Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum sit determinatum genus peccati Whether the sin against the Holy Spirit is a determinate genus of sin Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum non sic determinat genus peccati. To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the sin against the Holy Spirit does not determine a genus of sin. Sicut enim peccatum quod ex industria geritur est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, ita peccatum quod est ex infirmitate est in Patrem, et quod ex ignorantia est in Filium. Sed peccatum ex infirmitate non nominat determinate aliquod genus peccati, sed peccati circumstantiam. Ergo nec peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum est determinatum genus peccati. Obj. 1: For just as a sin committed out of diligence is a sin against the Holy Spirit, so also a sin due to weakness is one against the Father and one by ignorance against the Son. But “sin by weakness” does not name determinately a genus of sin, but a circumstance of sin. Therefore, neither is the sin against the Holy Spirit a determinate genus of sin. Praeterea, peccare ex industria vel certa malitia est peccare ex electione, ut dictum est. Sed unusquisque habens habitum vitiosum, ex electione peccat, ut ex 7 Ethic. patet, ubi distinguit intemperatum contra incontinentem: quorum primus habens habitum per electionem peccat, secundus per passionem. Ergo peccare ex habitu est peccare ex certa malitia, quod est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Sed peccatum ex habitu procedens non nominat determinatum genus peccati. Ergo nec peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, sinning by diligence or out of a certain malice is sinning by choice, as was said. But everyone who has a vicious habit sins by choice, as is clear from the Ethics 7, where he distinguishes the intemperate person from the incontinent person. The first of these has a habit and sins by choice; the second sins by passion. Therefore, sinning out of habit is sinning out of a certain malice, which is the sin against the Holy Spirit. But “sin that proceeds from habit” does not name a determinate genus of sin. Therefore, neither does sin against the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, in littera assignantur diversae species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum, ut desperatio, obstinatio, et multa hujusmodi. Sed ista se habent ad omne genus peccati: quia nullum genus peccati est quod interdum ex desperatione oriri non possit, et sic de aliis. Ergo peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum non est determinatum genus peccati. Obj. 3: In the text are assigned different species of sin against the Holy Spirit, such as despair, obstinacy, and many other such things. But these relate to every species of sin because there is no genus of sin that cannot at some time arise from despair, and so forth. Therefore, sin against the Holy Spirit is not a determinate genus of sin. Praeterea, peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum dicitur quod est contra appropriatum Spiritui Sancto. Sed omne peccatum mortale contrariatur gratiae, quae appropriatur Spiritui Sancto. Ergo omne peccatum mortale debet dici in Spiritum Sanctum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, sin against the Holy Spirit means what is against that which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. But every mortal sin is contrary to grace, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, every mortal sin ought to be called a sin against the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, mors animae est, ut Augustinus dicit, In Joan., c. 47, et 8 De civit. Dei, separatio animae a Deo. Sed quodlibet peccatum mortale separat animam a Deo. Ergo quodlibet mortale est ducens ad mortem. Sed peccatum ad mortem est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, ut Magister dicit. Ergo quodlibet mortale est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Obj. 5: As Augustine says, the death of the soul is the soul’s separation from God. But every mortal sin separates the soul from God. Therefore, every mortal sin leads to death. But sin unto death is sin against the Holy Spirit, as the Master says. Therefore, every mortal sin is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Sed contra, quodlibet genus peccati distinguitur ab aliis generibus. Sed peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum est quoddam genus peccati gravius caeteris, ut Magister dicit. Ergo est determinatum et distinctum ab aliis. On the contrary, every genus of sin is distinguished from other genera. But sin against the Holy Spirit is a genus of sin more grave than the rest, as the Master says. Therefore, it is a determinate genus distinct from the