Quaestio 1 Question 1 On the gifts in general Hic quaeruntur sex: Here six questions are asked: primo utrum dona sint virtutes; first, whether the gifts are virtues; secundo de numero donorum; second, what is their number; tertio utrum maneant in patria; third, whether they will remain in heaven; quarto quomodo se habeant ad beatitudinem; fourth, how they are related to beatitude; quinto quomodo se habeant ad fructus; fifth, how they are related to the fruits [of the Holy Spirit]; sexto quomodo se habeant ad petitiones. sixth, how they are related to the petitions. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum dona sint virtutes Whether the gifts are virtues Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona sint virtutes. To the first we proceed thus. It appears that the gifts are virtues. Gregorius enim dicit in moralibus, quod per septem filios Job, septem virtutes intelliguntur, scilicet sapientia, intellectus, scientia, consilium et cetera. Haec autem dicuntur septem dona Spiritus Sancti. Ergo dona sunt virtutes. Obj. 1: For Gregory says in the Morals on the Book of Job that by Job’s seven sons are understood seven virtues—namely, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel, and the rest. Now, these are called the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the gifts are virtues. Praeterea, Jacob. 1 dicit Glossa, quod per donum perfectum, quod dicitur esse desursum descendens a Patre luminum, intelliguntur dona gratuita. Sed virtutes inter bona gratuita continentur, cum Deus sine meritis praecedentibus eas nobis infundat, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo virtutes sunt dona. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Gloss on James 1:17 says that by the perfect gift, which he says is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, is understood the gratuitous gifts. But virtues are contained among the gratuitous gifts, since God pours them into us without any previous merits, as Augustine says. Therefore the gifts are virtues. Praeterea, per nomina in proprietates rerum spiritualium oportet devenire. Sed fere omnia nomina donorum ad aliquas virtutes pertinent: quia pietas ad justitiam pertinet; fortitudo autem una de quatuor cardinalibus est; consilium autem pertinet ad prudentiam, ut dicit Philosophus, in 6 Ethic.; scientia autem et intellectus et sapientia ponuntur a Philosopho virtutes intellectuales. Ergo dona a virtutibus non distinguuntur. Obj. 3: Furthermore, to get to the properties of spiritual realities, one must go through their names. But nearly all the names of the gifts pertain to certain virtues, since piety pertains to justice, fortitude is one of the four cardinal virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, and the Philosopher asserts that knowledge, understanding, and wisdom are intellectual virtues. Therefore the gifts are not distinct from the virtues. Praeterea, cuicumque convenit definitio, et definitum. Sed definitio virtutis, quam ponit Augustinus: virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis operatur sine nobis, convenit donis; et similiter etiam quaecumque aliae definitiones quae de virtutibus communiter assignantur. Ergo dona sunt virtutes. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the definition belongs to the thing it defines. But the definition of virtue that Augustine states—virtue is the good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, by which one uses nothing bad, [and] which God works in us without us—befits the gifts. And so do all other commonly assigned definitions of the virtues. Therefore the gifts are virtues. Si dicatur quod dona differunt a virtutibus quia donum est aliquid perfectius virtute; Obj. 5: One might say that the gifts differ from the virtues in that a gift is something more perfect than virtue. contra. Secundum Apostolum, et Augustinum, inter omnia alia dona Dei excellentius donum est caritas. Sed caritas ponitur virtus. Ergo donum non est perfectius virtute. On the contrary, according to the Apostle, and Augustine, among all the other gifts of God the more excellent gift is charity. But charity is asserted to be a virtue. Therefore a gift is not more perfect than a virtue. Praeterea, Macrobius distinguit quatuor gradus virtutum, scilicet politicas, purgatorias, purgati animi, et exemplares, et unus gradus est super alium. In omnibus tamen gradibus nomen virtutis servatur. Ergo dona non possunt differre a virtutibus pro eo quod sunt supra virtutes. Obj. 6: Furthermore, Macrobius distinguishes four grades of virtues—namely, the political, the purgative, and that of the purified soul, and the exemplar, and each subsequent grade is above the other. Yet in all these grades the name “virtue” is retained. Therefore the gifts cannot differ from the virtues as being above virtues. Sed contra, ea quae ex opposito dividuntur, non sunt idem. Sed Gregorius, in principio Moral., dividit dona contra virtutes, dicens per septem filios Job significari septem dona, per tres filias