Distinctio 28 Distinction 28 The command to love one's neighbor Divisio textus Division of the text Hic queri potest utrum illo mandato etc. Hic determinat de caritate per comparationem ad ipsum diligibile; Here it can be asked whether by that commandment of love of neighbor we are commanded to love our whole neighbor, that is, soul and body. Here, the Master determines the truth about charity in point of its comparison to the object of love. et dividitur in duas partes: This consideration is divided into two parts. in prima inquirit quid sit per caritatem diligendum; In the first, he asks what should be loved from charity; in secunda quo ordine, distinct. 29, ibi: post praedicta de ordine caritatis agendum est. in the second, in what order they should be loved, where he says: after the above matters, we must discuss the order of charity. Et prima in tres: The first is divided into three parts. in prima ostendit ad quos se extendit praeceptum caritatis quantum ad homines; In the first, he shows what the commandment of charity extends to, with respect to people; in secunda quantum ad angelos, ibi: oritur autem hic quaestio; in the second, with respect to angels, at the question arises here concerning angels; in tertia elicit ex dictis quamdam distinctionem, ibi: hic notandum est. in the third, he draws a certain distinction from what was said, at here is to be noted. Circa primum duo facit: Concerning the first, he does two things. primo determinat veritatem; First, he determines the truth; secundo removet dubitationem quamdam, ibi: hic videtur Augustinus tradere, quod ex praecepto non teneamur diligere nosmetipsos. second, he removes a doubt, at here Augustine seems to teach that we are not bound by precept to love ourselves. Quaestio 1 Question 1 Which objects should be loved from charity Hic quaeruntur septem: Here, we will address seven questions: primo, utrum virtutes sint ex caritate diligendae; first, whether virtues should be loved out of charity; secundo, utrum inanimata; second, whether inanimate things; tertio, utrum angeli; third, whether angels; quarto, utrum daemones; fourth, whether demons; quinto, utrum mali homines; fifth, whether evil people; sexto, utrum homo ex caritate seipsum diligere possit; sixth, whether someone can love himself out of charity; septimo, utrum proprium corpus. seventh, whether one should love one’s own body. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum virtutes sint diligendae ex caritate Whether virtues should be loved from charity Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes ex caritate sint diligendae. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that virtues should be loved from charity. Augustinus enim dicit: qui diligit fratrem, dilectionem qua diligit magis diligat. Sed dilectio qua proximus diligitur, est virtus caritatis. Ergo virtutes ex caritate sunt diligendae, cum proximus diligatur ex caritate. Obj. 1: For Augustine says, he who loves his brother, loves more the love by which he loves. But the love by which a neighbor is loved is the virtue of charity. Therefore virtues should be loved from charity, since the neighbor is loved from charity. Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed amicitia vera diligit amicum propter honestum. Ergo diligit honestum etiam magis quam amicum. Ergo et caritas, quae est amicitia quaedam, ut dictum est, dist. 27, quaest. 2, art. 1, corp., magis est virtutum quam etiam proximorum dilectiva. Obj. 2: Further, that due to which anything is such as it is, is even more so itself. But true friendship loves the friend on account of what is noble. Hence it loves what is noble even more than the friend. Therefore charity, which is a certain friendship, as was said, is more loving of the virtues than even of neighbors. Praeterea, actus primi et actus reflexi super eos ad eamdem potentiam pertinent, quia sunt ejusdem rationis; sicut intelligere aliquod intelligibile, et intelligere se intelligere. Sed ad actus ejusdem rationis perficit eadem virtus. Ergo cum per caritatem diligatur proximus, per caritatem diligetur dilectio qua diligitur proximus: et eadem ratione aliae virtutes. Obj. 3: Further, first acts pertain to the same power as the acts reflective upon them, since they are of the same notion, for example, understanding something intelligible and understanding oneself to understand it. But acts of the same notion are perfected by one and the same virtue. Therefore since the neighbor is loved through charity, through charity is likewise loved the love by which the neighbor is loved; and for the same reason, other virtues are so loved by charity. Praeterea, ex caritate diligenda sunt illa quae ad beatitudinem referuntur. Sed virtutibus in beatitudinem ducimur, et nobiscum manent in beatitudine. Ergo virtutes ex caritate sunt diligendae. Obj. 4: Further, things having reference to our final beatitude should be loved from charity. But we are led to beatitude by the virtues, and they will remain with us in beatitude. Therefore the virtues should be loved from charity. Praeterea, caritas est dilectio finis ultimi. Sed ultimus finis nostrae vitae est beatitudo. Ergo beatitudinem ex caritate diligere debemus. Sed virtutes et gratiae, cum consummantur, in beatitudinem transeunt. Ergo et virtutes diligendae sunt ex caritate. Obj. 5: Further, charity is love of the ultimate end. But the ultimate end of our life is beatitude. Therefore we ought to love beatitude from charity. But when they reach consummation, virtues and grace will pass into beatitude. Therefore the virtues should be loved from charity. Sed contra est quod Augustinus sufficienter enumerat ea quae sunt diligenda ex caritate, et nullam mentionem facit de virtutibus, ut patet in littera. On the contrary, Augustine sufficiently enumerates the things that should be loved from charity, and he makes no mention of virtues, as is evident in the text. Praeterea, illud quod propter nos tantum diligimus, non diligitur ex caritate: quia caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt; 1 Cor. 13:5. Sed virtutes propter nos tantum diligimus, quia in seipsis non subsistunt, cum accidentia sint; unde nec bonitatem habent, nisi secundum quod in nobis sunt. Ergo non sunt diligendae ex caritate. Furthermore, what we love only on account of ourselves is not loved from charity, since charity does not seek after its own (1 Cor 13:5). But we love virtues only on account of ourselves, since, being accidents, they do not subsist of themselves; hence neither do they have goodness except insofar as they exist in us. Therefore they should not be loved from charity. Praeterea, illa sola sunt ex caritate diligenda quae nobiscum participant beatitudinem. Sed virtutes, cum sint accidentia, non sunt capabilia beatitudinis, nec etiam vitae. Ergo non sunt ex caritate diligendae. Furthermore, those alone should be loved from charity that share beatitude with us. But virtues, since they are accidents, are not capable of beatitude, or even of life. Therefore they should not be loved from charity. Respondeo dicendum, quod cum caritas amorem includat, et aliquid addat, diligi aliquid ex caritate contingit dupliciter. I answer that, since charity includes love but adds something more, it happens in two different ways that something can be loved from charity.