Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum usuras accipere sit peccatum Whether usury is a sin Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod usuras accipere non sit peccatum. To the sixth we proceed thus. It appears that usury is not a sin. Nihil enim est peccatum nisi quod est contra praeceptum aliquod morale: caeremonialia autem, et judicialia legis Mosaicae nos non obligant. Sed praeceptum de non accipiendo usuram, non est morale: quia praecepta moralia obligant respectu omnium, et ad omnes; sed Deut. 23, Judaeis conceditur quod fenerentur non proximis, sed extraneis. Ergo usuras accipere non est peccatum. Obj. 1: For nothing is a sin unless it is against some moral precept, whereas the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Mosaic law do not obligate us. But the precept about not committing usury is not a moral precept. For the moral precepts obligate as regards all things and to all men, but in Deuteronomy 23:19–20, it is granted to the Jews that they may lend at interest to foreigners, but not to their neighbors. Therefore usury is not a sin. Praeterea, constat quod ille qui alicui pecuniam mutuat, aliquod commodum ei facit. Sed secundum Philosophum in 5 Ethic., in retributione commanet civitas, ut scilicet quantum fecit, tantum ei fiat. Ergo non est peccatum, sed licitum et justum, ut pro commodo quod mutuando fecit, aliquod lucrum reportet. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is certain that he who loans money to someone does him a favor. But according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5, in repayment the city endures, namely, such that as much as someone has done, so much is done for him in return. Therefore it is not a sin, but something licit and just, that for a favor that someone has done in lending, some profit would come back to him. Si dicas, quod tenebatur ei gratis mutuare; unde in hoc peccat quod vendit alicui quod ei debebat: Obj. 3: You might say that one is bound to lend to someone gratuitously, and this is why one sins who sells to someone what he owed him. contra. Secundum hoc ergo non peccabit lucrum de mutuo quaerens, nisi quando mutuare tenetur. Sed non semper tenetur mutuare. Ergo aliquando licet ei usuras accipere. On the contrary, according to this, he who seeks profit from loaning will sin only when he is bound to lend. But one is not always bound to lend. Therefore sometimes it is licit to take usury. Praeterea, non minus possum accipere ab eo cui beneficus extiti, quam ab eo cui nullum beneficium contuli. Sed si aliquis cui non mutuassem, aliquid mihi daret de suo, etiam si sperassem accipere, licite detinere possem. Ergo et ab eo cui beneficus extiti, mutuum concedendo, licet mihi aliquid expectare, recipere, et detinere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, I am just as able to receive from one to whom I have been liberal, as I am from one to whom I have shown no liberality. But if someone to whom I made no loan were to give me something of his, even if I had hoped to receive it, I can licitly hold onto it. Therefore also from him to whom I have been liberal in giving a loan, it is licit for me to hope for, to receive, and to hold onto something. Praeterea, plus efficitur mihi debitor ille in quem transtuli dominium rei meae, quam ille cui solum usum rei meae concessi. Sed in rebus in quibus non transfertur dominium, si concedantur ad aliquem usum, licet inde aliquid accipere, sicut patet in locationibus domorum, equorum, et hujusmodi. Ergo multo amplius licet mihi accipere ab eo in quem per mutuum pecuniae meae dominium transtuli. Obj. 5: Furthermore, one to whom I have transferred ownership of something of mine becomes my debtor more than does one to whom I have granted only the use of something of mine. But in things wherein ownership is not transferred, if their use is granted, it is licit thereby to receive something in return—as is clear in the locations of homes, horses, and the like. Therefore much more is it licit for me to receive something from someone wherein, through a loan of my money, I have transferred ownership. Praeterea, quicumque communicat alicui in peccato mortali, peccat mortaliter. Sed ille qui dat usuras accipiens mutuum, communicat ei qui accipit usuras dans mutuum. Si ergo accipiens usuras semper peccat, videtur quod et dans; quod falsum est. Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever is a partner with someone in a mortal sin, sins mortally. But he who pays the interest when taking a loan is a partner with him who receives the interest when making the loan. Therefore, if one who receives interest always sins, it appears that so is the one who pays it—which is false. Sed contra, Luc. 6: date mutuum, nihil inde sperantes. Contra hoc veniunt feneratores. Ergo peccant. On the contrary, Luke 6:35 says: lend, expecting nothing in return. But the moneylenders came against this. Therefore they sin. Praeterea, ea quae veniunt in eamdem divisionem, sunt unius rationis. Sed dare pecuniam ad usuram connumeratur aliis quae sunt peccata mortalia, ut patet in Psalm. 14: Domine, quis habitabit in tabernaculo tuo? Ergo est peccatum mortale. Furthermore, things that belong to the same division are of one notion. But to give money in usury is counted with other things that are mortal sins, as is clear in Psalm 15:1, O Lord, who shall sojourn in thy tent? Therefore it is a mortal sin. Praeterea, ubicumque est turpe lucrum, est peccatum. Sed Philosophus ponit in 4 Ethic. feneratores inter turpes lucratores. Ergo et cetera. Furthermore, wherever there is base profit there is sin. But the Philosopher asserts, in the Ethics 4, that moneylenders are base profit-makers. Therefore etc. Respondeo dicendum, quod ab omnibus dicitur communiter quod dare ad usuram peccatum mortale est. Sed diversi diversas rationes assignant. Quidam enim dicunt, quod ideo pecuniam pro certo lucro concedere non licet, sicut donum vel equum, vel alia hujusmodi, quia pecunia non deterioratur ex usu, sed