others. Praeterea, peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, cum sit irremissibile, distinguitur ab aliis quae remissibilia sunt, secundum remissibile et irremissibile. Sed istae differentiae sunt maxime distantes. Ergo multo magis distincta genera peccatorum facient quam aliquae aliae differentiae. Furthermore, sin against the Holy Spirit, being unforgivable, is distinguished from others that are forgivable by “forgivable” and “unforgivable.” But these differences are the most distant. Therefore, all the more will they produce distinct genera of sins than other differences. Respondeo dicendum, quod, ut supra dictum est, peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum dicitur quod est ex certa malitia vel industria sive electione, quod idem est. I answer that, as was said above, the sin against the Holy Spirit means one that is out of a certain malice or diligence, that is, a choice, which is the same thing. Quod autem aliquis ex certa deliberatione actum peccati eligat, non impulsus aliqua passione, potest contingere dupliciter. Aut per positionem alicujus in eligente, per quod inclinatur in talem actum, sicut in sibi similem; sic enim omnis habens habitum vel peccati vel virtutis inclinatur in actus similes suis habitibus, quia naturalis appetitus rei est in id quod sibi simile est; et hoc modo quicumque habet habitum intemperantiae, eligit actum intemperantiae, et sic de aliis peccatis. Now, there are two ways it can happen for someone to choose an act of sin out of a certain deliberation that is not impelled by a passion. Either it is by putting something in the one choosing whereby he inclines to such an act as like himself. For in this way, everyone who has a habit of sin or virtue inclines to acts like his own habits because the natural appetite of a thing is for what is like itself. And this is the way in which anyone who has a habit of intemperance chooses an act of intemperance, and so forth for other sins. Alio autem modo ex certa deliberatione peccatum eligitur, quando voluntas rejicit illud per quod homo a peccato retrahi posset: verbi gratia, aliquis propter expectationem futuri praemii abstinet a peccato. Si ergo aliquis spem futuri praemii abjiciat voluntarie vel aliquid hujusmodi, quod a peccato retrahebat, eliget hoc quod sibi erit delectabile secundum carnem, quasi per se bonum, et ita ex certa malitia peccabit. In the other way, sin is chosen out of a certain deliberation when the will rejects that whereby man could be withdrawn from sin. For example, someone refrains from sin because of expecting a future reward. Therefore, if one voluntarily rejects hope of future reward or some such thing that withdrew him from sin, he will choose what will be pleasant to him in terms of the flesh as if it were essentially good, and thus will sin out of a certain malice. Sumendo ergo primo modo peccatum ex electione, non nominatur aliquod genus peccati determinatum, sed quaedam peccati circumstantia, ut scilicet actus ex habitu procedat; quod in omnibus generibus peccatorum contingit. Sed secundo modo, speciale peccatum dicitur, quod ex electione contingit. Quia speciale peccatum dicitur ex speciali objecto; hoc autem est speciale objectum voluntatis, in quo peccatur, scilicet hoc quod a peccato natum erat retrahere, cui voluntas dissentit, ab eo sponte recedens. Therefore, taking sin by choice in the first way, it does not name a determinate genus of sin, but instead a given circumstance of sin, namely, that the act proceed from a habit. This is possible in all genera of sins. But, in the second way, it indicates a specific sin that occurs by choice. For a specific object indicates a specific sin. Now, the specific object of the will wherein the sin is committed is that which was naturally apt to withdraw from sin, that with which the will disagrees and from which it withdraws on its own initiative. Peccatum autem in Spiritum Sanctum non proprie dicitur illud quod ex electione procedit primo modo, sed quod secundo modo ex electione procedit: quia peccata et specificantur et nominantur ab objectis; objectum autem in hoc peccato est hoc quod a peccato retrahebat, et istud est bonitas quaedam, vel aliquis effectus Spiritui Sancto appropriabilis; et ideo peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum determinatum genus peccati nominat. But sin against the Holy Spirit does not properly mean that which proceeds from choice in the first way, but instead that which proceeds from choice in the second way. For sins are both specified and named from their objects. But the object in this sin is that which withdrew from sin, and this is a kind of goodness or some effect that can be appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Thus, sin against the Holy Spirit names a determinate