Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, obedientia respicit in praecepto quod servat, debitum observandi. Hoc autem debitum causatur ex ordine praelationis, quae virtutem coactivam habet, non tantum temporaliter sed etiam spiritualiter propter conscientiam, ut apostolus dicit Roman. 13, secundum quod ordo praelationis a Deo descendit, ut apostolus, ibidem, innuit. Et ideo secundum hoc quod a Deo est, obedire talibus Christianus tenetur, non autem secundum quod a Deo praelatio non est. Dictum est autem, quod praelatio potest a Deo non esse dupliciter: vel quantum ad modum acquirendi praelationem, vel quantum ad usum praelationis. Quantum ad primum contingit dupliciter: aut propter defectum personae, quia indignus est; aut propter defectum in ipso modo acquirendi, quia scilicet per violentiam vel per simoniam, vel aliquo illicito modo acquirit. Ex primo defectu non impeditur quin jus praelationis ei acquiratur; et quoniam praelatio secundum suam formam semper a Deo est (quod debitum obedientiae causat); ideo talibus praelatis, quamvis indignis, obedire tenentur subditi. Sed secundus defectus impedit jus praelationis: qui enim per violentiam dominium surripit non efficitur vere praelatus vel dominus; et ideo cum facultas adest, potest aliquis tale dominium repellere: nisi forte postmodum dominus verus effectus sit vel per consensum subditorum, vel per auctoritatem superioris. I answer that, as was said, obedience regards the debt to observe what is in the command it keeps. Now, this debt is caused by the prelate's order, which has the power of compulsion, not only temporally but also spiritually on account of conscience, as the Apostle says (Rom 13:1–7), insofar as the order of the prelate comes down from God, as the Apostle suggests in the same place. And thus, in respect of its being from God, a Christian is bound to obey such prelature, but not insofar as the exercise of the prelature is not from God. Now, it has been said that there are two ways in which the exercise of prelature can be not from God: in the way the office of prelate was acquired or in the exercise of the office of prelate. The first is possible in two ways: either due to a deficiency in the person, being unworthy, or else due to a deficiency in the very way in which he acquires the office, that is, because he acquires it by violence, simony, or some other illicit means. The first deficiency does not impede his acquiring the right of prelature. And since prelature in its form is always from God (which causes the debt of obedience), the subjects are bound to obey these kinds of prelates, though unworthy. But the second deficiency does impede the right to prelature. For one who seizes dominion by violence does not truly become the prelate or the master. And thus, when there is the faculty, one can resist this kind of dominion, unless perhaps the person has later on truly become master either by the consent of the subjects or by the authority of a superior. Abusus autem praelationis potest esse dupliciter: vel ex eo quod est praeceptum a praelato, contrarium ejus ad quod praelatio ordinata est, ut si praecipiat actum peccati contrarium virtuti ad quam inducendam et conservandam praelatio ordinatur; et tunc aliquis praelato non solum non tenetur obedire, sed etiam tenetur non obedire, sicut et sancti martyres mortem passi sunt, ne impiis jussis tyrannorum obedirent: vel quia cogunt ad hoc ad quod ordo praelationis non se extendit; ut si dominus exigat tributa quae servus non tenetur dare, vel aliquid hujusmodi; et tunc subditus non tenetur obedire, nec etiam tenetur non obedire. The abuse of prelature, in turn, can be in two ways. Either by the prelate's commanding what is contrary to that for which the prelature is ordained, as if one commands an act of sin contrary to the virtue for whose inculcation and preservation the prelature is ordained. And in this case one not only is not bound to obey the prelate, but is also bound not to obey, just as the holy martyrs suffered to avoid obeying the impious demands of tyrants. Or else, because they compel to that to which the order of the prelature does not extend, as if a master requires tributes that the servant is not bound to give or some such thing. And then the subject is neither bound to obey nor bound not to obey. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa praelatio quae ad utilitatem subditorum ordinatur, libertatem subditorum non tollit; et ideo non est inconveniens quod tali praelationi subjaceant qui per spiritum sanctum filii Dei effecti sunt. Vel dicendum, quod Christus loquitur de se et suis discipulis, qui nec servilis conditionis erant, nec res temporales habebant, quibus suis dominis obligarentur ad tributa solvenda; et ideo non sequitur quod omnis Christianus hujusmodi libertatis sit particeps, sed solum illi qui sequuntur apostolicam vitam, nihil in hoc mundo possidentes, et a conditione servili immunes. Reply Obj. 1: Prelature that is ordered to the benefit of the subjects does not take away the subjects' freedom. And thus, it is not unfitting for those who have become the children of God by the Holy Spirit to be subject to this kind of prelature. Or else, it should be said that Christ is speaking of himself and his disciples, who were neither of servile condition nor possessed temporal goods whereby they would have been obligated to pay tributes to their masters. And thus, it does not follow that every Christian is a participant in this sort of freedom, but only those who follow the apostolic life, possessing nothing in this world and immune from servile condition. