Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma Whether an angel is composed of matter and form Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that an angel is composed of matter and form. Quidquid enim est in genere aliquo, participat rationem illius generis. Sed ratio substantiae, secundum quod est praedicamentum, est quod sit composita ex materia et forma. Boetius enim dicit in Comment. praedicamentorum, in Expos. praedic. substantiae, lib. 1, quod Aristoteles, relictis extremis, scilicet materia et forma, agit de medio, id est de composito, cum de substantia determinat. Cum ergo angelus sit in praedicamento substantiae, videtur quod ex materia et forma componatur. Obj. 1: For whatever is in a genus participates in the account of that genus. But the account of substance, as a category, is to be composed of matter and form. For Boethius says in his Commentary on the Categories that Aristotle, leaving behind the extremes, namely, matter and form, deals with the mean, that is, the composite, when he deals with substance. Therefore, since an angel is in the category of substance, it seems that it is composed of matter and form. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt in aliquo genere uno communicant uniformiter principia illius generis. Sed principia generis substantiae sunt materia et forma. Cum ergo corpora quae sunt in genere substantiae communicent ista principia ita quod ex eis componuntur, videtur quod etiam angelus, qui est in eodem genere, ex materia et forma componatur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever things are in one genus share uniformly in the principles of that genus. But the principles of the genus of substance are matter and form. Therefore, since bodies that are in the genus of substance share these principles in such a manner that they are composed of them, it seems that an angel, which is in the same genus, is also composed of matter and form. Praeterea, ubicumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, invenitur materia; cum proprietates rei non sint a re separatae. Sed recipere, substare, et hujusmodi, sunt proprietates materiae. Ergo cum inveniantur in angelo, videtur quod angelus sit ex materia compositus. Obj. 3: Furthermore, wherever the properties of matter are found, matter is found, since the properties of a thing are not separated from the thing. But to receive, to be a substrate, and things of this sort, are the properties of matter. Therefore, since they are found in an angel, it seems that an angel is composed of matter. Praeterea, omne quod est, vel est tantum actus, vel tantum potentia, vel utrumque. Sed angelus non est actus purus quia sic non differret a Deo: nec est potentia pura, quia sic non differret a materia prima, et praeterea nullam operationem haberet. Ergo est compositus ex actu et potentia: et hoc est componi ex materia et forma: ergo, etc. Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that exists is either act alone, potency alone, or both together. But an angel is not pure act, since in that case it would not differ from God. Nor is it pure potency, since in that case it would not differ from prime matter. And besides, it would have no activity. Therefore, it is composed of act and potency. And this is to be composed of matter and form. Therefore, and so forth. Praeterea, in libro De causis, propos. 4, dicitur, quod omne creatum, compositum est ex finito et infinito. Sed angelus est ens creatum. Ergo ex infinito, quod est materia, compositus est. Obj. 5: Furthermore, it says in the Book of Causes that every created thing is composed of the definite and the indefinite. But an angel is a created being. Therefore, it is composed of the indefinite, which is matter. Item dicit Boetius in lib. De Trinitate, cap. 2, quod forma simplex subjectum esse non potest. Sed angelus est subjectum gratiae. Ergo non est tantum forma, sed etiam habet materiam partem sui. Obj. 6: Again, Boethius says in On the Trinity that simple form cannot be a subject. But an angel is the subject of grace. Therefore, it is not form alone, but also has matter as a part of it. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit in 4 cap. De div. nom., quod angeli intelliguntur immateriales et incorporales. On the contrary, Dionysius says in On Divine Names that angels are understood to be immaterial and incorporeal. Praeterea, Boetius dicit in lib. De duabus naturis, cap. 6, quod omnis natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae nititur fundamento. Sed angelus est substantia incorporea. Ergo materiam pro fundamento non habet. Furthermore, Boethius says in On the Two Natures that no nature of an incorporeal substance rests upon any foundation of matter. But an angel is an incorporeal substance. Therefore, it does not have matter as a foundation. