Utrum Deus sit super omnia diligendus ex caritate Whether God is to be loved above all things from charity Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit supra omnia diligendus ex caritate. Quia, sicut dicit Dionysius, amor est unitiva virtus. Sed magis est sibi unusquisque unitus quam Deo. Ergo magis ex caritate debet se diligere quam Deum. Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. It seems that God is not to be loved above all things from charity. For as Dionysius says, love is a unitive power. But anyone is more united to himself than he is to God. Therefore he ought from charity to love himself more than he loves God. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, quod unicuique est amabile quod est sibi bonum. Sed quidquid diligit propter hoc quod est sibi bonum, propter seipsum diligit homo. Ergo quidquid diligit propter seipsum diligit. Ergo se magis diligit omnibus quae diligit; et ita non diligit Deum supra omnia. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8 that anyone finds lovable that which is good for him. But whatever a man loves owing to the fact that it is good for him, he loves on account of himself. Therefore whatsoever he loves, he loves on account of himself. Therefore he loves himself more than everything he loves; and so, he does not love God above all things. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit, quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum, veniunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum. Sed primum in quolibet genere est potissimum. Ergo amor quem quisque habet ad seipsum, est potior amore quem habet ad alterum; et ita quisque plus seipsum quam Deum diligit secundum naturam: et ita etiam secundum caritatem, cum gratia naturam non destruat. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 that friendly feelings for another come from friendly feelings toward oneself. But the first in any genus is the most powerful. Accordingly, the love someone has for himself is more powerful than the love he has for another, and so, by nature, a man loves himself more than he loves God—and the same is true even by charity, since grace does not destroy nature. Praeterea, sicut dicit Gregorius, probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis. Sed tantum quisque facit pro gratia conservanda, sive beatitudine creata habenda, quantum pro Deo. Ergo tantum diligit quis gratiam, vel beatitudinem creatam, quantum Deum. Sed dilectio qua dicimur diligere virtutem, vel aliquod accidens, refertur ad ipsum subjectum accidentis, cui desideratur illud accidens. Ergo tantum quisque diligit se habens caritatem, quantum Deum. Obj. 4: Further, as Gregory says, love’s proof is a deed done. But a person does as much to preserve grace or possess created beatitude as he does for the sake of God. Therefore a person loves grace or created beatitude as much as he loves God. But the love by which we are said to love virtue or some accident is referred to the subject of the accident, the one for whom that accident is desired. Therefore someone having charity loves himself as much as he loves God. Praeterea, tantum quisque diligit proximum quantum diligit Deum in proximo vel in seipso: quia Deus non est melior in se quam ubicumque est. Ergo tantum quisque diligit seipsum vel proximum quantum diligit Deum: et ita non diligitur Deus ex caritate super omnia. Obj. 5: Further, a person loves her neighbor only to the extent that she loves God in the neighbor. But a person loves God in himself as much as she loves God in a neighbor or in herself, because God is no better in himself than he is wherever he is. Therefore a person loves herself or her neighbor as much as she loves God; and thus God is not loved above all things from charity. Sed contra, finis magis diligendus est his quae sunt ad finem. Sed Deus est finis omnium diligibilium ex caritate. Ergo ipse est maxime diligendus. On the contrary (1), the end is more to be loved than things ordered to the end. But God is the end of everything that is loved from charity. Therefore he is to be loved most of all. Praeterea, unicuique est diligibile proprium bonum, secundum Philosophum. Sed Deus est majus bonum quam aliquid aliud, et est proprium magis alicui quam aliquid aliud: quia est magis intimum animae quam etiam ipsa sibi, ut dicitur in libro De spiritu et anima. Ergo Deus super omnia diligendus est. Furthermore (2), each and every man finds his proper good lovable, according to the Philosopher. But God is a greater good than any other, and is more proper to someone than any other, since he is more intimately present to the soul than even the soul is to itself, as is said in On the Spirit and the Soul. Therefore God is to be loved above all things. Praeterea, quod est causa aliorum in unoquoque genere, maximum est in genere illo, ut dicitur in 2 Metaph. Sed Deus est causa et ratio quare omnia ex caritate diligantur, quia divina bonitas est per se objectum caritatis. Ergo magis diligendus est Deus quam aliquid aliud. Furthermore (3), that which is a cause of others in any genus is supreme in that genus, as is said in the Metaphysics 2. But God is the cause and the reason why all things are loved