Distinctio 32 Distinction 32 God's charity for us Divisio textus Division of the text Premissis adjiciendum est. Postquam determinavit Magister de dilectione caritatis qua diligimus Deum, hic determinat de dilectione qua Deus diligit nos; To the above we must add [something] concerning the love of God, by which he loves us. After the Master has considered the love of charity by which we love God, here he examines the love by which God loves us. Et dividitur in partes duas: And this consideration is divided into two parts. in prima ostendit quomodo Deus omnem creaturam diligit; In the first, he shows how God loves every creature; in secunda movet quaestionem de reprobis, quos diligere non videtur, ibi: de reprobis vero qui praeparati non sunt ad vitam, sed ad mortem, si quaeritur, utrum debeat concedi quod Deus ab aeterno dilexit eos; dicimus de electis solis simpliciter hoc esse concedendum. in the second, he raises a question about the reprobate whom God does not seem to love, at as for the reprobate, who are not prepared for life, but for death, if it is asked whether it ought to be granted that God may have loved them from all eternity, we say that this is to be granted simply only with regard to the elect. Prima in duas. The former is divided into two parts. In prima determinat de dilectione Dei, secundum quod absolute dicitur creaturam diligere. In the first, he considers the love of God by which God is said, absolutely speaking, to love the creature; In secunda determinat de gradibus divinae dilectionis, secundum quod unum plus et alium minus dicitur diligere, ibi: cum autem dilectio Dei immutabilis sit et cetera. in the second, he determines about the degrees of divine love according to which he is said to love one thing more and another less, at but since God’s love is immutable . . . one may ask what is the sense of the statement that God is said to love this thing more or less than that one. Et dividitur haec pars in duas: And this part is divided into two parts. in prima determinat de ordine divinae dilectionis quantum ad diversos; In the first, he determines about the order of love with respect to different objects; in secunda quantum ad eumdem, ibi: si vero quaeritur de aliquo uno, utrum magis diligatur a Deo uno tempore quam alio; distinguenda est dilectionis intelligentia. in the second, with respect to the same object, at but if it is asked concerning someone whether he is loved more by God at one time than at another, we must distinguish the meaning of the statement. Circa primum tria facit: About the former, he does three things. primo movet quaestionem; First, he raises the question. secundo determinat eam, ibi, potest tamen sane intelligi etc.; Second, he determines it, at and yet it may be certainly understood. tertio confirmat solutionem, ibi: consideratur enim duobus modis dilectio Dei. Third, he confirms the solution, at for God’s love is considered in two ways: according to essence and according to efficacy. Quaestio 1 Question 1 How God loves every creature Hic quaeruntur quinque: Here, we will inquire into five things: primo, utrum Deus creaturam diligat; first, whether God loves the creature; secundo, utrum omnem creaturam; second, whether he loves every creature; tertio, utrum ab aeterno; third, whether he loves them from eternity; quarto, utrum omnia aequaliter; quarto, quid plus et quid minus sive aequaliter. fourth, whether he loves them all equally, and what he loves more, what less or equally. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deo competat creaturam amare Whether it accords with God’s nature that he love a creature Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non competat creaturam amare. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that loving a creature does not accord with God’s nature. Amor enim quamdam passionem animi importat. Sed aliae passiones animae, ut ira, et hujusmodi, non sunt in Deo, nisi secundum effectum, et per similitudinem. Ergo nec amor est in ipso. Obj. 1: For love implies a certain passion of the soul. But other passions of the soul, such as anger and things of this sort, are not in God, except according to effect and by way of likeness. Therefore neither is love in him. Praeterea, inter multum distantia non potest esse amor; unde amici non optant amicis maxima bonorum, ne amicitia dissolvatur, ut Philosophus dicit in 9 Ethic. Sed nulla est tanta distantia quanta Creatoris a creatura. Ergo non potest esse amor Dei ad creaturam. Obj. 2: Further, between a great distance there cannot be love. Hence, friends do not desire the greatest of goods for their friends, lest the friendship be dissolved, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. But there is no distance as great as that between Creator and creature. Therefore there cannot be a love of God for a creature. Praeterea, amor transfert amantem in amatum, ut vivat jam vita amati, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed Deus non transfertur in aliquid aliud, cum sit immobilis; sed omnia ad se trahit, ut dicitur Joan. 12. Ergo ipse non amat creaturam. Obj. 3: Further, love bears the lover into the beloved, so that he now lives the life of the beloved, as Dionysius says. But God is not borne into anything other, since he is unmoving; rather he draws all things to himself, as is said in John 12:32. Therefore he does not love the creature. Praeterea, amans quodammodo subjicitur amato, inquantum affectus amantis amato informatur, ut supra dictum est. Sed Deus nullo modo creaturae subjicitur. Ergo nullo modo amat creaturam. Obj. 4: Further, the one loving is, in a way, subjected to the beloved, insofar as the lover’s affection is informed by the beloved, as was said above. But God is in no way subjected to a creature. In no way, therefore, does he love a creature. Praeterea, omnis nostra perfectio a divina perfectione exemplatur. Sed omnis virtus perfectio mentis est. Ergo cum quaedam aliae virtutes non sint in Deo, ut temperantia, et hujusmodi, videtur quod nec caritas. Obj. 5: Further, all our perfection has the divine perfection for exemplar. But every virtue is a perfection of the mind. Therefore since certain other virtues are not in God, for example temperance and things of this sort, it seems that neither is charity. Sed contra, sicut essentia sua est exemplar omnis creaturae, ita bonitas sua est causa omnis bonitatis in creatura. Sed Deus cognoscendo essentiam suam cognoscit omnia quae ab ipsa exemplantur. Ergo amando bonitatem suam, amat omnia quae ab ipsa bonitatem participant. On the contrary, just as God’s essence is the exemplar of every creature, so God’s goodness is the cause of all goodness in the creature. But God, in knowing his essence, knows all the things that have it for exemplar. Therefore in loving his own goodness, he loves all the things that participate goodness from him. Praeterea, Joan. 3:16: sic Deus dilexit mundum etc. Furthermore, God so loved the world that he gave his only Son (John 3:16). Praeterea, Dionysius dicit quod divinus amor non permisit ipsum sine germine esse. Furthermore, Dionysius says that divine love does not allow itself to be without seed. Respondeo dicendum, quod unicuique habenti cognitionem amabile est proprium bonum non solum amore naturali, sed amore animali, sive intellectuali. Unde cum in Deo sit sui perfecta cognitio, amat suam bonitatem. Bonum autem alicujus non solum dicitur secundum hoc quod in ipso est, sed etiam secundum quod in alio est per similitudinem. Unde cum bonitas quae est in creatura, sit similitudo divinae bonitatis, sequitur quod ipse creaturam diligat. I answer that to each thing possessed of knowledge, its own proper good is lovable—not only by a natural love, but by an animal or an intellectual love. Hence, since in God there is perfect knowledge of himself, he loves his own goodness. Now the good of a thing refers not only to good present in it itself, but also to good present in another by way of that other’s likeness to it. Since therefore the goodness that is in creatures is a likeness of the divine goodness, it follows that he himself loves the creature.