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hanc materiam tres sunt positiones. Quidam enim dicunt quod in omni substantia creata est materia, et quod omnium est materia una; et hujus positionis auctor videtur Avicebron, qui fecit librum Fontis vitae, quem multi sequuntur. Secunda positio est quod materia non est in substantiis incorporeis, sed tamen est in omnibus corporibus, etiam una; et haec est positio Avicennae, 8 Metaph., cap. 12. Tertia positio est quod corpora caelestia et elementa non communicant in materia: et haec est positio Averrois, De substantia orbis, cap. 2, et Rabbi Moysis, lib. 1 Directorii, cap. 75, et videtur magis dictis Aristotelis consonare; I answer that concerning this matter there are three positions. Some say that in every created substance there is matter and that there is one matter for all things. The source of this position seems to be Avicebron who composed a book entitled The Fountain of Life, which many follow. The second position is that matter is not in incorporeal substances, but nevertheless is in all bodies, and that there is only one matter. And this is the position of Avicenna. The third position is that the heavenly bodies and the elements do not have the same matter. This is the position of Averroes and Rabbi Moses, and it seems to harmonize more with the statements of Aristotle. et ideo istam eligimus, quantum ad praesens pertinet, dicentes, quod quidquid sit de corporalibus, in angelis nullo modo potest esse materia: tum ratione intellectualitatis, tum etiam ratione incorporeitatis; quod enim nullum intellectuale sit materiale, communiter a philosophis tenetur. Unde etiam ex immaterialitate divina ejus intellectum concludunt. Thus, we choose this position as far as pertains to the present issue, saying that whatever may be the case for bodily things, matter cannot be present in any way in angels, both by reason of their intellectuality and by reason of their incorporeality. For it is commonly held by philosophers that no intellectual thing is material. Hence they even conclude that God has intellect from the fact of his immateriality. Et ratio satis manifesta est, quia materia prima recipit formam, non inquantum est forma simpliciter, sed inquantum est haec. Unde forma existens in materia non est intellecta nisi in potentia, quia cognitio est formae, inquantum est forma; et ideo si intellectus aliquis poneretur habens materiam, forma existens in eo non esset haec: unde forma existens in materia non est intellecta in actu: et sic per formam illam non intelligeret. Hujus etiam signum est, quod forma materialis non efficitur intellectualis, nisi quia a conditionibus materiae abstrahitur; et sic efficitur perfectio intellectus proportionata sibi: unde oportet intellectum non materialem esse: et hoc non sequitur materiam ex parte alicujus formae, cum omnis forma per abstractionem a conditionibus materiae intelligibilis fiat; sed consequitur eam secundum se, et universaliter, sive sit sub forma corporali, sive spirituali. The reason is manifest enough, namely, that prime matter receives form not inasmuch as it is form simply, but rather inasmuch as it is this form. Hence a form existing in matter is not understood except potentially, since knowledge is of a form inasmuch as it is a form. Thus, if an intellect were posited as having matter, the form existing in it would not be actually understood, and so it would not understand through that form. And a sign of the same truth is that a material form does not become intellectual unless it is abstracted from the conditions of matter, and in this way, it becomes a perfection of the intellect proportionate to it. Hence the intellect must be non-material. And this does not follow on matter on the part of its form, since every form becomes intelligible by abstraction from the conditions of matter. Rather, it follows on it in itself and universally, whether it is under a bodily form or a spiritual one. Secundo incorporeitas repugnat materiae: cum enim uni perfectibili debeatur una perfectio, et in materia prima non sit ulla diversitas, oportet quod omnis forma ante quam non potest in ea esse ulla diversitas, nec intelligi, investiat eam totam. Sed ante corporeitatem non potest intelligi aliqua diversitas quia diversitas praesupponit partes, quae non possunt esse nisi praeintelligatur divisibilitas quae consequitur quantitatem, quae sine corporeitate non est. Unde oportet quod tota materia sit vestita forma corporeitatis; et ideo si aliquid est incorporeum, oportet esse immateriale. Second, incorporeality is incompatible with matter. For since to one perfectible thing one perfection is due, and since there is no differentiation in prime matter, every form must invest the whole of it, before which there cannot be any differentiation in it, nor can such be understood. But before corporeality, no differentiation can be understood to be present, because differentiation presupposes parts, which cannot exist unless we assume divisibility, which follows