Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset dominium Whether there would have been dominion in the state of innocence Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu naturae integrae praelatio, seu dominium, non fuisset. To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that in the state of integral nature there would not have been preeminence or dominion. Dicit enim Gregorius, lib. 21 Moral.: natura omnes homines aequales fecit; sed pro meritis alios aliis occulta, sed justa Dei dispensatio subjecit. Sed si homines non peccassent, statum naturae retinuissent. Ergo omnes fuissent aequales, et nulla in eis fuisset praelatio. Obj. 1: For Gregory says: nature made all men equal, but for their merits God’s hidden but just arrangement has made some subject to others. But if men had not sinned, they would have retained the state of nature. Therefore, all would have been equal, and there would have been no preeminence among them. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in 19 De civit. Dei, hominem ad imaginem Dei factum solum irrationalibus esse praepositum. Sed homo non aequiparatur irrationalibus nisi propter peccatum, ut dicitur in Psal. 48:13: homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit: comparatus est jumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis. Ergo si peccatum non fuisset, unus homo alii suppositus non fuisset. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that man made according to God’s image is only set over irrational creatures. But man is only made equal to irrational creatures because of sin, as it says in Psalm 49:12 [48:13]: when he was in honor, man did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and has become like them. Therefore, if there had been no sin, one man would not have been set under another. Praeterea, dominium sine servitute esse non potest. Sed Augustinus, ubi supra, et alii sancti communiter dicunt quod servitus pro peccato est introducta. Ergo et dominium, seu praelatio, ante peccatum non fuisset. Obj. 3: Furthermore, dominion cannot exist without servitude. But Augustine and other saints commonly say that servitude was introduced due to sin. Therefore, dominion or preeminence, too, would not have existed before sin. Praeterea, Apostolus dicit, 1 Tim. 1:9: lex non est justo posita. Sed Philosophus dicit in fine Ethic., quod haec fuit necessitas constituendi reges et alios principes, ad leges condendas habentes vim coactivam ad virtutis actus, quam sermo persuasorius sapientum non habet. Ergo si omnes justitiam in qua conditi sunt servassent, praelatio non fuisset. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Apostle says: the law is not laid down for the just (1 Tim 1:9). But the Philosopher says at the end of the Ethics that the necessity of setting up kings and other rulers was to establish laws possessing the power to compel to acts of virtue, a power that the more persuasive speeches of the wise do not have. Therefore, if all had preserved the justice in which they were created, there would not have been preeminence. Praeterea, ea quae consequuntur naturam integram, etiam remanent in patria. Sed in futuro omnis cessabit praelatio, ut dicitur in Glossa ord. 1 Corinth. 15:24. Ergo et in natura integra praelatio non fuisset. Obj. 5: Furthermore, what follows on integral nature also remains in heaven. But in the future all preeminence will cease, as it says in a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15:24. Therefore, in integral nature, too, there was not preeminence. Sed contra illud, quod est dignitatis, in natura integra multo nobilius fuisset. Sed dominium et praelatio ad dignitatem pertinent. Ergo multo amplius in statu naturae integrae fuissent. On the contrary, what belongs to dignity would have been much more noble in integral nature. But dominion and preeminence pertain to dignity. Therefore, much more would they have existed in the state of integral nature. Praeterea, status naturae integrae non fuit altior quam est modo status angelorum. Sed in angelis est unus ordo qui dominationum vocatur, et etiam alii ad praelationem pertinentes, ut principatus, potestates et archangeli. Ergo et in statu naturae humanae ante peccatum fuisset praelatio. Furthermore, the state of integral nature was not higher than the state of the angels is now. But among the angels there is an order called that of dominions as well as others pertaining to preeminence, such as principalities, powers, and archangels. Therefore, there would also have been preeminence in the state of human nature before sin. Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est praelationis modus: unus quidem ad regimen ordinatus, alius autem ad dominandum. Domini autem ad servum, ut in 8 Ethic., Philosophus dicit, est praelatio sicut tyranni ad subditum. Differt autem tyrannus a rege, ut ibidem Philosophus dicit: quia rex ordinat praelationem suam ad bonum gentis cui praeest, propter ejus utilitatem statuta et legem faciens; tyrannus autem praelationem suam ordinat ad utilitatem propriam; et ideo duplex modus praelationis supradictus in hoc differt, quia in primo intenditur bonum subditorum, in secundo proprium bonum praesidentis; et ideo secundus modus praelationis in statu naturae integrae esse non potuisset, nisi respectu eorum quae ad hominem tamquam ad finem ordinantur. Haec autem sunt creaturae irrationales, quibus omnibus ad suum commodum praefuisset multo amplius quam nunc. Sed creatura rationalis, quantum est de se, non ordinatur ut ad finem ad aliam, ut homo ad hominem; sed si hoc fiat, non erit nisi inquantum homo propter peccatum irrationalibus creaturis comparatur; unde etiam Philosophus, ibidem, servum comparat organo, dicens, quod servus est organum animatum, et organum est servus inanimatus. Et ideo talis praelatio hominis ad hominem ante peccatum non fuisset; sed prima praelatio, quae ordinatur ad utilitatem subditorum, fuisset ibi quantum ad aliquem usum, non quantum ad omnes. Est enim praelatio ad dirigendum subditos in his quae agenda sunt ad supplendum defectus, ut quod populi a regibus defendantur; et iterum ad corrigendum mores, dum mali puniuntur, et coacte ad actus virtutis inducuntur. Sed quia ante peccatum nil fuisset quod homini nocere posset, nec etiam voluntas alicujus bono contradiceret; ideo, quantum ad duos ultimos usus praelatio in statu innocentiae non fuisset; sed quantum ad primum usum solum, qui scilicet est dirigere in agendis vel in sciendis, secundum quod unus alio majori munere sapientiae et majori lumine intellectus praeditus fuisset. I answer that there are two manners of preeminence: one ordered to rule, the other to domination. Now, the preeminence of master to slave, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, is like that of tyrant to subject. A tyrant differs from a king, as the Philosopher says in that same place, because a king orders his preeminence to the good of the nation over which he is set, making law and statutes for its benefit, whereas a tyrant orders his preeminence to his own benefit. Thus, the two manners of preeminence mentioned above differ in that the good of the subjects is intended in the first, but the good of the one presiding in the second. Thus, the second manner of preeminence could not have existed in the state of integral nature, except in regard to what is ordered to man as an end. These are the irrational creatures, over all of which man would have been set for his benefit much more than now. But a rational creature, as far as it itself goes, is not ordered to another as an end, as man to man. If this happens, it will only be inasmuch as man is compared to irrational creatures because of sin. Hence in the same place the Philosopher also compares a slave to an organ, saying that a slave is an animate organ and an organ is an inanimate slave. Thus, this kind of preeminence of man to man would not have existed before sin. But the first preeminence, which is ordered to the benefit of the subjects, would have existed there in regard to a given function, though not in regard to all. For preeminence is for making up for a defect, as when the people are defended by kings, as well as for correcting morals, when the wicked are punished and incited to acts of virtue by compulsion. But because there would have been nothing that could harm man before sin nor would anyone’s will contradict the good, there would not have been preeminence in the state of innocence as regards the last two functions, but only as regards the first function, that is, that which is giving direction in what is to be done or known, insofar as one would have been endowed with a greater gift of wisdom and greater light of intellect than another. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod natura omnes homines aequales in libertate fecit, non autem in perfectionibus naturalibus; liberum enim, secundum Philosophum, in 1 Metaph., est quod sui causa est. Unus enim homo ex natura sua non ordinatur ad alterum sicut ad finem; et ideo secundus modus praelationis non fuisset qui libertatem subditis tollit, sed primus modus esse posset, qui nullum praejudicium libertati affert, dum subditi ad bonum praepositi non ordinantur, sed e converso regimen praepositi ad bonum subditorum; unde non incongrue se eorum servos appellant. Reply Obj. 1: Nature made all men equal in freedom, but not in natural perfections. For the free, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 1, is that which is the cause of itself. For one man by his nature is not ordered to another as an end. Thus, the second manner of preeminence would not have existed, that which takes away the subjects’ freedom. But the first manner could exist, since it does not prejudice freedom seeing as the subjects are not ordered to the good of the one set over them; but, on the contrary, the rule of the one set over them is ordered to the good of the subjects. Hence it is not inappropriate for them to call themselves their servants. Ad secundum dicendum, quod auctoritas illa loquitur quantum ad secundum modum praelationis. Reply Obj. 2: This authority is speaking of the second manner of preeminence. Et similiter ad tertium. Reply Obj. 3: Likewise in reply to the third objection. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quantum ad illum usum praelatio non fuisset, sed quantum ad alios, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: There would not have been preeminence in that function, but in the others, as was said. Ad quintum dicendum, quod supra, dist. 11, dictum est, quomodo intelligendum sit omnem praelationem in futuro evacuari. Si tamen simpliciter intelligeretur in futuro tolli, non oportet quod in statu innocentiae praelatio non fuisset: quia status ille adhuc erat status viae, et in via est necessaria praelatio per quam unus ab alio dirigatur: quod non adeo necessarium conceditur in termino viae. Reply Obj. 5: Above it was stated how we should understand that every office of preeminence is vacated in the future. Yet if it were understood simply as being taken away in the future, this need not mean that there would not have been preeminence in the state of innocence. For this state was still a wayfaring state. And on the way there is a necessary preeminence whereby one is directed by another, which we concede is not so necessary at the end of the way. Quaestio 2 Question 2 De obedientia ad praelatos Obedience to prelates Deinde quaeritur de obedientia ad praelatos; et circa hoc tria quaeruntur: Then the question of obedience to prelates is asked. Three questions are asked concerning this: primo utrum obedientia sit virtus; et si est virtus, utrum sit virtus specialis; first, whether obedience is a virtue, and, if it is a virtue, whether it is a specific virtue; secundo utrum Christiani potestatibus saecularibus, et praecipue tyrannis, obedire teneantur; second, whether Christians are bound to obey secular powers, particularly tyrants; tertio utrum profitentes obedientiam, in omnibus praelatis suis teneantur obedire. third, whether those who profess obedience are bound to obey their prelates in all things. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum obedientia sit virtus Whether obedience is a virtue Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obedientia non sit virtus. To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that obedience is not a virtue. Omnis enim virtus est medium vitiorum, ut Philosophus dicit in 2 Ethic. Sed obedientia non est hujusmodi: quia per abundantiam non corrumpitur, sed perficitur, si aliquis obediat in illis in quibus non tenetur. Ergo obedientia non est virtus. Obj. 1: For every virtue is a mean between vices, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. But obedience is not this sort of thing because excess does not destroy, but instead perfects it, if someone is obedient in matters in which he is not bound. Therefore, obedience is not a virtue. Praeterea, obedientia respicit praeceptum. Sed praeceptum se extendit ad omnes actus virtutum: quia omnes sunt in praecepto legis. Ergo obedientia non est virtus determinata, sed consequens omnem virtutem: quod etiam potest videri ex definitione Ambrosii supra, 35 dist. inducta: dicit enim, quod peccatum est transgressio legis Dei et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, obedience regards a command. But command extends to all the acts of the virtues because all are in the command of the law. Therefore, obedience is not a determinate virtue, but follows on every virtue. This can even be seen from Ambrose’s definition quoted above. For he says that sin is a transgression of the divine law and disobedience of heavenly commands. Praeterea, si est virtus determinata, aut est una de cardinalibus, aut de adjunctis. Sed nulla de cardinalibus est, quia illae sunt tantum quattuor inter quas non numeratur obedientia; similiter inter adjunctas non invenitur, ut patet si considerentur virtutes adjunctae, quas Philosophus, 4 Ethic., enumerat. Ergo obedientia non est virtus determinata. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it is a determinate virtue, it is either one of the cardinal virtues or one of the ones connected with them. But it is not one of the cardinal virtues, since those are only the four, and obedience is not among their number. Likewise, we do not find it among the connected virtues, as is clear if we consider the connected virtues that the Philosopher enumerates in the Ethics 4. Therefore, obedience is not a determinate virtue. Si dicatur, quod reducitur ad justitiam: Obj. 4: One might say that it is traced back to justice. contra. Nulla virtus perficitur per diminutionem rationis objecti proprii, ut patet in magnanimitate, quae magnum respicit; et quanto majus fuerit quod operandum est, magis ad magnanimitatem pertinet. Sed justitia debitum respicit quasi objectum, quia justitiae actus est reddere alteri quod suum est. Cum igitur obedientia perficiatur per hoc quod debitum minuitur, quod quanto aliquis minus considerat, ut Bernardus dicit, De praec. et dispens., c. 7, perfectior est obedientia, videtur quod obedientia ad justitiam non reducatur. On the contrary, no virtue is perfected by lessening the account of its proper object, as is clear in magnanimity, which regards the great, and the greater that which was supposed to be done, the more it pertains to magnanimity. But justice regards what is due as its object because the act of justice is to render to another what is his. Therefore, since obedience is perfected by lessening what is due, seeing as the less consideration one gives to the due, as Bernard says, the more perfect the obedience, it seems that obedience is not traced back to justice. Praeterea, justitia legalis dicitur secundum quam praeceptis homo adaequatur. Sed obedientia praecepta respicit. Ergo obedientia est idem quod justitia legalis. Sed justitia legalis, ut dicit Philosophus, 5 Ethicor., est omnis virtus. Ergo obedientia non est aliqua virtus determinata sed generalis. Obj. 5: Furthermore, legal justice is spoken of as that according to which a man is made level with commands. But obedience regards commands. Therefore, obedience is the same thing as legal justice. But legal justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, is every virtue. Therefore, obedience is not a given determinate virtue, but a general one. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, Moral., lib. 35, quod obedientia non tam est virtus quam mater omnium virtutum. Sed esse matrem virtutum convenit caritati. Ergo obedientia videtur esse idem quod caritas; et ita non videtur distincta ab aliis virtutibus. Obj. 6: Furthermore, Gregory says that obedience is not so much a virtue as the mother of all virtues. But it befits charity to be the mother of virtues. Therefore, obedience seems to be the same as charity. Thus, it does not seem to be distinct from other virtues. Sed contra, Hugo de sancto Victore dicit, Serm. 16: obedientia est virtus quae omnia amplectitur injuncta, necessario implenda, nisi obstiterit imperantis auctoritas; et ita est specialis virtus, cum assignetur sibi actus specialis. On the contrary, Hugh of Saint Victor says: obedience is the virtue that embraces everything enjoined as necessarily to be fulfilled, unless the authority of the one commanding stands in the way. Thus, it is a specific virtue, since a specific act is assigned to it. Praeterea, quod assignatur maximum in aliquo genere,est aliquid determinatum in genere illo. Sed Gregorius dicit quod obedientia est maxima virtutum. Ergo obedientia est quaedam virtus determinata. Furthermore, what is assigned as the greatest in a genus is something determinate in that genus. But Gregory says that obedience is the greatest of virtues. Therefore, obedience is a certain determinate virtue. Respondeo dicendum, quod obedientia est virtus, et est specialis virtus. Cum enim habitus, potentiae et actus distinguantur per objecta, oportet quod virtus, quae habet speciale objectum, sit specialis virtus. Dicitur autem speciale objectum a speciali ratione, quamvis illa specialis ratio circa multas res vel omnes poni possit. Contingit enim eamdem rem ad diversas potentias pertinere, sicut colorem ad visum, imaginationem et intellectum, sed sub diversa ratione; unde contingit ut una virtus specialis se extendat ad actus omnium virtutum secundum quamdam specialem rationem, sicut dicit Philosophus, 4 Ethic., de magnanimitate, quod operatur magnum in actibus omnium virtutum; unde et caeterarum virtutum ornatus quidam est: et tales virtutes dicuntur quodammodo generales, quia habent materiam generalem, quamvis objectum speciale habeant propter specialem rationem objecti, quae in multis materiis invenitur. I answer that obedience is a virtue, and is a specific virtue. For since habits, powers, and acts are distinguished by their objects, a virtue that has a specific object must be a specific virtue. Now, we speak of a specific object on the basis of a specific account, even though this specific account can be applied to many or all things. For it is possible for the same thing to pertain to different powers, as color does to sight, to the imagination, and to the intellect, though with different accounts. Hence one specific virtue can extend to the acts of all virtues with reference to a given specific account, as the Philosopher says of magnanimity, that is, that it performs a great action in the acts of all the virtues. Hence it is also a kind of adornment of the rest of the virtues. And such virtues are said to be in a certain way general because they have a general matter, even though they possess a specific object, due to the object’s specific account that is found in many matters. Et per hunc modum dico quod obedientia est specialis virtus, quia attendit specialem rationem, scilicet praeceptum cum debito consentiendi. Et quia reddere alteri quod suum est et sibi debetur est justitiae, ideo obedientia pars quaedam justitiae est et specialiter divinae: quia hoc suum quod superioribus redditur, scilicet impletio mandatorum, est quaedam pars hujusmodi communis quod debitum dicitur, vel quod suum est, et quod etiam exigi posset coram judice; nam circa hujusmodi est proprie specialis justitia. And in this way, I say that obedience is a specific virtue because it takes note of a specific account, namely, a command with the debt to consent. Since rendering to another what is his and what is due him belongs to justice, obedience is a part of justice, specifically divine justice. For the “one’s own” that is rendered to superiors, namely, fulfilling their orders, is a part of this kind of common justice called “debt” or what is “one’s own,” that which could also be required before a judge. For special justice properly concerns this kind of thing.