Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum pueri non baptizati sentiant in anima afflictionem spiritualem Whether unbaptized children feel spiritual affliction in their soul Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri non baptizati afflictionem spiritualem in anima sentiant. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that unbaptized children feel spiritual affliction in their soul. Quia, sicut dicit Chrysostomus, In Matth., in damnatis gravior erit poena quod Dei visione carebunt, quam quod igne inferni cremabuntur. Sed pueri visione divina carebunt. Ergo afflictionem spiritualem ex hoc sentient. Obj. 1: For, just as Chrysostom says, in the damned, the fact that they will lack the vision of God will be a more serious punishment than the fact that they will be burned by the fire below. But children will lack the vision of God. Therefore, they will feel spiritual affliction from this. Praeterea, carere illo quod quis vult habere sine afflictione esse non potest. Sed pueri vellent visionem divinam habere, alias voluntas eorum actualiter perversa esset. Ergo cum ea careant, videtur quod ex hoc afflictionem sentiant. Obj. 2: Furthermore, lacking what one wants to have cannot exist without affliction. But children would want to possess the vision of God. Otherwise their will would actually be perverse. Therefore, since they lack it, it seems that they feel affliction from that fact. Si dicatur, quod non affliguntur, quia sciunt se non culpa propria ea esse privatos; Obj. 3: One might say that they are not afflicted, since they know they are not being deprived by their own fault. contra. Immunitas a culpa dolorem poenae non minuit, sed auget: non enim si aliquis non propria culpa exhaeredatur vel mutilatur, propter hoc minus dolet. Ergo etiam quamvis pueri non propria culpa tanto bono priventur, ex hoc eorum dolor non tollitur. On the contrary, immunity from fault does not lessen the pain of punishment, but increases it. For if someone is disinherited or mutilated for what is not his own fault, he does not on this account suffer less pain. Therefore, even though children will be deprived of such a great good for what is not their own fault, their pain is not thereby taken away. Praeterea, sicut pueri baptizati se habent ad meritum Christi, ita non baptizati ad meritum Adae. Sed pueri baptizati ex merito Christi consequuntur praemium vitae aeternae. Ergo et non baptizati dolorem sustinent ex hoc quod per demeritum Adae aeterna vita privantur. Obj. 4: Furthermore, unbaptized children are to Adam’s merits as baptized children are to Christ’s merits. But from Christ’s merit baptized children obtain the reward of eternal life. Therefore, unbaptized children also undergo pain from the fact of being deprived of eternal life through Adam’s demerit. Praeterea, absentari a re amata non potest esse sine dolore. Sed pueri naturalem cognitionem de Deo habebunt, et eadem ratione naturaliter eum diligent. Ergo cum ab eo sint in perpetuum separati, videtur quod hoc sine dolore pati non possint. Obj. 5: Furthermore, one cannot be absent from something he loves without pain. But the children will have natural knowledge of God and for the same reason will naturally love him. Therefore, since they are separated from him forever, it seems that they cannot suffer this without pain. Sed contra, si pueri non baptizati post mortem dolorem interiorem habeant, aut dolebunt de culpa, aut de poena. Si de culpa, cum a culpa illa ulterius emundari non possint, dolor ille erit in desperationem inducens. Sed talis dolor in damnatis est vermis conscientiae. Ergo pueri vermem conscientiae habebunt, et sic non esset eorum poena mitissima, ut in littera dicitur. Si autem de poena dolerent, ergo cum poena eorum juste a Deo sit, voluntas eorum divinae justitiae obviaret; et sic actualiter deformis esset, quod non conceditur. Ergo nullum dolorem interiorem sentient. On the contrary, if unbaptized children had internal pain after death, they will experience pain either from fault or punishment. If it is from fault, then since they cannot be further cleansed from this fault, the pain will lead to despair. But this kind of pain is the worm of conscience in the damned. Therefore, the children would have the worm of conscience, and in this case their punishment would not be the most mild, as it says in the text. Alternatively, if they experienced pain from punishment, then since their punishment is justly from God, their will would be opposed to divine justice, and in this case it would actually be deformed, which we are not granting here. Therefore, they will feel no internal pain. Praeterea, ratio recta non patitur ut aliquis perturbetur de eo quod in ipso non fuit ut vitaretur: propter quod Seneca probat, Epist. 