Respondeo dicendum, quod amor ad appetitum pertinet; appetitus autem est virtus passiva; unde in 3 de anima, dicit philosophus, quod appetibile movet sicut movens motum. Omne autem passivum perficitur secundum quod informatur per formam sui activi; et in hoc motus ejus terminatur et quiescit; sicut intellectus, antequam formetur per forma intelligibilis, inquirit et dubitat: qua cum informatus fuerit, inquisitio cessat, et intellectus in illo figitur; et tunc dicitur intellectus firmiter illi rei inhaerere. Similiter quando affectus vel appetitus omnino imbuitur forma boni quod est sibi objectum, complacet sibi in illo, et adhaeret ei quasi fixus in ipso; et tunc dicitur amare ipsum. Unde amor nihil aliud est quam quaedam transformatio affectus in rem amatam. I answer that love pertains to appetite. Appetite, however, is a passive power. This is why in On the Soul 3 the Philosopher says what is desirable moves like an unmoved mover, whereas desire moves as a moved mover. Now, every passive principle is brought to perfection insofar as it is formed by the form of its corresponding active principle, and in this [active principle, through being so informed,] its motion reaches its terminus, and it comes to a rest. We see this in the case of intellect: before it is formed by an intelligible form, it inquires and doubts, but as soon as it is so informed, its inquiry ceases and the intellect fastens upon that, and then the intellect is said to adhere firmly to that thing. Similarly, when the affection or appetite is wholly imbued by the form of a good that is an object for it, it finds the good suitable, and adheres to it as though fixed upon it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a certain transformation of affection into the thing loved. Et quia omne quod efficitur forma alicujus, efficitur unum cum illo; ideo per amorem amans fit unum cum amato, quod est factum forma amantis; et ideo dicit philosophus 9 Ethic., quod amicus est alter ipse; et 1 Corinth. 6, 17: qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est. Unumquodque autem agit secundum exigentiam suae formae, quae est principium agendi et regula operis. Bonum autem amatum est finis: finis autem est principium in operabilibus sicut prima principia in cognoscendis. Unde sicut intellectus formatus per quidditates rerum ex hoc dirigitur in cognitione principiorum, quae scitis terminis cognoscuntur; et ulterius in cognitionibus conclusionum, quae notae fiunt ex principiis; ita amans, cujus affectus est informatus ipso bono, quod habet rationem finis, quamvis non semper ultimi, inclinatur per amorem ad operandum secundum exigentiam amati; et talis operatio est maxime sibi delectabilis, quasi formae suae conveniens; unde amans quidquid facit vel patitur pro amato, totum est sibi delectabile, et semper magis accenditur in amatum, inquantum majorem delectationem in amato experitur in his quae propter ipsum facit vel patitur. Et sicut ignis non potest retineri a motu qui competit sibi secundum exigentiam suae formae, nisi per violentiam; ita neque amans quin agat secundum amorem; et propter hoc dicit Gregorius, quod non potest esse otiosus, immo magna operatur, si est. And since anything that is made the form of something is made one with it, through love the lover becomes one with what is loved, which becomes the lover’s form. And therefore the Philosopher says in Ethics 9 that a friend is another self; and we read in 1 Corinthians 6:17: anyone united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him. Now, each thing acts according to the demands and needs of its form, which is the principle of acting and the rule of work. But the good loved is the end, and the end is the starting-point in matters of action, as first principles are the starting-point in matters of knowledge. Whence, just as the intellect, once it is informed by the essences of things, is directed thereby to the knowledge of the principles, which principles become known once the terms are known, and is directed further to the knowledge of conclusions that come to be known from the principles, so too, the lover whose affection is informed by the good itself—which has the notion of an end, though not always of the last end—is inclined through love to act according to the demands and needs of the beloved, and such activity is most of all delightful to him, as being suitable to his form. For this reason, whatsoever the lover does or suffers for the beloved, the whole of it is delightful to him, and he is ever more stirred up, insofar as he experiences greater delight in the beloved in all he does or suffers for his sake. And just as fire cannot be restrained, except