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Baptismus non delet statim omnes poenalitates ex peccato primi parentis consequentes, sicut necessitatem moriendi et caecitatem, vel aliquid hujusmodi; sed regenerat in spem vivam illius vitae in qua omnia ista tollentur; et sic non oportet ut aliquis statim baptizatus a servili conditione liberetur, quamvis illa sit poena peccati. Reply Obj. 2: Baptism does not immediately wipe out all the penalties following on the sin of our first parent, such as the necessity of dying, blindness, and so forth. Rather, it regenerates unto living hope in the life wherein all these will be taken away. And so a baptized person need not immediately be freed from the condition of servitude, even though it is a punishment for sin. Ad tertium dicendum, quod majus vinculum non absolvit a minori, nisi quando non compatitur se cum illo; sicut umbra et veritas simul esse non possunt: propter quod veniente veritate Evangelii, umbra veteris legis cessavit. Sed vinculum quo in Baptismo quis ligatur, compatitur vinculum servitutis; et ideo non absolvit ab illo. Reply Obj. 3: A greater bond only looses from a lesser one when it is incompatible with it, just as shadow and truth cannot exist simultaneously, which is why when the Gospel's truth came the shadow the old law ceased. But the bond whereby one is bound in baptism is compatible with the bond of service. And thus, it does not loose from it. Ad quartum dicendum, quod qui per violentiam praelationem accipiunt, non sunt veri praelati; unde nec eis obedire tenentur subditi nisi sicut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Those who receive a prelature by violence are not true prelates. Hence subjects are also not bound to obey them, except as stated. Ad quintum dicendum, quod Tullius loquitur in casu illo quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit, nolentibus subditis, vel etiam ad consensum coactis, et quando non est recursus ad superiorem, per quem judicium de invasore possit fieri: tunc enim qui ad liberationem patriae tyrannum occidit, laudatur, et praemium accipit. Reply Obj. 5: Cicero is speaking of the case when someone seizes dominion for himself by violence while the subjects do not will it or even are compelled to consent, and when there is no recourse to a superior who could make a judgment about the invader. For in this case, one who slays the tyrant for the freedom of his country is praised and receives a reward. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum religiosi professi teneantur obedire praelatis suis in omnibus Whether professed religious are bound to obey their prelates in all things? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod obedientiam professi simpliciter teneantur obedire praelatis suis. Colos. 3, 20: filii obedite parentibus per omnia. Sed magis tenetur obedire quis patri spirituali quam carnali. Ergo spirituales filii, praecipue obedientiam professi, patribus spiritualibus in omnibus obedire tenentur. Obj. 1: To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that those who have professed obedience are bound to obey their prelates simply. Colossians 3:20: children, obey your parents in everything. But one is even more bound to obey his spiritual father than his bodily father. Therefore, spiritual children, particularly those who have professed obedience, are bound to obey their spiritual fathers in everything. Praeterea, beatus Benedictus dicit in regula, quod si praelatus etiam impossibile praecipiat, tentandum impossibile tamen est. Sed multo magis tenetur quis ad obediendum in possibilibus quam in impossibilibus. Ergo in omnibus possibilibus simpliciter obedientiam professus obedire tenetur praelato. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Blessed Benedict says in the Rule that even if a prelate commands the impossible, the impossible must be attempted. But all the more is one bound to obey in possible matters than in impossible ones. Therefore, in all possible matters simply, one who has professed obedience is bound to obey his prelate. Praeterea, religio quaelibet principaliter tria vota substantialia habet, scilicet castitatis, paupertatis, et obedientiae. Sed castitatem tenetur omnibus modis servare, et similiter paupertatem, ut nihil proprium habeat. Ergo et obedientiam sic tenetur servare ut in omnibus simpliciter obediat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, any form of religious life principally possesses three substantial vows: chastity, poverty, and obedience. But one is bound to preserve chastity in every way, and likewise poverty so that he possesses nothing of his own. Therefore, one is also bound to keep obedience in this way, so that he is obedient in everything simply. Praeterea, inferiori non relinquitur judicium de superiori. Sed si subditus haberet discernere in quo obediret, in quo non, relinqueretur sibi judicium de praecepto superioris. Ergo subditus tenetur in omnibus simpliciter obedire. Obj. 4: Furthermore, judgment of a superior is not left to an inferior. But if the subject had to discern in which matters to be obedient or not, judgment of the superior's command would be left to him. Therefore, the subject is bound to obey in everything simply. Praeterea, quilibet Christianus tenetur praelatis spiritualibus obedire. Si ergo profitentes obedientiam non tenerentur simpliciter in omnibus obedire, in nullo differrent profitentes obedientiam a non profitentibus, et sic talis professio supervacua esset. Ergo cum non sit supervacua, tenentur in omnibus obedire. Obj. 5: Furthermore, every Christian is bound to obey his spiritual prelates. Therefore, if those who profess obedience were not bound simply to obey in everything, those who profess obedience would not be different from those who do not profess it. And in this case this kind of profession would be pointless. Therefore, since it is not pointless, they are bound to obey in everything. Sed contra, Bernardus dicit in Lib. de Disp. et praecepto: nihil me prohibeat horum quae promisi, nihil plus exigat quam promisi. Sed non promittuntur nisi illa quae sunt in regula. Ergo non tenetur subditus in aliis obedire nisi quae ad regulam pertinent. On the contrary, Bernard says in On Dispensation and Precept: nothing of what I have promised forbids me; nothing requires more of me than I have promised. But only what is in the rule is promised. Therefore, a subject is not bound to obey in other matters, unless they pertain to the rule. Praeterea, nullus tenetur ad aliquid ad quod ceteri non tenentur, nisi secundum quod ad illud ex voto se obligat speciali. Sed profitentes non vovent obedire in omnibus, sed solum obedire secundum regulam talem vel talem. Ergo non tenentur in omnibus obedire. Et haec etiam ratio accipitur ex verbis Bernardi in eodem libro dicentis de hoc: non parum praelati praescribitur voluntati, quod is qui profitetur, spondet obedientiam; non tamen obedientiam omnimodam, sed determinate secundum regulam, nec aliam quam sancti Benedicti; et post subdit: praefixam praelatus sibi ex regula sciat mensuram; et sic sua demum imperia moderari circa id solum quod rectum esse constiterit; nec quodlibet rectum, sed hoc tantum quod praedictus pater constituit. Furthermore, no one is bound to something to which others are not bound, except insofar as he obliges himself to it by a special vow. But those who make profession do not vow to obey in everything, but only to obey according to such-and-such a rule. Therefore, they are not bound to obey in everything. And this reasoning is also drawn from the words of Bernard in the same book when he speaks of this: no small amount is ordered over to to the will of the prelate when one who makes profession promises obedience, not just any kind of obedience, but determinately according to the rule, no other than that of Saint Benedict. And later he adds: and in this way, finally, he has decided that his own commands should be governed in relation only to that which has been ruled on, not any kind of ruling, but only that which the aforementioned Father has established. Respondeo dicendum, quod est triplex obedientia: scilicet indiscreta, imperfecta (discreta tamen) et perfecta. Indiscreta obedientia, quae nec obedientia dici debet, est quando aliquis obedit in illis quae divinae legis regulae contrariantur, quam debet inviolabiliter observare: vel etiam in illis quae contrariantur regulae quam professus est, in his dumtaxat quae dispensationi praelati non subduntur, et ad hanc obedientiam nullus tenetur, immo quilibet tenetur eam non habere. Imperfecta autem obedientia, sed sufficiens ad salutem obedientiam profitentibus, est illa qua aliquis obedit in his quae servare promisit, et non aliis; unde b. Benedictus dicit: ceterum subditus hujusmodi obedientiam quae voti finibus cohibetur, noverit imperfectam; et ad hanc obedientiam profitentes obedientiam ex necessitate coguntur. Obedientia vero perfecta est secundum quam subditus simpliciter obedit in omnibus quae non sunt contraria legi divinae, vel regulae quam professus est; unde ibidem b. Benedictus dicit: perfecta obedientia legem nescit, terminis non arctatur, nec continetur professionis angustiis; largiori voluntate fertur in latitudinem caritatis, et ad omne quod injungitur, spontaneo vigore liberalis alacrisque animi, modum non considerans, in infinitum extenditur; et ad hanc obedientiam nullus tenetur debito