on quantity, which cannot exist without corporeality. Hence the whole of matter must be invested with the form of corporeality. Thus, if there is anything incorporeal, it must be immaterial. Et tamen aliquam compositionem in angelo ponimus: quae qualis sit investiganda est. In rebus ex materia et forma compositis, natura rei, quae quidditas vel essentia dicitur, ex conjunctione formae ad materiam resultat, ut humanitas ex conjunctione animae et corporis. De ratione autem quidditatis inquantum est quidditas, non est quod sit composita; quia nunquam inveniretur simplex natura, quod ad minus in Deo falsum est: nec est de ratione ejus quod sit simplex, cum quaedam inveniatur composita, ut humanitas. Esse autem secundum quod dicitur res esse in actu, invenitur ad diversas naturas vel quidditates diversimode se habere. Quaedam enim natura est de cujus intellectu non est suum esse, quod patet ex hoc quod intelligi potest cum hoc quod ignoretur an sit, sicut phaenicem, vel eclipsim, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Alia autem natura invenitur de cujus ratione est ipsum suum esse, immo ipsum esse est sua natura. Esse autem quod hujusmodi est, non habet esse acquisitum ab alio; quia illud quod res ex sua quidditate habet, ex se habet. Sed omne quod est praeter Deum habet esse acquisitum ab alio. Even so, we do hold that there is a composition in the angels; what kind of composition this is should be explored. In things composed of matter and form, the nature of the thing, which is called “whatness” or “essence,” results from the joining of the form to the matter, as, for example, humanity results from the joining of soul and body. But it does not pertain to the account of whatness, precisely as whatness, that it be composite, since then a simple nature could never be found, which is at least false in the case of God. Nor does it pertain to its account that it be simple, since some are found to be composite, as in the case of humanity. But being, insofar as a thing is said to be actually, is found to relate in different ways to different natures or quiddities. For there is one sort of nature whose existence does not pertain to understanding it, as is clear from the fact that one can understand it, while at the same time not knowing whether it exists, as in the case of a phoenix, or an eclipse, or something of this sort. But another sort of nature is found whose very to-be pertains to its account, or rather, to-be is itself its nature. Now, an existence of this sort does not have existence acquired from another, since that which a thing has from its own whatness it has from itself. But everything except for God has existence acquired from another. Ergo in solo Deo suum esse est sua quidditas vel natura; in omnibus autem aliis esse est praeter quidditatem, cui esse acquiritur. Sed cum quidditas quae sequitur compositionem dependeat ex partibus, oportet quod ipsa non sit subsistens in eo quod sibi acquiritur, sed ipsum compositum, quod suppositum dicitur: et ideo quidditas compositi non est ipsum quod est, sed est hoc quod aliquid est, ut humanitate est homo; sed quidditas simplex, cum non fundetur ex aliquibus partibus, subsistit in esse quod sibi a Deo acquiritur; et ideo ipsa quidditas angeli est quod subsistit etiam ipsum suum esse, quod est praeter suam quidditatem, et est id quo est; sicut motus est id quo aliquid denominatur moveri; et sic angelus compositus est ex esse et quod est, vel ex quo est et quod est: et propter hoc in lib. De causis, propos. 9, dicitur, quod intelligentia non est esse tantum, sicut causa prima; sed est in ea esse, et forma, quae est quidditas sua: Therefore, in God alone is his to-be his whatness or nature, whereas in all other things to-be is outside their whatness, to which the to-be is added. But since a whatness that follows on composition depends on its parts, it must not itself be what subsists in the existence it acquires. Rather, this is the composite itself, which is called the “supposit.” Thus, the whatness of a composite is not the very thing that exists; rather, it is that-by-which something exists, as a man exists by his humanity. But a simple whatness, since it is not founded on any parts, subsists in the existence that it acquires from God. Thus, the whatness of an angel is what subsists, and its very existence, which is outside its whatness, is that-by-which it exists, just as motion is that by which something is designated as moving. In this way, an angel is composed of to-be and what-is, or of that-by-which-it-is and what-is. For this reason it says in the Book of Causes that an intelligence is not existence alone, like the First Cause is, but rather there is in it existence and form, which is its whatness. et quia omne quod non habet aliquid ex se, sed recipit illud ab alio, est possibile vel in potentia respectu ejus, ideo ipsa quidditas est sicut potentia, et suum esse