significari virtutes. Ergo dona non sunt virtutes. On the contrary (1), things that are divided by opposition are not the same thing. But Gregory, at the beginning of Morals, divides the gifts from the virtues, saying that the seven gifts are signified by Job’s seven sons, and the virtues are signified by his three daughters. Therefore the gifts are not virtues. Praeterea, ea quae non sunt unius divisionis, non sunt eadem. Sed virtus alio modo dividitur in suas species quam donum. Ergo virtus non est idem quod donum. Furthermore, things that do not belong to one division are not the same. But virtue is divided into its species in a different way than are the gifts. Therefore a virtue is not the same as a gift. Praeterea, timor ponitur inter septem dona. Non tamen potest dici quod sit virtus: quia nec theologica, nec cardinalis. Ergo dona non sunt virtutes. Furthermore, fear is placed among the seven gifts. Yet it cannot be said that it is a virtue, because it is neither theological nor cardinal. Therefore the gifts are not virtues. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem diversimode determinatum est a diversis. I answer that different people have considered this question in diverse ways. Quidam enim moti ex diversitate nominum, hanc differentiam assignaverunt inter virtutes et dona, quod dona dicuntur per comparationem ad Deum dantem, virtutes autem per comparationem ad opera specialia et speciales materias; et ideo ponunt dona in superiori parte animae, virtutes autem in inferiori. For some, moved by the diversity of the names, assigned as the difference between the virtues and the gifts the fact that the gifts are named through their relation to God as giving them, whereas the virtues are named through their relation to specific works and specific matters. And therefore they place the gifts in the higher part of the soul, but the virtues in its lower part. Sed hoc non potest stare: quia comparatio donorum ad Deum dantem non potest esse nisi vel sicut ad efficientem, vel sicut ad objectum, vel finem. Comparatio autem ad Deum sicut ad objectum, non potest diversificare dona a virtutibus: quia non omnia dona habent Deum pro objecto, cum scientia de temporalibus sit, fortitudo etiam circa difficilia; virtutes autem theologicae magis habent Deum pro objecto quam dona. Similiter etiam nec comparatio ad Deum sicut ad causam efficientem vel finem: quia hoc commune est omnibus habitibus infusis; et secundum commune non attenditur differentia. Non enim potest dici quod immediatius a Deo procedant dona quam virtutes: quia caritas, quae est virtus, est donum, in quo omnia dona alia nobis donantur. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod dona sunt magis in ratione, sed virtutes sunt magis in voluntate: quia de virtutibus tantum duae inveniuntur in ratione sive intellectu, scilicet fides et prudentia; de donis autem quatuor. But this cannot stand, because the relation of the gifts to God their giver can only be the relation to their efficient cause, or to their object, or to their end. Now, the relation to God as their object cannot distinguish the gifts from the virtues, since not all the gifts have God as their object. For knowledge is about temporal things, and fortitude is about difficult things. Moreover, the theological virtues more than the gifts have God for their object. Likewise also neither is their relation to God as to their efficient or final cause, since this is common to all the infused habits, and one does not designate a difference in what is held in common. For it cannot be said that the gifts proceed from God more immediately than do the virtues, since charity, which is a virtue, is the gift in which all the other gifts are given to us. And therefore others say that the gifts are more in the reason, whereas the virtues are more in the will. For only two of the virtues are found in the reason or intellect, namely faith and prudence, but four of the gifts are. Sed hoc iterum non potest stare: quia eadem est differentia quae est divisiva generis et constitutiva speciei; unde si habitus infusus dividitur in virtutem et donum per hoc quod est in ratione vel voluntate esse, oportet quod esse in ratione sit differentia constitutiva vel quasi constitutiva doni, et esse in voluntate virtutis; et ita oportet dicere quod salvetur in omnibus quae continentur sub eis, et non in pluribus: quod patet esse falsum. But neither can this stand, since the difference that divides a genus is the same as what constitutes its species. Whence, if the infused habit is divided into the virtue and the gift through being in reason and will, then being in reason must be the constitutive difference or like a constitutive difference of gift, and being in the will must be that of virtue. And then one must say that this is so in all the things contained under them, and in no others—which appears to be false. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod virtutes sunt ad bene operandum, sed dona ad resistendum tentationibus. And therefore others say that the virtues are for acting rightly, but the gifts are for resisting temptations. Sed hoc iterum nihil est: quia sicut eadem qualitas naturalis est qua ignis calefacit et qua resistit omni infrigidanti, ita idem habitus est quo quis bona operatur et contrariis operibus repugnat: quia unicuique, secundum Philosophum, delectabilis est operatio secundum proprium habitum, et contrarium est quod illi operationi repugnat. But this too is null, because just as it is the same natural quality by which a fire heats and by which it resists all cooling, so too it is the same habit by which someone does good things and fights back against contrary deeds. For according to the Philosopher, an activity following its proper habit is delightful, and what is contrary to that activity is repugnant to it. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod virtutes sunt ad expurgandum animam a peccatis, sed dona ad sanandum animam a sequelis peccati, innitentes verbo Gregorii, qui dicit, quod sapientia datur contra stultitiam, intellectus contra hebetudinem, et sic de ceteris quae non nominant peccata, sed sequelas peccati. And therefore others say that the virtues are for purifying the soul from sins, whereas the gifts are for healing the soul from things that follow on sin. This view rests on the words of Gregory, who says that wisdom is given against foolishness, understanding against dimness, and so on for the others, which name not the sins but things that follow on sin. Sed hoc iterum, ut videtur, non sufficit: quia ad actum peccati consequitur macula, et reatus, quae per gratiam removentur; et iterum dispositio vel habitus, qui per habitus contrarios tolluntur; et sic videtur quod dona non possunt esse ad hoc specialiter quod sequelas peccati removeant. Et praeterea omnia illa quae Gregorius dicit, tolluntur per virtutes: quia praecipitationem tollit prudentia vel providentia, superbiam tollit humilitas; et sic non potest secundum hoc esse differentia propria inter virtutes et dona. But this too seems not to be enough, for in an act of sin there follows a stain and guilt, which are removed by grace, and also a disposition or habit, which are taken away by contrary habits. And thus, it appears that the gifts cannot be specifically for removing the consequences of sin. And furthermore, all the things Gregory speaks of are taken away by the virtues, since prudence or foresight takes away precipitousness, humility takes away arrogance; and thus the proper difference between the virtues and the gifts cannot be in reference to this. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod virtutes sunt ad conformandum nos Christo in his quae bene operatus est, sed dona sunt ad conformandum ipsi in his quae fortiter passus est. And therefore others say that the virtues are for the sake of conforming us to Christ in things that one performs rightly, whereas the gifts are for conforming us to him in things that one suffers with fortitude. Sed hoc iterum nihil videtur esse dictu: quia in Passione Christi praecipue a sanctis proponuntur nobis imitanda caritas, humilitas, patientia, quae sunt virtutes, et magis quam sapientia et scientia, quae sunt dona. Unde videtur adinventio quaedam esse, et rationi non concordat. But this too seems null, by what was said, because in Christ’s Passion the things most proposed by the saints for our imitation are his charity, humility, and patience, which are virtues, and more so than his wisdom and knowledge, which are gifts. Whence this appears to be a certain invention, and not something concordant with the reality. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod dona dantur ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum; et haec opinio inter omnes vera videtur. Unde ad hujus intellectum sciendum, quod cum virtus in omnibus rebus inveniri possit, secundum quod habent aliquas proprias operationes, in quibus ad bene operandum ex propria virtute perficiuntur; loquentes tamen in morali materia de virtute, intelligimus de virtute humana, quae quidem ad operationem humanam bene exequendam perficit. Operatio autem hominis potest dici tripliciter. Primo ex potentia eliciente vel imperante operationem; sicut operatio rationis vel alicujus potentiae quae obedit rationi, quia a ratione habet homo quod sit homo; nutriri autem et videre non sunt operationes hominis inquantum est homo, sed inquantum est vivum vel animal; et secundum hoc omnes habitus perficientes ad operationes aliquas in quibus non communicat homo cum brutis, possunt dici virtutes humanae. Secundo dicitur operatio humana ex materia, sive objecto, sicut illae quae habent pro materia passiones, sive operationes humanas: sic enim virtutes morales proprie virtutes humanae dicuntur. Unde dicit Philosophus 10 Ethicor., quod opus speculativae virtutis est magis divinum quam humanum: quia habet necessaria et aeterna pro materia, non autem humana. Tertio dicitur humana ex modo, quia scilicet in operationibus humanis vel primo vel