85 et lib. 2 De ira, quod perturbatio in sapientem non cadit. Sed in pueris est ratio recta nullo actuali peccato obliquata. Ergo non turbabuntur de hoc quod talem poenam sustinent, quam vitare nullo modo potuerunt. Furthermore, right reason cannot bear someone’s being distressed over what he did not have in himself the ability to avoid. For this reason Seneca proves that distress does not befall the wise person. But in these children there is right reason that is not obscured by any actual sin. Therefore, they will not be troubled by the fact that they undergo a punishment that they had no way of avoiding. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc est triplex opinio. I answer that there are three opinions concerning this. Quidam enim dicunt quod pueri nullum dolorem sustinebunt, quia in eis adeo ratio obtenebrata erit ut non cognoscant se amisisse quod amiserunt: quod probabile non videtur, ut anima ab onere corporis absoluta ea non cognoscat quae saltem ratione investigari possint, et etiam multo plura. Some say that the children will undergo no pain, since in them reason will be so darkened that they will not know that they have lost what they have lost. This does not seem probable, such that the soul freed from the burden of the body should not know at least what could be investigated by reason, and even much more. Et ideo alii dicunt quod in eis est perfecta cognitio eorum quae naturali cognitioni subjacent, et cognoscunt Deum, et se ejus visione privatos esse, et ex hoc aliquem dolorem sentient; tamen mitigabitur eorum dolor, inquantum non propria voluntate culpam incurrerunt pro qua damnati sunt. Hoc etiam probabile non videtur: quia talis dolor parvus esse non potest de tanti boni amissione, et praecipue sine spe recuperationis; unde poena eorum non esset mitissima. Praeterea omnino eadem ratione qua dolore sensibili et exterius affligente non punientur, etiam dolorem interiorem non sentient: quia dolor poenae delectationi culpae respondet; unde, delectatione remota a culpa originali, omnis dolor ab ejus poena excluditur. Thus, others say that in them there is complete knowledge of what falls under natural knowledge, that they know God and are deprived of seeing him, and that from this they will feel some pain. Yet, their pain will be mitigated inasmuch as they incurred the fault for which they were damned not by their own will. This, too, does not seem probable, since this kind of pain concerning the loss of such a great good cannot be a small one, particularly without hope of recovering it. Hence their punishment would not be the mildest. Furthermore, for entirely the same reason that they will not be punished by sensible pain inflicted externally, they will also not feel internal pain because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure in the fault. Hence with pleasure removed from original sin, all pain is excluded from its punishment. Et ideo alii dicunt quod cognitionem perfectam habebunt eorum quae naturali cognitioni subjacent, et vita aeterna se privatos esse cognoscent, et causam quare ab ea exclusi sunt; nec tamen ex hoc aliquo modo affligentur: quod qualiter esse possit videndum est. Thus, others say that they will have complete knowledge of what falls under natural knowledge and will know they have been deprived of eternal life. As well, they will know the reason why they have been excluded from it. Yet, nevertheless, they will not be afflicted by this in any way. But one should look into how this can be the case. Sciendum ergo quod ex hoc quod caret aliquis eo quod suam proportionem excedit, non affligitur, si sit rectae rationis; sed tantum ex hoc quod caret eo ad quod aliquo modo proportionatus fuit: sicut nullus sapiens homo affligitur de hoc quod non potest volare sicut avis, vel quia non est rex vel imperator, cum sibi non sit debitum: affligeretur autem, si privaretur eo ad quod habendum aliquo modo aptitudinem habuit. Therefore, it should be known that if one has right reason, he is not afflicted by the fact that he lacks what goes beyond his own proportion. Instead, he is only afflicted by lacking that to which he was in some way proportioned. So, too, no wise person is afflicted by the fact that he cannot fly like a bird or because he is not king or emperor. But he would be afflicted if he were deprived of what he had some aptitude to possess in some way. Dico ergo quod omnis homo usum liberi arbitrii habens proportionatus est ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quia potest se ad gratiam praeparare, per quam vitam aeternam merebitur; et ideo si ab hoc deficiant, maximus erit dolor eis quia amittunt illud quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri autem nunquam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc quod vitam aeternam haberent: quia nec eis debebatur ex principiis naturae, cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat, nec actus proprios habere potuerunt quibus tantum bonum consequerentur; et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinae; immo magis gaudebunt de hoc quod participabunt multum de divina bonitate in perfectionibus naturalibus. Nec potest dici quod fuerunt proportionati ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quamvis