acquisitum est sicut actus; et ita per consequens est ibi compositio ex actu et potentia; et si ista potentia vocetur materia, erit compositus ex materia et forma: quamvis hoc sit omnino aequivoce dictum; sapientis enim est non curare de nominibus. Since everything that does not have something from itself, but receives it from another, is possible or in potency with respect to it, the whatness itself is as potency, while its acquired existence is as act. Consequently there is a composition of act and potency there. If this potency is called “matter,” then there will be a composite of matter and form, although this would be an entirely equivocal statement. After all, a wise man does not quibble over names. Ad primum ergo dicendum est, quod de ratione substantiae est quod subsistit quasi per se ens; et ideo forma et materia, quae sunt pars compositi, cum non subsistant, non sunt in praedicamento substantiae sicut species, sed solum sicut principia. Quod autem hoc subsistens habeat quidditatem compositam, non est de ratione substantiae: unde non oportet illud quod est in praedicamento substantiae habere quidditatem compositam, sed oportet quod habeat compositionem quidditatis et esse: omne enim quod est in genere suae quidditatis non est suum esse, ut Avicenna, Met., tract. 7, cap. 4, dicit. Et ideo non potest Deus in praedicamento substantiae poni: unde Boetius intendit dicere, quod inter tria haec, scilicet materiam, formam, et compositum, ex his solum compositum est in genere substantiae sicut species; non autem intendit quod omne quod est in genere substantiae, sit compositum ex materia et forma. Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to the account of substance that it subsists as a being by itself, as it were. Thus, form and matter, which are a part of the composite, since they do not subsist, are not in the category of substance as a species but only as principles. But that a subsisting thing has composite whatness does not belong to the account of substance. Hence it is not necessary for what is in the category of substance to have composite whatness. It is necessary for it to have a composition of whatness and being. For in the case of everything that is in a genus, its whatness is not its own existence, as Avicenna says. Thus, God cannot be put in the category of substance. Hence what Boethius intends to say is that among these three things, namely, matter, form, and the composite, out of these only the composite is in the genus of substance as a species. But he does not intend to say that everything that is in the genus of substance must be a composite of matter and form. Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqua sunt unius generis logice loquendo, quae naturaliter non sunt unius generis, sicut illa quae communicant in intentione generis quam logicus inspicit, et habent diversum modum essendi: unde in 10 Metaph. dicitur, quod de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus nihil commune dicitur, nisi communitate nominis: et ideo non oportet angelos cum corporalibus eadem principia communicare, nisi secundum intentionem tantum, prout in omnibus invenitur potentia et actus analogice tamen, ut in 12 Metaph. dicitur. Reply Obj. 2: Some things that are not of a single genus naturally are of a single genus logically speaking, such as those things that share in the intention of the genus that logic studies, and yet they have a different manner of being. Hence in the Metaphysics 10 it says that nothing is said in common of the corruptible and the incorruptible except by use of a common name. Thus, it is not necessary for angels to share the same principles with bodily things, except with respect to the intention alone, inasmuch as potency and act are found in all things, though analogically, as is said in the Metaphysics 12. Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Commentator in 3 De anima, recipere, et omnia hujusmodi, dicuntur aequivoce de materia et intellectu: materia enim prima recipit formam non prout est forma simpliciter, sed prout est hoc, unde per materiam individuatur; sed intellectus recipit formam inquantum est forma simpliciter, non individuans eam, quia forma in intellectu habet esse universale; unde etiam Philosophus ibidem dicit, quod intelligere pati quoddam est, sed communiter et aequivoce dictum; unde ex hoc non ponitur compositio vel materialitas substantiae intellectualis. Reply Obj. 3: As the Commentator says on On the Soul 3, to receive, and all things of this sort, are said equivocally of matter and of intellect. For prime matter receives a form not insofar as it is form simply, but as being a “this.” Hence it is individuated by matter. But the intellect receives a form insofar as it is a form simply, not as individuating it, since a form in the intellect has a universal being. Hence the Philosopher also says in the same place that to understand is in a certain way to