Ad quintum dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium Christi non erat determinatum ad unum secundum numerum, sed ad unum secundum genus, scilicet ad bonum, quia in malum non potest; sed tamen hoc potest facere et non facere; et hoc non excludit libertatem arbitrii, quia posse peccare non est libertas arbitrii nec pars libertatis, ut dicit Anselmus. Et haec quidem determinatio ex perfectione liberi arbitrii contingit secundum quod per habitum gratiae et gloriae terminatur in eo ad quod est naturaliter ordinatum, scilicet in bono: quia liberum arbitrium, quamvis in nobis se habeat ad bonum et ad malum, non tamen est propter malum, sed propter bonum. Vel dicendum, quod si etiam esset determinatum ad unum numero, sicut ad diligendum Deum (quod non facere non potest), tamen ex hoc non amittit libertatem, aut rationem laudis sive meriti: quia in illud non coacte, sed sponte tendit; et ita est actus sui dominus. Reply Obj. 5: Christ’s free decision was not determined to numerically one thing, but to generically one thing—namely, the good. For he could not do evil. But nevertheless, he can do this and not do this, and this does not exclude the freedom of decision, since to be able to sin is not a freedom of decision, nor a part of freedom, as Anselm says. And this determination of the perfection of free decision happens insofar as, through the possession of grace and glory, it is at the end to which it is naturally ordered—the good. For free decision, although in us it is related to good and evil, it is nevertheless not for the sake of evil, but for the sake of the good. Or it should be said that, even if it were determined to numerically one thing, such as to loving God, which he cannot not do, still he does not lose freedom thereby, or the notion of praise or merit, for he stretches toward it not by any coercion but spontaneously, and thus he is the lord of his own acts. Ad sextum dicendum, quod Christus non meretur secundum divinitatem, secundum quam habet quod omnia sunt sua; sed meretur secundum humanitatem, ex qua non habet quod omnia sunt sua. Reply Obj. 6: Christ did not merit in in virtue of his divinity, in virtue of which he has all things as his own. Rather, he merits in virtue of his humanity, from which not all things are his own. Et per hoc patet solutio ad septimum: quia a Filio Dei meremur ratione divinitatis suae, ex qua parte ipse non merebatur. Reply Obj. 7: This is clear from the last reply. For we merit from the Son of God by reason of his divinity, from which part he himself did not merit. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum Christus ab instanti suae conceptionis potuerit mereri Whether Christ was able to merit from the instant of his conception Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non potuerit mereri in instanti suae conceptionis. To the third we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ was not able to merit in the instant of his conception. Nullus enim meretur nisi agendo. Sed prius est esse rei quam ejus agere. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis quando Christus primo habuit esse secundum humanam naturam, non potuit mereri. Obj. 1: For no one merits except by acting. But a thing’s existence is prior to its acting. Therefore in the first instant of his conception, when Christ first had existence according to his human nature, he was not able to merit. Praeterea, opus meritorium cum deliberatione est, cum sit ex electione liberi arbitrii, quae sequitur consilium. Sed deliberatio, cum sit quidam motus, requirit tempus. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis mereri non potuit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, a meritorious work occurs with deliberation, since it comes from the choice of a free decision, which follows on taking counsel. But deliberation, since it is a motion, requires time. Therefore in the first instant of conception he was not able to merit. Praeterea, quidquid Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, habuit ab alio, non a se. Sed meriti sui ipse causa fuit. Igitur in primo instanti conceptionis non meruit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever Christ had in the first instant of his conception, he had from another, and not from himself. But he himself was the cause of his own merit. Therefore he did not merit in the first instant of his conception. Praeterea, sicut meritum est per liberum arbitrium, ita et peccatum. Sed diabolus non potuit peccare in primo instanti suae creationis. Ergo nec anima Christi in primo instanti creationis suae potuit mereri. Sed primum instans conceptionis fuit primum instans creationis animae. Ergo in illo instanti mereri non potuit. Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as merit is through free decision, so too is sin. But the devil was not able to sin in the first instant of his creation. Therefore neither was Christ’s soul able to merit in the first instant of its creation. But the first instant of his conception was the first instant of the creation of his soul. Therefore in that instant he was not able to merit. Praeterea, Christus quantum ad corpus, in pueritia erat similis aliis pueris. Sed alii pueri propter imbecillitatem organorum corporalium non habent perfectam imaginationem, nec usum liberi arbitrii. Per consequens ergo nec Christus: et ita tunc, ut videtur, mereri non potuit. Obj. 5: Furthermore, with respect to his body, Christ as an infant was like other infants. But other infants, on account of the feebleness of their bodily organs, did not have a perfect imagination, nor a use of free decision. Therefore consequently neither did Christ, and thus it appears that he could not then merit. Sed contra, Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis fuit vir. Hierem. 31:22: novum faciet Dominus super terram: femina circumdabit virum. Sed perfecti viri est mereri. Ergo Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis potuit mereri. On the contrary, Christ was a man in the first instant of his conception: the Lord has created a new thing on the earth: a woman protects a man (Jer 31:22). But meriting belongs to a perfect man. Therefore Christ in the first instant of his conception was able to merit. Praeterea, perfectior est anima perfecta prima et secunda perfectione, quam perfecta solum perfectione prima. Sed Christo non accrevit aliqua spiritualis perfectio. Ergo cum operatio sit perfectio secunda, et habitus perfectio prima; quandocumque habuit habitum virtutis, habuit actum ejus. Sed actu virtutis merebatur. Ergo Christus in instanti conceptionis merebatur. Furthermore, a soul perfected with the first and second perfection is more perfect than one perfected only with the first perfection. But no spiritual perfection was added to Christ. Therefore since an activity is a second perfection, and habit is a first perfection, whenever he had the habit of a virtue, he had its act. But he merited by the act of virtue. Therefore Christ merited in the instant of his conception. Respondeo dicendum, quod Christo debemus attribuere secundum animam, omnem perfectionem spiritualem quae sibi potest attribui; unde, cum possibile sit ipsum in primo instanti suae conceptionis actum meritorium perfecisse, dicendum est, Christum in primo instanti suae conceptionis meruisse. I answer that we ought to attribute to Christ, in reference to his soul, every spiritual perfection that can be attributed to him. Whence, since a meritorious act could have perfected him in the first instant of his conception, one should say that he merited in the first instant of his conception. Quod enim aliqua res in primo instanti in quo est non possit suam actionem habere, non potest contingere nisi tribus modis. Primo ex hoc quod deest sibi aliqua perfectio quae requiritur ad agendum; sicut catulus in primo instanti suae nativitatis non potest videre, quia non habet organum videndi completum. Alio modo propter aliquod impediens extrinsecum; sicut aqua generata in aliquo loco concluso impeditur ut non possit proprio motu moveri. Tertio ex natura operationis quae successionem habet; et tunc in primo instanti quo res est, incipit illam actionem, non tamen illa actio est in illo instanti, sed in tempore; sicut patet quod primum instans in quo ignis est ignis, quod est ultimum instans suae generationis, est primum instans motus sui sursum; sed tamen motus ejus non est in illo instanti, quia motus successivorum est. Constat autem quod in Christo non deficiebat aliqua perfectio ex parte ipsius agentis, quae est necessaria ad meritorium actum; et iterum nihil erat quod impedire posset; ipse etiam motus caritatis, quo movebatur, indivisibilis erat, non successivus; et ideo in ipso instanti conceptionis mereri potuit. For something in its first instant of existence being unable to have its action occurs only in three ways. First, because it lacks some perfection that is required for acting; for example, a puppy in the first instant of its birth cannot see, since it does not have complete organs for seeing. In another way, on account of some extrinsic impediment; for example, water generated in a certain enclosed space is impeded from being able to move with its proper motion. Third, due to the nature of an activity that is successive, and then in the first instant in which the thing exists, it begins that action, yet that action does not exist within that instant but over time. For example, it is clear that the first instant in which a fire is a fire, which is the last instant of its generation, is the first instant of its upward motion; yet its motion is not in that instant, since motion is successive. Now, it is certain that no perfection necessary for meritorious action on the side of the agent himself is lacking in Christ; further, there was nothing that could impede him; and the motion of charity, by which he was moved, was indivisible and not successive. Therefore in the first instant of his conception he was able to merit. Quidam autem dicunt, quod in ipso instanti conceptionis non meruit quantum ad usum virtutum; sed