genus of sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum aliquis hoc secundo modo ex electione peccat, quod proprie peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum dicitur, considerantur ibi duo actus, quorum uterque peccatum est, et primus est causa secundi. Verbi gratia, aliquis uno actu voluntatis praemia aeterna contemnit, eorum spem a se abjiciens, et in hoc ipso peccat; et quia desperat de praemio, incidit in actum fornicationis, et hic actus in eo ex certa electione provenit propter praecedentem actum. Unde patet quod cum dicitur peccatum ex industria, ipsa industria, quae notatur esse causa peccati, est quoddam peccatum, et est determinatum peccati genus: et hoc proprie est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Sed infirmitas vel ignorantia, non nominat peccatum aliquod, sed poenam tantum; et ideo ex ea non designatur speciale peccatum. Reply Obj. 1: When one sins by choice in this second way, which is what the sin against the Holy Spirit properly indicates, there are considered to be two acts there. Both of these are a sin, and the first is the cause of the second. For example, by one act of the will someone regards eternal rewards with contempt, rejecting hope of them for himself, and in this he sins. Because he despairs of the reward, he falls into an act of fornication. This act comes to be in him from a certain choice due to the preceding act. Hence it is clear that when we speak of a sin by diligence, the diligence that we note as a cause of the sin is a sin, and is a determinate genus of sin. This is properly the sin against the Holy Spirit. But weakness or ignorance name not a given sin, but punishment only. Thus, a specific sin is not denoted by them. Ad secundum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Reply Obj. 2: The reply is clear from what was said. Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum non dicitur ille actus secundus qui ex primo, ut dictum est, causatur, nisi forte secundum quod virtus primi actus manet in eo; sed ipse primus actus est proprie peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum; et ideo non est inconveniens ut ex uno determinato peccato omnia peccata possint oriri, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Sin against the Holy Spirit is not said to be the second act that is caused by the first, as was said, except perhaps insofar as the force of the first act remains in it. Rather, the first act itself is properly the sin against the Holy Spirit. Thus, it is not unfitting for all sins to be able to arise from one determinate sin, as was said above. Ad quartum dicendum, quod contrariari gratiae contingit dupliciter. Primo directe per se, et hoc fit dum aliquis gratiam actualiter despicit, vel aliquid ad gratiam pertinens, et sic opponitur gratiae peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Secundo indirecte et quasi ex consequenti; et sic omne peccatum mortale gratiae opponitur: quia per peccatum mortale quaeritur aliquid quod simul cum gratia esse non potest. Reply Obj. 4: There are two ways for something to be contrary to grace. The first is directly and essentially. And this occurs when one actually despises grace or something pertaining to grace. This is the way in which the sin against the Holy Spirit is opposed to grace. The second is indirectly and, as it were, by consequence. And in this way, every mortal sin is opposed to grace. For by mortal sin one seeks something that cannot exist simultaneously with grace. Ad quintum dicendum, quod peccatum mortale quantum ad aliquid est simile morti, et quantum ad aliquid aegritudini; inquantum enim separat a Deo, qui vita est, mortis similitudinem habet, et haec est mors prima; inquantum autem adhuc manet possibilitas redeundi ad vitam, habet similitudinem aegritudinis ducentis ad mortem condemnationis, quae est mors secunda, quae omnino similitudinem mortis retinet, dum per eam homo a Deo separatur, et ad vitam gratiae possibilis reditus non est. Sicut autem in aegritudinibus corporalibus quaedam sunt curabiles, quaedam autem non, quantum est de natura morbi, et hae dicuntur infirmitates ad mortem, ita etiam in peccatis illa tantum peccatorum mortalium ad mortem dicuntur quae, quantum in se est, irremissibilia sunt. Dicitur ergo peccatum esse mortale a morte prima, sed ad mortem propter mortem secundam. Reply Obj. 5: Mortal sin is like death in a certain respect and is like sickness in another respect. For inasmuch as it separates from God, who is life, it bears a likeness to death, and this is the first death. But inasmuch as there still remains the possibility of coming back to life, it bears a likeness to sickness that leads to the death of condemnation, which is the second death, which bears total likeness to death when man is separated from God by it and has no possibility of returning to the life of grace. Now, just as in bodily sicknesses there are some that can be cured and others that cannot as far as the nature of the disease goes, and the latter are called “sicknesses unto death,” so also among sins it is only those sins among mortal sins that are called “sins unto death” that, as far as they themselves go, are unforgivable. Therefore, sin is called “mortal” from the first death, but “unto death” because of the second death. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum convenienter assignentur in littera Whether the species of sin against the Holy Spirit are fittingly assigned in the text Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur in littera species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the species of sin against the Holy Spirit are unfittingly assigned in the text. Nullus enim desperare potest, credens remissionem peccatorum in Ecclesia fieri. Sed negare remissionem peccatorum est infidelitatis. Ergo desperatio est species infidelitatis, et non peccati in Spiritum Sanctum. Obj. 1: For no one can despair while he believes that there is forgiveness of sins in the Church. But to deny that there is forgiveness of sins belongs to faithlessness. Therefore, despair is a species of faithlessness, not of sin against the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, illud quod est infinitum nullus potest nimis extendere. Sed misericordia Dei infinita est. Ergo nullus peccat ex hoc quod Dei misericordiam nimis extendat; et ita videtur quod nimis praesumere de Dei misericordia non sit peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum vel species ejus. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one can stretch what is infinite too much. But God’s mercy is infinite. Therefore, no one sins by stretching God’s mercy too much. Thus, it seems that to presume too much on God’s mercy is not the sin against the Holy Spirit or a species of it. Praeterea, accidentia non constituunt speciem. Sed impoenitentia est quoddam accidens peccati, sicut duratio cujuslibet rei est accidens ejus, quod solum impoenitentia dicere videtur, ut scilicet peccatum usque ad mortem duret. Ergo impoenitentia non est aliqua species peccati. Obj. 3: Furthermore, accidents do not constitute a species. But impenitence is an accident of a sin, just as the duration of anything is an accident of that thing, which is all that impenitence seems to indicate, namely, such that the sin endures until death. Therefore, impenitence is not a species of sin. Praeterea, praeteritum et futurum non diversificant speciem. Sed impoenitentia et obstinatio non differunt nisi secundum praeteritum et futurum: quia impoenitentia est ex hoc quod de praeteritis commissis homo non poenitet; obstinatio autem est in hoc quod futuris committendis firmiter proposito inhaeret. Ergo impoenitentia et obstinatio non sunt duae species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, past and future do not differentiate species. But impenitence and obstinacy only differ with reference to past and future. For impenitence is from man’s not repenting of sins committed in the past, whereas obstinacy is in man’s clinging to a firm plan to commit sins in the future. Therefore, impenitence and obstinacy are not two species of sin against the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, veritas appropriatur Filio, qui dicit Joan. 14:6: ego sum via, veritas et vita. Sed peccatum in Filium est quod est contra appropriatum Filii. Ergo impugnatio veritatis non est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, sed in Filium. Obj. 5: Furthermore, truth is appropriated to the Son, as John 14:6 says: I am the way, and the truth, and the life. But sin against the Son is that which is against what is appropriated to the Son. Therefore, impugning the truth is a sin not against the Holy Spirit, but against the Son. Praeterea, invidia est unum capitale vitiorum, ut supra dictum est, et non est gravius inter ea. Sed alia peccata capitalia non ponuntur species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo nec invidentia fraternae gratiae debet peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum dici. Obj. 6: Furthermore, envy is one of the capital vices, as was said above, and there is no gravest among them. But other capital sins are not posited to be species of sins against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, neither should envying one’s brother be called a sin against the Holy Spirit. Praeterea, oppositorum generum diversae sunt species. Sed peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, quod est ex certa malitia, ex opposito dividitur contra peccatum in Patrem vel Filium, quod est ex infirmitate vel ex ignorantia. Cum igitur