secundo modo, etiam modus humanus servatur. Si autem ea quae hominis sunt, supra humanum modum quis exequatur, erit operatio non humana simpliciter, sed quodammodo divina. Unde Philosophus, in 7 Ethic., contra virtutem simpliciter dividit virtutem heroicam, quam divinam dicit, eo quod per excellentiam virtutis homo fit quasi Deus. And this is why others say that the gifts are given for higher acts than the acts of the virtues, and among all of these opinions this appears to be the true one. Whence, to understand this, note that virtue can be found in all things insofar as they have certain proper activities wherein they are perfected to doing them well by their proper virtue. Yet when speaking about virtue in moral matters, we understand human virtue, which perfects one for performing human activities well. Now, the activity of man can be spoken of in three ways. First, from reference to the power eliciting and commanding the activity, such as the activity of reason or of any power that obeys reason, since a man has it that he is a man from his reason, whereas to be nourished and to see are not the activities of a man as man, but as alive or an animal. And in reference to this, all habits perfecting any activities wherein man is not like the beasts can be called “human virtues.” Second, an activity can be called human from its matter or object, as those human activities that have the emotions for their matter, for in this way the moral virtues are properly called the “human virtues.” This is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 that an act of contemplative virtue is more divine than human, because it has necessary and eternal things as its matter, not human things. Third, an activity is called “human” from its mode, namely, because in human activities, whether in the first or second way, a human mode is also preserved. However, if things that belong to man someone performs in a superhuman mode, it will not simply speaking be a human action, but in a way a divine action. Whence the Philosopher, in the Ethics 7, divides heroic virtue—which he calls “divine” insofar as a man becomes like God through the virtue’s excellence—against virtue simply speaking. Et secundum hoc dico, quod dona a virtutibus distinguuntur in hoc quod virtutes perficiunt ad actus modo humano, sed dona ultra humanum modum: quod patet in fide et intellectu. Connaturalis enim modus humanae naturae est ut divina non nisi per speculum creaturarum et aenigmata similitudinum percipiat; et ad sic percipienda divina perficit fides, quae virtus dicitur. Sed intellectus donum, ut Gregorius dicit, de auditis mentem illustrat, ut homo etiam in hac vita praelibationem futurae manifestationis accipiat; et ad hoc etiam consonat nomen doni. Illud enim proprie donum dici debet quod ex sola liberalitate donantis competit ei in quo est, et non ex debito suae conditionis. And following this, I say that the gifts are distinguished from the virtues in that the virtues perfect one for action in a human mode, but the gifts do so for action beyond the human mode. This is clear in faith and understanding. For the connatural mode of human nature is that one perceive divine things only through a reflection in created things and the enigmas of likenesses, and thus, the faith that is said to be a virtue perfects one for perceiving divine things. But the gift of understanding, as Gregory says, illuminates the mind about things heard so that a man might even in this life receive the first fruits of the future manifestation. And even the name “gift” is consonant with this. For that should properly be called a “gift” which belongs to the one who has it only from the liberality of the one who gives it, and not due to any prior condition. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dona possunt dici virtutes, inquantum perficiunt ad bene operandum, et humanae, secundum quod operationes quae ex donis eliciuntur, non sunt communes hominibus et brutis; sed sunt supra virtutes, inquantum ultra humanum modum perficiunt. Reply Obj. 1: The gifts can be called “virtues” insofar as they perfect one for doing well, and they can be called “human” insofar as the actions that are elicited by the gifts are not common to men and beasts. But they are above the virtues insofar as they perfect one beyond the human mode. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio doni non salvatur in virtutibus etiam infusis, quantum ad omnia, secundum quod salvatur in donis praedictis: quia modus operandi qui est in virtutibus, est secundum conditionem humanam, quamvis substantia habitus sit ex divino munere; et ita aliquo modo potest dici virtus donum. Reply Obj. 2: The notion of a gift is not preserved in all respects in even the infused virtues, inasmuch as it is not preserved in the gifts mentioned. For the mode of action present in the virtues is according to the human condition, even though the substance of the habit is from divine favor. And thus in a certain way a virtue can be called a “gift.”