non per actionem suam, tamen per actionem aliorum circa eos: quia potuerunt ab aliis baptizari, sicut et multi pueri ejusdem conditionis baptizati, vitam aeternam consecuti sunt; hoc enim est superexcedentis gratiae ut aliquis sine actu proprio praemietur; unde defectus talis gratiae non magis tristitiam causat in pueris decedentibus non baptizatis quam in sapientibus hoc quod eis multae gratiae non fiunt quae aliis sibi similibus factae sunt. Therefore, I say that every man possessing the use of free decision is proportioned to obtain eternal life because he can prepare himself for grace, through which he will merit eternal life. Thus, if they fall short of this, it will be a very great pain for them, since they are losing what could have been theirs. But the children were never proportioned to possessing eternal life, since it was not due them from the principles of nature, seeing as it exceeds every faculty of nature. Nor could they have had acts of their own whereby to obtain a good this great. Thus, they will experience no pain at all from lacking the vision of God. In fact, they will instead rejoice in the fact that they will participate much in God’s goodness in natural perfections. And it cannot be said that they were proportioned to obtain eternal life, even if not through their own action but through the action of others concerning them. For they were able to be baptized by others, just as many children in the same condition were in fact baptized and have obtained eternal life. For it belongs to super-surpassing grace that someone should be rewarded without an act of his own. Hence lacking this kind of grace does not cause greater sadness in deceased unbaptized children than does the fact that, among the wise, many graces were not given, although they were given to others like themselves. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in damnatis pro culpa actuali, qui usum liberi arbitrii habuerunt, fuit aptitudo ad vitam aeternam consequendam, non autem in pueris, ut dictum est; et ideo non est similis ratio de utrisque. Reply Obj. 1: In those damned for actual sin, who had the use of free decision, there was an aptitude for obtaining eternal life, whereas there is not in the children, as was said. Thus, the account of both cases is not similar. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis voluntas sit possibilium et impossibilium, ut in 3 Ethicorum dicitur, tamen voluntas ordinata et completa non est nisi eorum ad quae quis aliquo modo ordinatus est; et si in tali voluntate deficiant homines dolent; non autem si deficiant ab illa voluntate quae impossibilium est, quae potius velleitas quam voluntas debet dici; non enim aliquis illud vult simpliciter, sed vellet, si possibile foret. Reply Obj. 2: Although the will is for what is possible and what is impossible, as it says in the Ethics 3, the ordered and complete will is only for that to which one has in some way been ordered. If they fall short in such a will, human beings experience pain, but not if they fall short of the will for what is impossible, which should really be called a “velleity” rather than a will. For one is not willing the thing simply, but would will it if it were possible. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad habendum proprium patrimonium vel membra corporis sui quilibet est ordinatus; et ideo non est mirum, si dolet aliquis de earum amissione, sive pro culpa sua, sive pro aliena eis privetur. Unde patet quod ratio non procedit ex simili. Reply Obj. 3: Everyone is ordered to possess his own patrimony or the limbs of his own body. Thus, it is no wonder if someone experiences pain at losing them, whether he is deprived of them by his own fault or someone else’s. Hence it is clear that the argument does not proceed from a similar case. Ad quartum dicendum, quod donum Christi excedit peccatum Adae, ut ad Rom. 5 dicitur; unde non oportet quod pueri non baptizati tantum habeant de malo quantum baptizati habent de bono. Reply Obj. 4: The gift of Christ surpasses Adam’s sin, as it says in Romans 5:12–21. Hence unbaptized children need not have as much evil as baptized children have good. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis pueri non baptizati sint separati a Deo quantum ad illam conjunctionem quae est per gloriam, non tamen ab eo penitus sunt separati, immo sibi conjunguntur per participationem naturalium bonorum; et ita etiam de ipso gaudere poterunt naturali cognitione et dilectione. Reply Obj. 5: Even though unbaptized children are separated from God as far as the joining with him that occurs through glory goes, they are not totally separated from him. In fact, they are joined to him through participation in natural goods. Thus, they will also be able to rejoice in him with natural knowledge and love. Expositio textus Exposition of the text Quod vero in actuali peccato Adae plura notari valeant peccata, Augustinus in Enchiridio insinuat. Sciendum est quod in aliquo peccato possunt notari deformitates plurium