necessitatis, sed solum ex honestate quadam, sicut tenetur semper aemulari charismata meliora. I answer that there are three kinds of obedience: indiscreet, imperfect (though discreet), and perfect. Indiscreet obedience, which ought not even to be called "obedience," is when one obeys in what is contrary to the rule of divine law, which ought to be observed inviolate. Or, also in what is contrary to the rule that he has professed, so long as it is not in something that falls under the prelate's dispensation. And no one is bound to this kind of obedience. In fact, everyone is bound not to have it. Next, obedience that is imperfect, though sufficient for salvation for those who profess obedience, is that whereby one obeys in matters he has promised to observe and not others. Hence Blessed Benedict says: still, the subject will know this kind of imperfect obedience, which is limited to the boundaries of the vow. And this is the obedience to which those who profess obedience are compelled of necessity. Finally, perfect obedience is that in accord with which the subject obeys simply in everything that is not contrary to the divine law or the rule he has professed. Hence in the same place, Blessed Benedict says: perfect obedience knows no law, is not confined by limitations, is not bound in by the narrowness of profession, by a more generous will is borne to the wideness of charity, and in relation to everything enjoined with the spontaneous vigor of a generous and eager spirit, with no consideration of measure, extends to infinity. And no one is bound to this kind of obedience by a debt of necessity, but only by a certain nobleness, just as one is bound always to desire earnestly the higher gifts. Quidam tamen aliter dicunt, scilicet quod obedientiam professi, ex necessitate tenentur obedire praelatis suis non solum in his quae ad regulam pertinent, sed in omnibus quae regulae non contrariantur, sive sint indifferentia, sive de numero bonorum, dummodo non sint altiora quam professio proprii ordinis requirit; sed ad aequalia vel faciliora praelatus cogere potest, etiam si secundum praecepta regulae non sint. Still, some say otherwise, namely, that those who have professed obedience are bound by necessity to obey their prelates not only in what pertains to the rule, but in everything that is not contrary to the rule, whether it be indifferent or numbered among what is good, so long as it is not higher than the profession of one's own order requires. But, they say, the prelate can compel to equal or easier matters, even if they are not based on the precepts of the rule. Sed prima opinio est longe melior: quia cum debitum obedientiae ex ordine praelationis causetur, ad illa tantummodo ex obedientiae voto subditus obligatur ad quae praelatio est ordinata. Ad hoc autem praelationes in religionibus ordinantur, ut status religionis secundum instituta regulae conservetur; et ideo in his solum quae ad regulam pertinent, debitum obedientiae causatur. Sciendum autem, quod ad regulam pertinet aliquid dupliciter; vel directe vel indirecte. Directe, sicut ea quae in statutis regulae continentur, ut non comedere carnes, tenere silentium, et hujusmodi. Indirecte, sicut ea quae pertinent ad mutua obsequia, sine quibus status religionis servari non posset, vel etiam quae pertinent ad poenam transgressionum; etsi de eis nulla specialis mentio in regula fiat. But the first opinion is far better. For, since the debt of obedience is caused by the order of the prelate, the subject is only obligated by the vow of obedience to that to which the prelature is ordered. Now, the prelatial offices in religious orders are ordered to the preservation of the state of religion according to the institutes of the rule. And thus, the debt of obedience is caused only in what pertains to the rule. But it should be known that something can pertain to the rule in two ways: directly or indirectly. Directly, as what is contained in the rule's statutes, such as not eating meat, maintaining silence, and so forth. Indirectly, as what pertains to mutual deference, without which the state of religion could not be preserved, or even what pertains to the punishment of transgressions, even if no specific mention is made of these in the rule. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod praeceptum apostoli intelligitur non de omnibus absolute, sed de omnibus quae ad praelationem patris ad filium pertinent: quia in quibusdam, ut philosophus dicit in 9 Ethic., magis est obediendum patri, et in quibusdam magis duci exercitus quam patri, et in quibusdam magis medico, et sic de aliis. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle's command is understood not of everything absolutely, but of everything that pertains to the prelatial relationship of father to son. For in certain matters, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 9, the father is more to be obeyed, while in others the captain of the army is more to be obeyed than the father, and in others the physician is more to obeyed, and so forth. Ad secundum dicendum, quod beatus Benedictus loquitur de obedientia perfecta, quam omnes obedientiam profitentes ex honestate aemulari debent; non tamen obligantur ex necessitate. Reply Obj. 2: Blessed Benedict is speaking of perfect obedience, which all who profess obedience ought to desire earnestly out of nobleness, though they are not bound of necessity. Ad tertium dicendum, quod castitas est virtus habens determinatam materiam, et determinatum actum: similiter et paupertas. Obedientia vero habet generalem materiam, ut dictum est; et ideo si aliquis obedientiam absolute voveret in omnibus, esset confusio religionum, quia idem teneretur servare unus quod alter; et ideo votum obedientiae determinatur secundum certam regulam. Non est autem simile de aliis duobus votis. Reply Obj. 3: Chastity is a virtue possessing determinate matter and a determinate act. So, too, is poverty. However, obedience has a general matter, as was said. And thus, if one vowed obedience absolutely in everything, there would be a confusion of religious orders, since one would be bound to keep the same thing as another. And thus, the vow of obedience is determined in accord with a certain rule. But the case is not similar for the other two vows. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis subditus non habeat judicare de praecepto praelati, habet tamen judicare de actu proprio in his dumtaxat in quibus praelato ex ordine praelationis subditus non est; et ideo non oportet quod in omnibus obediat, immo necesse est quod in quibusdam non obediat. Reply Obj. 4: Although the subject does not have the competence to judge the prelate's command, he does have competence to judge his own act in those matters in which he is not subject to the prelate by order of the prelature. And thus, he need not obey in everything. In fact, it is necessary for him not to obey in some things. Ad quintum dicendum, quod illi qui obedientiam non profitentur, non tenentur in omnibus obedire spiritualibus praelatis, nisi in illis quae pertinent ad regulam quam in Baptismo professi sunt, ut scilicet abrenuntiantes Satanae et omnibus pompis ejus et Christianam vitam agere profitentes, induant novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est. Reply Obj. 5: Those who do not profess obedience are not bound to obey their spiritual prelates in everything, but only in what pertains to the rule they professed in baptism, namely, renouncing Satan and all his pomps and professing to live the Christian life, they put on the new man created according to God. Expositio textus Exposition of the Text Post praedicta, consideratione dignum occurrit. Ratio ordinis est: quia potentia per actum cognoscitur; unde prius de actu peccati determinandum fuit quam de potentia peccandi; quamvis potentia actu naturaliter sit prior. After the aforesaid, it seems worth considering. The reason for this order is that a power is known by its act. Hence the act of sin had to be addressed prior to the power to sin, even though the power is naturally prior to the act. Utrum potentia peccandi sit nobis a Deo vel a nobis. Videtur debuisse dicere, potentiae peccandi, pluraliter, quia actibus plurium potentiarum peccare contingit. Sed dicendum, quod nulla potentia habet quod eliciat actum peccati, nisi inquantum est voluntas vel a voluntate mota; et ideo una potentia est secundum quam primo peccatum inest, scilicet voluntas vel liberum arbitrium. Whether the power to sin comes to us from God or from ourselves. It seems that he should have said "the powers to sin" in the plural, since it is possible to sin in the acts of more than one power. But it should be said that no power has the ability to elicit an act of sin except inasmuch as it is the will or is moved by the will. And thus, there is one power in accord with which sin is first of all in [us], namely the will or free choice. Mala voluntas non a Deo nobis est, sed a nobis et a Diabolo. Hoc verum est, si sumatur voluntas pro actu voluntatis; non autem si sumatur pro potentia, quae est principium actus; et ideo similitudo nulla est, per quam a simili de potentia concludere volunt. An evil will does not come to us from God, but from ourselves or from the devil. This is true if we take "will" for the act of the will, but not if we take it for the power that is the act's principle. And thus, the likeness whereby some wish to draw a conclusion about the power on the basis of similarity is null. Sed pluribus sanctorum testimoniis indubitanter monstratur quod potestas mali a Deo est. Videtur quod probatio Magistri nihil valeat: quia auctoritates sequentes non loquuntur de potentia peccandi, sed de potestate praelationis. Sed dicendum quod in potestate praelationis, quae habitualis potentia est, includitur etiam habitualis potestas peccandi: quia propter potestatem praelationis multa peccata praelati facere possunt, quae non possent, si praelati non essent. But it is indubitably shown by many testimonies of the Saints that the power