Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum quod aliqua habent esse, possunt definiri, ut in 7 Metaph., dicitur; unde quia ens per prius de substantia dicitur, quae perfecte rationem entis habet, ideo nil perfecte definitur nisi substantia: accidentia autem, sicut incomplete rationem entis participant, ita et definitionem absolutam non habent: quia in definitionibus eorum ponitur aliquid quod est extra genus eorum, scilicet subjecta ipsorum. Similiter etiam cum ens, quodammodo dicatur de privationibus et negationibus, ut in 4 Metaph., dicitur, earum etiam potest esse aliquis modus definitionis incompletissimus, qui est quasi exponens nominis significationem, non essentiam indicans, quam nullam habet: non autem ita quod peccatum omnino sit privatio et negatio, sed quantum ad id solum ex quo formaliter rationem mali habet; et ideo ex parte illa definitur per privationem, ut patet ex omnibus descriptionibus in littera positis. Reply Obj. 1: To the extent things possess being, they can be defined, as it says in the Metaphysics 7. Hence, because “being” is said with greater priority of substance, which has the account of being in the complete sense, only substance can be defined completely. Therefore, accidents, as having an incomplete participation in the account of being, do not have an absolute definition. For their definitions include something outside their genus, namely, their subject. Likewise, too, since “being” is said in a certain way of privations and negations, as it says in the Metaphysics 4, there can also be a way of defining them, though a quite incomplete one, which is a sort of explanation of the term’s signification, not an indication of the essence that it does not possess. It is not that sin is totally a privation or negation, but instead it is as regards that whereby it formally has the account of evil. Thus, from that perspective it is defined by way of privation, as is clear from all the descriptions put forward in the text. Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum non dicitur univoce de omnibus generibus peccatorum, sed per prius de peccato actuali mortali, a quo peccatum veniale deficit ex hoc quod non omnino a fine deordinat. Sed aliquo modo a fine retardat, ordine ad finem salvato; unde deficit ex parte illa ex qua peccatum formaliter rationem mali habet. Originale autem deficit ab eo ex parte ipsius substantiae actus; actuale enim mortale est voluntarium voluntate propria illius in quo est; sed originale est voluntarium voluntate alterius; unde deficit ex parte illa ex qua peccatum habet rationem culpae. Et ideo non oportet quod definitio peccati in genere conveniat nisi illi peccato in quo perfecte ratio generis invenitur. Potest autem et definitio peccati in genere eis secundum quid convenire, sicut et ratio generis in eis per posterius invenitur. Reply Obj. 2: “Sin” is not said univocally of all kinds of sin, but with priority of actual mortal sin, of which venial sin falls short due to the fact that it does not totally disorder one from the end. But it does in a way slow one down from reaching the end while preserving the order to the end. Hence it falls short of the aspect whereby sin formally has the account of evil. Original sin, in turn, falls short on the side of the act’s substance. For actual mortal sin is voluntary by the proper will of the person in whom it exists, but original sin is voluntary by the will of another. Hence it falls short of the aspect whereby sin has the account of a fault. Thus, the definition of sin in general need only agree with the kind of sin in which the account of the genus is found perfectly. But the definition of sin in general can also agree with the others in a qualified sense, just as the account of the genus is found in them in a subsequent way. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquando utimur non veris differentiis loco verarum, propter earum occultationem, ut in 1 Post., dicitur, ita etiam loco veri generis potest poni aliquid per quod genus magis innotescat; et sic Augustinus, intendens magis plane quam artificialiter loqui, genus peccati, quod est operatio, per istam circumlocutionem dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, significavit. Reply Obj. 3: Just as we sometimes use differences that are not true in place of true ones because the true ones are obscure, as it says in the Posterior Analytics 1, so too in place of a true genus we can give something whereby the genus becomes better known. Thus, Augustine, intending to speak more plainly than artificially, signified