peccatorum dupliciter. Aut proprie, et sic in peccato Adae apparet deformitas superbiae, gulae et inobedientiae, et hujus modi; aut quasi metaphorice, et sic in eo ostenditur deformitas homicidii, quia seipsum spiritualiter occidit, et fornicationis, quia spiritualiter fornicatus est, a Deo recedens; et tamen est unum solum peccatum, has deformitates ex diversis circumstantiis habens, speciem peccati ex ultimo fine retinens; et ideo etiam non oportet quod peccatum originale quod ex eo causatur sit multa. But Augustine, in the Enchiridion, indicates that many sins can be identified in the actual sin of Adam. Therefore, it should be known that in a given sin we can identify the deformities of more than one sin in two ways: either properly, and in this way the deformities of pride, gluttony, disobedience, and so forth, appear in Adam’s sin; or else, as it were, metaphorically. And in this latter way, we see in it the deformity of homicide, since he spiritually killed himself, and of fornication, since he spiritually committed fornication by withdrawing from God. Yet, there is only one single sin possessing these deformities from the different circumstances while retaining the species of sin from its last end. Thus, the original sin caused by it also does not need to be many. Non est putandum gravius fuisse peccato in Spiritum Sanctum. Contra. Homo primus habuit minus impellens ad peccatum quam sequentes. Quanto autem aliquis minori tentatione cadit, gravius peccat. Ergo primus homo gravius peccavit caeteris sequentibus. ‘Yet it is not to be held to have been graver than the sin against the Holy Spirit.’ The first man had less inducing him to sin than subsequent human beings. But the less the temptation under which one falls, the more gravely he sins. Therefore, the first man sinned more gravely than other subsequent human beings. Praeterea, magis malum est quod magis nocet. Illud autem peccatum plus caeteris nocuit. Ergo pejus fuit. Furthermore, what does more harm is a greater evil. Now, that sin did more harm than the rest. Therefore, it was worse. Et dicendum quod contingit aliquod peccatum esse simpliciter levius altero, quod quantum ad aliquam circumstantiam gravius est, ut supra dictum est cum de peccato Adae ageretur; eo quod peccatum simpliciter gravius esse dicitur quod ex specie sua gravitatem majorem habet vel ex pluribus circumstantiis magis aggravatur, vel ex una circumstantia magis actum deformante; unde multa alia peccata simpliciter graviora sunt primo peccato Adae, tum quia ex majori contemptu, tum quia ex sua specie majorem turpitudinem habent; sed quo ad hanc circumstantiam, quod sola exteriori tentatione pulsatus cecidit, gravius est illis peccatis, ad quae etiam exterior tentatio impellit. Unde patet responsio ad primum. It should be said that it can happen that one sin is lighter simply than another that is graver as regards a given circumstance, as was said above when dealing with Adam’s sin, by virtue of the fact that a sin is said to be graver simply when it possesses greater gravity from its species, or is made graver by many circumstances, or even from one circumstances that greatly deforms the act. Hence many other sins are simply graver than the first sin of Adam, both because they arise from greater contempt, and because they possess greater turpitude from their species. But as regards the circumstance that Adam fell when assaulted by external temptation alone, it is graver than sins to which internal temptation also impels. Hence the reply to the first is clear. Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc est per accidens, quod tale nocumentum naturae humanae intulit, quia scilicet fuit primum peccatum quod naturam humanam vitiavit, et ordinem animae ad Deum interrupit in illo ex quo omnes homines, per coitum generati, naturam humanam traxerunt. Quodcumque autem aliud peccatum fuisset hoc modo primum, etiam similem effectum habuisset, sive fuisset peccatum operis sive voluntatis; quamvis quidam aliter dicant, dicentes si Adam alio modo peccasset, non incurrisse eum necessitatem moriendi: quia haec poena illi tantum culpae videtur ordinata esse a Deo, cum dicit, Gen. 2:17: quacumque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris. Sed in hoc ostenditur, etiamsi alia peccata commisisset, quod similem poenam sustinuisset, quasi a minori. Gravius est enim praeceptum praeterire naturalis legis, quo prohibetur illud quod in se est malum, quam praeterire praeceptum disciplinae, quo prohibetur quod non est malum, nisi quia prohibitum. To the second, it should be said that it is incidental that this kind of harm befell human nature, namely, that it was the first sin that vitiated human nature and disrupted the soul’s order to God in the one from whom all human beings generated through intercourse have taken human nature. Now, no matter what other sin had been first in this manner, it would also have had a similar effect, whether it had been a sin of the work or of the will. Yet some say