undergo, though said in a common manner and equivocally. Hence on this basis we do not posit the composition or materiality of an intellectual substance. Ad quartum jam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt; ostensum est enim quod in angelo est potentia et actus; non tamen sicut partes quidditatis; sed potentia tenet se ex parte quidditatis, et esse est actus ejus. Reply Obj. 4: The reply to the fourth objection is already clear from what has been said. For it has been shown that in an angel there is potency and act, though not as parts of the whatness. Rather, the potency is on the side of the whatness, while to-be is its act. Ad quintum dicendum, quod objectio procedit ex falso intellectu litterae: non enim est sensus quod ens creatum componatur ex finito et infinito sicut ex partibus integralibus, sed sicut ex partibus quasi subjectivis: quia entis creati quoddam est finitum, sicut incorruptibile, et quoddam infinitum, sicut corruptibile, quod non est determinatum ad esse tantum, sed quandoque est et quandoque non est; unde in quodam Comment. lib. De causis, exponitur infinitum: id est potens esse vel non esse. Reply Obj. 5: The objection proceeds from a false understanding of the text. For the sense is not that a created being is composed of the definite and the indefinite as of integral parts, but rather as it were of subjective parts. For a created being has a certain definite aspect, such as “incorruptible,” and a certain indefinite aspect, such as “corruptible,” which is not determined only to being, but rather is at one time, and is not at another time. Hence in one commentary on On Causes, the explanation is given that the indefinite is potential being or non-being. Vel dicendum, quod componitur ex infinito, scilicet ex potentia, et finito, scilicet ex actu. Or we may say that it is composed of the indefinite, namely, potency, and of the definite, namely, act. Ad sextum dicendum, quod forma omnino simplex, quae est suum esse, sicut essentia divina, de qua Boetius ibi loquitur, nullo modo potest esse subjectum; sed forma simpliciter subsistens quae non est suum esse, ratione possibilitatis quam habet, potest subjectum esse; sed aequivoce a modo quo materia vel materiale subjectum dicitur, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 6: An entirely simple form that is its own being, as is the divine essence, about which Boethius speaks in that place, can in no way be a subject. But a form subsisting simply that is not its own being, by reason of the potentiality it has, can be a subject, though equivocally and not in the same way as “subject” is said of matter or the material, as has been said. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum in angelis possit esse personalitas Whether there can be personhood in the angels Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in angelis non possit esse personalitas. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that there cannot be personhood in the angels. Individuatio enim est de ratione personae, quia persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Principium autem individuationis est materia. Cum ergo angelus materia careat, ut dictum est, videtur quod ab eo personalitas excludatur. Obj. 1: For individuation pertains to the account of person, since a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. But the principle of individuation is matter. Since, therefore, an angel lacks matter, as has been said, it seems that personhood is excluded from it. Praeterea, omnis forma, quantum est de se, communicabilis est et universalis. Sed angelus est forma simplex. Ergo videtur quod sit universale. Sed universalia non dicimus personas. Ergo videtur quod angelus non sit persona, ut dicit Boetius, lib. De duabus naturis, cap. 2. Obj. 2: Furthermore, every form, as far as lies in itself, is communicable and universal. But an angel is a simple form. Therefore, it seems that it is universal. But we do not call universals persons, as Boethius says. Therefore, it seems that an angel is not a person. Praeterea, perfectio debet perfectibili proportionari. Sed forma intelligibilis, quae est perfectio intellectus, non habet rationem singularis, sed magis universalis. Ergo nec intellectus. Sed angeli sunt divini intellectus et divinae mentes, ut dicit Dionysius, Cael. heir., cap. 11. Ergo non sunt personae. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a perfection has to be proportionate to the perfectible. But an intelligible form, which is a perfection of the intellect, does not have the account of an individual, but rather of a universal. Therefore, neither does the intellect. But angels are divine intellects and divine minds, as Dionysius says. Therefore, they are not persons. Praeterea, persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Sed a Dionysio, De divin. nominibus, cap. 4, ponitur angelus in ordine intellectualium, quae supra rationabilia constituit. Ergo videtur quod angelus non sit persona. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. But Dionysius puts angels in the order of intellectual things that he established as supra-rational. Therefore, it seems that an angel is not a person. Sed contra, persona, secundum magistros, est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Sed angelus cum sit quid subsistens, dicitur hypostasis, et ejus proprietates sunt nobilissimae. Ergo videtur quod sit persona. On the contrary, a person, according to the masters, is a hypostasis with a distinct property pertaining to dignity. But an angel, since it is something subsisting, is called a “hypostasis,” and its properties are most noble. Therefore, it seems that it is a person. Praeterea, hoc idem habetur ex littera et ex dictis Richardi de Sancto Victore, qui, lib. 4 De Trinit., cap. 14, etc., secundum diversas proprietates diversimode personam ponit in homine, angelo et Deo. Furthermore, this same thing is related in the text and in the statements of Richard of Saint Victor, who in accordance with different properties applies “person” to man, angel, and God in different ways. Respondeo dicendum, quod personalitas est in angelo, alio tamen modo quam in homine: quod patet, si tria quae sunt de ratione personae considerentur, scilicet subsistere, ratiocinari et individuum esse. Subsistit enim homo in partibus suis, ex quibus componitur; sed angelus in natura sua simplici nullo indigens partium vel materiae fundamento. Ratiocinatur homo discurrendo et inquirendo lumine intellectuali per continuum et tempus obumbrato, ex hoc quod cognitionem a sensu et imagine accipit: quia, secundum Isaac in lib. De definitione, ratio oritur in umbra intelligentiae; sed angelus lumen intellectuale purum et impermixtum participat; unde etiam sine inquisitione deiformiter intelligit, secundum Dionysium. Similiter incommunicabilitas est in homine ex hoc quod natura sua receptibilis in materiae fundamento per materiam determinatur; sed in angelo in se determinata est ex hoc quod in aliquo sicut forma determinabilis recipi non potest; et ex hoc ipso satis incommunicabilis est, et non per determinationem recipientis: sicut et divinum esse est proprium et determinatum non per additionem alicujus contrahentis, sed per negationem omnis addibilitatis; unde dicitur in lib. De causis, quod individuatio sua est bonitas pura. Quare patet quod multo nobilior est personalitas in angelo quam in homine sicut et caetera quae eis conveniunt, secundum Dionysium. I answer that there is personhood in angels, though in a different way than in man. This is clear if the three things that pertain to the account of person are considered, namely: to subsist, to reason, and to be an individual. For man subsists in the parts from which he is composed. But an angel subsists in its simple nature, needing no foundation of parts or matter. Man reasons by discursion and inquiry with an intellectual light that is shadowed through space and time, due to the fact that he receives knowledge from the senses and imagination. For, according to Isaac in the Book of Definitions, reason arises in the shadow of intelligence. But an angel participates in pure and unadulterated intellectual light. Hence according to Dionysius, it also understands without inquiry, after the mode of God himself. Likewise, a man has incommunicability by the fact that his nature, which can be received in the foundation of matter, is determined by matter. But in an angel the nature is determinate in itself by the fact that it cannot be received in another as a determinable form. And from this very fact it is sufficiently incommunicable, not through the determination of a receiver, just as the divine being is proper and determinate not by the addition of anything accepting it but by the negation of every possibility of addition. Hence it says in the Book of Causes that its individuation is pure goodness. For this reason it is clear that personhood in an angel is much nobler than in man, as also are those other things that befit them according to Dionysius. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod forma participabilis non individuatur nisi per materiam, in qua accipit esse determinatum; sed forma quae non est receptibilis, non indiget materia determinante, sed in sua natura determinatur ad esse quod sibi non ad materiam dependens acquiritur sicut formis corruptibilibus; nec in materia etsi non ad materiam dependens, sicut animae rationali. Reply Obj. 1: A form that can be participated is individuated only by matter, in which it receives determinate being. But a form that is not receivable does not need determining matter. Rather, in its own nature it is determined to being, which it acquires without depending on matter as do corruptible forms. Nor does it acquire being in matter though not dependent on matter, like the rational soul.