the genus of sin, which is an activity, by way of the circumlocution word, deed, or desire. Ad quartum dicendum, quod justitia non sumitur hic prout est specialis virtus, sed pro justitia generali, quae est idem subjecto quod omnis virtus, ut in 4 Ethicor., cap. 2, Philosophus dicit, differens a virtute solum ratione: quia virtus dicitur secundum quod ad actum dirigit; justitia vero secundum quod rectitudini legis concordat, et secundum quod in bonum commune cedit. Reply Obj. 4: “Justice” is not being taken here as the specific virtue, but for general justice, which is the same in subject as all virtue, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4, differing only conceptually from virtue. For we say “virtue” as directing to the act, but “justice” as agreeing with the rectitude of the law and as falling under the common good. Ad quintum dicendum, quod obedientia etiam quandoque sumitur ut specialis virtus, quando scilicet specialis ratio ad faciendum aliquid est auctoritas praecipientis; et huic opponitur inobedientia quae est speciale peccatum, quando scilicet aliquis praetermittit hoc quod est praeceptum, specialiter in contemptum praecipientis. Aliquando autem obedientia sumitur quasi omnem virtutem consequens; actus enim omnis virtutis in praecepto legis est: unde quicumque aliquem actum virtutis facit, obedit, et obedientiae opponitur inobedientia quae omne peccatum mortale consequitur; et hoc modo inobedientia hic in definitione peccati ponitur. Reply Obj. 5: “Obedience,” too, is sometimes taken as the specific virtue, namely, when the specific reason for doing something is the authority of the person commanding it. And the disobedience that is the specific sin is opposed to this, that is, when someone omits what is commanded specifically in contempt of the one commanding it. But sometimes “obedience” is taken as what follows on all virtue. For every act of virtue is in the law’s command. Hence whoever does an act of virtue, obeys. To this kind of obedience is opposed the disobedience that follows on every mortal sin. This is how disobedience is being included here in the definition of sin. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum in omni peccato sit aliquis actus Whether there is an act in every sin Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod omne peccatum in actu consistat, etiam peccatum omissionis. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that every sin consists in an act, even a sin of omission. Peccatum enim est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut dictum est. Sed in hoc quod dicitur: dictum vel factum vel concupitum, tangitur aliquis actus. Ergo etiam peccatum omissionis in aliquo actu consistit. Obj. 1: For sin is a word, deed, or desire against the law of God, as was said. But in saying word, deed, or desire, it touches on an act. Therefore, even a sin of omission consists in some act. Praeterea, omne peccatum vel est originale vel actuale. Sed omissio non est originale peccatum: quia originale aequaliter in omnes transit qui per concupiscentiam generantur, non autem in omnibus est peccatum omissionis. Ergo oportet quod sit actuale. Sed actuale ab actu dicitur. Ergo omissionis peccatum aliquem actum significat. Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is either original or actual. But omission is not original sin because original sin passes equally to everyone generated through concupiscence; but there is not a sin of omission in everyone. Therefore, it must be actual. But we say “actual” because of “act.” Therefore, a sin of omission signifies some act. Praeterea, quicumque se habet similiter nunc et prius, non magis nunc quam prius peccat. Sed aliquis qui nihil agit, similiter se habet nunc et prius. Si ergo aliquando talis peccat, continue dum actum illum non agit videtur peccare. Hoc autem inconveniens est, quia sic peccatum omissionis quodlibet gravissimum esset. Ergo peccatum omissionis non est, si aliquis omnino nihil agat; sed oportet quod sit in eo aliquis actus. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever is situated now like he was before is not sinning more now than he was before. But someone who is doing nothing now is situated similarly now and before. Therefore, if such a person ever sins, he seems to be continuously sinning when he is not performing the given act. But this is unfitting because then any sin of omission would be very grave. Therefore, it is not a sin of omission if someone is doing nothing at all. Rather, there must be some act in him. Praeterea, demeritum opponitur merito. Sed meritum non potest esse nisi per actum. Cum ergo opposita ad idem genus reducantur, videtur quod omne peccatum et demeritum in actu aliquo consistat. Obj. 4: Furthermore, demerit is opposed to merit. But merit can only be through act. Therefore, since opposites are traced back to the same genus, it seems that every sin and demerit consists in an act. