Ad tertium dicendum quod impotentia coactionis quae opponitur voluntario tollit rationem meriti et demeriti, non impotentia quae est ex perfectione in bonitate vel malitia; quia hoc voluntarium non tollit, sed ponit voluntatem confirmatam ad unum. Reply Obj. 3: The powerlessness of coercion, which is opposed to the voluntary, takes a way the notion of merit and demerit. But the powerlessness that comes from perfection in goodness, or in evil, does not. For it does not remove the voluntary, but rather asserts a will confirmed in one thing. Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Rabbi Moyses, verbum Philosophi intelligendum est cum conditione, quia scilicet posset, si vellet. Reply Obj. 4: As Rabbi Moses says, the Philosopher’s statement should understood conditionally: namely, that he would be able if he willed to do so. Ad quintum dicendum quod Christus potuisset illa verba exprimere, si voluisset; sed velle non potuit. Reply Obj. 5: Those words mean that Christ would have been able to do so, if he had willed it—but he was not able to will it. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum Christus habuerit potentiam peccandi Whether Christ had the power to sin Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non habuit potentiam peccandi. To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ did not have the ability, or power, to sin. Secundum enim quamlibet potentiam est aliquis potens. Sed Christus non potuit peccare. Ergo non habuit peccandi potentiam. Obj. 1: For relative to every ability there is someone with who is able. But Christ was not able to sin. Therefore he did not have the ability to sin. Praeterea. Potentia peccandi, secundum Anselmum, non est libertas arbitrii nec pars libertatis, sed diminuit libertatem. Sed in Christo libertas non fuit diminuta. Ergo ipse non habuit potentiam peccandi. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the ability to sin, according to Anselm, is neither the freedom of decision nor a part of freedom; rather, it diminishes freedom. But in Christ freedom was not diminished. Therefore he did not have the ability to sin. Praeterea. Potentia peccandi est radix et principium peccati. Sed in Christo non fuit aliquod principium vel radix peccati. Ergo ipse non habuit potentiam peccandi. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the ability to sin is the root and principle of sin. But in Christ the principle and root of sin was absent. Therefore he did not have the ability to sin. Praeterea. Christus, etiam secundum quod homo, fuit maxime Deo similis. Sed Deus non potest peccare nec potentiam peccandi habet. Ergo nec Christus secundum quod homo. Obj. 4: Furthermore, Christ, even as man, was maximally like God. But God is not able to sin, nor does he have the ability to sin. Therefore neither does Christ insofar as he is a man. Sed contra. Philosophus dicit quod potestates pravorum sunt eligendae. Sed omnia bona hominum Christus habuit. Ergo habuit potentiam peccandi. On the contrary (5), the Philosopher says that the abilities of depraved men are choice-worthy. But Christ had all the good things of men. Therefore so too the ability to sin. Praeterea. Sicut dicit Damascenus: Filius Dei assumpsit quidquid in nostra natura plantavit. Plantavit autem in ea potentiam peccandi; quia potentia peccandi a Deo est, quamvis voluntas peccandi non sit ab eo. Ergo potentiam peccandi habuit. Furthermore (6), as Damascene says, the Son of God assumed whatever he planted in our nature. Now, he planted in it the ability to sin, since the ability to sin is from God, although the will to sin is not from him. Therefore he had the ability to sin. Praeterea. Potentia peccandi est potentia qua peccatur. Hoc autem est liberum arbitrium. Cum igitur Christus habuerit liberum arbitrium secundum quod homo, ut dicit Damascenus, oportet quod habuerit potentiam peccandi. Furthermore (7), the ability to sin is the ability by which one sins. Now, this is free decision. Therefore, since Christ had free decision, insofar as he was a man, as Damascene says, it must be that he had the ability to sin. Praeterea. Anima Christi creatura est. Sed secundum Damascenum, omnis creatura vertibilis est vel secundum electionem vel secundum substantiam. Ergo anima Christi vertibilis est secundum electionem, cum vim electivam habeat. Sed vertibilitas electionis est potentia peccandi. Ergo Christus habuit potentiam peccandi. Furthermore (8), Christ’s soul is a created thing. But according to Damascene, every created thing is changeable, either with respect to choice or with respect to substance. Therefore Christ’s soul can be changed with respect to choice, since he had the ability to choose. But the changeability of choice is the ability to sin. Therefore Christ had the ability to sin. Responsio. Dicendum quod actus se habet ad potentiam dupliciter: quia actus egreditur a potentia, et iterum per actus specificatur potentia. Et ideo cum dicitur potentia aliquid faciendi, ut potentia videndi, potest dupliciter intelligi: quia potest designari vel ordo potentiae ad actum, secundum quod actus sumitur ut effectus potentiae: vel designatur potentia ipsa specificata per actum, secundum quod actus sumitur loco differentiae specificae ipsius potentiae. Et primo modo non potest dici quod ille qui habet visum impeditum, habeat potentiam videndi, sicut non potest dici quod possit videre. Sed secundo modo potest dici quod habet potentiam videndi, sicut quod habet potentiam visivam. I answer that an act is related to an ability, or power, in two ways: because an act goes forth from a power and because a power is specified through an act. And therefore since a “power” is said to be something of an action, such as the “power of seeing,” it can be understood in two ways. For by it can be designated the power’s order to the act, according to which the act is taken as the effect of the power, or by “power” is designated the very thing being specified by the act, insofar as the act is taken in the place of a [specific] difference. In the first way, it cannot be said that one who has impaired vision has the power of seeing, just we cannot say that he can see. In the second way, it can be said that he has the power of seeing, just as that he has the visual power. Haec