Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid pertinet ad perfectionem hominis quod omnino derogat perfectioni Dei. Unde quamvis humilitas sit perfecta virtus in homine, non oportet tamen ut in Deo ponatur, si proprie sumatur humilitas. Quod patet ex speciebus superbiae quae ei opponuntur: quarum prima est, cum bonum quod habet quis tribuit sibi; et hoc quidem in homine vitium est, quia nihil a se habet, sed in Deo summae perfectionis est, qui nihil ab extrinseco habet. Reply Obj. 2: Some things that belong to man’s perfection would completely detract from God’s perfection. Hence, although humility is a perfect virtue in man, still it need not be present in God, if “humility” is being taken in its proper sense. This is evident from those species of pride that are opposed to humility, the first of which is when someone takes credit for a good that he possesses; in man, who has nothing from himself, this is a vice, but in God, who has nothing from anything outside of him, it belongs to the highest perfection. Ad tertium dicendum quod in productione minimae creaturae manifestatur potentia infinita et sapientia et bonitas Dei; quia quaelibet creatura ducit in cognitionem alicujus primi et summi, quod infinitum est in omni perfectione. Nec oportet ut potentia infinita per effectum infinitum manifestetur, nec bonitas infinita per communicationem infinitam; sed sufficit ad ostendendam bonitatem infinitam hoc quod unicuique secundum suam capacitatem largitur. Reply Obj. 3: God’s infinite power, wisdom, and goodness are manifested when he makes the least of things created, since everything created leads one to the knowledge of something first and highest that is infinite in every perfection. Nor is it necessary that his infinite power be manifested through an infinite effect, or his infinite goodness through an infinite communication of it. Rather, to show his infinite goodness it suffices that he bestow it upon each thing according to its capacity. Ad quartum dicendum quod capacitas alicujus creaturae potest intelligi dupliciter. Vel secundum potentiam naturalem quae pertinet ad rationem seminalem. Et sic nullam capacitatem naturae vacuam Deus dimittit in genere, quamvis capacitas alicujus creaturae particularis non impleatur propter aliquod impedimentum. Vel secundum potentiam obedientiae, secundum quod quaelibet creatura habet ut ex ea possit fieri quod Deus vult. Et hoc modo in humana natura est capacitas hujus dignitatis, ut in unitatem divinae personae assumatur. Neque oportet ut omnem talem capacitatem impleat; sicut non oportet quod Deus faciat quidquid potest, sed secundum quod congruit ordini sapientiae ejus. Reply Obj. 4: The capacity of a created thing can be understood in two ways. The first is according to its natural potency, which pertains to its seedlike principle. In this respect, God does not leave empty any capacity of a created thing, generically speaking, although the capacity of some particular created thing may not be fulfilled, due to some impediment. The second is according to its obediential potency, whereby anything created is able to become what God wills it to be. And in this respect, in human nature there is a capacity for this dignity: that of being assumed into the unity of the divine person. Nor must every capacity like this be fulfilled, just as God need not do whatever he is able to do, but rather what befits the order established by his wisdom. Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Apostolus Rom. 5:20: ubi abundavit delictum, superabundavit et gratia. Unde non est inconveniens ut aliquod bonum Deus ex peccato eliciat quod sine peccato non fuisset, ut patet in multis virtutibus, ut in patientia, poenitentia, et hujusmodi. Et ita etiam ex peccato hominis hoc optimum bonum Deus potuit elicere, ut Filius Dei Incarnaretur. Propter quod dicit Gregorius: O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem. Reply Obj. 5: As the Apostle says in Romans 5:20, where sin increased, grace abounded all the more. Hence it is not unfitting that God bring forth from sin some good that would not have existed without sin, as is evident in many virtues, such as patience, penitence, and others of this sort. And so in the same way, God was able to bring forth from man’s sin that supreme good, the Incarnation of the Son of God. It is for this reason that Gregory says, O happy