Quarto secundum hoc quod est habere vertibilitatem immutabilem, quod angelo convenit, eo quod immutabiliter adhaereat bono vel malo ad quod se semel per electionem convertit; vel habere mutabilem vertibilitatem, quod homini convenit, qui de bono in malum mutari potest, et e contrario. Fourth, some say they are distinguished on the basis of having an immutable capacity for turning, which befits an angel due to the fact that it immutably clings to the good or evil that it has once turned itself toward through its choice; or it is on the basis of having a mutable capacity for turning, as befits man, who can be changed from good to evil and vice versa. Quinto secundum virtutem interpretativam: quia, secundum Damascenum, lib. 2 Orth. fidei, cap. 3, angelus interpretatur vel loquitur quibusdam nutibus et signis intellectualibus sine vocis expressione, ut infra patebit; homo autem loquitur voce expressa. Fifth, some say they are distinguished with respect to communicative power. For, according to Damascene, an angel communicates or speaks by certain intellectual indications and signs without vocal expression, as will be clear below, whereas man speaks through vocal expression. Nec est mirum quod sic diversimode angeli et animae differre assignantur: quia differentiae essentiales, quae ignotae et innominatae sunt, secundum Philosophum, in 7 Metaph., designantur differentiis accidentalibus, quae ex essentialibus causantur, sicut causa designatur per suum effectum; sicut calidum et frigidum assignantur differentiae ignis et aquae. Unde possunt plures differentiae pro specificis assignari, secundum plures proprietates rerum differentium specie, ex essentialibus differentiis causatas; quarum tamen istae melius assignantur quae priores sunt, quasi essentialibus differentiis propinquiores. And it is no wonder that angels and souls are said to differ in these different ways. For, according to the Philosopher, essential differences that are unknown and unnamed are indicated by the incidental differences that are caused by essential differences, as a cause is designated by its effect. For example, the differences of fire and water are assigned as “hot” and “cold.” Hence multiple differences can be assigned for specific things in accordance with the multiple properties of things that differ in species, which properties are caused by essential differences. Yet from among these it is better to assign those that are prior, since they are, so to speak, closer to the essential differences. Cum ergo substantiarum simplicium, ut dictum est de angelis, sit differentia in specie secundum gradum possibilitatis in eis, ex hoc anima rationalis ab angelis differt, quia ultimum gradum in substantiis spiritualibus tenet, sicut materia prima in rebus sensibilibus, ut dicit Commentator in 3 De anima. Unde quia plurimum de possibilitate habet, esse suum est adeo propinquum rebus materialibus, ut corpus materiale illud esse possit participare, dum anima corpori unitur ad unum esse: et ideo consequuntur istae differentiae inter animam et angelum, unibile et non unibile, ex diverso gradu possibilitatis. Therefore, since, as has been said of the angels, there is a difference in species among simple substances in accordance with the degree of potentiality in them, a rational soul differs from angels due to the fact that it holds the last rank among spiritual substances, as prime matter does among sensible things, as the Commentator says on On the Soul 3. Hence because it has a great amount of potentiality, its being is so close to material things that a material body can participate in being when the soul is united to the body with regard to a single being. Thus, the differences between the soul and an angel, “unitable” and “non-unitable,” follow from the different degrees of potentiality. Item ex eodem sequuntur aliae differentiae, rationale et intellectuale: quia ex hoc quod angelus plus habet de actu quam anima, et minus habet de potentia, participat quasi in plena luce naturam intellectualem, unde intellectualis dicitur; anima vero, quia extremum gradum in intellectualibus tenet, participat naturam intellectualem magis defective quasi obumbrata: et ideo dicitur rationalis, quia ratio, ut dicit Isaac, in lib. De definit., oritur in umbra intelligentiae. Again, the other differences, “rational” and “intellectual,” follow from the same thing. For from the fact that an angel partakes more of act than the soul, and partakes less of potency, it participates in the intellectual nature as if in the full light (for which reason it is called “intellectual”). But if the soul, because it holds the last rank among intellectual things, participates in the intellectual nature more deficiently, as if in a shadow. Thus, it is called “rational,” since reason, as Isaac says, arises in the shadow of intelligence. Tertia vero distinctio sequitur ex prima et secunda: ex hoc enim quod anima corporis forma et actus est, procedunt ab essentia ejus quaedam potentiae organis affixae, ut sensus, et hujusmodi, ex quibus cognitionem intellectualem accipit, propter hoc quod rationalis est habens cognitionem decurrentem ab uno in aliud; et sic a sensibilibus in intelligibilia venit, et per hoc ab angelo differt, qui non a sensibilibus discurrendo ad intelligibilia, cognitionem accipit. The third distinction follows from the first and second. For from the fact that the soul is the form of the body and its act, certain powers connected with organs proceed from its essence, such as the senses and things of this