Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis voluntas sit possibilium et impossibilium, ut in 3 Ethicorum dicitur, tamen voluntas ordinata et completa non est nisi eorum ad quae quis aliquo modo ordinatus est; et si in tali voluntate deficiant homines dolent; non autem si deficiant ab illa voluntate quae impossibilium est, quae potius velleitas quam voluntas debet dici; non enim aliquis illud vult simpliciter, sed vellet, si possibile foret. Reply Obj. 2: Although the will is for what is possible and what is impossible, as it says in the Ethics 3, the ordered and complete will is only for that to which one has in some way been ordered. If they fall short in such a will, human beings experience pain, but not if they fall short of the will for what is impossible, which should really be called a “velleity” rather than a will. For one is not willing the thing simply, but would will it if it were possible. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad habendum proprium patrimonium vel membra corporis sui quilibet est ordinatus; et ideo non est mirum, si dolet aliquis de earum amissione, sive pro culpa sua, sive pro aliena eis privetur. Unde patet quod ratio non procedit ex simili. Reply Obj. 3: Everyone is ordered to possess his own patrimony or the limbs of his own body. Thus, it is no wonder if someone experiences pain at losing them, whether he is deprived of them by his own fault or someone else’s. Hence it is clear that the argument does not proceed from a similar case. Ad quartum dicendum, quod donum Christi excedit peccatum Adae, ut ad Rom. 5 dicitur; unde non oportet quod pueri non baptizati tantum habeant de malo quantum baptizati habent de bono. Reply Obj. 4: The gift of Christ surpasses Adam’s sin, as it says in Romans 5:12–21. Hence unbaptized children need not have as much evil as baptized children have good. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis pueri non baptizati sint separati a Deo quantum ad illam conjunctionem quae est per gloriam, non tamen ab eo penitus sunt separati, immo sibi conjunguntur per participationem naturalium bonorum; et ita etiam de ipso gaudere poterunt naturali cognitione et dilectione. Reply Obj. 5: Even though unbaptized children are separated from God as far as the joining with him that occurs through glory goes, they are not totally separated from him. In fact, they are joined to him through participation in natural goods. Thus, they will also be able to rejoice in him with natural knowledge and love. Expositio textus Exposition of the text Quod vero in actuali peccato Adae plura notari valeant peccata, Augustinus in Enchiridio insinuat. Sciendum est quod in aliquo peccato possunt notari deformitates plurium peccatorum dupliciter. Aut proprie, et sic in peccato Adae apparet deformitas superbiae, gulae et inobedientiae, et hujus modi; aut quasi metaphorice, et sic in eo ostenditur deformitas homicidii, quia seipsum spiritualiter occidit, et fornicationis, quia spiritualiter fornicatus est, a Deo recedens; et tamen est unum solum peccatum, has deformitates ex diversis circumstantiis habens, speciem peccati ex ultimo fine retinens; et ideo etiam non oportet quod peccatum originale quod ex eo causatur sit multa. But Augustine, in the Enchiridion, indicates that many sins can be identified in the actual sin of Adam. Therefore, it should be known that in a given sin we can identify the deformities of more than one sin in two ways: either properly, and in this way the deformities of pride, gluttony, disobedience, and so forth, appear in Adam’s sin; or else, as it were, metaphorically. And in this latter way, we see in it the deformity of homicide, since he spiritually killed himself, and of fornication, since he spiritually committed fornication by withdrawing from God. Yet, there is only one single sin possessing these deformities from the different circumstances while retaining the species of sin from its last end. Thus, the original sin caused by it also does not need to be many. Non est putandum gravius fuisse peccato in Spiritum Sanctum. Contra. Homo primus habuit minus impellens ad peccatum quam sequentes. Quanto autem aliquis minori tentatione cadit, gravius peccat. Ergo primus homo gravius peccavit caeteris sequentibus. ‘Yet it is not to be held to have been graver than the sin against the Holy Spirit.’ The first man had less inducing him to sin than subsequent human beings. But the less the temptation under which one falls, the more gravely he sins. Therefore, the first man sinned more gravely than other subsequent human beings. Praeterea, magis malum est quod magis nocet. Illud autem peccatum plus caeteris nocuit. Ergo pejus fuit. Furthermore, what does more harm is a greater evil. Now, that sin did more harm than the rest. Therefore, it was worse. Et dicendum quod contingit aliquod peccatum esse simpliciter levius altero, quod quantum ad aliquam circumstantiam gravius est, ut supra dictum est cum de peccato Adae ageretur; eo quod peccatum simpliciter gravius esse dicitur quod ex specie sua gravitatem majorem habet vel ex pluribus circumstantiis magis aggravatur, vel ex una circumstantia magis actum deformante; unde multa alia peccata simpliciter graviora sunt primo peccato Adae, tum quia ex majori contemptu, tum quia ex sua specie majorem turpitudinem habent; sed quo ad hanc circumstantiam, quod sola