fault, that deserved such a one, so great a redeemer. Ad sextum dicendum quod beatitudo totius hominis est ex ipsa Divinitate, in quam virtus intellectus immediate fertur, ex quo redundat gloria in inferiores partes animae et in ipsum corpus. In visione autem humanitatis Christi erit quoddam gaudium accidentale, sicut etiam in victoria Passionis ejus. Et tamen constat apud omnes quod si homo non peccasset, Christus passus non fuisset. Reply Obj. 6: The beatitude of the whole man is from the very divinity into which the power of the intellect is immediately drawn—from which intellect glory overflows into the lower parts of the soul, and even into the body itself. However, there will be a certain incidental joy in the vision of Christ’s humanity, just as there will also be in the victory of his Passion. And nevertheless it is affirmed on all sides that if man not sinned, Christ would not have suffered. Ad septimum dicendum quod si etiam ponatur quod diabolus praeviderit rationalem creaturam a Filio Dei assumendam, non tamen oportet quod praeviderit accidentia ad ipsam; sicut etiam, ut ibidem Bernardus dicit, praevidit se futurum principem malorum—quod per suum casum consecutus est—et tamen suum casum non praevidit, ut in 2 lib. dictum est. Reply Obj. 7: Even if it is held that the devil foresaw that the rational creature was to be assumed by the Son of God, it nevertheless need not be that he foresaw all that would lead up to it. In the same way, as Bernard says in that passage, he foresaw that he was going to be the prince of the evil ones, which followed upon his fall, and yet he did not foresee his fall, as was said in Book II. Ad ea vero quae in contrarium objiciuntur, potest responderi secundum aliam opinionem, quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de adventu in carnem passibilem ad redimendum—redemptio enim non fuisset nisi servitus peccati praecessisset—et non de adventu in carnem simpliciter. Reply Sed Contra 8–11: As for the arguments to the contrary, it could be answered that, according to the second opinion mentioned in the main response, those authorities are speaking of his coming into flesh that is able to suffer for the sake of redemption (for there would have been no redemption unless the servitude to sin had preceded it), and not of his coming into flesh simply speaking. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum Filius Dei Incarnationem suam debuerit tantum differre Whether it was fitting for God to delay his Incarnation for so long Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Filius Dei Incarnationem suam non debuit tantum differre. To the fourth we proceed thus. It appears that the Son of God should not have delayed his Incarnation so long. Tempus enim Incarnationis dicitur tempus plenitudinis: ad Galat. 4:4: cum venit plenitudo temporis misit Deus Filium suum. Sed plenitudo perfectionem importat. Cum ergo perfectio universi consummata sit die septima, ut dicitur Gen. 1, videtur quod tunc debuit Filius Dei incarnari. Obj. 1: For the time of the Incarnation is called the time of fullness: thus Galatians 4:4 says, when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son. But “fullness” imports perfection. Therefore, since the perfection of the universe was consummated on the seventh day, as it says in Genesis 2:2, it appears that the Son of God should have been incarnate then. Item, amor causat donum et celeritatem doni. Sed Deus ex maxima caritate Incarnatus est. Ergo videtur quod non debuerit tantum incarnationem differre. Prima probatur per id quod dicitur Prov. 3:28: ne dicas amico tuo: vade et revertere, cras dabo tibi, cum statim possis dare. Secunda, per hoc quod dicitur Jer. 31:3: in caritate perpetua dilexi te, ideo attraxi te miserans. Obj. 2: Furthermore, love causes the gift and the swiftness with which it is given. But God became incarnate out of the greatest charity. Therefore it appears that he should not have delayed the Incarnation for so long. The first proposition is proved through what it says in Proverbs 3:28, do not say to your neighbor, 'go, and come again, tomorrow I will give it'—when you have it with you. The second proposition is proved through what it says in Jeremiah 31:3, I have loved you with an everlasting love; therefore I have continued my faithfulness to you. Item, quanto differtur medicina, tanto periculosius morbus invalescit. Sed