Distinctio 44 Distinction 44 De potentia peccandi The power to sin Divisio textus Division of the text Determinato de peccato quantum ad actum peccati, hic determinat de potentia peccandi; et dividitur in partes duas: Having addressed sin as regards the act of sin, here he addresses the power to sin. This is divided into two parts. in prima determinat de potentia peccandi; In the first, he addresses the power to sin. in secunda continuat se ad sequentem librum, ibi: jam nunc his intelligendis atque pertractandis quae ad Verbi incarnati mysterium pertinent, integra mentis consideratione intendamus. In the second, he segues into Book III, at let us now readily attend, with the whole consideration of our mind, to understanding and treating those things which pertain to the mystery of the Word made flesh. Prima dividitur in duas: The first is divided into two parts. in prima inquirit utrum potentia peccandi sit a Deo; In the first, he inquires whether the power to sin is from God. in secunda determinat de obedientia quae debetur eis qui potentiam praelationis a Deo habent, ibi: hic oritur quaestio non transilienda silentio. In the second, he addresses the obedience due to those who possess the power of preeminence from God, at here arises a question which is not to be passed over in silence. Circa primum tria facit: Concerning the first, he does three things. primo movet quaestionem; First, he raises a question. secundo narrat opinionem quorumdam, ibi: putant quidam potentiam recte agendi nobis esse a Deo, potentiam vero peccandi non a Deo, sed a nobis vel a diabolo esse; Second, he relates the opinion of some, at some hold that the power to act righteously comes to us from God, and that the power to sin does not come from God, but from ourselves or from the devil. tertio determinat veritatem, ibi: sed pluribus sanctorum testimoniis indubitanter monstratur quod potestas mali a Deo est. Third, he settles on the truth, at but it is indubitably shown by many testimonies of the Saints that the power of evil is from God. Hic oritur quaestio non transilienda silentio. Hic inquirit de obedientia debita his qui a Deo potestatem habent: Here arises a question which is not to be passed over in silence. Here he inquires about the obedience due those who possess power from God. et primo movet quaestionem; And first he raises the question. secundo solvit, ibi: sed sciendum est Apostolum ibi loqui de saeculari potestate. Second, he gives a solution, at but it is to be known that the Apostle there speaks of secular power. Jam nunc his intelligendis atque pertractandis quae ad Verbi incarnati mysterium pertinent, integra mentis consideratione intendamus. Hic continuat se ad sequentia: Let us now readily attend, with the whole consideration of our mind, to understanding and treating those things which pertain to the mystery of the Word made flesh. Here he segues into what follows. et primo ponit continuationem; And first he lays out the fact that he is moving on. secundo assignat ordinem, ibi: hic est rationis ordo, etc. Second, he assigns the order, at now, the order of reason. Hic est duplex quaestio: Here there are two questions. prima de potentia peccandi; First, on the power to sin. secunda de obedientia. Second, on obedience. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De potentia peccandi The power to sin Circa primum quaeruntur tria: Concerning the first, three questions are asked: primo utrum potentia peccandi sit bona et a Deo; first, whether the power to sin is good and is from God; secundo cum secundum praelationis officium, adsit potestas multa peccata perpetrandi, quae nisi quis in statu praelationis esset, facere non posset; utrum etiam omnis praelatio a Deo sit; second, since, in accord with an office of preeminence, there is the power of perpetrating many sins that one could not commit if he were not in the state of preeminence, whether all preeminence is also from God; tertio utrum praelatio, sive dominium, sit a Deo in ordinationem naturae institutae vel in punitionem naturae corruptae. third, whether preeminence or dominion is from God for the ordering of established nature or for the punishment of corrupted nature. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum potentia peccandi sit a Deo Whether the power to sin is from God Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentia peccandi non sit a Deo. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the power to sin is not from God. Posse enim peccare, ut Anselmus dicit in cap. De lib. arb., neque est libertas neque pars libertatis. Sed omnis potentia naturalis quae est in nobis ad agendum actus humanos, ad liberum arbitrium pertinet. Ergo potentia peccandi non est in nobis aliqua potentia naturalis. Constat etiam quod non est gratiae potentia: quia per gratiam nullus ordinatur ad peccatum. Cum ergo omnis potentia quae est in nobis a Deo sit gratiae vel naturae, videtur quod potentia peccandi non sit in nobis a Deo. Obj. 1: For being able to sin, as Anselm says, is neither freedom nor part of freedom. But every natural power in us to perform human acts pertains to free decision. Therefore, the power to sin is not some natural power within us. It is also certain that it is not a power of grace, because no one is ordered toward sin by a grace. Therefore, since every power in us from God belongs to grace or nature, it seems that the power to sin is not in us from God. Praeterea, Deuter. 32:4: Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ergo quanto aliquid magis est perfectum, magis debet computari inter divina opera. Sed actus est perfectior quam potentia. Cum igitur actus peccati non sit a Deo, nec potentia peccandi a Deo erit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the works of God are perfect (Deut 32:4). Therefore, the more perfect something is, the more it ought to be reckoned among the divine works. But the act is more perfect than the power. Therefore, since the act of sin is not from God, neither will the power to commit sin be from God. Praeterea, ad opus humanum concurrunt potentia, scientia et voluntas. Sed voluntas peccandi non est a Deo. Ergo eadem rationem nec potentia peccandi ab ipso est. Obj. 3: Furthermore, for a human act, power, knowledge, and will come together. But the will to sin is not from God. Therefore, for the same reason, neither is the power to sin from him. Praeterea, a causa per se producitur effectus secundum similitudinem suae causae; unde a Deo, qui est per se causa omnium, omnia producuntur retinentia similitudinem ejus quantum possunt: quia a primo ente sunt entia, et a primo vivente viventia. Sed in potentia peccandi non assimilatur creatura Deo. Ergo potentia peccandi non est in nobis a Deo. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a cause essentially produces an effect after the likeness of its cause. Hence God, who is essentially the cause of everything, produces everything, and they retain a likeness to him as far as possible. For beings are from the first being and living things from the first living thing. But the creature does not become like God in its power to sin. Therefore, the power to sin is not in us from God. Praeterea, cujus usus malus est, ut Boetius dicit, De diff. topic., ipsum malum est. Sed potentiae peccandi usus est ipsum peccatum, quod malum est. Ergo et potentia peccandi mala est. Sed nullum malum est a Deo. Ergo potentia peccandi non est a Deo. Obj. 5: Furthermore, that whose use is evil, as Boethius says, is evil itself. But using the power to sin is a sin, which is evil. Therefore, the power to sin is also evil. But no evil is from God. Therefore, the power to sin is not from God.