otherwise, stating that if Adam had sinned in some other way, he would not have incurred the necessity of dying, since this punishment seems to have been ordained by God for this fault alone, when he says: in the day that you eat of it you shall die (Gen 2:17). But this very fact shows that if Adam had committed other sins, he would have born a similar punishment, as if arguing from the lesser. For it is graver to transgress a precept of the natural law whereby what is evil in itself is prohibited than to transgress a disciplinary precept prohibiting what is only evil because of the prohibition. Si vero quaeritur, an illud peccatum primis parentibus fuerit dimissum, dicimus eos per poenitentiam veniam consecutos. Videtur quod primi parentes pro peccato non satisfecerint: quia cum bonum sit potentius quam malum, ut probat Dionysius, 4 cap. De div. nom., si peccato proprio totum genus humanum primi parentes interfecerunt, multo fortius satisfactione propria maculam quam induxerant, abstersissent, si satisfecissent. But if it is asked whether that sin was remitted to the first parents, we say that they received forgiveness through penance. It seems that our first parents did not make satisfaction for their sin. For since good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius proves, if our first parents infected the whole human race by their sin, then if they had made satisfaction, all the more would they have wiped away the stain they had introduced. Sed dicendum est quod primum peccatum interrumpere potuit rectum ordinem humanae rationis in Deum, ratione cujus inducta est necessitas ut interrumperetur ordo corporis ad animam per mortem, et sic vitium personae in naturam potuit redundare; sed ejus poenitentia non potuit facere ut ordo ille non fuisset interruptus: quia quod factum est pro infecto haberi non potest. Unde non potuit restaurari quod peccatum abstulerat quantum ad naturam, sed solum quantum ad personam, quae a reatu actuali purgabatur per poenitentiam; non enim potest natura in statum altiorem revocari nisi per id quod naturam totam excedit; et ideo oportuit ad curationem naturae ut esset Deus et homo qui naturam perfecte curaret. Sed hoc ad tertium librum magis pertinet. But it should be said that the first sin was able to disrupt the right order of human reason to God, by reason of which the necessity was introduced of the body’s order to the soul being disrupted by death. And in this way, the vice of the person was able to redound to the nature. But the person’s penitence was unable to make it so that the order had not been disrupted, because what was done as regards the one infected cannot be held on to. Hence he was not able to restore what sin had taken away as regards the nature, but only as regards the person, which is purged from the actual guilt by penitence. For nature can only be called back to a higher state through what surpasses the whole nature. Thus, for nature to be cured, there had to be a God-man who would perfectly cure the nature. But this pertains more to Book III. Si homo in ea juste vixerit, non continuo meretur eam mortem non perpeti. Hoc ideo contingit, quia quamvis per justitiam hominis purgetur infectio originalis culpae, secundum hoc quod ex natura in personam redundat, non tamen purgatur quantum ad ipsam naturam absolute; et ideo poenae quae ipsi naturae debentur, non remittuntur, quamdiu in tali natura infectio maneat, etiamsi centies moreretur homo, et in pristinum statum resurgeret; semper enim manente infectione naturae, manet obligatio ad poenam. Sinful flesh, even if man lives justly in it after the remission of sins, does not necessarily deserve not to suffer that death which it has derived from the propagation of sin. This is the case because, although the infection of original fault is purged by man’s justice, with reference to the fact that it redounds from the nature to the person, it is still not purged as regards the nature itself absolutely. Thus, the punishments that are due the nature itself are not remitted as long as the infection remains in such a nature, even if a man died a hundred times and rose in pristine condition. For if the infection of the nature remains, the obligation to punishment always remains. Distinctio 34 Distinction 34 De peccato actuali quantum ad rationem mali Actual sin as regards the account of evil Divisio textus Division of the text Postquam determinavit de peccato originali, quod a primis parentibus in posteros transit per carnis originem; hic incipit determinare de actuali, quod a parentibus in posteros transit per imitationem operis; et dividitur in partes duas: After he has addressed the original sin that passes from our first parents to their offspring by fleshly origin, here he begins to address the actual sin that passes from parents to their children by imitation of the work. This is divided into two parts. in prima determinat de peccato actuali quantum ad rationem mali; In the first, he addresses actual sin as regards the account of evil.