quodlibet peccatum praedictorum, ut desperatio, praesumptio et hujusmodi, possit ex infirmitate vel ex ignorantia accidere, videtur quod non convenienter assignetur species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum. Obj. 7: Furthermore, opposite genera have different species. But the sin against the Holy Spirit, which is from a certain malice, is distinguished by opposition to sin against the Father or the Son, which are from weakness or ignorance. Therefore, since any of the aforementioned sins, such as despair, presumption, and so forth, can occur from weakness or from ignorance, it seems that the species of sin against the Holy Spirit is unfittingly assigned. Praeterea, aliquis non peccat ex electione, prout peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum ex electione dicitur, nisi removeantur omnia quae a peccato retrahere possunt; quolibet enim retrahente manente, peccatum non eligitur. Sed omnia retrahentia a peccato non tolluntur nisi per omnia sex enumerata. Ergo nullum istorum sex per se sumptum est species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum, sed simul accepta per modum partium integralium faciunt unum peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum. Obj. 8: Furthermore, as sin against the Holy Spirit means sin by choice, one only sins by choice by removing everything that can withdraw from sin. For while anything that withdraws does remain, sin is not chosen. But everything withdrawing from sin is only taken away by all six things that were enumerated. Therefore, none of these six taken by itself is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, but taken together as integral parts they make one sin against the Holy Spirit. In contrarium est quod in littera determinatur per auctoritates sanctorum. On the contrary, there is what is settled in the text through the authorities of the saints. Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, proprie loquendo, secundum quod est determinatum genus peccati, consistit in actu voluntatis abjicientis id per quod aliquis a peccato retrahitur. I answer that, as was said, sin against the Holy Spirit, properly speaking, consists, as a determinate genus of sin, in the act of the will that rejects that whereby one is withdrawn from sin. Contingit autem hoc dupliciter. Retrahitur enim aliquis a peccato et operatur bonum propter se, et aliquis propter aliud. Now, this is possible in two ways. For one is withdrawn from sin and performs a good action for its own sake while another does the same for the sake of something else. Propter aliud autem dupliciter: vel ad vitanda supplicia, vel ad consequenda praemia; et neutrum virtuosi est, qui bonum propter se operatur, et malum propter se fugit, et haec duo tolluntur per “praesumptionem,” quae privat timorem suppliciorum; et per “desperationem,” quae tollit spem praemiorum. It can be for the sake of something else in two ways: to avoid penalties or to attain rewards. Neither of these is characteristic of the virtuous person, who does a good action for its own sake and flees evil on its own account. These two are taken away by “presumption,” which deprives one of the fear of penalties, and by “despair,” which takes away hope of rewards. Propter se aliquis operatur bonum vel fugit malum, quando movetur principaliter ex aliquo quod in ipso actu virtutis vel peccati est. Hoc autem est dupliciter. Aliquid enim potest considerari in actu virtutis vel vitii, ut est quoddam humanum bonum, et aliquid ut est quoddam divinum. Si ergo consideretur actus peccati ex parte ejus quod est humanum in actu, sic duo possunt ibi esse, scilicet delectatio indebita et deformitas actus: et ex utroque aliquis a peccato retrahitur; et secundum hoc sunt duae species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum, scilicet “obstinatio” et “impoenitentia”: quia per obstinationem aliquis firmiter adhaeret delectationi, ac si non esset incompetens; per impoenitentiam autem non vitat deformitatem quae est in actu, quae erat ratio poenitendi. However, one does good for its own sake or flees evil on its own account when he is moved principally by something in the act of virtue or sin itself. This is in two ways. For in the act of virtue or vice we can consider something as a human good and as a divine good. Therefore, if we consider the act of sin from the perspective of the act’s human element, two things can be said to be there: undue pleasure and the deformity of the act. And one can be withdrawn from sin by both. On this basis there are two species of sin against the Holy Spirit, namely, “obstinacy” and “impenitence.” For by obstinacy one firmly clings to pleasure as if it were not inappropriate, while by impenitence one does not avoid the deformity in the act that was reason for repenting.