autem distinctio, ut ex dictis patet, habet locum in illis actibus quibus specificantur potentiae. Hujusmodi autem sunt actus ad quos potentiae ordinantur. Sed liberum arbitrium non ordinatur ad peccandum, immo peccatum incidit ex defectu ejus; unde peccare non specificat potentiam liberi arbitrii. Et ideo cum dicitur quod aliquis habet potentiam peccandi, non intelligitur quod habeat liberum arbitrium, sed quod habeat ipsum ordinatum ad peccandum, ita ut peccare possit. However, this distinction, as is clear from things said, is relevant in the acts by which powers, or abilities, are specified. Now, of this sort are the acts to which the powers are ordered. But free decision is not ordered to sin; rather, it falls into sin from its falling short. This is why sinning does not specify the power of free decision. And therefore when it is said that someone has the power to sin, it is not understood that he has free decision, but that he has it as ordered to sin, such that he can sin. Et ideo sicut de Christo non dicitur quod possit peccare, ita nec quod potentiam peccandi habeat, proprie loquendo et secundum se; sed potest concedi sub hoc sensu ut dicatur habere potentiam peccandi, quia habet potentiam quae in aliis est potentia peccandi. And therefore, just as it is not said of Christ that he can sin, so too he does not have ability to sin, properly speaking, and according to itself. But it can be granted in the following sense: he is said to “have the power to sin” insofar as he has the power that, in others, is the power to sin. Et hoc modo sustinendo, facile est respondere ad primas quatuor rationes. Rep. Obj. 1–4: And granting it this way, it is easy to respond to the first four arguments. Ad quintum autem dicendum quod potestates malorum sunt eligendae per accidens, non quia sunt malorum, sed quia eaedem sunt ad bona; magis autem essent eligendae, si essent bonorum tantum. Reply Sed Contra 5: The abilities of evil men are choice-worthy in an incidental way—not because they are those of evil men, but because the same abilities are for good things. However, they would be more choice-worthy if they were for only good things. Ad sextum dicendum quod potentia peccandi, inquantum peccandi, non est a Deo, ut in 2 lib. d. ultima dictum est; sed quantum ad subjectum potentiae tantum. Reply Sed Contra 6: The power to sin, as sin, is not from God, as was said in Book II, except only as relative to the power’s subject. Ad septimum dicendum quod liberum arbitrium, ut ex dictis patet, non potest dici simpliciter potentia peccandi, nisi in his qui peccare possunt. Reply Sed Contra 7: Free decision, as is clear from things said, cannot be called a “power to sin,” simply speaking, except in those who can sin. Ad octavum dicendum quod illa vertibilitas in Christo perficitur per gratiae plenitudinem; sicut et potentia materiae terminatur per actum formae totam potentialitatem materiae tollentis, ut patet in caelo. Reply Sed Contra 8: That changeability in Christ is perfected through his fullness of grace, just as also the potency of matter is bounded by the act of a form that takes away the entire potentiality of matter, as is clear in the heavens. Quaestio 3 Question 3 De congruitate quantum ad sexum Christ's sex Deinde quaeritur de congruitate quantum ad sexum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Next, we ask about the fittingness regarding his sex, and about this two things are asked: Primo, in quo sexu humanam naturam assumere debuit. first, in which sex he should assume the human nature; Secundo, de quo sexu, utrum scilicet de viro vel de muliere. second, from which sex he should assume it—namely, from a man or from a woman. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Christus debuerit aliquem sexum accipere Whether Christ ought to take on a certain sex Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debuerit sexum aliquem accipere. To the first let us proceed as follows. It appears that he should not have taken on a certain sex. Quia ipsum corpus Christi verum praesignat corpus mysticum. Sed in corpore mystico quod est Ecclesia, non est differentia sexuum; quia, sicut dicit Apostolus Galat. 3:28: in Christo non est masculus et femina. Ergo nec ipse sexum assumere debuit. Obj. 1: For Christ’s very body prefigures his mystical body. But in the mystical body, which is the Church, there is no difference of sexes, since the Apostle says, there is neither male nor female . . . in Christ (Gal 3:28). Therefore neither should he have assumed a sex. Praeterea. Sexus ordinatur ad generationem carnalem. Sed Christus non venerat ut esset principium humani generis per generationem carnalem, sed spiritualem. Ergo sexum assumere non debuit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, sex is ordered to physical generation. But Christ did not come so that he would be the principle of the human race through a physical generation, but a spiritual one. Therefore he should not have taken on a sex. Praeterea. Spiritus creatus indifferenter se habet ad utrumque sexum. Sed plus distat spiritus increatus a differentia sexuum quam creatus. Ergo ipse Deus se habet indifferenter ad utrumque sexum. Ergo vel utrumque assumere debuit vel neutrum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a created spirit is related indifferently to the sexes. But the uncreated Spirit is more distant from the difference of sex than is a created spirit. Therefore God himself is related indifferently to each sex. Therefore he should have assumed either both sexes or neither. Sed contra. Christus debuit fratribus assimilari quantum ad naturalia, ut dicitur Hebr. 2:17. Sed sexus est de naturalibus hominis. Ergo debuit sexum assumere. On the contrary, Christ ought to have become like his brethren in natural attributes, as is said in Hebrews 2. But sex is among the natural attributes of man. Therefore he ought to have assumed sex. Praeterea. Quod est inassumptibile, est incurabile, ut dicit Damascenus. Sed sexus praecipue curatione indigebat, in quo maxime peccatum originale regnat. Ergo debuit assumere sexum. Furthermore, what cannot be assumed cannot be cured, as Damascene says. But sex especially needed cure, since original sin rules in it most of all. Therefore he ought to have assumed sex.