by violence, from the motion that suits it according to the requirements of its form, so neither can the lover be restrained from acting according to love; and on account of this, Gregory says that love cannot be lazy, but rather, if it exists at all, it accomplishes great things. Et quia omne violentum est tristabile, quasi voluntati repugnans, ut dicitur 5 Metaphys.; ideo etiam est poenosum contra inclinationem amoris operari, vel etiam praeter eam; operari autem secundum eam, est operari ea quae amato competunt. Cum enim amans amatum assumpserit quasi idem sibi, oportet ut quasi personam amati amans gerat in omnibus quae ad amatum spectant; et sic quodammodo amans amato inservit, inquantum amati terminis regulatur. And since every violent thing is saddening, as if repugnant to the will, as it says in Metaphysics 5, it is therefore painful to work against love’s inclination, or even to disregard it, whereas to work according to it is to accomplish those things that are suitable for the beloved. For since the lover takes up the beloved as though he were the same as himself, he must, as it were, act as though he were the beloved in all that regards the beloved. And so, in a way, the lover serves the beloved insofar as he is guided by the beloved’s ends. Sic ergo Dionysius completissime rationem amoris in praedicta assignatione ponit. Ponit enim ipsam unionem amantis ad amatum, quae est facta per transformationem affectus amantis in amatum, in hoc quod dicit amorem esse unitivam et concretivam virtutem; et ponit inclinationem ipsius amoris ad operandum ea quae ad amatum spectant, sive sit superius, sive inferius, sive aequale, in hoc quod dicit: movens superiora et cetera. Accordingly, Dionysius, in the passage cited above, furnishes a most complete definition of love. For where he says that love is a unitive and concretive power, he sets down the very union between lover and beloved, which comes about through the transformation of the lover’s affection into the beloved; and where he says moving superior things, he sets down love’s inclination to accomplish those things that regard the beloved, whether the beloved be a superior, an inferior, or an equal. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus hic non sumitur pro habitu, sicut in 2 Ethic., sed communiter pro omni eo quod potest esse principium alicujus operationis vel motus. Et quia amor inclinationem facit ad operandum, ut dictum est, ideo amorem virtutem dicit. Reply Obj. 1: The word “virtue” is not used here to refer to a habit, as in Ethics 2, but more broadly, for anything that can be the principle of some activity or motion. And since love brings about an inclination to activity, as was said, therefore Dionysius calls love a virtue. Ad secundum dicendum, quod amor dicitur esse habiti, si ut formatum habet suam formam: quam quidem formationem desiderium praecedit in ipsam tendens, sicut ratio intellectum vel scientiam; et ideo dicitur esse non habiti. Unde amor dicitur virtus unitiva formaliter: quia est ipsa unio vel nexus vel transformatio qua amans in amatum transformatur, et quodammodo convertitur in ipsum. Vel dicendum, quod quietatio affectus in aliquo, quam amor importat, non potest esse nisi secundum convenientiam unius ad alterum: quae quidem convenientia est secundum quod ab uno participatur id quod est alterius; et sic amans quodammodo habet amatum; unde conjunctio quae in habere importatur, est conjunctio rei ad rem, et praecedit unionem rei ad affectum, quae est amor. Reply Obj. 2: Love is said to be “of something already had” as that which is formed already has its form. But this formation is preceded by the desire that tends toward being formed, as reason precedes understanding or knowledge, and so [from the vantage of desire] love is said to be of something not had. Whence love is called a unitive power formally, since it is the very union or connection or transformation by which the lover is transformed into the beloved and in a way is turned into him. Or it may be said that the quieting of affection suggested by the word “love” can only exist when two are found to be suited for each other, a fittingness that follows the extent of the participation of the one in that which belongs to the other, and in this way, the lover in a sense has the beloved. Whence the conjunction implied in “to have” is the conjunction of thing to thing, and this is preceded by the union of thing to affection, which is love. Ad tertium dicendum, quod amoris radix, per se loquendo, est similitudo amati ad amantem; quia sic est ei bonum et conveniens. Contingit autem per accidens dissimilitudinem amoris et similitudinem odii esse causam