from charity, since the divine goodness is charity’s per se object. Therefore God is more to be loved from charity than anything else. Respondeo dicendum, quod cum objectum amoris sit bonum, dupliciter aliquis tendere potest in bonum alicujus rei. I answer that, since the good is the object of love, there are two ways in which someone can tend to something’s good. Uno modo ita quod bonum illius rei ad alterum referat, sicut quod bonum unius rei optet alteri, si non habet; vel complaceat sibi, si habet: sicut amat quis vinum, in quantum dulcedinem vini peroptat, et in hoc gaudet quod ea fruitur, non quod vinum ipsam habet; et hic amor vocatur a quibusdam amor concupiscentiae. Amor autem iste non terminatur ad rem quae dicitur amari, sed reflectitur ad rem illam cui optatur bonum illius rei. In one way, he can tend to it such that he refers that thing’s good to another, as when I desire one thing’s good for the sake of another, should that other lack it, or when it pleases me that the other has that good, just as someone loves wine insofar as he greatly desires the wine’s pleasant taste, and rejoices not because the wine possesses that pleasant taste, but because he is enjoying it. And this love is called by some the “love of concupiscence.” That love, however, does not have its ultimate term in the thing that is said to be loved, but is bent toward that person for whom that thing’s good is desired. Alio modo amor fertur in bonum alicujus rei ita quod ad rem ipsam terminatur, inquantum bonum quod habet, complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei; et hic est amor benevolentiae, qui est principium amicitiae, ut dicit Philosophus. Unde gradus caritatis secundum hunc modum amoris attendendi sunt, quia caritas amicitiam includit, ut supra, dist. 27, quaest. 2, art. 1, corp., dictum est. In another way, love is borne to the good of something such that it has its term in that very one, inasmuch as the lover is pleased that the object of his love has whatever good he has, and desires for him the good he as yet lacks. And this is “love of benevolence,” which is the beginning of friendship, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. Hence, the degrees of charity are to be gauged in accordance with this kind of love, since charity includes friendship, as was said above. Bonum autem illud unusquisque maxime vult salvari quod est sibi magis placens: quia hoc est appetitui informato per amorem magis conforme; hoc est autem suum bonum. Unde secundum quod bonum alicujus rei est vel aestimatur magis bonum ipsius amantis, hoc amans magis salvari vult in ipsa re amata. Bonum autem ipsius amantis magis invenitur ubi perfectius est; et ideo, quia pars quaelibet imperfecta est in seipsa, perfectionem autem habet in suo toto; ideo etiam naturali amore pars plus tendit ad conservationem sui totius quam sui ipsius. Unde etiam naturaliter animal opponit brachium ad defensionem capitis, ex quo pendet salus totius. Et inde est etiam quod particulares homines seipsos morti exponunt pro conservatione communitatis, cujus ipsi sunt pars. Now, the good that each person most of all wishes to see preserved is that good that is more pleasing to him, because this good is more in conformity with the appetite informed through love. This good, however, is his own good. Hence, it is to the extent that something’s good is, or is reckoned to be, more the lover’s own good that he wishes that good to be preserved in the one loved. The lover’s own good, however, is found more where it is more perfect. And thus, since any part whatever is imperfect in itself but has perfection in its whole, it follows that even by natural love the part tends more to the preservation of the whole than to its own conservation. Accordingly, an animal naturally interposes its arm in defense of the head on which the health of the whole animal depends, and particular men, too, expose themselves to death for the preservation of the community of which they are a part. Quia ergo bonum nostrum in Deo perfectum est, sicut in causa universali prima et perfecta bonorum, ideo bonum in ipso esse magis naturaliter complacet quam in nobis ipsis; et ideo etiam amore amicitiae naturaliter Deus ab homine plus seipso diligitur. Et quia caritas naturam perficit, ideo etiam secundum caritatem Deum supra seipsum homo diligit, et super omnia alia particularia bona. Caritas autem supra naturalem dilectionem ipsius addit quamdam associationem in vita gratiae, ut supra dictum est. Since therefore our good is perfect in God, as in the first and perfect universal cause of good things, it follows that the good’s being in him naturally pleases us more than the good’s being in us. And thus, too, with love of friendship, God is naturally loved by a man more than a man loves himself. And since charity perfects nature, it follows according to charity as well that man loves God above himself and above all other particular goods. However, charity adds to the natural love of God a certain fellowship in the life of grace, as was said earlier. Quidam autem dicunt, quod aliquis naturaliter amore concupiscentiae Deum plus seipso diligit, inquantum divinum bonum est sibi delectabilius; sed amore