solum habuit meritum in radice, scilicet in habitu caritatis et aliarum virtutum ex quibus dignus fuit gloria; sed quantum ad usum virtutum non meruit in ipso instanti, sed post ipsum instans. Et ad hoc moventur rationibus inductis in objiciendo. Sed prima opinio magis mihi placet, et secundum eam respondendum est ad argumenta in contrarium facta. However, some say that in the first instant of his conception he did not merit, as regards the use of the virtues, but he had merit only in its root—namely, in the habit of charity and the other virtues because of which he was worthy of glory; but with respect to the use of the virtues he did not merit in that instant, but after that instant. And they are moved to this by the arguments introduced in the objections. But the first opinion sets me more at ease, and I respond in accordance with it to the arguments made against it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse est prius quam agere natura, non tempore de necessitate. Reply Obj. 1: Existence is prior in its nature to acting, but not necessarily prior in time. Ad secundum dicendum, quod deliberatio et consilium, ut dicit Philosophus, non sunt de his quae sunt ad finem, quando non est certum quae expediant ad finem intentum. In ipsa autem intentione finis aliquis meretur; unde non exigitur deliberatio ad meritum, etiam in aliis hominibus, quantum ad appetitum finis. Et praeterea in Christo non exigebatur deliberatio etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quia de his certus erat. Reply Obj. 2: Deliberation and taking counsel, as the Philosopher says, are not about the end, but about the things that are for the sake of the end, when it is not certain which things are expedient for the intended end. Now, something is merited in the very intention of the end, whence one does not need deliberation for merit, even in other men, as regards the desire for the end. And furthermore, in Christ he did not need deliberation even with regard to things that are for the end, since he was certain about them. Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, scilicet meritum, et ab alio habuit, inquantum scilicet exigitur gratia, et a seipso habuit, inquantum meritum procedit ex libero arbitrio. Non enim semper necessarium est ut causa causatum praecedat tempore, sed quandoque sufficit quod praecedat natura. Reply Obj. 3: That which Christ possessed in the first instant of his conception, namely merit, he had both from another, inasmuch as grace is required, and from his very self, inasmuch as merit proceeds from a free decision. For it is not always necessary that the cause precede the effect in time, but sometimes it is enough that it precede it by its nature. Ad quartum dicendum, quod motus voluntatis in finem bonum, est sibi naturalis; unde in primo instanti creationis suae potest habere motum in bonum finem, quia ad finem naturaliter desideratum appetendum non indigemus deliberatione; et in hoc potest esse meritum. Sed peccatum contingit ex hoc quod voluntas movetur in aliquid quod non competit fini naturaliter desiderato; unde oportet quod contingat ex falsa collatione illius ad finem: et ideo requiritur ad peccatum collatio ejus quod habet apparentem bonitatem ad id quod est per se bonum naturaliter desideratum. Unde in primo instanti creationis non potest mens peccare. Reply Obj. 4: The will’s motion towards a good end is natural to it. Whence, in the first instant of its creation it can have a motion toward a good end, since we do not need deliberation for desiring a naturally desired end; and there can be merit in this. But sin happens because the will moves toward something that does not befit the naturally desired end. Whence this must arise from a false connection of it to the end; and therefore a connection of what has an apparent goodness to what is through itself a naturally desired good is required for sin. This is why in the first instant of creation the mind could not sin. Ad quintum dicendum, quod Christus non habebat a sensibus acceptam scientiam, sed infusam; et ita habitus scientiae perfectae poterat esse etiam cum infirmitate organorum; et iterum dictum est, quod infirmitas corporis in ipso non refundebatur in mentem, sicut nec mentis gloria corporis infirmitatem tollebat: et ideo imperfectio organorum corporalium, usum rationis non tollebat in ipso. Reply Obj. 5: Christ [in his first instant] did not have knowledge taken from the senses, but infused knowledge; and thus, the habit of perfect knowledge was able to exist even with the weakness of the organs. And it is said further, the infirmity of his body did not overflow into his mind, just as the glory of his mind did not destroy the weakness of his body. Therefore the imperfection of his bodily organs did not destroy the use of reason in him. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum Christus meruit sibi immortalitatem Whether Christ merited immortality for himself Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non meruerit sibi immortalitatem corporis. To the fourth we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ did not merit for himself the immortality of his body. Mereri enim est extranei, cui non debetur merces nisi per meritum; sicut et adoptari est extranei, cui non debetur hereditas nisi per adoptionem. Sed Christus ad bona Patris, quae sunt sua, non dicitur adoptari quasi extraneus. Ergo eadem ratione nec immortalitatem, vel aliquid hujusmodi, meruit. Obj. 1: For meriting is for an outsider, one to whom the reward is owed only through the merit; for example, being adopted happens to an outsider, to whom the inheritance is owed only through an adoption. But to attain the goods of his Father, which are Christ’s own, Christ is not said to be adopted, as though he were an outsider. Therefore for the same reason neither does he merit immortality, or anything of this sort. Praeterea, praemium est dignius merito. Sed bonus motus animae Christi quo merebatur, est dignior quolibet corporali. Ergo non merebatur immortalitatem corporis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the reward is of the same dignity as the merit. But the good motion of Christ’s soul, by which he merited, is worth more than anything bodily. Therefore he did not merit the immortality of the body. Praeterea, Christus non erat debitor mortis: quia non habebat peccatum, quod mortis debitores facit. Ergo cum nullus mereatur illud malum evitare cujus non est debitor, videtur quod ipse immortalitatem non meruit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ did not owe a death, since he had no sin, which is what makes us owe death. Therefore since no one merits the avoidance of some evil that he is not obligated to, it appears that he did not merit immortality. Sed contra est quod in littera dicitur, quod claritas corporis est praemium humiliationis. Sed immortalitas corporis ad claritatem corporis pertinet. Ergo etiam immortalitatem meruit. On the contrary, there is what is said in the text, that the brilliance of his body is the reward of its humiliation. But the immortality of the body pertains to the brilliance of the body. Therefore he merited even immortality. Praeterea, bona gloriae nulla creatura habet sine merito. Sed immortalitas pertinet ad gloriam. Ergo ipsam Christus meruit. Furthermore, no created thing has the goods of glory without merit. But immortality pertains to glory. Therefore Christ merited it. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod impassibilitatem animae Christus non meruerit. Id enim quod nobis est naturale, non meremur. Sed anima secundum suam naturam est impassibilis. Ergo impassibilitatem non meruit. Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ did not merit his soul’s inability to suffer. For what is natural to us we do not merit. But the soul, in virtue of its own nature, is unable to suffer. Therefore it did not merit impassibility. Praeterea, omne quod inest alicui per accidens, ex hoc ipso quod accidens removetur, ei non inest. Sed anima patitur, sicut et movetur, per accidens, scilicet per corpus. Ergo ex hoc ipso quod separatur a corpore, fit impassibilis. Sed Christus non meruit animam a corpore separari: quia meritum mortis peccatum est, ut dicitur Rom. 6. Ergo non meruit impassibilitatem animae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is present in something accidentally will not be in it if it is removed accidentally. But the soul suffers just as it also is moved, accidentally—namely, through the body. Therefore from the fact that it is separated from the body it becomes unable to suffer. But Christ did not merit the soul being separated from the body, since sin is what merits death, as is said in Romans 6. Therefore he did not merit the impassibility of his soul. Praeterea, impassibilitas animae pertinet ad beatitudinem animae, sicut impassibilitas corporis ad beatitudinem corporis. Sed anima Christi a principio fuit beata. Ergo impassibilitatem animae non meruit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the impassibility of the soul pertains to the beatitude of the soul, just as the impassibility of the body pertains to the beatitude of the body. But Christ’s soul was beatified from the beginning. Therefore he did not merit the impassibility of the soul. Sed contra, anima Christi post Resurrectionem fuit impassibilis. Sed ante fuit passibilis. Ergo sicut gloriam Resurrectionis, ita et animae impassibilitatem meruit. On the contrary, after the Resurrection Christ’s soul was unable to suffer. But before that it was able to suffer. Therefore just as he merited the glory of the Resurrection, so too he merited the impassibility of his soul. Praeterea, animae damnatorum sunt passibiles, quia impassibilitatem non meruerunt. Ergo cum anima Christi non fuerit passibilis post Resurrectionem, videtur quod impassibilitatem meruerit. Furthermore, the souls of the damned are able to suffer, since they did not merit impassibility. Therefore, since Christ’s soul was not able to suffer after the Resurrection, it appears that he merited impassibility.