of evil is from God. It seems that the Master's proof is not valid. For the authorities that follow are speaking not of the power to sin, but of the power of prelature. But it should be said that in the power of prelature, which is a habitual power, there is also included the habitual power to sin. For on account of the power of prelature prelates can commit many sins that they could not if they were not prelates. Per me reges regnant, et tyranni per me terram tenent. Quae sit differentia inter regem et tyrannum, ex dictis in tertio articulo primae quaestionis apparet. Kings rule through me, and tyrants hold the earth through me. The difference between a king and a tyrant is apparent from what was said in the third article of the first question. Sed sciendum est, apostolum ibi loqui de saeculari potestate. Videtur quod solutio Magistri sit insufficiens: quia superius ostendit etiam potestatem nocendi quam Diabolus habet, a Deo esse; et ita videtur quod si potestati est obediendum, quia potestas est a Deo, etiam Diabolo sit obediendum. Sed dicendum quod proculdubio auctoritas apostoli tantum de potestate praelationis intelligitur; cujusmodi potestatem supra homines Diabolus non habet; nisi inquantum cum eo quasi foedus ineunt, consentientes ei per peccatum, sicut servi ejus effecti. Sed hoc pactum illicitum est; et ideo ex hoc non acquiritur debitum obediendi, sed pactum frangendum est; Isa. 28, 18: pactum vestrum cum Inferno non stabit. Unde non oportet ut omni potestati quae a Deo sit, obediatur, sed ei tantum quae a Deo est ad hoc instituta ut sibi debita obedientia impendatur, cujusmodi est sola praelationis potestas. But it is to be known that the Apostle there speaks of secular power. It seems that the Master's solution is insufficient. For above he shows that even the devil's power to harm is from God. And thus, it seems that if a power is to be obeyed because it is from God, then the devil must also be obeyed. But it should be said that beyond any doubt the authoritative statement of the Apostle is understood only of the power of prelature, a kind of power that the devil does not have over human beings, except inasmuch as they enter into something like a covenant with him, consenting to it through sin and becoming like his slaves. But this pact is illicit. And thus, for this reason it does not acquire a debt of obedience. Instead, the pact is to be broken: your agreement with Sheol will not stand (Isa 28:18). Hence not every power that is from God must be obeyed, but only one that is instituted by God so that due obedience may be paid to it, and the power of prelature is the only such kind. Contemne potestatem timendo majores potestates. Ex hoc videtur quod sit magis obediendum majori potestati quam minori. Sed hoc videtur esse falsum. Disregard power, fearing greater powers. From this it seems that a greater power is more to obeyed than a lesser power. But this seems to be false. Quia in quibusdam magis obeditur uni quam alteri, et in quibusdam minus, sicut in quibusdam plus patri quam duci exercitus, et in quibusdam plus duci exercitus quam patri, ut in 9 Ethic. dicitur. Ergo sequitur quod idem eodem sit major et minor. Obj. 1: For in certain matters one is more obeyed than another and in other matters less, as in some matters one's father is more obeyed than the captain of the army, and in others the captain of the army is obeyed more than the father, as it says in Ethics 9. Therefore, it follows that an identical power is both greater and lesser than an identical power. Praeterea, archiepiscopi potestas est major quam potestas episcopi. Sed in quibusdam plus tenentur obedire subditi suis episcopis quam archiepiscopis. Ergo non semper majori potestati est obediendum magis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, an archbishop's power is greater than a bishop's power. But some matters subjects are more bound to obey their bishops than their archbishops. Therefore, the greater power is not always more to be obeyed. Praeterea, abbates monasteriorum subduntur episcopis, nisi sint exempti. Ergo potestas episcopi est major quam potestas abbatis. Sed monachus tenetur plus obedire abbati quam episcopo. Ergo non semper majori potestati obediendum est magis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the abbots of monasteries are subject to bishops, unless they are exempt. Therefore, a bishop's power is greater than an abbot's power. But a monk is more bound to obey the abbot than the bishop. Therefore, the greater power is not always more to be obeyed. Praeterea, potestas spiritualis est altior quam saecularis. Si ergo majori potestati magis est obediendum, praelatus spiritualis semper absolvere poterit a praecepto potestatis saecularis: quod est falsum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, spiritual power is higher than secular power. Therefore, if the greater power is more to be obeyed, a spiritual prelate will always be able to absolve from the command of a secular power, which is false.