Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod non debuerit cessare tempore gratiae. Thurificatio enim, ut dicunt sancti et magistri, non cessavit: quia significat illud quod semper faciendum est, scilicet devotionem orationis. Sed observatio Sabbati significat requiem in Deo, ut Augustinus dicit, super Exod. cap. 31, quae quidem semper facienda est. Ergo non debuit tempore gratiae cessare. Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it should not cease in the time of grace. For as the saints and masters say, using incense did not cease, because it signifies something that one should always do, namely, be devoted in prayer. But the observance of the Sabbath signifies rest in God, as Augustine says, commenting on Exodus 31—and this too one should always do. Therefore it should not cease in the time of grace. Praeterea, observatio Sabbati ad maximam perfectionem ordinabat, scilicet ad vacandum divinae contemplationi. Sed status gratiae est perfectior statu legis. Ergo etiam magis debet observari in hoc statu quam in illo. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the observance of the Sabbath was ordered to the greatest perfection—namely, making space for divine contemplation. But the state of grace is more perfect than the state of the law. Therefore much more so should this be observed in this state than in that. Si dicas, quod observatur, sed mutata die, scilicet Dominica; Obj. 3: You might say that it is observed, but the day has been changed, that is, to the Lord’s day. contra. Magis est in reverentia habendum quod ad divinitatem pertinet quam quod ad Christi humanitatem. Sed ratio observandi Sabbatum fuit mysterium divinae quietis. Ergo non fuit observatio Sabbati commutanda in observationem Dominicae propter mysterium Resurrectionis, quod Christo secundum humanam naturam competit. On the contrary, what pertains to his divinity should be held in greater reverence than what pertains to his humanity. But the reason for observing the Sabbath was the mystery of the divine rest. Therefore the observance of the Sabbath should not have been changed to the observance on the Lord’s day on account of the mystery of the Resurrection, which befits Christ in virtue of his human nature. Praeterea, tempore gratiae tenemur perfectius Deo vacare quam tempore legis. Sed tempore legis a multis abstinebatur quae nunc in die Dominico licite fiunt: non enim erat licitum cibos coquere, nec itinerare. Ergo observatio Sabbati non est mutata in Dominicam: ergo adhuc debet observatio Sabbati remanere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, in the time of grace we are bound to make space for God more perfectly than they were in the time of the law. But in the time of the law one abstained from many things that now can be licitly done on the Lord’s day; for it was not licit to cook food or to walk. Therefore the observance of the Sabbath was not changed to the Lord’s day. Therefore the observance of the Sabbath should still remain. Sed contra, Exod. 31:15: septima dies erit Sabbatum, idest requies: Glossa: alia praecepta servanda in Novo Testamento ad litteram non dubitamus; illud autem de Sabbato, velatum et in mysterio praeceptum fuit, ut hodie a nobis non servetur, sed solum signatum intueamur. On the contrary, when Exodus 31:15 says, the seventh day is a Sabbath of solemn rest, a Gloss says, we do not doubt that the other precepts should be observed literally in the New Covenant, but the precept about the Sabbath was veiled and commanded in a mystery, so that it would not be kept by us today, but so that we might look upon it as only a sign. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod Sabbati observatio excogitata fuit parvulis, et sub elementis mundi servientibus. Sed a tali servitio liberati sumus per adventum Christi. Ergo et Sabbati observatio cessavit. Furthermore, Damascene says that the observance of the Sabbath was devised for the little ones, and those serving under the elements of the world. But we have been freed from such service by the coming of the Christ, so the observance of the Sabbath has ended. Solutio 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod sicut praeceptum de sacrificiis habuit aliquam causam moralem non simpliciter, sed secundum congruentiam illorum quibus lex dabatur, qui ad idolatriam proni erant, ut Deo offerrent quod alias idolis obtulissent; et aliam causam mysticam, scilicet ad significandum sacrificium Passionis Christi: ita et praeceptum de observatione Sabbati habuit aliquam causam moralem ex conditione eorum quibus lex dabatur, qui propter avaritiam eis inditam intantum se et sibi subditos operibus servilibus occupassent quod omnino mens eorum a divinis subtraheretur: et hanc causam tangit Damascenus. Similiter etiam quia ad errores gentium proni erant, indicta est eis observatio Sabbati, ut creationem mundi semper prae oculis haberent, et sic Deum recognoscerent et timerent: quam causam tangit Rabbi Moyses. I answer that the precept about the sacrifices had a certain moral cause, not simply speaking, but according to a congruence with those to whom the law was given, who were prone to idolatry, so that they might offer to God what they would otherwise have offered to idols. And it also had another, mystical cause: namely, to signify the sacrifice