exteriori tentatione pulsatus cecidit, gravius est illis peccatis, ad quae etiam exterior tentatio impellit. Unde patet responsio ad primum. It should be said that it can happen that one sin is lighter simply than another that is graver as regards a given circumstance, as was said above when dealing with Adam’s sin, by virtue of the fact that a sin is said to be graver simply when it possesses greater gravity from its species, or is made graver by many circumstances, or even from one circumstances that greatly deforms the act. Hence many other sins are simply graver than the first sin of Adam, both because they arise from greater contempt, and because they possess greater turpitude from their species. But as regards the circumstance that Adam fell when assaulted by external temptation alone, it is graver than sins to which internal temptation also impels. Hence the reply to the first is clear. Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc est per accidens, quod tale nocumentum naturae humanae intulit, quia scilicet fuit primum peccatum quod naturam humanam vitiavit, et ordinem animae ad Deum interrupit in illo ex quo omnes homines, per coitum generati, naturam humanam traxerunt. Quodcumque autem aliud peccatum fuisset hoc modo primum, etiam similem effectum habuisset, sive fuisset peccatum operis sive voluntatis; quamvis quidam aliter dicant, dicentes si Adam alio modo peccasset, non incurrisse eum necessitatem moriendi: quia haec poena illi tantum culpae videtur ordinata esse a Deo, cum dicit, Gen. 2:17: quacumque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris. Sed in hoc ostenditur, etiamsi alia peccata commisisset, quod similem poenam sustinuisset, quasi a minori. Gravius est enim praeceptum praeterire naturalis legis, quo prohibetur illud quod in se est malum, quam praeterire praeceptum disciplinae, quo prohibetur quod non est malum, nisi quia prohibitum. To the second, it should be said that it is incidental that this kind of harm befell human nature, namely, that it was the first sin that vitiated human nature and disrupted the soul’s order to God in the one from whom all human beings generated through intercourse have taken human nature. Now, no matter what other sin had been first in this manner, it would also have had a similar effect, whether it had been a sin of the work or of the will. Yet some say otherwise, stating that if Adam had sinned in some other way, he would not have incurred the necessity of dying, since this punishment seems to have been ordained by God for this fault alone, when he says: in the day that you eat of it you shall die (Gen 2:17). But this very fact shows that if Adam had committed other sins, he would have born a similar punishment, as if arguing from the lesser. For it is graver to transgress a precept of the natural law whereby what is evil in itself is prohibited than to transgress a disciplinary precept prohibiting what is only evil because of the prohibition. Si vero quaeritur, an illud peccatum primis parentibus fuerit dimissum, dicimus eos per poenitentiam veniam consecutos. Videtur quod primi parentes pro peccato non satisfecerint: quia cum bonum sit potentius quam malum, ut probat Dionysius, 4 cap. De div. nom., si peccato proprio totum genus humanum primi parentes interfecerunt, multo fortius satisfactione propria maculam quam induxerant, abstersissent, si satisfecissent. But if it is asked whether that sin was remitted to the first parents, we say that they received forgiveness through penance. It seems that our first parents did not make satisfaction for their sin. For since good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius proves, if our first parents infected the whole human race by their sin, then if they had made satisfaction, all the more would they have wiped away the stain they had introduced. Sed dicendum est quod primum peccatum interrumpere potuit rectum ordinem humanae rationis in Deum, ratione cujus inducta est necessitas ut interrumperetur ordo corporis ad animam per mortem, et sic vitium personae in naturam potuit redundare; sed ejus poenitentia non potuit facere ut ordo ille non fuisset interruptus: quia quod factum est pro infecto haberi non potest. Unde non potuit restaurari quod peccatum abstulerat quantum ad naturam, sed solum quantum ad personam, quae a reatu actuali purgabatur per poenitentiam; non enim potest natura in statum altiorem revocari nisi per id quod naturam totam excedit; et ideo oportuit ad curationem naturae ut esset Deus et homo qui naturam perfecte curaret. Sed hoc ad tertium librum magis pertinet. But it should be said that the first sin was able to disrupt the right order of human reason to God, by reason of which the necessity was introduced of the body’s order to the soul being disrupted by death. And in this way, the vice of the person was able to redound to the nature. But the person’s penitence was unable to make it so that the order had not been disrupted, because what was done as regards the one infected cannot be held on to. Hence he was not able to restore what sin had taken away as regards the nature, but only as regards the person, which is purged from the actual guilt by penitence. For nature can only be called back to a higher state through what surpasses the whole nature. Thus, for nature to be cured, there had to be a God-man who would perfectly cure the