatur, et cogi ad illud: quia necessitas coactionis voluntati contraria est, ut in 5 Metaph. Philosophus dicit. Reply Obj. 1: God works in the will and in free decision according to its specific requirement. Hence even if he changes man’s will to something else, he nevertheless does this by his omnipotence in such a way that the person voluntarily wills that to which his will is changed. Thus, the account of compulsion is taken away. Otherwise there would be an implied contradiction, if one were said not to will that to which his will is changed and to be compelled to it. For compulsion’s necessity is contrary to the will, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5. Ad secundum dicendum, quod divina praescientia necessitatem libero arbitrio non imponit, quamvis hoc quod praescitum est impossibile sit non evenire; et hoc quomodo esse possit in 1 libro ostensum est. Reply Obj. 2: The divine foreknowledge does not impose necessity on free decision, even though it is impossible for what is foreknown not to occur. How this can be the case was shown in Book I. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad actum liberi arbitrii, nulla virtus est eo superior, nisi Deus, quamvis forte aliqua alia virtus creata simpliciter potentior sit; unde nulla virtus creata liberum arbitrium cogere nec immutare potest. Deus autem potest quidem immutare, sed non cogere, eo modo quo dicitur non posse facere ut duo contradictoria sint simul. Reply Obj. 3: Other than God, no power is higher than the act of free decision, though perhaps another created power is stronger simply. Hence no created power can compel or change free decision. However, God can change free decision, but he cannot compel it, in the way that we say he cannot make two contradictories to be at the same time. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis intellectus sit superior virtus quam voluntas ratione ordinis, quia prior est et a voluntate praesupponitur; tamen voluntas etiam quodammodo superior est, secundum quod imperium habet super omnes animae vires, propter hoc quod ejus objectum est finis; unde convenientissime in ipsa summum libertatis invenitur; liber enim dicitur qui causa sui est, ut in 1 Metaph. dicitur. Reply Obj. 4: Even though the intellect is a higher power than the will by reason of order, since it is prior to the will and presupposed by it, the will is also higher in a certain way, insofar as it has command over all the soul’s powers on account of the fact that its object is the end. Hence it is most fitting that we find the height of freedom in it, for that is called “free” which is the cause of itself, as it says in the Metaphysics 1. Ad quintum dicendum, quod motus caelestis se habet ad liberum arbitrium sicut inclinans ad aliquid agendum, inquantum ex impressione corporis caelestis relinquitur aliqua dispositio in corpore, secundum quam anima efficitur prona ad hanc actionem vel illam, sicut ex naturali complexione, quidam sunt magis proni ad unum vitium quam alii; et hoc modo possunt astrologi praenuntiare aliquid ex his quae ex libero arbitrio dependent, conjecturaliter, et non per certitudinem scientiae, quia virtutem coactivam sufficienter super libero arbitrio non habent corpora caelestia. Unde etiam Ptolomaeus dicit, in Centiloquio, quod homo sapiens dominatur astris, quia per sapientiam suam potest vitare ea ad quae astra disponunt. Avicenna tamen videtur velle, ut supra dictum est, quod motus voluntatis reducantur sicut in regulans in animas corporum caelestium: quia ponit quod animae inferiores sunt ex animabus superioribus; unde non est mirum si impressionem habet anima superior in animam inferiorem. Sed secundum fidem Catholicam hoc stare non potest, quae ponit animas immediate a Deo creari; unde ipse solus in voluntate operari potest, et in ipsam imprimere; et ideo diversitates humanae voluntatis in uniformitatem voluntatis divinae reducuntur, sicut in primum regulans. Reply Obj. 5: The heavenly motion is related to free decision as inclining one toward doing something, inasmuch as the impression of a heavenly body leaves a disposition in the body in accord with which the soul is rendered prone to this or that action, just as by natural makeup some are more prone to one vice than others are. This is how astronomers can announce in advance something that depends on free decision, by way of conjecture and not by scientific certitude, since the heavenly bodies do not have sufficient compulsive power over free decision. Hence, too, Ptolemy says that the wise man is master of the stars, since by his wisdom he can avoid what the stars dispose him to. But Avicenna seems to be of the opinion, as was said above, that the motions of the will are traced back to the souls of the heavenly bodies as to their regulator. For he posits that the lower souls are from the higher souls. Hence it is no wonder if a higher soul makes an impression on a lower soul. But according to the Catholic faith, this cannot stand, for the faith asserts that souls are created immediately by God. Hence he alone can work in the will and make an impression on it. Thus, the differences between human wills are reduced to the uniformity of the divine will as to the first rule. Ad sextum dicendum, quod incontinens dicitur vinci a passionibus non quasi cogentibus, sed vehementer inclinantibus ad aliquid agendum. Reply Obj. 6: One who is incontinent is said to be overcome by the passions not as if they compelled him, but because they forcefully incline him to act in a certain way. Ad septimum dicendum, quod usus liberi arbitrii non impeditur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet ad usum liberi arbitrii requiritur usus rationis, et ad usum rationis requiritur usus imaginativae virtutis, qui per laesionem organi impeditur. Reply Obj. 7: The use of free decision is impeded not through itself, but incidentally, that is, inasmuch as the use of reason is required for the use of free decision, and the use of reason requires the use of the imaginative power, which is impeded by harm to the organ. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum liberum arbitrium se extendat ad omnia opera humana Whether free decision extends to all human works Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non se extendat ad omnia opera humana. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that free decision does not extend to all human works. Liberum enim arbitrium cogi non potest, ut dictum est. Sed quaedam opera humana cogi possunt; impeditur enim homo a motu per violentiam. Ergo non omnia opera humana sunt liberi arbitrii. Obj. 1: For, as we have said, free decision cannot be compelled. But some human works can be compelled. For by violence a human being is prevented from moving. Therefore, not all human works belong to free decision. Praeterea, in 1 Ethic. dicitur quod quaedam opera humana sunt fines. Electio autem non est finis, ut in 3 Ethic. dicitur. Cum igitur eligere sit actus liberi arbitrii, videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit omnium humanorum actuum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the Ethics 1 it says that some human works are ends. But a choice is not for the end, as it says in the Ethics 3. Therefore, since choosing is an act of free decision, it seems that free decision does not belong to all human acts. Praeterea, omnes actus liberi arbitrii sunt in potestate nostra. Sed quidam actus sunt in nobis, non in potestate nostra existentes, sicut actus generativae, nutritivae et augmentativae. Ergo non omnes actus nostri sunt liberi arbitrii. Obj. 3: Furthermore, all the acts of free decision are in our power. But there are some acts in us that are not within our power, such as the acts of the generative, nutritive, and augmentative parts. Therefore, not all our acts belong to free decision. Praeterea, potentia determinata est ad determinatos actus. Si igitur liberum arbitrium esset, omnium humanorum actuum non esset determinata sed universalis potentia, quod supra falsum esse dictum est. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a determinate power is to determinate acts. Therefore, if free decision were to belong to all human acts, it would be not a determinate but a universal power, which we said above is false. Praeterea, illud quod est praeter voluntatem est etiam praeter liberum arbitrium, cum liberum arbitrium sit facultas voluntatis et rationis, ut supra dictum est. Sed, ut Dionysius dicit, 4 cap. De divin. nom., malum est praeter voluntatem. Ergo liberum arbitrium hominum ad mala opera non se extendit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is outside the will is also outside free decision, since free decision is a faculty of will and reason, as was said above. But, as Dionysius says, evil is outside the will. Therefore, men’s free decision does not extend to evil works. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in 2 libro quod homo libero arbitrio inquirit, eligit, impetum facit ad opus, et sic de aliis. Ergo videtur quod ad ipsum pertineant omnes actus humani. On the contrary, Damascene says that by free decision man inquires, chooses, puts a work into effect, and so forth. Therefore, it seems that all human acts pertain to free decision. Praeterea, ut supra dictum est, liberum arbitrium est voluntas. Sed omnes actus humani sunt voluntarii. Ergo sunt etiam liberi arbitrii. Furthermore, as was said above, free decision is the will. But all human acts are voluntary. Therefore, they also belong to free decision. Respondeo dicendum, quod actus alicujus potentiae vel habitus potest esse dupliciter: vel quia elicit ipsum, vel quia imperat eum. Ille autem actus proprie a potentia elici dicitur qui immediate ab ipsa potentia procedit, sicut ab intellectu intelligere: et hoc modo non omnes actus humani sunt liberi arbitrii; sed proprius actus ejus est eligere, ut supra dictum est. Sed per imperium voluntatis et liberi arbitrii moventur etiam aliae potentiae in suos actus; unde virtus appetitiva dicitur movens, quia imperat motum, et virtus motiva affixa musculis et nervis, quia exequitur: et per modum istum omnes actus humani sunt liberi arbitrii, quia ab ipso imperati. I answer that the act or habit of a power can exist in two ways: either the power elicits it or the power commands it. That act is properly said to be elicited by a power that immediately proceeds from the power itself, just as understanding proceeds from the intellect. And not all human acts belong to free decision in this way. Rather, its proper act is choosing, as was said above. But by the command of the will and free decision other powers, too, are moved to their acts. Hence the appetitive power is called a mover because it commands a motion, and the motive power attached to muscles and nerves is called a mover because it carries it out. In this way, all human acts belong to free decision, since they are commanded by it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium non potest cogi in suo actu proprio, qui est eligere, sed tamen potest cogi in aliquibus imperatis ab ipso propter coactionem virtutum exequentium. Reply Obj. 1: Free decision cannot be compelled in its proper act, which is choosing, though it can be compelled in certain acts commanded by it on account of the powers that carry out these acts being compelled.