tripliciter. Reply Obj. 3: The root of love, speaking of its essential meaning, is the likeness of the beloved to the lover, since it is owing to such a likeness that the beloved is good and suitable for him. But it happens incidentally that unlikeness can be a cause of love and likeness a cause of hate, and this, in three ways. Uno modo quando affectus amantis non sibi complacet, neque quiescit in conditione vel aliqua proprietate sui ipsius, sicut cum quis aliquid in se ipso odit; et tunc oportet quod diligat ipsum qui in hoc est sibi dissimilis, quia ex hoc ipso quod est dissimilis sibi in conditione, efficitur similis affectui suo; et e contrario odit illum qui sibi similatur, et affectui suo non similatur. In one way, when the affection of the lover is not at rest within itself, nor at rest in his condition or one of his qualities, as when someone hates something in himself. And then it behooves him to love someone else who, in that respect, is unlike himself, since from the very fact that the other is unlike him in condition, he is made like to his affection, and, conversely, he hates whatever is like him and is not made like to his affection. Secundo quando aliquis ex ipsa similitudine impedit amantem ab amati fruitione; et hoc invenitur in omnibus rebus quae non possunt simul a multis haberi, sicut sunt res temporales; unde qui amat lucrum de aliqua re, vel delectationem, impeditur a fruitione sui amati per alium, qui sibi vult similiter illud appropriare; et hinc oritur zelotypia, quae non patitur consortium in amato; et invidia, inquantum bonum alterius aestimatur impeditivum boni proprii. In a second way, this happens when someone who loves something is prevented from enjoying what he loves owing to that likeness [between himself and another possessor], and this occurs in regard to everything which cannot be possessed simultaneously by many, such as temporal things. Whence the one who loves to get profit or delight from a thing is impeded from the enjoyment of what he loves by another who similarly wishes to appropriate that thing to himself. And here is the source of jealousy, which does not allow any sharing of what is loved, and envy, inasmuch as the good of another is judged an impediment to one’s own good. Tertio secundum quod dissimilitudo praecedens facit percipi amorem sequentem. Quia enim sentimus in hoc quod sensus movetur (quae quidem motio cessat, quando sensibile jam effectum est forma sentientis), ideo ea quae consuevimus, non ita percipimus; sicut patet de fabris, quorum aures plenae sunt sonis malleorum; et propter hoc amor magis sentitur, quando affectus de novo per amorem ad aliquid transformatur. Et ideo etiam quando aliquis non habet praesentiam sui amati, magis fervet et anxiatur de amato, inquantum magis amorem percipit, quamvis apud praesentiam amati non sit amor minor, sed minus perceptus. Unde Augustinus: amor ipse non ita sentitur cum eum non prodit indigentia: quoniam semper praesto est quod amatur. In a third way, this happens when an unlikeness that comes before causes one to perceive more keenly a love that comes afterwards. For since we sense precisely when the sense-power is moved, which motion ceases when the sensible is now made the form of the power sensing, we do not perceive those things to which we have grown accustomed, as is evident with a builder whose ears are full of the sound of hammers. And it is for this reason that love is felt more keenly when the affection has been newly transformed into the beloved by the force of love. Hence, when someone does not have the beloved really present, he or she burns for the beloved and is in dire straits, for the love is then more keenly perceived, although in the beloved’s presence, love is not less, but only less perceived. Thus Augustine says, love is not felt when need does not produce it, since what is loved is always available. Ad quartum dicendum, quod in amore est unio amantis ad amatum, sed est ibi triplex divisio. Ex hoc enim quod amor transformat amantem in amatum, facit amantem intrare ad interiora amati, et e contra; ut nihil amati amanti remaneat non unitum; sicut forma pervenit ad intima formati, et e converso; et ideo amans quodammodo penetrat in amatum, et secundum hoc amor dicitur acutus: acuti enim est dividendo ad intima rei devenire; et similiter amatum penetrat amantem, ad interiora ejus perveniens; et propter hoc dicitur quod amor vulnerat, et quod transfigit jecur. Sed quia nihil potest in alterum transformari nisi secundum quod a sua forma quodammodo recedit, quia unius una est forma, ideo hanc divisionem penetrationis praecedit alia divisio, qua amans a seipso separatur in amatum tendens; et