Distinctio 30 Distinction 30 Order of charity as regards merit Divisio textus Division of the text Hic queri solet quid potius sit. Postquam determinavit Magister de ordine caritatis respectu diversorum diligendorum quantum ad quantitatem dilectionis, hic determinat ordinem quantum ad efficaciam merendi. Here it is usual to ask what is better and of greater merit, to love one’s friends or to love one’s enemies. After the Master has determined the order of charity with respect to diverse objects of love as to the quantity of love, here he considers this order as to the efficacy of meriting. Dividitur autem haec pars in duas: This consideration is divided into two parts. in prima prosequitur suam intentionem; In the first, he pursues his intention; in secunda movet quamdam dubitationem ex dictis, ibi: illud vero quod sequitur, magis nos movet. in the second, he raises a doubt from what has been said, at but what follows troubles us more. Prima in duas: The former is divided into two parts. in prima ponit quaestionem; In the first, he poses the question; in secunda determinat eam, ibi: sed haec comparatio implicita est. in the second, he answers it, at but this comparison is tangled. Et circa hoc tria facit: And concerning the answer, he does three things. primo determinat quaestionem; First, he answers the question. secundo objicit in contrarium, ibi: Augustinus tamen sentire videtur majus esse diligere inimicum quam amicum; Second, he gives an objection to the contrary, at but Augustine appears to feel that it is a greater thing to love an enemy than a friend. tertio solvit, ibi: quod si quis simpliciter concedere noluerit (...) determinet ista secundum praemissam intelligentiam. Third, he solves the objection, at someone may not be willing to simply grant this . . . if so, let him determine these things in accordance with the understanding set out earlier. Illud vero quod sequitur, magis nos movet. Hic tria facit: But what follows troubles us more. Here he does three things. primo ponit dubitationem; First, he raises a doubt. secundo ponit quamdam falsam solutionem, ibi: quidam quod hic dicitur, simpliciter tenere volentes, illud praeceptum determinant; Second, he sets down a faulty solution, at some, who wish to hold simply what is said here, interpret that precept and say that to love all men, even an enemy, is given as a commandment to those who are perfect. tertio ponit opinionem propriam, ibi: sed melius est ut intelligatur omnibus illo mandato praecipi cunctos diligere, etiam inimicos. Third, he sets down his own opinion, at but it is better to understand that it is commanded to all by that commandment to love all, even their enemies. Quaestio 1 Question 1 The efficacy of meriting Hic quaeruntur quinque: Here in this Distinction, we will inquire into five things: primo, utrum omnes diligere teneantur inimicos; first, whether all are bound to love enemies; secundo, utrum teneantur eis signa dilectionis exhibere; second, whether all are bound to show them signs of love; tertio, quid majoris meriti sit, diligere inimicum, vel diligere amicum; third, what is of greater merit, to love an enemy or to love a friend; quarto, quid sit majoris meriti, diligere Deum, vel proximum; fourth, what is of greater merit, to love God or to love one’s neighbor; quinto, utrum tota virtus merendi penes caritatem consistat. fifth, whether the whole power of meriting is based on charity. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos Whether all are bound to love enemies Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes teneantur ad diligendum inimicos. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that not all are bound to love enemies. Matth. 5: diligite inimicos vestros; dicit Glossa: hoc perfectorum est. Sed ad ea quae sunt perfectionis non omnes tenentur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non tenentur omnes inimicos diligere. Obj. 1: For on the verse love your enemies (Luke 6:27), a Gloss says: this belongs to the perfect. But not all are bound to those things that belong to perfection, as was said above. Therefore not all are bound to love enemies. Praeterea, non tenentur ad plura homines in Nova Lege quam in Veteri, ut patet Matth. 14, [ubi] super illud: Et accipiens panes etc. dicit Glossa: non alia quam quae scripta erant praedicat, sed legem et prophetas gravia esse demonstrat. Sed in Veteri Lege non tenebantur homines ad diligendum inimicos; Matth. 5:43: dictum est antiquis: diliges amicum tuum, et odio habebis inimicum tuum. Ergo nec modo tenemur ad dilectionem inimicorum. Obj. 2: Further, men are not bound to more things under the New Law than under the Old, as is evident from Mark 8:6, where the Gloss, on the lines and taking the loaves, says: he does not preach anything other than what was written, but he shows that the law and the prophets are heavy. But under the Old Law men were not bound to loving enemies, for in Matthew 5:43 we read: you have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' Therefore neither are we bound to love enemies. Praeterea, natura non inclinat in aliquid contrarium caritati. Sed omnis natura inclinat in detestationem contrarii. Cum ergo inimicus, inquantum hujusmodi, sit contrarius nobis, videtur quod non teneamur ex caritate inimicos diligere. Obj. 3: Further, nature does not incline to something contrary to charity. But every nature is inclined to detest its contrary. Since therefore an enemy, precisely as enemy, is contrary to us, it seems that we are not bound, from charity, to love enemies. Praeterea, illos quibus malum optamus, et de quorum malis gaudemus, non diligimus. Sed licet optare mala inimicis, et de eorum malis gaudere; unde in Scriptura Sacra frequenter ponuntur imprecationes contra inimicos; et in consolationem fidelium inducitur hostium destructio. Ergo non tenemur inimicos diligere. Obj. 4: Further, we do not love those for whom we desire evils and about whom we rejoice in evils [that befall them]. But it is permissible to desire evils for enemies and to rejoice over their evils. Hence in Sacred Scripture, imprecations against enemies are frequently given, and the destruction of hostile forces is narrated for the consolation of the faithful. Therefore we are not bound to love enemies. Praeterea, caritas facit voluntatem hominis voluntati divinae conformari. Sed Deus odit aliquos, sicut dicitur Malach. 1:2: Esau odio habui. Ergo licet inimicos odio habere. Obj. 5: Further, charity conforms man’s will to the divine will. But there are some whom God hates, as is said in Malachi 1:3: I have hated Esau. Therefore it is permissible to hate enemies. Praeterea, hoc videtur expresse in Psalm. 138:22: perfecto odio oderam illos. Sed omnis perfectio ex caritate est. Ergo caritas facit inimicos odire, non solum quod non faciat eos diligere. Obj. 6: Further, this [hatred] seems to be clearly expressed in Psalm 139:22, which says, I hate them with perfect hatred. But every perfection comes from charity. Therefore not only does charity not make one love enemies, it makes one rather hate them. Sed contra, Levit. 19:18: non quaeras ultionem, nec memor eris injuriae civium tuorum. On the contrary, you shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself (Lev 19:18).