of the Passion of the Christ. In the same way, so too the precept about the observance of the Sabbath had a certain moral cause, due to a condition of those to whom the law was given, who, on account of the avarice so deeply established in them, occupied both themselves and those subject to them with servile works, which thoroughly drew their minds away from divine things; Damascene is touching on this cause. And likewise, because they too were prone to the errors of the nations, the observance of the Sabbath was appointed for them, so that they would always hold before their eyes the creation of the world, and thus would recall God and fear him; Rabbi Moses is touching on this cause. Habuit nihilominus et causam mysticam triplicem. Unam allegoricam, ad significandum quietem Christi in sepulcro. Aliam moralem, ad significandum requiem humanae mentis a peccatis, et ab omnibus aliis rebus, in quibus requiem non invenit, nisi in Deo, in quo solo est quies. Tertiam anagogicam, ad significandum aeternam requiem qua sancti in gloria quiescent. Et ideo conveniens fuit institutio Sabbati pro tempore illo. Not withstanding, it also had a mystical cause in three ways. One was allegorical—for signifying Christ’s rest in the tomb. The second was moral—for signifying the rest of the human mind from sins and from all other things in which it does not find rest, other than in God, in whom alone there is rest. The third was anagogical—for signifying the eternal rest whereby the saints rest in glory. And therefore the institution of the Sabbath was fitting for that time. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Sabbati tempus non amittitur, si hoc in Sabbato fiat ad quod deputatum est, scilicet divinorum contemplatio. Sed quia Judaei omissis divinis in Sabbatis nugis et inutilibus rebus vacabant, ideo eos Seneca derisit, ut dicitur Thren. 1:7: viderunt eam hostes, et deriserunt Sabbata ejus. Reply Obj. 1: The time of the Sabbath is not given up if what it was set aside for still occurs on that day—namely, the contemplation of divine things. But because the Jews omitted divine things on their Sabbaths and made space for rather useless things, this is why Seneca derided them, as is said in Lamentations 1:7, her enemies saw her and laughed at her Sabbaths. Ad secundum dicendum, quod labor non solum impedit contemplationis actum dum exercetur, sed etiam postquam transiit, dum remanent ex labore membra fessa, et mens distracta. Unde convenientius fuit ut unus dies integer divinis deputaretur quam in singulis diebus aliquae horae. Reply Obj. 2: Labor impedes the act of contemplation not only while it is being done, but even after, when one’s members are weary from that labor and the mind is distracted. Whence more fittingly was one entire day set aside for divine things rather than certain hours on each day. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quandoque actus unius virtutis intermittendus est propter actum excellentioris virtutis; sicut opera aliarum virtutum aliquando propter opus justitiae intermittuntur, ut dicit Tullius in 1 De offic. Virtutes autem omnes contemplativae sunt digniores virtutibus activae, quarum materia esse possunt servilia opera. Unde non est inconveniens quod opus servile intermittatur ad tempus, ut contemplationi vacetur. Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes the act of one virtue must be interrupted for the act of a more excellent virtue; for example, the works of the other virtues are interrupted at a certain time for a work of justice, as Cicero says in On Duties 1. Now, all the contemplative virtues are of greater dignity than the active virtues, the matter of which can be servile works. Whence it is not a problem that a servile work be interrupted for a time so that one can make space for contemplation. Solutio 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod praeceptum de Sabbato observando, quantum ad aliquid morale est, et quantum ad aliquid caeremoniale, et quantum ad aliquid potest etiam dici judiciale. Secundum enim illud ejus quod naturalis ratio dictat, praeceptum morale est, ut scilicet aliquo tempore homo contemplationi vacet. Sed taxatio temporis in qua vacandum sit, non est de dictamine naturalis legis, et ideo non est morale praeceptum. Sed secundum quod habet pro causa significationem, sic est caeremoniale. Secundum autem quod habet pro causa conditionem illius populi, cui subveniendum erat per hoc praeceptum, judiciale est. To the second question, it should be said that the precept about observing the Sabbath is in a certain respect moral, in a certain respect ceremonial, and in a certain respect can even be called judicial. For in reference to that [part] of it that natural reason dictates, it is a moral precept—namely, such that man vacates a certain time for contemplation. But the assignment of the time to be so vacated does not come from a dictate of natural law, so it is not a moral precept. But insofar as it has a signification as a [final] cause, in this way it is ceremonial. But insofar as the precept has as its cause the condition of the people who were to be subject to it, in this way it is judicial. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod connumeratur aliis praeceptis Decalogi quantum ad id quod habet de ratione moralis praecepti. Reply Obj. 1: It is numbered with the other precepts of the Decalogue insofar as it has something of the notion of a moral precept. Ad secundum dicendum, quod opera servilia mystice intelliguntur peccata; sed ad litteram opera servilia dicuntur ad quorum exercitium servos deputatos habemus, in quibus debent artes mechanicae dirigere, quae contra liberales dividuntur. Reply Obj. 2: Sins are understood mystically by “servile works,” but literally “servile works” signifies the matters we have designated servants to do, wherein mechanical arts, which are divided against he liberal arts, ought to be directive. Ad tertium dicendum, quod causae illae non sunt morales nisi considerata conditione illius populi cui lex dabatur. Unde ex hoc magis potest concludi quod sit judiciale praeceptum quam morale. Reply Obj. 3: Those causes are only moral when one considers the condition of that people to whom the law was given. Whence from this argument one concludes that it is a judicial precept more than a moral one. Solutio 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod Sabbati observatio quantum ad illud quod de lege naturali habebat, prout morale praeceptum est, tempore gratiae non cessavit, immo perfectius implendum est, sicut et alia moralia praecepta; et ideo Apostolus, 1 Corinth. 7, dat consilium de virginibus, ut extra solicitudinem existentes, semper quae Dei sunt, cogitent. Sed taxatio diei vel temporis, quae ad legem moralem non pertinebat, veniente statu gratiae cessavit, sicut et alia legalia. To the third question, it should be said that the observance of the Sabbath, with respect to what it has of the natural law, insofar as it is a moral precept, has not ceased in the time of grace—indeed, it has been fulfilled more perfectly, as is the case with the other moral precepts. This is why the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 7, gives the counsel about virgins so that, being without concerns, they might always think about the things of God. But the assignment of the day or time, which did not pertain to the moral law, has ceased with the advent of the state of grace, as do other things pertaining to the law too. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod observatio Sabbati, inquantum caeremonialis est, principaliter significat requiem Christi in sepulcro, et per consequens quietem quam habemus per ipsum, consepulti cum eo per baptismum in mortem; Rom. 6. Unde veniente veritate, figura cessavit. Et non est simile de thurificatione, quae principaliter non est signum futuri, sed ejus quod semper esse debet. Reply Obj. 1: The observance of the Sabbath, insofar as it is ceremonial, signifies principally Christ’s rest in the tomb, and consequently the rest that we have through him, having been buried with him through baptism into death (Rom 6:4). Whence, upon the coming of the truth, the figure ceased. And this is not like using incense, which is not principally a sign of something to come, but of what ought always to be so. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia perfectius in Nova Lege debemus Deo vacare, ideo non fuit taxandum tempus illis quibus injungitur, ut sine intermissione orent. Reply Obj. 2: Because we ought to make space for God more perfectly in the New Covenant, a time should not be assigned for those to whom it is enjoined, so that they might pray without ceasing. Ad tertium dicendum, quod observatio Dominicae non obligat ex praecepto Decalogi nisi quantum ad hoc quod est de dictamine legis naturae: taxatio enim illius diei est ex institutione Ecclesiae volentis Resurrectionem Christi, cui nostram vitam conformare debemus, in jugi memoria esse. Quamvis autem Resurrectio Christi ei secundum humanitatem conveniat, tamen opus divinitatis est, quae eum a mortuis suscitavit. Unde non in minori reverentia est habenda quam requies artificis, et consummatio operum conditionis facta in die Sabbati; immo amplius, secundum quod opus conditionis opere reparationis perficitur. Reply Obj. 3: The observance of the Lord’s day does not bind one as a precept of the Decalogue except insofar as the latter is from the dictate of the law of nature. For the assignment of that day comes from an institution of the Church intending that Christ’s Resurrection—to which we ought to conform our lives—be held constantly in our memory. Now, although Christ’s Resurrection belongs to him in virtue of his humanity, still it is the work of his divinity that he rose from the dead. Whence it should not be held in less reverence than the rest of the artisan and the consummation of the works of creation accomplished on the seventh day—indeed it should be held in even greater reverence, insofar as the work of creation is perfected by the work of reparation. Ad quartum dicendum, quod in die Dominico tenemur vacare ex constitutione Ecclesiae ab operibus quae nos impedire possent a cultu divino, qui indicitur in tali die exercendus, nisi ex causa per eum qui habet auctoritatem, in aliquo dispensetur. Neque oportet quod ab omnibus in die Dominica cessemus a quibus in die Sabbati cessabant: quia antiquorum cessatio ab omnibus operibus servilibus in significationem erat, non autem nostra cessatio. Reply Obj. 4: On the Lord’s day we are bound, by of an establishment of the Church, to be unoccupied by works that can impede us from divine worship, which we should do on that the day—unless a dispensation is given in something for some reason by one who has the authority. Nor is it necessary that we on the Lord’s day cease doing all the things that they ceased doing on the Sabbath day, since the ancients’ cessation from all servile works was to signify something, but our cessation is not. