Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod fides possit esse de scitis. Deum esse, est creditum. Sed hoc est scitum, quia demonstrative probatum est. Ergo fides est de scitis. Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that faith cannot be about things that are known. For that there is a God is something believed. But this can be known, because it has been proved demonstratively. Therefore faith is about things that are known. Praeterea, unum de generantibus scientiam est doctrina. Sed fides, quantum ad distinctionem credendorum, est per doctrinam, quia fides ex auditu est: Rom. 10. Ergo fides est de scitis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, one of the things that begets knowledge is teaching. But faith, as regards the distinction of things that should be believed, is through teaching. For faith is from hearing (Rom 10:17). Therefore faith is of things that are known. Praeterea, omne illud ad quod habetur ratio probans, est [scitum.] Sed ad ea quae sunt fidei, potest haberi ratio probans: 1 Petr. 3:15: parati semper ad reddendum rationem de ea quae in nobis est fide et spe; et Commentator super 1 cap. De divin. nom. dicit, quod ratio est prior auctoritate; et Richardus de Sancto Victore dicit, quod ad nullam veritatem probandam deficit ratio. Ergo fides est de scitis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is held from reason proving it is something known. But things that belong to faith can have a reason proving it: always be prepared to make a defense to any one who calls you to account for the hope that is in you (1 Pet 3:15). Likewise, the Commentator says in On the Divine Names that reason is prior to authority, and Richard of Saint Victor says that reason falls short of proving no truth. Therefore faith is of things that are known. Praeterea, omnis probatio convincens intellectum ad assentiendum, facit scientiam. Sed ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, convincitur intellectus per miracula, sicut supra dictum est de daemonibus. Ergo fides est de scitis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, every proof that convinces the intellect to assent makes knowledge. But the intellect is convinced by miracles to assent to things that are of faith, as was said above about the demons. Therefore faith is of things known. Sed contra, scientia ex intellectu principiorum causatur. Sed de his quae fides credit non possumus habere intellectum fide manente, scilicet in statu viae. Ergo fides non potest esse de scitis. On the contrary, knowledge is caused by the understanding of principles. But we cannot have understanding of the things that faith believes as long as it remains faith, that is, in the state of the Way. Therefore faith cannot be of things known. Praeterea, scientia est effectus rationis. Sed ea de quibus est fides, sunt supra rationem. Ergo de his quae sunt fidei, non potest esse scientia. Furthermore, knowledge is an effect of reason. But the things that faith is about are above reason. Therefore there cannot be knowledge of the things that faith is about. Praeterea, Deum nemo vidit unquam; Joan. 1:18. Sed fides proprie de Deo est. Ergo est de non visis et cetera. Furthermore, no one has ever seen God (John 1:18). But faith, properly speaking, is about God. Therefore it is not about things seen. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod ea de quibus est fides, sint ignota. Quia secundum Gregorium, apparentia non habent fidem, sed agnitionem. Sed ea quae non habent agnitionem, sunt ignota. Ergo ea quae fidem habent ignota sunt. Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the things that faith is about are unknown. For according to Gregory, the things that are apparent do not bear faith but awareness. But things that do not bear awareness are unknown. Therefore the things that bear faith are unknown. Praeterea, 1 Corinth. 2:9: oculus non vidit et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. Sed quaecumque cognoscuntur, in cor ascendunt. Ergo fides, quae est de praedictis, est de ignotis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it risen into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him (1 Cor 2:9). But whatever things are known ascend into the heart. Therefore faith, which is about the things described, is of things that are not known. Praeterea, omnis nostra cognitio habet ortum a sensu, secundum philosophos. Sed ea quae cadunt sub fide, nullo modo possunt reduci ad cognitionem sensibilem. Ergo de eis non est cognitio aliqua. Obj. 3: Furthermore, our every cognition takes its origin from sensation, according to the philosophers. But the things that fall under faith in no way can be traced sense cognition. Therefore there is no cognition of them. Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur, est praesens aliquo modo cognoscenti. Sed fides, ut dicit Augustinus, est de absentibus. Ergo ea quae sunt fidei, sunt ignota. Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is known is in some way present to the one knowing it. But faith, as Augustine says, is about things that are not present. Therefore the things that belong to faith are unknown. Sed contra, omnis habitus in potentia cognitiva existens facit cognoscere suum objectum. Sed fides est in cognitiva potentia existens sicut in subjecto, ut prius dictum est, dist. 23, qu. 1, art., 3. Ergo ea quae sunt fidei aliquo modo cognoscuntur. On the contrary, every habit present in a cognitive power can known its object. But faith is present in a cognitive power as in a subject, as was said before. Therefore the things that are of the faith are in some way known. Praeterea, infidelitas est ignorantia, ut patet 1 Tim. 1:13: misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in incredulitate mea. Ergo fides est cognitio; et ita credita sunt cognita. Furthermore, lack of faith is lack of knowledge, as is clear from 1 Timothy 1:13: I received mercy because I had acted ignorantly in unbelief. Therefore faith is a cognition, and thus things known are believed. Solutio 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum, ad primam quaestionem, quod visio, proprie loquendo, est actus sensus visus, sed propter nobilitatem istius sensus translatum est nomen visionis ad actus aliarum potentiarum cognitivarum secundum similitudinem ad sensum visus. I answer that vision, properly speaking, is the act of the sense of sight, but on account of the nobility of this sense, the name “vision” has been extended to the acts of the other cognitive powers, in virtue of their likeness with the sense of sight. Potest ergo attendi similitudo quantum ad genus cognitionis tantum; et sic largo modo, et improprie omnis cognitio visio dicetur; et secundum hoc fides est de visis utcumque, sicut Magister dicit, non quidem visu exteriori, sed interiori. Therefore the likeness can be attended to in reference to only the genus of cognition, and in this way, in a broad sense and improperly, every cognition might be called “vision.” And according to this, faith is of things “seen” in whatever way, as the Master says, but not with an exterior sight, but an interior one. Potest etiam ulterius attendi haec similitudo non solum quantum ad genus cognitionis, sed etiam quantum ad modum cognoscendi. Modus autem quo sensus visus videt, est inquantum species visibilis facti in actu per lumen formatur in visu; unde transferendo nomen visionis ad intellectum, proprie intelligendo, videmus quando per lumen intellectuale ipsa forma intellectualis fit in intellectu nostro; sive illud lumen sit naturale; sicut cum intelligimus quidditatem hominis, aut alicujus hujusmodi; sive sit supernaturale, sicut quo Deum in patria videbimus. This likeness can be see even further not only as regards the genus of cognition, but even as regards the mode of the cognition. Now, the mode by which sense sees is insofar as the visible species is actually formed in the sight through light; this is why, by extending the name “vision” to the intellect, we properly speaking “see” when the intelligible form itself arises in our intellect through an intellectual light—whether that light be natural, as when we understand what a man is or something like this, or it be supernatural, as the light by which we will see God in the heavenly homeland. Et ulterius videri per intellectum dicuntur illa complexa quorum cognitio ex praedicta visione consurgit; sicut per lumen naturale videmus principia prima quae cognoscimus statim, ut terminos cognoscimus; sive per lumen supernaturale, sicut est visio prophetiae. Et ulterius etiam ea quae in ista principia resolvere possumus per rationem dicuntur videri, sicut ea quae scimus demonstrative probata. And beyond this, the intellect is said to “see” those composite things the cognition of which arises from the vision described. For example, through the natural light we see the first principles that we know immediately, and know even first terms; likewise when one sees through the supernatural light, as is the case with the vision of prophesy. And beyond this too, the things that we can trace back, through reason, to such principles are said to be “seen”—like the things that we know when demonstratively proved. Et secundum hoc patet quod fides non potest esse de visis: quia forma illa intelligibilis quae principaliter est objectum fidei, scilicet Deus, formationem intellectus nostri subterfugit, et non est ei pervius in statu viae, ut dicit Augustinus. Nec iterum ea quae sunt fidei, ad principia visa reducere possumus demonstrando. And following this, it is clear that faith cannot be of things that are seen. For that intelligible form that is principally the object of faith—that is, God—escapes the formation of our intellect, and is impenetrable to it in the state of the Way, as Augustine says. Neither, again, can we trace back, by demonstration, the things that are of faith to principles that are seen. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod visio accipitur ibi large secundum primum modum. Reply Obj. 1: “Vision” here is be taken in a broad sense, following the first mode. Ad secundum dicendum, quod termini principiorum naturaliter notorum sunt comprehensibiles nostro intellectui: ideo cognitio quae consurgit de illis principiis, est visio: sed non est ita de terminis articulorum. Unde in futuro, quando Deus videbitur per essentiam, articuli erunt ita per se noti et visi, sicut modo principia demonstrationis. Reply Obj. 2: The terms of principles that are naturally known are comprehensible to our intellect. Therefore the cognition that arises from such principles is a vision. But this is not the case with the terms of the articles [of faith]. Whence, in the future, when God will be seen by his essence, the articles will be known and see through themselves, in the way that the principles of demonstration are. Ad tertium dicendum, quod fidem praecedit intellectus, quo intelligimus quid significatur per nomen, et non quo intelligimus quid sit res ipsa: quia nomina ex effectibus Deo imponuntur. Reply Obj. 3: The understanding by which we understand what is signified by the name comes before faith, but not the understanding by which we understand what the reality itself is. For names are imposed on God from their effects. Ad quartum dicendum, quod prophetia respicit temporale quasi proprium objectum, quod intellectu comprehendi potest; et ideo prophetia est visio. Reply Obj. 4: Prophesy has to do with a temporal thing as its proper object, which can be comprehended by the intellect. And this is why prophesy is a vision. Ad quintum dicendum, quod de eo quod est materiale in objecto fidei, scilicet Incarnatio, non est fides, nisi secundum quod stat sub illo formali; sicut visus non est de colore nisi secundum quod stat sub lumine; et sic non cadit sub visu corporali, nec intellectuali. Reply Obj. 5: Faith is not about what is material in the object of faith—namely, a created reality—except insofar as is stands under what is formal, just as sight is not of color except insofar as it stands under light. And thus, faith does not fall under bodily vision or intellectual. Solutio 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod fides, ut dictum est, comparatur ad aliquid dupliciter, scilicet per se et per accidens. Et quod per se pertinet ad fidem, pertinet ad eam semper et ubique; ideo quod pertinet ad fidem ratione hujus vel illius, non est fidei per se, sed per accidens. Sic ergo quod simpliciter humanum intellectum excedit ad Deum pertinens, nobis divinitus revelatum, per se ad fidem pertinet; quod autem excedit intellectum hujus vel illius, et non omnis hominis, non per se sed per accidens ad fidem pertinet. To the second question, it should be said that faith, as was said, is related to something in two ways: through itself and accidentally. And what through itself pertains to faith pertains to it always and everywhere; therefore what pertains to faith by reason of this or that man is not of faith through itself, but accidentally. Therefore what pertains to God that simply exceeds human understanding and has been revealed to us pertains through itself to faith. But what exceeds the understanding of this or that man, but not of every man, pertains to faith not through itself but accidentally. Ea autem quae omnem humanum intellectum excedunt non possunt per demonstrationem probari: quia demonstratio in intellectu principiorum fundatur; et ideo hujusmodi non possunt esse scita, sed quaedam quae sunt praecedentia ad fidem, quorum non est fides nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet excedunt intellectum hujus hominis, et non hominis simpliciter, possunt demonstrari et sciri; sicut hoc quod est Deum esse: quod quidem est creditum quantum ad eum cujus intellectus ad demonstrationem non attingit: quia fides, quantum in se est, ad omnia quae fidem concomitantur vel sequuntur vel praecedunt sufficienter inclinat. However, the things that exceed every human intellect cannot be proved through demonstration, for demonstration is founded on the understanding of principles, and therefore things of this sort cannot be known. But there are some things that come before faith, of which there is not faith except by accident—namely, insofar as they exceed the understanding of this man, not that of man simply speaking—and can be demonstrated and known. For example, that there is a God: this indeed is believed, as regards him whose intellect does not attain it according to demonstration. For faith as regards itself sufficiently inclines one to all the things that come with, or follow, or precede faith. Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum. Reply Obj. 1: And thereby the reply to the first objection is clear. Ad secundum dicendum, quod fides determinatur per auditum doctrinae proponentis quid tenendum sit, sed non probantis propositum; et ideo scientiam talis doctrina non facit. Reply Obj. 2: Faith becomes determinate through hearing the teaching of someone who puts forward what should be rejected and what should be held to, but not from someone proving a proposition. And therefore such teaching does not causes knowledge. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio humana praecedit auctoritatem humanam, et ratio divina praecedit auctoritatem divinam, cui fides innititur; unde fides nostra ita se habet ad rationem divinam qua Deus cognoscit, sicut se habet fides illius qui supponit principia subalternatae scientiae ad scientiam subalternantem, quae per propriam rationem illa probavit. Reply Obj. 3: Human reason comes before human authority, and divine reason comes before divine authority, which faith rests upon. Whence, our faith is related to the divine reason by which God knows just as faith of one who supposes the principle of a subalternated science relates to the subalternating science, which latter has proved it through its proper notion. Unde Apostolus non monet humanam rationem inducere ad probandum fidem, sed divinam, ut quid Deus dixit; humanam autem ad defendendum, ut per eam ostendatur quod ea quae fides supponit, non sunt impossibilia; non ita autem quod sufficienter per rationem humanam ea quae fidei sunt, probari possunt. Et ideo verbum Richardi intelligendum est de probatione non sufficienti, sed aliquo modo persuadenti. This is why the Apostle does not encourage us to bring in human reason to prove the faith, but divine, so that it might be shown what God has said. But we should bring in human reason to defend it, so that by reason it might be shown that the things that faith asserts are not impossible—but not as though the things that are of the faith could be sufficiently proved through human reason. And therefore the words of Richard should be understood as being about a proof that is not sufficient, but in some way persuasive. Ad quartum dicendum, quod argumenta quae cogunt ad fidem, sicut miracula, non probant fidem per se, sed probant veritatem annuntiantis fidem: et ideo de his quae fidei sunt, scientiam non faciunt. Reply Obj. 4: Arguments that force one toward faith, such as miracles, do not prove faith through themselves. Rather, they prove the veracity of the one declaring the faith. And therefore they do not cause knowledge of the things that are of the faith. Solutio 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod ad perfectam rationem cognitionis intellectivae tria requiruntur. Primo quod id quod cognoscitur, intellectui proponatur; secundo quod intellectus illis adhaereat; tertio quod ea videat. Ea ergo quae fidei sunt, intellectui proponuntur non quidem in seipsis, sed quibusdam verbis quae ad eorum expressionem non sufficiunt, et quibusdam similitudinibus ab eorum repraesentatione deficientibus; et ideo dicuntur cognosci in speculo, et in aenigmate. Et propter hoc non videtur, proprie loquendo, sed tamen intellectus assentit eis: et propter hoc imperfecte cognoscuntur, nec omnino ignorantur. To the third question, it should be said that, for the perfect notion of intellectual cognition three things are required: first, that what is cognized be proposed to the intellect; second, that the intellect adhere to it; and third, that it see it. And therefore the things that are of the faith are proposed to the intellect not in their very selves, but by certain words that do not suffice for their expression, and by certain likenesses falling short of their representation. And therefore they are said to be known as in a mirror and in an enigma. And on account of this, they are not seen, properly speaking, but nevertheless the intellect assents to them; so they are imperfectly cognized, but neither are they wholly unknown.