est sapientis medici ut periculum morbi evitet. Ergo videtur quod Incarnationem suam Dei Filius accelerare debuit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, an illness becomes more dangerous the longer the medicine is delayed. But a wise physician avoids the danger of an illness. Therefore it appears that the Son of God ought to have hastened his Incarnation. Item, 1 Tim. 2:4, dicitur quod vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri. Sed si Christus ante incarnatus fuisset, multis ad salutem via magis patuisset, ut dicitur Mat. 11:21: si in Tyro et Sidone factae fuissent virtutes quae factae sunt in te, olim poenitentiam egissent. Ergo videtur quod Deus ante incarnari debuit. Obj. 4: Furthermore, 1 Timothy 2:4 says that God desires all men to be saved. But if Christ had been incarnate before, the way to salvation would have been opened to more men, as it says in Matthew 11:21: if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. Therefore it appears that God should have become incarnate before he did. Praeterea, ut dicit Boetius, in libro 3 De consolatione, natura a perfectioribus initium sumit. Sed opus Dei non est minus ordinatum quam opus naturae. Cum ergo perfectissimum in operibus Dei sit ipsa Incarnatio, videtur quod circa principium Deus incarnari debuerit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Boethius says in the Consolation of Philosophy, nature takes its beginning from those things that are more perfect. But God’s work is not less ordered than nature’s work. Therefore, since the Incarnation is the most perfect thing in the works of God, it seems that God should have been incarnate around the time of the beginning. Sed contra, perfectio gratiae magis assimilatur perfectioni gloriae quam perfectioni naturae. Sed perfectio gratiae Incarnationi debetur, ut dicit Joan. 1:17: gratia et veritas per Jesum Christum facta est. Cum ergo perfectio gloriae fini saeculorum debeatur, perfectio vero naturae principio, videtur quod versus finem saeculorum magis quam circa principium Deus incarnari debuerit. On the contrary, the perfection of grace is more like the perfection of glory than the perfection of nature. But the perfection of grace is due to the Incarnation, as John 1:17 says: grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. Therefore, since the perfection of glory is due to the end of all time, while the perfection of nature to the beginning, it seems that God should have been incarnate more towards the end of all time rather than around the beginning. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: institutum est ut jam pactae sponsae non statim tradantur, ne vilem habeat maritus datam, quam non suspiravit sponsus dilatam. Sed hoc beneficium, scilicet Incarnationis, debet homo maxime carum habere. Ergo decuit ut humanum genus ipsum dilatum suspiraret. Furthermore, Augustine says, it is an established custom that a betrothed woman not be given in marriage immediately, lest she be held cheaply when given to a husband who did not yearn for his betrothed for very long. But man ought to prize most highly this benefit, that of the Incarnation. Therefore it was becoming that the human race long for it when it was delayed. Praeterea, perfectio fini debetur. Sed tempus Incarnationis est tempus perfectissimum, quia in eo Dominus temporis natus est; unde etiam tempus plenitudinis dicitur. Ergo videtur quod versus finem temporis incarnari debuerit. Furthermore, perfection is owed to the end. But the time of the Incarnation is the most perfect time. For in it, the Lord of time was born, which is also why it is called the time of fullness. Therefore it appears that God ought to have been incarnate towards the end of time. Respondeo dicendum quod Incarnationi tempus congruissimum dispensator temporum elegit. Omnia enim tempus habent, ut habetur Eccl. 3. Haec autem congruitas non plene a nobis cognosci potest, qui non omnium temporum proportiones cognoscimus. Sed tamen possunt plures rationes congruitatis assignari quare hoc tempus ad Incarnationem elegerit. I answer that the most suitable time for the Incarnation was chosen by the one who arranges all times; for all things have their time, as it says in Ecclesiastes 3:1. However, this suitability cannot be fully known by us, since we do not know the proportions of all times. But nonetheless, several reasons