secundum hoc dicitur amor extasim facere, et fervere, quia quod fervet extra se bullit, et exhalat. Quia vero nihil a se recedit nisi soluto eo quod intra seipsum continebatur, sicut res naturalis non amittit formam nisi solutis dispositionibus quibus forma in materia retinebatur, ideo oportet quod ab amante terminatio illa, qua infra terminos suos tantum continebatur, amoveatur; et propter hoc amor dicitur liquefacere cor, quia liquidum suis terminis non continetur; et contraria dispositio dicitur cordis duritia. Reply Obj. 4: In love there is a union of lover and beloved, but there is also a threefold division. For by the fact that love transforms the lover into the beloved, it makes the lover enter into the interior of the beloved and vice versa, so that nothing of the beloved remains not united to the lover, just as a form reaches to the innermost recesses of that which it informs and vice versa. Thus, the lover in a way penetrates into the beloved, and so love is called “piercing”; for to come into the innermost recesses of a thing by dividing it is characteristic of something piercing. In the same way does the beloved penetrate the lover, reaching to his innermost recesses, and that is why it is said that love “wounds,” and that it “transfixes the innards.” But because nothing can be transformed into another without withdrawing, in a way, from its own form, since of a single thing there is a single form, therefore preceding this division of penetration is another division by which the lover, in tending toward the beloved, is separated from himself. And according to this, love is said to bring about ecstasy and to burn, since that which burns rises beyond itself and vanishes into smoke. Further still, because nothing withdraws from itself unless it is unbound from what was containing it within itself, as a natural thing does not lose its form unless the dispositions retaining this form in the matter are unbound, it is therefore necessary that that boundedness by which the lover was contained within his own bounds be taken away from him. And that is why love is said to “melt the heart,” for a liquid is not contained by its own limits, while the contrary disposition is called “hardness of heart.” Ad quintum dicendum, quod unio est duplex. Quaedam quae facit unum secundum quid, sicut unio congregatorum se superficialiter tangentium; et talis non est unio amoris, cum amans in interiora amati transferatur, ut dictum est. Alia est unio quae facit unum simpliciter, sicut unio continuorum, et formae et materiae; et talis est unio amoris, quia amor facit amatum esse formam amantis; et ideo supra unionem addit concretionem, ad differentiam primae unionis, quia concreta dicuntur quae simpliciter unum sunt effecta; unde et alia littera habet continuativa. Reply Obj. 5: Union is twofold. For a certain kind of union unifies [only] in a qualified sense, like the union of things brought together by their surfaces touching; and such is not the union of love, since, as was said, the lover is transformed into the inner identity of the beloved. There is another union that unifies simply speaking, like the union of continuous things and of form and matter; and such is the union of love, since love makes the beloved the lover’s form. Thus, in addition to “union” Dionysius adds “concretion,” in order to differentiate it from the first union, since those things are called “thoroughly mingled” which are made to be simply one. Accordingly, another version gives “continuative.” Ad sextum dicendum, quod appetitus, ut dictum est, movet motus: unde passio, quia movetur ab amato, est ulterius movens secundum exigentiam amati. Reply Obj. 6: Appetite, as was said, moves while being moved. Thus passion, since it is moved by what is loved, moves in keeping with the demands and needs of what is loved. Ad septimum dicendum, quod ipsa inclinatio superiorum ad providendum inferioribus, quae est eis ex propriis formis, amor eorum dicitur, ut infra patebit. Reply Obj. 7: The very inclination of superiors to provide for inferiors, which is in them owing to their proper forms, is called their love, as will be evident below. Ad octavum dicendum, quod non est inconveniens aequalium simpliciter, unum altero, quo ad quid, majus esse, secundum quod unum indiget altero. Reply Obj. 8: Among things which are equal simply speaking, it is not unfitting that one be greater than another, in precisely that respect in which one is needed by the other. Ad nonum dicendum, quod conversio qua inferiora ad superiora convertuntur, est ordinatio eorum ad finem a superioribus intentum. Et quamvis hujusmodi ordinatio sit a principio extrinseco inquantum ab ipsis