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, De vera relig., cap. 14, quod omne peccatum est voluntarium. Si ergo omissio est peccatum, videtur quod saltem actum voluntatis in ea esse oporteat. Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says that every sin is voluntary. Therefore, if omission is a sin, it seems that there must at least be an act of the will in it. Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, malum esse non posset, nisi esset bonum in quo malum consisteret. Sed ubi nullus est actus, non invenitur aliquod bonum, in quo deformitas peccati fundetur. Ergo videtur quod non possit esse aliquod peccatum in quo non sit aliquis actus. Obj. 6: Furthermore, as was said above, there could not be evil if there were not good, in which evil exists. But where there is no act, we find no good, in which the deformity of sin has its foundation. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a sin in which there is not some act. Sed contra, Ambrosius dicit in littera: peccatum est praevaricatio legis divinae, et caelestium inobedientia praeceptorum. Sed praeceptorum quaedam sunt affirmativa, quaedam negativa. Cum ergo aliquis nihil agendo inobediens divinis praeceptis affirmativis existat, videtur quod peccatum omissionis possit esse ubi non est aliquis actus. On the contrary, Ambrose says in the text: sin is a transgression of the divine law and a disobedience of heavenly commands. But some commands are affirmative, others negative. Therefore, since one can be disobedient to the affirmative divine commands by doing nothing, it seems that there can be a sin of omission where there is no act. Praeterea, nihil juste punitur nisi peccatum. Sed ei qui non facit quod praeceptum est sibi, etiamsi nullum actum faciat, juste poena infligitur. Ergo, etsi nullum actum agat, aliquis nihilominus omittendo peccat. Furthermore, only sin is justly punished. But a punishment is justly inflicted on one who does not do what is commanded him, even if he does not carry out any act. Therefore, even if someone performs no act, he can still sin by omitting one. Respondeo dicendum, quod omne peccatum oportet aliquo modo in actu consistere, non tamen eodem modo. Peccatum enim originale sicut rationem culpae habet ex hoc quod voluntarium est, non quidem voluntate propria, sed voluntate alterius, ita etiam rationem peccati habet ex hoc quod per actum alterius inductum est. Sed peccata actualia etiam in actu proprio illius in quo sunt consistunt; et hoc quidem planum est in his qui per commissionem peccant. I answer that every sin must in some way consist in an act, though not in the same way. For just as original sin has the account of a fault from the fact that it is voluntary, albeit not by one’s own will, but by the will of another, so too it has the account of a sin from the fact that it is introduced through the act of another. But actual sins consist also in the proper act of the one in whom they exist, and this is indeed clear in the case of those who sin by commission. Utrum autem in peccato omissionis sit aliquis actus a potentia elicitus, super hoc duplex opinio est. Quidam enim dicunt quod in peccato omissionis semper oportet aliquem actum esse, per quem aliquis retardatur ab expletione mandati vel praecepti, sive interiorem voluntatis, ut cum aliquis vult praecepto non obedire; sive exteriorem, ut cum aliquis facit aliquem actum per quem ab expletione praecepti impeditur; et ponitur exemplum de illo qui nimis vigilat, et non potest surgere hora debita. But on the question of whether there is some act elicited from a power in a sin of omission, there are two opinions. Some say that in a sin of omission there must always be an act whereby one is held back from fulfilling a mandate or command, whether this be an internal act of the will, as when one wills not to obey a command, or an external one, as when one performs an act that impedes fulfilling the command. And the example is given of one who stays up too late such that he cannot get up at the proper time. Sed ista opinio non videtur necessitatem habere: cum enim voluntas libera sit, nec ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum determinetur; potest hoc modo