sort, from which it receives intellectual knowledge, on account of the fact that it is rational and has discursive knowledge, which goes from one thing to another. And so, it comes to intelligible things from sensible ones and in this fact differs from an angel, who does not receive knowledge in a discursive manner by going from sensible things to intelligible ones. Quarta autem distinctio sequitur ex secunda: quia dicitur, quod per hoc quod angelus intellectum deiformem habet, convertitur ad quodcumque immobiliter; per quod ab anima dicitur angelus differre, quae non intellectu deiformi, sed per inquisitionem rationis cognitionem habet. The fourth distinction follows from the second. For it is said that through the fact that an angel has a God-like intellect, it can be turned to anything immovably, and in this way, an angel is said to differ from the soul, which has knowledge not by a God-like intellect, but through the inquiry of reason. Quinta etiam sequitur ex prima: quia propter hoc quod anima corpori unitur, potest vocem corporalem formare, non autem angelus. The fifth distinction, in turn, follows from the first. For on account of the fact that the soul is united to the body, it forms a bodily voice, while an angel does not. Unde patet quod istarum distinctionum prima melior est, quia accipitur secundum esse animae, quod primum est; secunda autem et tertia accipiuntur penes virtutem cognoscitivam vel intellectivam tantum, sicut secunda, vel penes intellectivam simul et sensitivam, sicut tertia. Quarta autem accipitur penes virtutem appetitivam; quia electio ad appetitum pertinet, ut dicit Philosophus in Ethicis, lib. 6, cap. 2; per quam anima mutabiliter convertitur. Unde cum appetitiva posterior sit cognitiva, haec minus valet quam praecedentes. Quinta accipitur penes virtutem motivam: formatio enim vocis est per motum corporalem membrorum. Motiva autem posterior est cognitiva et appetitiva; unde minus valet inter alias. Hence it is clear that the first of these distinctions is better, since it is taken with respect to the being of the soul, which is first. The second and third are taken on the basis of cognoscitive or intellective power alone, as in the second, or on the basis of intellective power together with sensitive power, as in the third. The fourth, in turn, is taken on the basis of appetitive power, since choice pertains to appetite, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics, and it is through this that the soul is turned in a mutable way. Hence since the appetitive power is subsequent to the cognitive power, this distinction is of less importance than the preceding ones. The fifth distinction is taken on the basis of motive power. For the formation of the voice arises from the bodily motion of the members. But motive power is subsequent to cognitive and appetitive power. Hence it is of less importance among the others. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod differentia non est nobilior genere, sicut natura una est nobilior altera, vel sicut forma una nobilior est alia: quia differentia nullam formam dicit, quae implicite in natura generis non contineatur, ut dicit Avicenna, tract. 5 suae Metaph., cap. ult.: genus enim non significat partem essentiae rei, sed totum. Sed dicitur genere nobilior, sicut determinatum indeterminato; et per hunc modum habere intellectum sic, est nobilius quam habere intellectum simpliciter; et habere sensum sic, quam habere sensum simpliciter: et ideo anima et angelus non conveniunt in eo quod per modum istum est nobilissimum in eis; unde non oportet quod conveniant in differentia ultima specifica, et ita sint idem specie. Reply Obj. 1: Difference is not more noble than genus in the way one nature is more noble than another, or one form is more noble than another, since a difference indicates no form that is not contained implicitly in the nature of the genus, as Avicenna says. For genus does not signify a part of a thing’s essence, but rather the whole. But it is said to be more noble than genus as determinate is more noble than indeterminate. As such, to have intellect in such a way is more noble than to have intellect simply, and to have senses in such a way is more noble than to have senses simply. Thus, the soul and an angel do not agree in that which is most noble in them in this particular way. Hence it is not necessary for them to agree in the ultimate specific difference and thus be the same in species. Ad secundum dicendum, quod in homine est intellectus; non tamen propter hoc in ordine intellectualium ponitur: quia illa substantia intellectualis dicitur cujus tota cognitio secundum intellectum est, quia omnia quae cognoscit, subito sine inquisitione sibi offeruntur; non autem ita est de cognitione animae, quia per inquisitionem et discursum rationis ad notitiam rei venit; et ideo rationalis dicitur, quia ejus cognitio secundum terminum tantum et secundum principium intellectualis est: secundum principium, quia prima principia sine inquisitione statim cognoscit, unde habitus principiorum indemonstrabilium intellectus dicitur; secundum terminum vero, quia inquisitio rationis ad intellectum rei terminatur; et ideo non habet intellectum ut naturam propriam, sed per quamdam participationem. Ratio autem et de Deo et de angelis dicitur; tamen alio modo sumitur, secundum quod scilicet omnis cognitio immaterialis ratio potest dici, prout dividitur ratio contra sensum, et non contra intellectum. Reply Obj. 2: In man there is intellect, but he is not for this reason placed in