can be assigned for why he would have chosen this time for the Incarnation because of its fittingness. Prima, quia homo per superbiam peccaverat; unde oportebat quod per humilitatem repararetur, ad quam exigebatur ut defectum suum cognosceret in virtute et in cognitione. Defectus autem cognitionis innotuit homini tempore legis naturae, quo tempore multi, lumine naturalis rationis non obstante, in pessimos errores idololatriae prolapsi sunt, et in nefandissima opera. Defectus autem virtutis propriae innotuit homini tempore legis scriptae; quia tunc per legem eruditus, nondum tamen peccati jugum excutere potuit. Et ideo oportuit quod post ista duo tempora quasi praeparatoria Deus homo fieret, ut in eo solo spes salutis haberetur. The first is that, because man had sinned through pride, it was necessary that he be restored through humility, and this required him to recognize his own lack in power and knowledge. Now, the deficiency of his knowledge was made known to man in the time of nature’s law, in which many fell into the worst errors of idolatry and into the most abominable deeds without the light of natural reason making any opposition. Furthermore, the deficiency of his power, properly speaking, was made known to man in the time of the written law. For at that time, although instructed by the law, he was not yet able to shake off the yoke of sin. And therefore it was necessary that God become man after these two periods of preparation, as it were, so that he might place his hope of salvation in God alone. Secunda ratio est quia naturalis ordo est ut ab imperfecto ad perfectum veniatur. Perfectissimum autem in operibus Dei est ipsa Incarnatio per quam creatura Deo unitur in unitate personae. Et ideo oportuit ut non in principio humani generis, sed postmodum versus finem saeculorum compleretur, ut sic prius esset quod animale est, deinde quod spirituale est, 1 Cor. 15:46. Et hanc causam Augustinus assignat in lib. 83 Quaest., dicens: sicut absurdus est qui juvenilem tantum aetatem vellet esse in homine—evacuaret enim pulchritudines quae ceteris aetatibus suas vices atque ordines gerunt—sic absurdus in ipso est qui universo generi humano unam aetatem desiderat. Nam et ipsum, tamquam unus homo, suas aetates agit. Nec oportuit venire divinitus magistrum, cujus imitatione in mores optimos formaretur, nisi in tempore juventutis. Et ideo Apostolus ad Gal. 3:24–25, dicit homines sub lege quasi sub paedagogo parvulos custoditos, donec veniret qui per prophetas promissus erat. The second reason is that the natural order is to go from the imperfect to the perfect. But the most perfect among God’s works is the Incarnation itself, through which a created thing is united to God in the unity of a person. For this reason, it was necessary that this work come to fufilment not at the beginning of the human race but later, towards the end of all time; thus what was animal would come first, and then what was spiritual, as it says in 1 Corinthians 15:44. Augustine assigns this reason in his On 83 Questions, where he says, it would be absurd if one were to wish that young adulthood be the only age of man, for he would thus abolish the excellences which manifest their succession and order in the other ages. In like manner, it would be absurd to desire a single age for the entire human race. For the race too lives through its own ages, just as one single man does. Nor was it necessary that the divine teacher, by imitating whom the human race might be formed in the most excellent mores, come in every age but only in the age of its young adulthood. And for this reason the Apostle says in Galatians 3:23 that under the law people were like little children in the custody of a tutor, until the one who had been promised through the prophets came. Tertia ratio est quia distantia a principio facit debilitatem in effectu. Unde et propter longe distare a principio, aliquae res perpetuum esse retinere non possunt, ut maneant semper eaedem secundum numerum. Unde si hoc maximum remedium, Incarnationis scilicet, in principio saeculorum fuisset, procedente tempore, effectus ejus in homines minus carus fuisset, frigescente caritate. Et ideo a principio humani generis indita est hominum mentibus lex naturalis, per quam homines Deo subjecti essent. Postmodum vero invalescente consuetudine peccatorum, lex naturalis adeo tenebrata est in pluribus, ut jam