praetermittere aliquid quod ejus contrarium non velit, nec de ejus contrario cogitet, nec etiam de aliquo alio quod sit per se impedimentum ejus quod facere tenetur; etsi enim aliquid velit quod, quantum est in se, non est impedimentum expletionis praecepti, sicut oppositum, constat quod ex hoc quod vult illud non peccat: quia illud potest esse secundum se licitum, sed peccat in eo quod praetermittit id quod facere debet. Ergo constat quod ille actus vel exterior vel interior per accidens ad peccatum omissionis pertinet; et ita in eo deformitas omissionis non fundatur; nec iterum in actu contrario praecepti: quia positum est quod talis actus non sit, cum voluntas possit in neutrum oppositorum ferri, sicut etiam Deus nec vult mala fieri, nec vult mala non fieri. Nec alicui dubium est quod aliquo sic se habente per omissionem peccat, quia juste punitur ex hoc quod praeceptum non implet; unde patet quod peccatum omissionis in sola negatione actus debiti consistit. Et haec est alia opinio. But this opinion does not seem to be endowed with necessity. For since the will is free and not determined to do something or not to do it, it can omit something without willing its contrary, and without thinking about its contrary or about anything else that would be an essential impediment to what the will is bound to do. For if it wills something that, considered in itself, is not an impediment to fulfilling a command by being opposed to the command, it is obvious that it does not sin from the fact that it wills this thing, since the thing can be licit in itself, but it does sin from the fact that it omits what it ought to do. Therefore, it is established that the act, either internal or external, pertains to the sin of omission incidentally, and thus, the omission’s deformity is not founded in the act. Nor is it founded in an act contrary to the command, since we posited that it is not this kind of act because the will can be turned to neither opposite, just as God neither wills evils to occur nor wills evils not to occur. No one can doubt that one who is in this situation sins by omission because he is justly punished due to his not fulfilling a command. Hence it is clear that a sin of omission consists only in the negation of a due act. And this is the other opinion. Sed quia opposita in idem genus reducuntur, ideo omissio actus peccati rationem consequitur ex eo quod voluntaria est, sicut et actus voluntarius rationem peccati et culpae habet; et huic etiam consonant verba Philosophi in 3 Ethic., cap. 3, ubi ostendit negligentiam sciendi vel faciendi aliquid juste a legibus puniri, ex hoc quod sicut in potestate hominis est facere aliquid, ita et non facere; unde sicut pro eo quod indebite facit juste punitur, ita pro eo quod indebite dimittit. But because opposites are traced back to the same genus, the omission of an act attains the account of a sin by being voluntary, just as a voluntary act has the account of a sin and a fault. The Philosopher’s words in the Ethics 3 agree with this as well, where he shows that negligence in knowing or doing something is justly punished on the basis that, just as it is within a man’s power to do something, so also it is in his power not to do it. Hence, just as he is justly punished for doing something unduly, so also he is justly punished for unduly failing to do something. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, opposita reducuntur in idem genus in quo vel utrumque est per se, ut patet in contrariis et relativis; vel unum est per se, et alterum per reductionem, ut patet in privatione et habitu, et affirmatione et negatione; unde habitum est in 28 dist. 1 libri ab Augustino, quod in eodem genere est genitus et non genitus; et ideo in dicto etiam includitur omissio dicti, et in facto omissio facit, et sic de aliis. Non enim hoc habet dictum inquantum est affirmative dictum, ut sit peccatum, sed inquantum est in voluntatis potestate, a rectitudine finis exiens. In hoc autem convenit cum dicto affirmativo etiam non dicere, quod similiter est in potestate voluntatis et a recto ordine exiens finis. Reply Obj. 1: As was said, opposites are traced back to the same genus, in which either both are essential, as is clear in contraries and relatives, or one is essential and the other is by way of reduction, as is clear in privation and habit and in affirmation and negation. Hence we have it from Augustine that in the same genus are the begotten and the not-begotten. Thus, in “word” is included the omission of a word, in “deed” the omission of a deed, and so forth. For a word is not a sin precisely because it is an affirmative statement, but because it is in the will’s power and departs from the rectitude of the end. But in this respect, not speaking agrees with affirmative speech, since it is likewise in the will’s power and departs from right order. Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum omissionis non est peccatum originale, sed actuale; nec dicitur actuale quasi in aliquo actu existat, sed quia ad genus actus reducitur cujus negatio est; sicut Augustinus ingenitum in genere relationis ponit, ut habitum est in 1 libro, dist. 28, et iterum sicut actus est in potestate voluntatis, ita et negatio ejus. Reply Obj. 2: A sin of omission is not original sin, but an actual sin. And it is not called “actual” as consisting in an act, but because it is traced back to the genus of act, of which it is the negation, just as Augustine includes “unbegotten” in the genus of relation, as we have it from Book I. And again, just as an act is in the will’s power, so is its negation. Ad tertium dicendum, quod omissio non est peccatum nisi secundum quod praecepto affirmativo opponitur. Praeceptum autem affirmativum obligat semper, sed non ad semper, sed ad aliquod tempus determinatum; et ideo in illo tempore tantum ad quod praeceptum affirmativum obligat aliquis reus omissionis tenetur. Reply Obj. 3: Omission is only a sin insofar as it is opposed to an affirmative command. Now, an affirmative command obliges always, but not at every moment. Instead, it obliges at a determinate time. Thus, only at the time the affirmative command obliges is one held guilty of omission. Ad quartum dicendum, quod malum pluribus modis contingere potest quam bonum, ut patet per Dionysium, ex 4 cap. De div. nomin., et Philosophum, in 2 Ethic., cap. 7; non enim bonum consistit, nisi omnia quae ad perfectionem rei exiguntur, conveniant; quodcumque autem eorum subtrahatur, ratio mali incidit; et ideo meritum, quod est quasi quoddam iter in finem beatitudinis, esse non potest, nisi sit operatio et operationis rectitudo; sed sive desit rectitudo in ipsa operatione, sive desit ipsa operatio, erit demeritum, quod est recessus a fine: quod etiam patet in corporalibus, quia locum corporalem nihil acquirit nisi per motum ordinatum in locum illum; potest autem locum illum amittere quod est extra proprium locum dupliciter, sive non moveatur, sed quiescat, sive moveatur motu indebito. Reply Obj. 4: Evil can occur in more ways than good, as is clear through Dionysius and the Philosopher. For there is only good when everything required for a thing’s perfection comes together. But when any of these things is subtracted, the account of evil is introduced. Thus, merit, which is like a kind of path to the end of beatitude, can only be an activity and the rectitude of an activity. But whether the rectitude is lacking in the activity or whether the activity itself is lacking, there will be demerit, which is a departure from the end. This is also clear in bodily things. For nothing reaches a bodily place except by motion ordered to that place. But it can miss a place outside its own proper place in two ways: if it does not move but stays still, or if it moves with an undue motion. Ad quintum dicendum, quod omissio est voluntaria non quasi actu voluntatis in ipsam transeunte, sed quia in voluntatis potestate est actum non facere, sicut et facere; et ideo sicut actus dicitur voluntarius, quia est in potestate voluntatis, ita et omissio actus. Reply Obj. 5: Omission is voluntary, not by an act of the will leading to it, but because it is in the will’s power not to do an act, just as it is in its power to do it. Thus, just as an act is called “voluntary” because it is in the will’s power, so also is the omission of an act. Ad sextum dicendum, quod oportet quod malum semper in bono subsistat; non tamen oportet quod illud bonum in quo malum subsistit sit actus: et ideo dico quod malum omissionis non fundatur in aliquo actu, sed in potentia, quae actum producere potest. Reply Obj. 6: Evil must always subsist in a good, but it is not necessary for the good in which an evil subsists to be an act. Thus, I say that the evil of omission is founded not in an act, but in the power that can produce the act. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum in actu exteriori sit peccatum Whether there is sin in the external act Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non consistat in actu exteriori. To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that sin does not exist in the external act. Quia, ut in lib. De somno et vigil., cap. 1, dicitur, cujus est potentia, ejus est actus; et eadem ratione cujus est habitus, ejus est actus. Sed habitus virtutis vel vitii non est in corpore, sed in anima. Ergo nec actus peccati erit actus corporis, sed animae. Obj. 1: For, as it says in On Sleep and Sleeplessness, what has the potency has the act, and for the same reason what has the habit has the act. But the habit of a virtue or vice is not in the body, but in the soul. Therefore, the act of sin will not be the body’s act, but the soul’s. Praeterea, ei qui vitare peccatum non potest, peccatum non est imputandum. Sed sicut gladius non potest vitare quin occidat, motus ab homine, ita etiam manus vel aliquod membrum non potest vitare quin actum exequatur quem voluntas imperat. Ergo peccatum in actu exteriori membrorum non consistit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin should not be imputed to one who cannot avoid sin. But just as a sword moved by a human being cannot avoid killing, neither can a hand or some limb avoid following through with the act that the will commands. Therefore, sin does not exist in the limbs’ external act. Praeterea, actus voluntatis medius est inter actum intellectus, scilicet cogitationem, et actum exteriorum membrorum, et magis unitur voluntas intellectui quam etiam ipsis membris. Sed cogitatio pure speculativa de aliquo, quantumcumque malo, non est peccatum. Ergo multo minus in exteriori actu peccatum erit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the act of the will is a mean between the intellect’s act, thinking, and the limbs’ external act, and the will is more united to the intellect than even to the limbs. But purely speculative thought about something, no matter how evil, is not a sin. Therefore, much less will there be sin in the external act. Praeterea, illud quo posito vel remoto, nihilominus est peccatum, non videtur in se deformitatem peccati continere. Sed sive sit actus exterior, sive non, dummodo adsit voluntas completa aliquod malum perpetrandi, peccatum perficitur, et imputatur ad mortem. Ergo actus exterior deformitatem non continet. Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which is a sin whether it is there or not does not seem to contain within itself the deformity of sin. But whether there is the external act or not, as long as the complete will to perpetrate an evil is present, the sin is complete and is imputed unto death. Therefore, the external act does not contain the deformity. Praeterea, illud quod est tantum ad manifestationem bonitatis vel malitiae, non videtur per se actus malitiae vel virtutis esse. Sed, ut in 10 Ethic., c. 6, Philosophus innuere videtur, exteriores actus sunt tantum ad manifestationem virtutis, et eadem ratione sunt ad manifestationem vitii. Ergo in actibus exterioribus non consistit peccatum. Obj. 5: Furthermore, what only manifests goodness or malice does not seem to be by itself an act of malice or virtue. But, as the Philosopher seems to suggest in the Ethics 10, external acts are only a manifestation of virtue and, for the same reason, only a manifestation of vice. Therefore, sin does not exist in external acts. Sed contra, servire peccato est peccare. Sed membra exteriora peccato servire dicuntur, ad Rom. 6:19: sicut exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae et iniquitati ad iniquitatem, ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire justitiae in sanctificationem. Ergo in actu exteriori membrorum peccatum consistit. On the contrary, to serve sin is to sin. But the external members are said to serve sin in Romans 6:19: for just as you once yielded your members to impurity and to greater and greater iniquity, so now yield your members to righteousness for sanctification. Therefore, sin does exist in the external act of the members. Praeterea, nihil prohibetur lege divina nisi peccatum. Sed lex divina non tantum prohibet actus interiores, sed etiam exteriores; adeo ut de his etiam diversa praecepta dentur, ut patet Exod. 20:14 et 17: non moechaberis et non concupisces uxorem, etc. Ergo non solum in actu interiori sed etiam exteriori peccatum consistit. Furthermore, nothing but sin is forbidden by divine law. But the divine law forbids not only internal acts, but also external ones, to the point that distinct commandments are given concerning them, as is clear from Exodus 20:14 and 17: you shall not commit adultery, and: you shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, etc. Therefore, sin exists not only in the internal act, but also in the external one.