superioribus inferiora ordinantur in fines superiorum; nihilominus est et a principio intrinseco, inquantum in inferioribus est quaedam inclinatio ad hoc, vel ex natura, sicut in amore naturali, vel ex voluntate, sicut est in amore animali; et propter hoc Deus dicitur omnia suaviter disponere, inquantum singula etiam ex seipsis faciunt hoc ad quod ordinata sunt. Reply Obj. 9: The being-turned by which inferiors are turned toward superiors is their being-ordered to an end intended by the superiors. And although the principle of this kind of being ordered is from without insofar as the inferiors are ordered by those superiors to the ends of the superiors, nevertheless it is from an intrinsic principle insofar as there is a certain inclination to this in the inferiors themselves, whether from nature, as in natural love, or from the will, as in animal love. And it is on account of this that God is said to “dispose all things sweetly,” insofar as singular things of themselves do that to which they are ordered. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum amor sit tantum in concupiscibili Whether love is only in the concupiscible power Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit tantum in concupiscibili. Dionysius enim ponit amorem esse divinum, angelicum, intellectualem, animalem, naturalem. Sed quidquid est in nobis, pertinet ad intellectum, vel animalitatem, vel naturam. Ergo in omnibus quae sunt in nobis, invenitur amor. Obj. 1: To the second we proceed thus. It seems that love is not only in the concupiscible power. For Dionysius, in On the Divine Names, sets down four kinds of love: divine, angelic, intellectual, and natural. But whatever is in us pertains to intellect, to animality, or to nature. Hence love may be found in all the things that are in us. Praeterea, Commentator ibidem ponit duas definitiones amoris. Prima est haec: amor est connexio vel vinculum, quo omnium rerum universitas ineffabili amicitia insolubilique unitate copulatur. Secunda est: amor est naturalis motus omnium rerum quae in motu sunt, finis, quietaque statio, ultra quam nullius creaturae progreditur motus. Ex quibus est accipere quod amor in omnibus rebus invenitur. Ergo et in omnibus quae in nobis sunt, sive sint partes animae, sive corporis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Commentator there sets down two definitions of love. The first is this: Love is the connection or chain by which the totality of all things is joined together in ineffable friendship and indissoluble unity. The second is: Love is the end and quiet resting place of the natural motion of all things that are in motion, beyond which no motion of the creature extends. From these things it may be gathered that love is found in all things. Love, therefore, is in all the things that are in us, be they parts of the soul or parts of the body. Praeterea, omnis potentia delectatur in conjunctione sui convenientis. Sed delectatio non est nisi in re animata. Ergo et cuilibet potentiae inest amor sui convenientis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, every power takes delight in being joined with what is fitting to it. But delight is only taken in something loved. Thus, in any power whatsoever exists a love for what is fitting to it. Praeterea, sicut praedictum est, art. praeced., et ex praedicta definitione colligitur, amor est finis et quietatio appetitivi motus. Sed cuilibet potentiae quae in nobis est, inest appetitus proprii boni, et tendit in ipsum. Ergo in qualibet potentia est invenire amorem. Obj. 4: Furthermore, as was said in the preceding article, and as can be gathered from the definition just mentioned, love is the end and quieting of appetitive motion. But within any power of ours is a desire for its proper good, and it tends toward this. Thus, love may be found in any power. Praeterea, ad minus irascibilis ad partem appetitivam pertinet. Appetitivae autem partis universale objectum est bonum. Cum ergo amor sit boni, videtur quod amor non sit tantum in concupiscibili, sed etiam in irascibili. Obj. 5: Furthermore, at very least, the irascible power, too, pertains to the appetitive part. But the universal object of the appetitive part is the good. Since, therefore, love is always of some good, it seems that love is not only in the concupiscible power but also in the irascible power. Sed contra est, quod dicit philosophus in 2 Top., quod amor est in concupiscibili. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in Topics 2 that love is in the concupiscible power. Praeterea, ordo partium animae proportionatur ordini partium corporis. Sed in partibus corporis unum membrum officium suum exercet respectu omnium membrorum, sicut pes non solum se, sed omnia alia membra portat. Ergo et concupiscibilis non solum sibi, sed omnibus aliis concupiscit et amat; et ita amor eorum quae ad omnes potentias pertinent, in concupiscibili esse videtur. Furthermore, the order found among parts of the soul corresponds to the order found among parts of the body. But among parts of the body, a single member can exercise a function that has regard to all the other members, as the foot carries not only itself but all the other members. [So too, among parts of the soul,] the concupiscible power desires and loves not only for itself but for all the others; and thus, the love of things pertaining to all powers seems to be in the concupiscible power. Praeterea, amor non est nisi cogniti. Si ergo in omnibus viribus esset amor proprii boni, pari ratione in omnibus esset cognitio proprii boni; quod falsum est. Furthermore, there is love only for something known. If, therefore, love of the proper good were in all powers, by the same reasoning knowledge of the proper good would also be in all of them—which is false. Praeterea, objectum concupiscibilis est bonum concupiscenti conveniens absolute. Sed quidquid est bonum secundum unamquamque potentiam est concupiscenti conveniens. Ergo appetere bonum uniuscujusque potentiae pertinet ad concupiscibilem, et eadem ratione amor; et ita amor non erit nisi in concupiscibili. Furthermore, the object of the concupiscible power is a good befitting the one desiring, absolutely speaking. But whatever is good in terms of any power is fitting to the one desiring. Therefore to desire the good of any power pertains to the concupiscible power, and for the same reason, pertains to love; and thus, love will only exist in the concupiscible power. Probatio primae. Si enim objectum concupiscibilis non esset bonum conveniens concupiscenti simpliciter, esset objectum ejus bonum conveniens solum concupiscibili. Bonum autem conveniens unicuique potentiae est per comparationem ad suum actum, sicut bonum conveniens visui, id quod est bonum ad videndum. Ergo secundum hoc, objectum concupiscibilis esset bonum sub hac ratione qua est bonum ad concupiscendum. Proof of the major premise: If the object of the concupiscible power were not a good befitting the one desiring, simply speaking, its object would be the good fitting only to the concupiscible power. But a good is fitting to any power by comparison with its specific act, as the good fitting to sight is that which is good for seeing. On this view, therefore, the object of the concupiscible power would be good under the aspect of “good for desiring.” Sed hoc est impossibile: quia concupiscere id quod est bonum ad concupiscendum, sequitur reflexionem concupiscibilis super actum suum, secundum quod concupiscit se concupiscere, vel bene concupiscere: illud enim ad quod aliquid est bonum, per prius desideratur, cum sit finis. Sed reflexionem potentiae super suum actum praecedit naturaliter simplex actus ipsius potentiae in suum objectum directe tendens, sicut per prius video colorem, quam videam me videre. Ergo objectum concupiscibilis non potest esse aliquid sub hac ratione quod est bonum ad concupiscendum: quia concupiscere hoc esset naturaliter prius et posterius reflexione concupiscibilis supra suum actum; quod est impossibile. But this is impossible. To desire “what is good for desiring” happens in the wake of the concupiscible power’s turning back upon its own act, insofar as it desires itself to desire or to desire well. That for which something is good is desired first, since it is the end. But the turning back of a power upon its own act is preceded naturally by the simple act of the same power directly tending toward its object, as I first see color before I see myself seeing. The object of the concupiscible power cannot, therefore, be something tended toward under the aspect of “good for desiring,” since to desire this would be naturally both prior and posterior to the turning back of the concupiscible power upon its own act, which is impossible. Ergo necessarium est alterum dare, scilicet quod bonum conveniens concupiscenti absolute sit objectum concupiscibilis. Therefore it is necessary to give another account—namely, that the object of the concupiscible power is a good befitting the one desiring, absolutely speaking. Respondeo dicendum, quod omne quod sequitur aliquem finem, oportet quod fuerit aliquo modo determinatum ad illum finem: alias non magis in hunc finem quam in alium perveniret. Illa autem determinatio oportet quod proveniat ex intentione finis, non solum ex natura tendente in finem: quia sic omnia essent casu, ut quidam philosophi