non videretur ad regimen humani generis sufficere. Et ideo tunc additum est aliud remedium, scilicet Vetus Lex et ea quae ad ipsam pertinent. Qua etiam processu temporis in cordibus hominum debilitata, oportuit aliud perfectius remedium per Incarnationem apponi usque ad tempus illud cum multorum caritas refrigesceret et tunc succedet per secundum adventum visio fidei, et status gloriae statui praesentis Ecclesiae. Et ideo Dionysius, dicit c. 5 Eccles. hier., quod sicut se habet hierarchia legis ad nostram hierarchiam, ita se habet nostra ad caelestem. The third reason is that a greater distance from the beginning weakens its effect. This is also why certain things are unable to last so as to remain forever the same in number: because they are far distant from the beginning. Therefore, if that greatest of remedies, the Incarnation, had taken place at the beginning of all time, its effect would, with the passing of time, have been less prized among men as their love grew cold. For this reason, from the beginning of the human race the natural law was implanted in men’s minds, through which law men might be subject to God; but afterwards, as the habit of sinning grew strong, the natural law was, for the majority of men, darkened to such a point that it seemed insufficient for governing the human race. That is why another remedy was added then: the Old Law and the things pertaining to it. And when this, too, grew weak in men’s hearts with the lapse of time, it was necessary that another, more perfect remedy be applied through the Incarnation, until that time when the love of many will grow cold. Then, through the Second Coming, faith will give way to vision, and the present state of the Church to the state of glory. Accordingly, Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy, that the hierarchy of the law is related to our hierarchy just as ours is related to the heavenly one. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod est triplex perfectio, scilicet naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Perfectio autem naturae est quae fuit in principio saeculorum. Perfectio vero gloriae erit in fine saeculorum. Et quia perfectio gratiae media est inter utramque, ideo Christus per quem gratia facta est, circa medium saeculorum venit. Unde dicitur Habac. 3:2: in medio annorum notum facies. Reply Obj. 1: There are three stages of perfection: that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory. Now, the perfection of nature existed at the beginning of time, whereas the perfection of glory will be at the end of time. And because the perfection of grace is the middle between these two, Christ, through whom grace has been given, came around the mid-point of time. This is why Habakkuk 3:2 says, I have heard the report of . . . thy work . . . In the midst of the years make it known. Ad secundum dicendum quod amor discretioni conjunctus, non facit accelerari donum antequam expediat ei cui datur. Non autem expediebat humano generi hoc donum accipere, antequam experimento disceret quantum eo indigebat, ut sic acceptum carius haberet. Reply Obj. 2: When love is joined with discernment it does not hasten the gift before it is beneficial to the one to whom it is given. But it was not beneficial for the human race to receive this gift before learning from experience how much it needed it, so that, receiving the gift in this way, the human race would hold it more dearly. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter est in morbo spirituali quam corporali. Ad sanationem enim corporalis morbi non exigitur ut infirmus vim medicinae et periculum morbi cognoscat: quod tamen maxime necessarium est in morbi spiritualis sanatione, qui per humilitatem et contritionem spiritus sanatur. Et ideo quamvis medicina corporalis non differatur, medicina tamen spiritualis differri potest. Nec tamen ita dilata est ut a principio penitus deesset: quia quamdiu fuit morbus, fuit medicina morbi, ut Hugo de S. Victore dicit; quamvis illa medicina non esset omnino sufficiens. Sic enim et medicus corporali aegroto praeparatoria quaedam medicamenta praebet, antequam perfectam medicinam det. Et hic etiam fuit processus Dei in sanatione humani generis. Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual sickness differs from bodily sickness. For healing of a sick body does not require that the sick man recognize the power of the medicine and the danger of the sickness, but this is in the greatest degree necessary for the healing of spiritual sickness, since the spirit is healed through humility and contrition. And so, although bodily medicine is not delayed, nevertheless spiritual medicine can be delayed. Yet it was not delayed in such a way that it was completely lacking from the beginning; for as long as there was a sickness, there was a medicine for it, as Hugh of Saint Victor says, even though that medicine is not wholly sufficient. For a doctor furnishes certain preparatory treatments to someone suffering from bodily illness before he gives the completing medicine, and this was God’s procedure in the healing of the human race. Ad quartum dicendum quod nullus eorum qui praeordinati erant ab aeterno, etiam ante Christi Incarnationem periit, nec etiam aliquis non praedestinatus, quandocumque Incarnatio fuisset, salvatus esset. Si tamen aliquod remedium praeberetur non praedestinato, quod praedestinato datur, scilicet gratia finalis, ille etiam salvaretur. Sed tamen hoc antecedens est incompossibile ei quod est eum non esse praedestinatum. Unde sic est vera ista: "si Christus praedicasset alicui praescito, ille poenitentiam egisset," sicut ista: "si gratia sibi daretur, poenitentiam ageret." Sed utriusque antecedens est incompossibile praescientiae condemnationis. Et ideo, quaerere quare Christus illi non praedicavit vel quare illi gratiam non apposuit, est idem quod quaerere praedestinationis causam, quae nulla est nisi voluntas Dei. Reply Obj. 4: Even before Christ’s Incarnation none of those who were eternally preordained perished, and no one who was not predestined would have been saved, regardless of when the Incarnation happened. Nevertheless, if a remedy that is given to the predestined—namely, final grace—were offered to someone who was not predestined, that person would also be saved. But this occurrence is contradictory to what it means for someone not to be predestined. It is just as true to say, “if Christ had preached to someone who was foreknown to be saved, that person would have repented,” as it is to say, “if grace were given to someone, he would repent.” But both conditions are contradictory to the divine foreknowledge of damnation, and therefore to ask why Christ did not preach to someone, or why he did not give grace to someone, is the same as asking for the cause of predestination, which is nothing other than the will of God. Ad quintum dicendum quod perfectum simpliciter praecedit imperfectum. Sed accipiendo perfectum et imperfectum circa idem, imperfectum praecedit perfectum; quia motus est de imperfecto ad perfectum, et hoc fit aliquo perfecto agente, quod oportet prius esse. Et ideo in humano genere prius fuit adhibita imperfecta medicina quam perfecta ab ipso perfecto Deo qui est perfectionis princeps, ut dicit Dionysius, De divin. nomin., cap. 5. Reply Obj. 5: The perfect comes before the imperfect simply speaking, but when considering the perfect and the imperfect in the same thing, the imperfect comes before the perfect. For movement is from imperfect to perfect, and this happens by way of some perfect agent, because it must be prior. And this is why in the human race an imperfect medicine was applied before the perfect one by the perfect God himself, who is the prince of perfection, as Dionysius says. Quaestio 2 Question 2 The person assuming flesh Deinde quaeritur de assumente carnem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque: Next we will inquire about the one who assumes flesh. Concerning this there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum una persona possit assumere carnem, alia non assumente. first, whether one divine person can assume flesh while another does not; Secundo, si sic, quare magis Filius carnem assumpsit. second, if this is so, why the Son assumed flesh rather than another; Tertio, utrum Pater vel Spiritus Sanctus potuerint vel possint assumere carnem. third, whether the Father or the Holy Spirit was able or is able to assume flesh; Quarto, si sic, an potuerint eamdem numero naturam humanam assumere. fourth, if so, whether they were able to assume the numerically same human nature; Quinto, utrum una persona possit duas numero naturas humanas assumere. fifth, whether one divine person is able to assume numerically two human natures. Articulus 1 Article 1