amicitiae plus seipsum naturaliter quam Deum diligit, dum plus se vult esse et vivere et habere aliqua bona quam Deum; sed caritas ad hoc naturam elevat ut etiam per amicitiam aliquis plus Deum diligat quam seipsum. Sed prima opinio probabilior est: quia inclinatio naturae hominis inquantum est homo, nunquam contradicit inclinationi virtutis, sed est ei conformis. Certain ones, on the other hand, say that a man naturally loves God more than himself with a love of concupiscence, insofar as the divine good is more delightful to him [than his own good is], whereas he naturally loves himself more than God with a love of friendship, because he wishes himself to exist and to live and to have some goods more than he wishes the same for God; but [they go on to say] that charity then has the function of so elevating nature that a man loves God more than himself even with love of friendship. But the first opinion is more defensible, since the inclination of human nature, as such, never contradicts the inclination of virtue, but is in conformity with it. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod amor non est unio ipsarum rerum essentialiter, sed affectuum. Non autem est inconveniens, ut illud quod est minus conjunctum secundum rem, sit magis conjunctum secundum affectum, dum plerumque ea quae realiter nobis conjuncta sunt, nobis displiceant, et ab affectu maxime discordent. Sed amor ad rerum unionem inducit, quantum possibile est; et ideo amor divinus facit hominem, secundum quod possibile est, non sua vita, sed Dei, vivere, sicut Apostolus dicit Gal. 11, 20: vivo ego, jam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus. Reply Obj. 1: Love is not essentially a union of things themselves, but a union of affection. However, it is not unfitting that what is less conjoined in reality should be more conjoined in regard to affection, since it often happens that things really conjoined to us are displeasing to us and most of all conflict with our affection. But love does bring about a real union with things, so far as this is possible. And therefore divine love makes a man, so far as this is possible, live not his own life but the life of God, as the Apostle says: it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me (Gal 2:20). Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis unicuique sit amabile quod sibi est bonum, non tamen oportet quod propter hoc sicut propter finem ametur, quia est sibi bonum; cum etiam amicitia non retorqueat ad seipsum bonum quod ad alterum optat: diligimus enim amicos, etiam si nihil nobis debeat inde fieri. Reply Obj. 2: Although each person finds lovable that which is good for him, it is nevertheless not necessary that the object of love be loved on account of that, that is, that it is good for him, as though this were the lover’s goal, since friendship does not turn back to oneself the good desired for another. For we love our friends, even if nothing might come of it to us. Ad tertium dicendum, quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum, venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum, non sicut ex causa finali, sed sicut ex eo quod est prius in via generationis. Quia sicut quilibet sibi prius est notus quam alter, et quam Deus; ita etiam dilectio quam quisque habet ad seipsum, est prior ea dilectione quam habet ad alterum, in via generationis. Reply Obj. 3: Friendly feelings toward another come from friendly feelings toward oneself, not as if the latter were the final cause of the former, but in the manner of what is prior in the process of generation, because, just as each person is first known to himself before another person, even God, is known to him, so too, in the process of generation, the love anyone has for himself is prior to the love he has for another. Ad quartum dicendum, quod opera nostra, proprie loquendo, non proportionantur affectioni qua Deum in seipso diligimus, quia ex nostris operibus nihil ei accrescit vel accrescere potest. Sed si esset possibile quod ex nostris operibus aliquid ei accresceret, habens caritatem multo plura faceret propter beatitudinem ei conservandam quam propter eam sibi adipiscendam. Reply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, our works are not proportioned to the affection by which we love God in himself, since nothing accrues or is able to accrue to him from our works. But if it were possible that something could accrue to him from our works, the person who has charity would do much more for the sake of preserving his beatitude than for the sake of securing it for herself. Ad quintum dicendum, quod Deus ubique aequaliter diligitur; tamen divinum bonum in isto esse, non est tantum amabile sicut ipsum esse in Deo: quia non aeque perfecte in omnibus est. Reply Obj. 5: While God is everywhere equally loved, nevertheless the divine good existing in some particular being is not as lovable as that very being is in God, since the divine good does not exist equally perfectly in everything. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum in dilectione Dei possit haberi respectus ad aliquam mercedem Whether the love of God permits consideration of a wage Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possit in dilectione Dei haberi respectus ad aliquam mercedem. Quia Joan. 10, mercenarius vituperatur. Sed mercenarius dicitur qui mercedem quaerit. Ergo dilectio Dei ex caritate non admittit respectum mercedis. Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that love of God forbids looking to some wage. For in John 10, the wage-seeker is reproved, but “wage-seeker” signifies one who seeks a wage. Therefore the love of God from charity cannot admit consideration of a wage. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: Deo licet sine praemio serviri non possit, tamen sine intuitu praemii serviendum est. Sed praemium nihil aliud est quam merces laboris. Ergo sine respectu mercedis Deo serviendum est. Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says: although it is impossible to serve God and gain no reward, nevertheless he is to be served without looking to a reward. But a reward is nothing other than a wage for labor done. Therefore God is to be served without consideration of a wage. Praeterea, amicitia civilis quamvis habeat multas dilectiones et utilitates, tamen ad eas non respicit, sed supra honestum fundatur. Sed amicitia caritatis magis est honesta quam amicitia civilis. Ergo nec ipsa ad aliquam utilitatem respicit. Obj. 3: Further, although civic friendship brings with it many delights and benefits, still for all that it does not look to them, but has the noble good as its foundation. But the friendship of charity is more noble than civic friendship; therefore neither does it look to any benefits. Praeterea, merces est finis eorum quae propter mercedem fiunt. Sed finis diligitur magis quam ea quae sunt ad finem. Si ergo Deus propter aliquam mercedem diligeretur, aliquid aliud magis diligeretur Deo; quod est contra rationem caritatis. Obj. 4: Further, a wage is the end of things done for the sake of a wage. But an end is more loved than things that stand relative to the end. If, therefore, God were loved for the sake of a wage to be gained, something else would be loved more than God—which is contrary to the nature of charity. Praeterea, sicut per caritatem homo adipiscitur praemium, ita etiam fugit poenam. Sed caritas expellit timorem poenae, maxime si sit perfecta. Ergo videtur quod etiam excludit intuitum mercedis. Obj. 5: Further, just as a person secures a reward through charity, so too does he escape punishment through charity. But charity, most of all when it is perfect, banishes the fear of punishment. Hence it also seems to exclude looking to a wage. Sed contra, sicut dicitur in Glossa Matth. 1, spes generat caritatem. Sed spes est expectatio mercedis. Ergo caritas potest esse cum intuitu mercedis. On the contrary (1), as is said in a gloss on Matthew 1, hope generates charity. But hope is the expectation of a wage. Therefore charity can co-exist with looking to a wage. Praeterea, Hebr. 11, dicitur de sanctis patribus, quod aspiciebant in remunerationem. Sed constat quod ipsi diligebant Deum ex caritate. Ergo dilectio Dei ex caritate compatitur intuitum mercedis. Furthermore (2), in Hebrews 11:26 it is said of the holy patriarchs that they were looking ahead to the reward. But there is no question that they loved God from charity. Therefore the love of God from charity is compatible with looking to a wage. Praeterea, amicorum est quod quaerant invicem perfrui. Sed nihil aliud est merces nostra quam perfrui Deo, videndo ipsum. Ergo caritas non solum non excludit, sed etiam facit habere oculum ad mercedem. Furthermore (3), friends seek to enjoy one another. But our wage is nothing other than to enjoy God by seeing him. Therefore not only does charity not exclude having an eye to a wage, but it even makes one do so. Respondeo dicendum, quod merces proprie dicitur praemium quod quis ex labore vel aliquo opere meretur. Praemium autem est quod alicui in bonum ejus redditur; unde merces, inquantum hujusmodi, importat aliquid referibile per amorem ad id cui merces redditur: mercedem enim aliquis propter seipsum amat. Non tamen est de ratione mercedis quod sit intentionis finis: quia plerumque aliquis mercedem ex opere non quaerit, cui merces datur. Ea autem quae propter se aliquis diligit, vel sunt perfectiones illius formaliter, sicut sanitas, virtus, operatio, dilectio, et hujusmodi; vel sunt effectiva vel conservativa horum, aut contrariorum prohibitiva. Unde si aliquis amat aliquid extra se propter seipsum, illud potest dici merces, inquantum ex eo aliquid in ipso relinquitur vel conservatur. Sed, sicut supra dictum est, de ratione amicitiae est quod amicus sui gratia diligatur; unde amicus non habet in amicitia rationem mercedis, proprie loquendo, quamvis ea quae ex amico in nobis fiunt, rationem mercedis habere possint, sicut delectationes, et utilitates quas ex ipso amans consequitur, ratione quarum ipse amicus merces dicitur quasi causaliter, sicut dicitur Deus merces nostra ratione eorum quae ex ipso in nobis sunt. I answer that a wage properly signifies the reward that someone earns from labor or from some work. Now, a reward is what is rendered to someone for his benefit. Hence a wage, insofar as it fits this description, implies something referable, through love, to that