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum usuras accipere sit peccatum Whether usury is a sin Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod usuras accipere non sit peccatum. To the sixth we proceed thus. It appears that usury is not a sin. Nihil enim est peccatum nisi quod est contra praeceptum aliquod morale: caeremonialia autem, et judicialia legis Mosaicae nos non obligant. Sed praeceptum de non accipiendo usuram, non est morale: quia praecepta moralia obligant respectu omnium, et ad omnes; sed Deut. 23, Judaeis conceditur quod fenerentur non proximis, sed extraneis. Ergo usuras accipere non est peccatum. Obj. 1: For nothing is a sin unless it is against some moral precept, whereas the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Mosaic law do not obligate us. But the precept about not committing usury is not a moral precept. For the moral precepts obligate as regards all things and to all men, but in Deuteronomy 23:19–20, it is granted to the Jews that they may lend at interest to foreigners, but not to their neighbors. Therefore usury is not a sin. Praeterea, constat quod ille qui alicui pecuniam mutuat, aliquod commodum ei facit. Sed secundum Philosophum in 5 Ethic., in retributione commanet civitas, ut scilicet quantum fecit, tantum ei fiat. Ergo non est peccatum, sed licitum et justum, ut pro commodo quod mutuando fecit, aliquod lucrum reportet. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is certain that he who loans money to someone does him a favor. But according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, in repayment the city endures, namely, such that as much as someone has done, so much is done for him in return. Therefore it is not a sin, but something licit and just, that for a favor that someone has done in lending, some profit would come back to him. Si dicas, quod tenebatur ei gratis mutuare; unde in hoc peccat quod vendit alicui quod ei debebat: Obj. 3: You might say that one is bound to lend to someone gratuitously, and this is why one sins who sells to someone what he owed him. contra. Secundum hoc ergo non peccabit lucrum de mutuo quaerens, nisi quando mutuare tenetur. Sed non semper tenetur mutuare. Ergo aliquando licet ei usuras accipere. On the contrary, according to this, he who seeks profit from loaning will sin only when he is bound to lend. But one is not always bound to lend. Therefore sometimes it is licit to take usury. Praeterea, non minus possum accipere ab eo cui beneficus extiti, quam ab eo cui nullum beneficium contuli. Sed si aliquis cui non mutuassem, aliquid mihi daret de suo, etiam si sperassem accipere, licite detinere possem. Ergo et ab eo cui beneficus extiti, mutuum concedendo, licet mihi aliquid expectare, recipere, et detinere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, I am just as able to receive from one to whom I have been liberal, as I am from one to whom I have shown no liberality. But if someone to whom I made no loan were to give me something of his, even if I had hoped to receive it, I can licitly hold onto it. Therefore also from him to whom I have been liberal in giving a loan, it is licit for me to hope for, to receive, and to hold onto something. Praeterea, plus efficitur mihi debitor ille in quem transtuli dominium rei meae, quam ille cui solum usum rei meae concessi. Sed in rebus in quibus non transfertur dominium, si concedantur ad aliquem usum, licet inde aliquid accipere, sicut patet in locationibus domorum, equorum, et hujusmodi. Ergo multo amplius licet mihi accipere ab eo in quem per mutuum pecuniae meae dominium transtuli. Obj. 5: Furthermore, one to whom I have transferred ownership of something of mine becomes my debtor more than does one to whom I have granted only the use of something of mine. But in things wherein ownership is not transferred, if their use is granted, it is licit thereby to receive something in return—as is clear in the locations of homes, horses, and the like. Therefore much more is it licit for me to receive something from someone wherein, through a loan of my money, I have transferred ownership. Praeterea, quicumque communicat alicui in peccato mortali, peccat mortaliter. Sed ille qui dat usuras accipiens mutuum, communicat ei qui accipit usuras dans mutuum. Si ergo accipiens usuras semper peccat, videtur quod et dans; quod falsum est. Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever is a partner with someone in a mortal sin, sins mortally. But he who pays the interest when taking a loan is a partner with him who receives the interest when making the loan. Therefore, if one who receives interest always sins, it appears that so is the one who pays it—which is false. Sed contra, Luc. 6: date mutuum, nihil inde sperantes. Contra hoc veniunt feneratores. Ergo peccant. On the contrary, Luke 6:35 says: lend, expecting nothing in return. But the moneylenders came against this. Therefore they sin.