nature. But this pertains more to Book III. Si homo in ea juste vixerit, non continuo meretur eam mortem non perpeti. Hoc ideo contingit, quia quamvis per justitiam hominis purgetur infectio originalis culpae, secundum hoc quod ex natura in personam redundat, non tamen purgatur quantum ad ipsam naturam absolute; et ideo poenae quae ipsi naturae debentur, non remittuntur, quamdiu in tali natura infectio maneat, etiamsi centies moreretur homo, et in pristinum statum resurgeret; semper enim manente infectione naturae, manet obligatio ad poenam. Sinful flesh, even if man lives justly in it after the remission of sins, does not necessarily deserve not to suffer that death which it has derived from the propagation of sin. This is the case because, although the infection of original fault is purged by man’s justice, with reference to the fact that it redounds from the nature to the person, it is still not purged as regards the nature itself absolutely. Thus, the punishments that are due the nature itself are not remitted as long as the infection remains in such a nature, even if a man died a hundred times and rose in pristine condition. For if the infection of the nature remains, the obligation to punishment always remains. Distinctio 34 Distinction 34 De peccato actuali quantum ad rationem mali Actual sin as regards the account of evil Divisio textus Division of the text Postquam determinavit de peccato originali, quod a primis parentibus in posteros transit per carnis originem; hic incipit determinare de actuali, quod a parentibus in posteros transit per imitationem operis; et dividitur in partes duas: After he has addressed the original sin that passes from our first parents to their offspring by fleshly origin, here he begins to address the actual sin that passes from parents to their children by imitation of the work. This is divided into two parts. in prima determinat de peccato actuali quantum ad rationem mali; In the first, he addresses actual sin as regards the account of evil. in secunda determinat de eo ex parte actus, in quo deformitas fundatur per quam malum dicitur esse actuale peccatum, dist. 35, ibi: post hoc videndum est quid sit peccatum. In the second, he addresses it on the side of the act in which the deformity is founded, whereby the evil is said to be an actual sin, at after these things, we must see what sin is. Prima dividitur in duas: The first part is divided into two parts. in prima determinat de malo, veritatem ostendens; In the first, he addresses evil, showing the truth. in secunda excludit quamdam objectionem, ibi: ad hoc autem quod dictum est malum esse quod bonum est quidam sic opponunt. In the second, he rules out a certain objection, at but some make the following objection to the statement, ‘evil is that which is good.’ Circa primum tria facit: Concerning the first, he does three things. primo dicit de quo intendit; First, he states what he intends. secundo prosequitur suum propositum, ibi: causa et origo primi peccati res bona extitit; Second, he pursues his proposal, at the cause and first origin of sin was a good thing. tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt, ibi: ex his aperitur quod primo et secundo supra investigando diximus. Third, he follows up what was said, at from these arguments is revealed what we said above was to be investigated first and second. Prima dividitur in duas: The first part is divided into two parts. in prima inquirit causam mali; In the first, he inquires as to the cause of evil. in secunda subjectum ejus, ibi: ostensa origine mali, superest videre in qua re sit malum. In the second, he inquires as to its subject, at after the origin of evil has been shown, it remains to see in what thing evil exists. Circa primum duo facit: Concerning the first, he does two things. primo ostendit primam causam propriam mali culpae, quae extra genus mali est; First, he shows the first proper cause of the evil of fault, which is outside the genus of evil. secundo ostendit causam proximam, quae est quasi univoca et in eodem genere, ibi: mala autem voluntas illa angeli et hominis causa est etiam malorum subsequentium. Second, he shows the proximate cause, which is like a univocal cause in the same genus, at and that evil will, both of the angel and of man, is also the cause of subsequent evils. Ostensa origine mali, superest videre in qua re sit malum. Hic inquirit subjectum mali: After the origin of evil has been shown, it remains to see in what thing evil exists. Here he inquires about the subject of evil. et primo ostendit quod subjectum mali est bonum; And he first shows that the subject of evil is good. secundo ex hoc inducit quamdam conclusionem, ibi: ex quo colligitur nihil aliud significari cum dicitur homo malus, nisi bonum malum; Second, from this he draws a conclusion: from this it is gathered that, when man is called evil, nothing else is meant than an evil good. tertio ostendit in hoc regulam artis dialecticae fallere, ibi: ideoque in his contrariis quae bona et mala vocantur, illa dialecticorum regula deficit, qua dicunt nulli rei duo simul inesse contraria. Third, he shows that the rule of the art of dialectic fails in this, at and so, ‘in these opposites which are called good and evil, that rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that two opposites cannot be in the same thing at the same time.’