one whose wage is rendered, for a person loves a wage on account of himself. Nonetheless, it does not belong to the notion of a wage that it be the end of a person’s intention, since it often happens that someone to whom a wage is given does not, in fact, seek a wage from his work. Now, those things that someone loves on account of himself are either formal perfections in him, such as health, virtue, activity, love, and the like, or they bring into being or preserve these things or impede their contraries. Hence, if someone loves something outside of himself on account of himself, that thing can be called a wage insofar as from it something else is obtained by him or is preserved in him. But, as was said above, it belongs to the notion of friendship that a friend be loved for his own sake. Hence within friendship a friend does not have the notion of a wage, properly speaking, even though the many good things that are brought about for us by a friend—for example, the delights and benefits that we, the lover, obtain from him—can have the notion of a wage, by reason of which the friend himself is called a “wage” in the manner of a cause, just as God is called our “wage” by reason of those things that exist in us from him. Patet ergo quod ponere mercedem aliquam finem amoris ex parte amati, est contra rationem amicitiae. Unde caritas per hunc modum oculum ad mercedem habere non potest: hoc enim esset Deum non ponere ultimum finem, sed bona quae ex ipso consequitur. It is clear, therefore, that setting up some wage as the end of love, on the part of love’s object, contradicts the definition of friendship. Hence in this way charity cannot have an eye to a wage, for this would be to set up as the ultimate end not God, but the goods that derive from him. Sed ponere mercedem esse finem amoris ex parte amantis, non tamen ultimum, prout scilicet ipse amor est quaedam operatio amantis, non est contra rationem amicitiae: quia ipsa amoris operatio cum sit quoddam accidens, non dicitur amari nisi propter suum subjectum, ut ex dictis patet: et inter ea quae propter se aliquis diligit, potest esse ordo, salva amicitia; unde et ipsam operationem amoris possum amare, non obstante amicitia, propter aliquid aliud. Erit tamen contra rationem virtutis, si virtutis operatio propter aliquid aliud virtute inferius, cujusmodi sunt temporalia bona, diligatur. On the other hand, to set up a wage as the end of love on the part of the lover, but still not as his ultimate end, taking into consideration that love itself is a certain activity of the lover, does not contradict the definition of friendship, because this very activity, since it is an accident, is not said to be loved except on account of its subject, as is clear from what was said before. And, without prejudice to friendship, there can be an order among things that a man loves on account of himself. Hence, friendship notwithstanding, I can love the very activity of love, on account of something else. Nevertheless it will contradict the notion of virtue if the activity of a virtue is loved on account of some other inferior power, of which sort are temporal goods. Patet ergo quod habens caritatem non potest habere oculum ad mercedem, ut ponat aliquid quodcumque finem amati, scilicet Dei (hoc enim esset contra rationem caritatis, ut est amicitia quaedam), nec iterum ut ponat aliquod bonum temporale finem ipsius amoris; quia hoc est contra rationem caritatis, ut est virtus: potest tamen habere oculum ad mercedem, ut ponat beatitudinem creatam finem amoris, non autem finem amati: hoc enim neque est contra rationem amicitiae, neque contra rationem virtutis, cum beatitudo virtutum sit finis. It is therefore clear that the person who has charity cannot have an eye toward a wage in such a way that he would be setting up anything else as the end in comparison with the one loved, viz., God, for this would contradict the definition of charity as friendship; nor in such a way that he would be setting up some temporal good as the end of his love, because this contradicts the definition of charity as virtue. But, since beatitude is the end of the virtues, the person who has charity can have an eye toward a wage in such a way that he sets up created beatitude as the end of his [exercise of the virtue of] love—not, however, as the end in comparison with the one loved—for this contradicts neither the definition of friendship nor the definition of virtue. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod mercenarius ibi dicitur qui opus spirituale propter mercedem temporalem exercet. Reply Obj. 1: The wage-seeker we read about in that passage signifies one who undertakes a spiritual work for the sake of a temporal wage. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sine intuitu praemii serviendum est, ita quod praemium non ponatur finis ejus quod amatur et cui servitur, sed quod ponatur finis ipsius servitii vel amoris. Reply Obj. 2: God is to be served without looking to a reward in such a way that a reward is not set up as the end of the one loved and served [as if there were some end beyond God], but is set up as the end of that very service or love [insofar as they are the lover’s activities].