the order of intellectual things. For something is called an “intellectual substance” whose whole knowledge is based in intellect, since everything it knows is immediately available to it without inquiry. But this is not the case with the soul’s knowledge, since it arrives at knowledge of a thing through inquiry and discursive reason. And in this way, it is called “rational,” since its knowledge is intellectual only with reference to its end and beginning: with reference to the beginning, since it knows first principles at once without inquiry, for which reason the habit of indemonstrable principles is called “understanding”; with reference to the end, since the inquiry of reason is terminated in understanding of the thing. Thus, it does not have intellect as its proper nature, but rather by way of a certain participation. Now, we also speak of “reason” in the case of God and the angels, though it is taken in a different sense, namely, insofar as all immaterial knowledge can be called “reason”—reason being distinguished here from the senses and not from the intellect. Ad tertium dicendum, quod unibilitas non est propria differentia essentialis; sed est quaedam designatio essentialis differentiae per effectum, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Unitability is not a proper essential difference. Rather, it is a kind of designation of an essential difference through its effect, as has been said. Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad quartum; quia illud quod convenit animae inquantum est forma, est effectus differentiae essentialis. Reply Obj. 4: From this the reply to the fourth objection is also clear. For what befits the soul, inasmuch as it is a form, is the effect of an essential difference. Ad quintum dicendum, quod ea quae differunt specie, differunt secundum finem proximum, qui est permanentia vel operatio rei, ut in 2 Caeli et mundi dicitur. Possunt tamen convenire in fine ultimo, et hujusmodi finis est beatitudo. Reply Obj. 5: Things that differ in species differ with respect to their proximate end, which is a thing’s permanence or activity, as is said in On the Heavens 2. But they can still agree in the last end, and beatitude is such an end. Expositio primae partis textus Exposition of the first part of the text Et quattuor quidem angelis videntur attributa. Videtur inconvenienter numerare: quia Dionysius, 11 Cael. hier., attribuit tria angelis, scilicet essentiam, virtutem et operationem; hic autem de operatione non fit mentio. And four things seem certainly to have been their attributes. It seems unfitting to number them in this way, since Dionysius attributed three things to the angels, namely, essence, power, and activity. But here there is no mention of activity. Praeterea, in 11 Metaph. dicitur a Commentatore, quod substantiae separatae dividuntur in voluntatem et intellectum: et ita videtur quod duo tantum debeant esse attributa. Moreover, the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 11 that separated substances are divided into will and intellect. Thus, it seems that there should be only two attributes. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis. Ergo videtur quod non debeat dividi contra tertium attributum. Moreover, free will is a faculty of reason and will. Therefore, it seems that it should not be divided against the third attribute. Item quaeritur de ratione numeri. Again, the question is asked about the reason for the number. Ad hoc dicendum, quod haec attributa accipiuntur secundum haec tria: “substantia,” “species,” et “virtus,” quae sic differunt. Res enim potest considerari secundum quod est principium alterius; et sic invenitur in re “virtus,” et secundum hoc attribuitur angelis liberum arbitrium. Vel secundum quod est in se, et hoc dupliciter: vel quantum ad ipsam naturam subsistentem, vel quantum ad modum perfectionis ejus, secundum quam speciem sortitur; et sic est “species,” et tertium attributum, quod est naturae rationalitas, secundum quod ratio dicta est in angelis esse. Si vero quantum ad ipsam naturam subsistentem, sic est “substantia”; secundum hanc duo sumuntur secundum duplicem acceptionem ejus: scilicet prout dicitur quidditas rei, et sic sumitur primum attributum, scilicet essentiae simplicitas; vel secundum quod dicitur hypostasis, et sic sumitur secundum, scilicet personalitas. To this we must say that these attributes are taken with reference to three things: “substance,” “species,” and “power.” They differ in the following way: for a thing can be considered as the principle of another, and in this way, “power” is found in the thing, and in this regard free will is attributed to the angels. Or it can be considered as it is in itself, and this in two ways: either with regard to the nature itself subsisting, or with regard to the mode of its perfection, in accord with which it is allotted a species. In this way, there is the “species” and the third attribute, which is rationality of nature, insofar as reason has been said to be in the angels. However, if we consider it with reference to the nature itself as subsisting, in this way, it is the “substance.” And with reference to this, two things are drawn out in accord with the two ways we can take it, namely, as being called the “whatness” of the thing, and in this way, the first attribute is drawn out, that is, simplicity of essence; or as being called the “hypostasis,” and in this way, the second attribute is drawn out, that is, personhood. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod operationis principium est ipsemet angelus; et ideo non numeratur inter collata sibi a creatione. Therefore, to the first we say that the principle of activity is the angel itself. And so this is not numbered among the things conferred on it from creation. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ista duo sunt quasi duae potentiae ejus; unde reducitur ad ultimum attributum et ad tertium diversimode. To the second we say that these two attributes are like two of its powers. Hence they are reduced to the final attribute and to the third in different ways. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in tertio attributo ponitur ratio et voluntas non secundum quod sunt potentiae consequentes essentiam, sed ut per eas designatur species essentiae ex qua procedunt, sicut etiam rationale ponitur differentia hominis: sed ad quartum pertinent, secundum quod sunt potentiae. To the third we say that reason and will are set down as the third attribute, not insofar as they are powers following on essence, but instead to designate by them the species of the essence from which they proceed, just as “rational” is given as the difference of man. But they pertain to the fourth attribute insofar as they are powers. Differentem essentiae tenuitatem, et differentem sapientiae perspicacitatem, atque differentem arbitrii libertatem et habilitatem recte habuisse intelligitur. Quomodo hoc sit ex dictis patet: quia quanto quidditas est magis propinqua ad esse divinum, tanto minus habet de potentia; et ita remanet major simplicitas; et ita etiam caetera nobiliora erunt inquantum nobilius esse recipiunt. They are rightly understood to have had a different fineness of essence, and a different perspicacity of wisdom, and a different aptitude for choice. It is clear how this is from what has been said. For the closer a whatness is to the divine being, the less it has of potency, and thus, its simplicity remains greater. And so, too, the rest will be more noble inasmuch as they receive nobler being. Qui tunc per naturalia bona aliis excellebant, ipsi etiam per munera gratiae aliis praeerant. Quantum ad illos qui ponunt angelos in gratuitis creatos facile est rationem assignare: quia ad nihil aliud potuit gratia mensurari nisi ad capacitatem naturae. Si autem ponantur in gratia non creati tunc, in naturalibus simul accipiendus sit conatus secundum quod naturalia dicimus etiam illa in quae per principia naturalia possumus, prout naturale contra gratuitum dividitur; probabile est etiam ut cujus natura est dignior, etiam conatus esset major in illo ad quod natura ordinabatur, cum non esset aliquid retardans, sicut in nobis, in quibus corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, Sap. 9:15. Et ideo quidquid sit de angelis, certum est quod nobis non infunditur gratia secundum mensuram naturalium, sed magis secundum mensuram conatus. Those who at that time excelled the rest through their natural goods should afterwards also be preeminent over them through the gifts of grace. With regard to those who posit that the angels were created in the state of grace, it is easy to assign the reason. For grace could be measured with reference to nothing other than the capacity of nature. But if they are posited not to have been created in the state of grace, then, since in natural things we must take effort into account even as we say that natural things are those which we can do through natural principles, “natural” being distinguished in contrast to “gratuitous,” it is again probable that the one whose nature is of greater dignity would also put forth a greater effort toward that to which its nature is ordered, since there would not be anything holding it back, as is the case in us, in whom a perishable body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). Thus, whatever may be the case with the angels, it is certain that in us grace is not infused after the measure of natural endowments but rather after the measure of effort. Divisio secundae partis textus Division of the second part of the text Hic Magister inquirit quales angeli effecti sunt secundum culpam vel gratiam; et dividitur in partes duas: Here the Master inquires as to what condition the angels were in respect to fault or grace when they were made. And this is divided into two parts. in prima ostendit quod angeli non sunt facti mali in principio suae creationis; In the first, he shows that angels were not made wicked at the beginning of their creation. in secunda ostendit qua perfectione erant boni, ibi: hic inquiri solet quam sapientiam habuerant. In the second, he shows by what perfection they were good, at here it is usual to ask what wisdom they had. Prima in duas: The first part is divided into two parts. in prima ponit quaestionem; In the first, he poses the question. in secunda prosequitur eam, secundum diversas opiniones, ibi: putaverunt enim quidam angelos qui ceciderunt creatos esse malos. In the second, he pursues it according to different opinions, at for some have held that the angels who fell were created evil. Et circa hoc duo facit: And concerning this he does two things. primo ponit opinionem dicentium angelos creatos esse malos, First, he lays out the opinion of those who say that the angels were created wicked. secundo ponit contrariam opinionem, ibi: aliis autem videtur omnes angelos creatos esse bonos. Second, he lays out the contrary opinion, at but it seems to others that all the angels were created good. Et circa hoc tria facit: And concerning this latter he does three things.