posuerunt. Intendere autem finem impossibile est, nisi cognoscatur finis sub ratione finis, et proportio eorum quae sunt ad finem in finem ipsum. Cognoscens autem finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, non solum seipsum in finem dirigit, sed etiam alia, sicut sagittator emittit sagittam ad signum. I answer that everything in pursuit of an end has to be determined to that end in some way, for otherwise it would not arrive at one end more than at any other. But such a determination has to emerge from an intention of the end—not merely out of nature tending to an end, since if that were true, all things would be by chance, as certain philosophers have claimed. But to intend an end is impossible unless the end is known precisely as end, and the relationship between things that are toward the end [i.e., the means] and the end itself is also known. Now, the one who knows an end and things that are toward the end directs not only himself but also other things to that end, as the archer shoots an arrow at a target. Sic ergo dupliciter aliquid tendit in finem. Uno modo directum in finem a seipso, quod est tantum in cognoscente finem et rationem finis. Alio modo directum ab alio; et hoc modo omnia secundum suam naturam tendunt in fines proprios et naturales, directa a sapientia instituente naturam. Et secundum hoc invenimus duos appetitus: scilicet appetitum naturalem, qui nihil aliud est quam inclinatio rei in finem suum naturalem qui est ex directione instituentis naturam, et iterum appetitum voluntarium, qui est inclinatio cognoscentis finem, et ordinem in finem illum; et inter hos duos appetitus est unus medius, qui procedit ex cognitione finis sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis et proportio ejus quod est ad finem, in finem ipsum; et iste est appetitus sensitivus. Et hujusmodi duo appetitus inveniuntur tantum in natura vivente et cognoscente. So, therefore, something tends to an end in two ways. In one way, as directed of itself to an end, which only happens in one who knows the end and the notion of the end. In another way, as directed by another; and in this way all things, in accord with their natures, tend to their proper and natural ends, as directed by the wisdom which established nature. We find two corresponding appetites: the natural appetite, which is nothing other than a thing’s inclination to its natural end—an inclination given by the direction of the one who established nature; and a voluntary appetite, which is the inclination of one who knows an end and the ordering of things toward that end. Between these two there is a middle appetite, which proceeds from knowledge of an end, yet lacks knowledge of the notion of end and the relationship between the end and things that are toward the end; and this is the sensitive appetite. These two kinds of appetite, sensitive and voluntary, are found only in natures to which living and knowing belong. Omne autem quod est proprium naturae viventis, oportet quod ad aliquam potentiam animae reducatur in habentibus animam; et ideo oportet unam potentiam animae esse cujus sit appetere, condivisam contra eam cujus est cognoscere, sicut etiam substantiae separatae dividuntur in intellectum et voluntatem, ut dicunt philosophi. Sic ergo patet quod in hoc differt appetitus naturalis et voluntarius, quod inclinatio naturalis appetitus est ex principio extrinseco; et ideo non habet libertatem, quia liberum est quod est sui causa: inclinatio autem voluntarii appetitus est in ipso volente; et ideo habet voluntas libertatem. Now, all that is proper to the nature of a living thing has to be led back to some power of the soul in the one that has a soul. Hence, there must be one power of the soul to which seeking after belongs, contradistinguished from that power to which knowing belongs, even as separated substances, too, are divided into intellect and will, as philosophers say. It is therefore clear that natural appetite differs from voluntary appetite in this respect: the natural appetite’s inclination is derived from an extrinsic principle and so it has no freedom, since “the free” may be defined as “that which is its own cause”; whereas the voluntary appetite’s inclination is from the very one willing, and thus the will has freedom. Sed inclinatio appetitus sensitivi partim est ab appetente, inquantum sequitur apprehensionem appetibilis; unde dicit Augustinus, quod animalia moventur visis: partim ab objecto, inquantum deest cognitio ordinis in finem: et ideo oportet quod ab alio cognoscente finem, expedientia eis provideantur. Et propter hoc non omnino habent libertatem, sed participant aliquid libertatis. Omne autem quod est a Deo, accipit aliquam naturam qua in finem suum ultimum ordinetur. Unde oportet in omnibus creaturis habentibus aliquem finem inveniri appetitum naturalem etiam in ipsa voluntate respectu ultimi finis; unde naturali appetitu vult homo beatitudinem, et ea quae ad naturam voluntatis spectant. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod naturalis appetitus inest omnibus potentiis animae et partibus corporis respectu proprii boni; sed appetitus animalis, qui est boni determinati, ad quod non sufficit naturae inclinatio, est alicujus determinatae potentiae, vel voluntatis vel concupiscibilis. But the sensitive appetite’s inclination is partly from the one desiring, inasmuch as it follows upon apprehension of an appetible, hence, Augustine says that animals are moved by what they see, and partly from another, inasmuch as they lack knowledge of the ordering to an end; and owing to this, it is necessary that things useful for the end be provided to them by another who knows [what is useful for the end]. Hence, they are moved toward such things by a natural inclination. On account of this, they do not have freedom in the full sense, but they do partake of some aspects of freedom. Now, everything which is from God receives from him a nature by which it is ordered to its ultimate end. Hence, natural appetite will be found, of necessity, in all created things directed to ends—even in the will itself, with respect to its ultimate end. Hence, by natural appetite, a person wills happiness as well as those things that concern the very nature of the will. Thus, it should be said that natural appetite exists in every power of the soul and in the parts of the body with respect to the proper good [of each power or part], but animal appetite, which is of a determinate good to which nature’s inclination does not suffice, belongs to some determinate power—either the will, the concupiscible power, or the irascible power. Et inde est quod omnes aliae vires animae coguntur a suis objectis praeter voluntatem: quia omnes aliae habent appetitum naturalem tantum respectu sui objecti; voluntas autem habet praeter inclinationem naturalem, aliam, cujus est ipse volens causa. Et similiter dicendum est de amore, qui est terminatio appetitivi motus: quia amor naturalis est in omnibus potentiis et omnibus rebus; amor autem animalis, ut ita dicam, est in aliqua potentia determinata, vel voluntate, secundum quod dicit terminationem appetitus intellectivae partis; vel in concupiscibili, secundum quod dicit determinationem sensitivi appetitus. And thence it is that all the other powers of the soul are compelled by their objects, except for the will, since all the others have only a natural appetite with respect to their objects, whereas the will has, beyond its natural inclination, another of which the very one who wills is the cause. And one should speak in a similar way about love, which is the termination of appetitive motion, since natural love is in all powers and in all things, while animal love, if I may so put it, is in some determinate power—either in the will, insofar as this refers to the termination of the appetite of the intellective part, or in the concupiscible power, insofar as this refers to the termination of the sensitive appetite. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Dionysius accipit amorem communiter ad naturalem, sensitivum quem animalem dicit, et intellectivum, quem dicit intelligibilem, quantum ad homines; angelicum et divinum, quantum ad substantias separatas. Et ponit quinque haec, quia non possunt esse plures gradus appetitus: quia in Deo est voluntarius appetitus tantum, quia ipse determinat omnia et non determinatur ab aliquo: in Angelis autem voluntarius cum naturali, inquantum determinatur a Deo ad aliquid volendum naturaliter; in homine autem voluntarius cum sensibili et naturali; in animalibus sensibilis cum naturali; in aliis naturalis tantum. Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius takes “love” as a common term, applicable to natural love, sensitive love, which he calls “animal,” and intellective love, which he calls “intellectual” as far as men are concerned, “angelic and divine” as far as separate substances are concerned. And he sets down these five, because there cannot be more levels of appetite: in God there is voluntary appetite only, for he determines all things and is not determined by anything; in angels, there is the voluntary with the natural, inasmuch as they are determined by God to the willing of something by nature; in man, the voluntary with the sensitive and the natural; in animals, the sensitive with the natural; and in other things, the natural only.