aliis rebus aliquid deperit ex usu. Sed ista ratio non est generalis: quia in aliquibus rebus, pro quarum concessione aliquid accipi potest licite, nihil ex usu deperit, sicut in concessione domus ad usum ad unum diem; et praeterea pretium quod accipitur, non commensuratur damno quod accidit ex usu rei; non enim tantum deperit in mutuo quantum datur. I answer that it is commonly said by all that usury is a mortal sin, but they assign diverse reasons. For some say that it is not licit to loan someone money for a determinate profit—for example, a gift or a horse or the like—because money does not deteriorate from the use of it, whereas other things are worn out by their use. But this argument is not universal, since in some things for which it is licit to receive something when loaning them are not worn out by their use; for example, in loaning one’s house for a day’s use. And further, the payment that is received is not commensurate with the loss that its use incurs, for it does not lose as much as is given in the loan. Et ideo alii assignant aliam rationem, quia videlicet quando pecunia mutuatur, transfertur dominium, quod non fit in domo et in aliis rebus. Justum autem videtur ut pro usu rei quae mea remanet, scilicet domus, aliquid accipere possim; sed pro usu rei, scilicet pecuniae, quae fit alterius ex hoc ipso quod mutuatur, aliquid accipere, nihil aliud est quam accipere aliquid ab aliquo pro usu rei propriae; et ideo videtur quod est quaedam exactio, et peccatum. Et haec ratio satis probabilis videtur; et ideo simile accidit in omnibus rebus in quibus transfertur dominium per mutuum, sicut granum, vinum, et hujusmodi, pro quorum usu nihil accipere licet ultra valorem ejus quod mutuatum est. And therefore others assign a different reason: namely, because when money is loaned, its ownership is transferred, whereas when a house or other things are loaned this does not occur. Now, it appears just that I would receive something for the use of a thing that remains mine, like a house, but to receive something for the use of my money, which occurs differently because of the fact that it is loaned, is nothing other than to receive something from someone for the use of the latter’s own property. Therefore this appears to be a tax, and a sin. And this reason appears sufficiently probable; and it is why something similar happens in things wherein ownership is transferred through a loan, like grain, wine, and the like, for whose use it is illicit to receive anything beyond the value of what was loaned. Potest tamen et alia ratio assignari; quia aliae res ex seipsis habent aliquam utilitatem, pecunia autem non, sed est mensura utilitatis aliarum rerum, ut patet per Philosophum in 5 Ethic. Et ideo pecuniae usus non habet mensuram utilitatis ex ipsa pecunia, sed ex rebus quae per pecuniam mensurantur secundum industriam ejus qui pecuniam ad res transmutat. Unde accipere majorem pecuniam pro minori, nihil aliud esse videtur quam diversificare mensuram in accipiendo, et dando; quod manifeste iniquitatem continet. Nonetheless, another reason can also be assigned: because all other things have a certain utility from themselves, whereas money does not, but is only a measure of the utility of other things, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. And therefore the use of money does not have a measure of its utility from the money itself, but only from the things that are measured by money, according to the industry of the one who exchanges money for things. Whence to take more money for something less appears to be nothing more than to change the measure in receiving and giving, which manifestly contains a lack of equity. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod lex Deuteronomii loquitur de Judaeis respectu aliarum nationum quae terram promissionis Judaeis divinitus concessam detinebant; et ideo permissum fuit eis ut usuris, et quibuscumque exactionibus extorquerent ab injuste possidentibus quod eis juste debebatur, sicut etiam dicitur de spoliatione Aegyptiorum, qui Judaeis mercedem laboris quo eis servierant, subtraxerunt. Vel dicendum, quod sicut libellus repudii permissus est eis ad duritiam cordis eorum, ne uxores interficerent, ad quod proni erant; ita etiam permissum fuit eis fenerare extraneis, ne fratribus suis fenerarent, ad quod eos innata avaritia incitabat. Reply Obj. 1: The law of Deuteronomy is speaking of the Jews in their relation with the other nations that occupied the land of the promise divinely bestowed upon the Jews. And therefore usury was permitted to them, as was exacting any taxes from those unjustly in possession of what was justly owed to the Jews; this is also like the despoiling of the Egyptians, to whom the Jews had been slaves and from whom the Jews were taking the wages of their labor. Or it could be said that, just as a bill of divorce was permitted for them because of the hardness of their hearts, lest they kill their wives, which they were prone to do, so too it was permitted that they lend money to foreigners, lest they lend money to their brothers, toward which an inborn avarice incited them. Ad secundum dicendum, quod beneficium mutui non est amplius quam pecunia mutuata; unde si plus exigitur, exigitur plus quam debitum est; et ideo est injusta exactio. Reply Obj. 2: The benefit of the loan is not greater than the money loaned, so if one exacts more, he exacts more than he is owed. And this is why it is an unjust exaction. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis homo non teneatur semper mutuum concedere, tenetur tamen ad hoc ut quandocumque mutuum exigit, non plus exigat quam dederat. Reply Obj. 3: Although a man is not always bound to grant a loan, still he is bound to this: that whenever he does make a loan, he may not require more than he gave. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ab eo cui beneficium contuli, licet mihi tantum sperare et accipere quantum feci, et non plus. Quidquid autem de utilitate contingit ei cui mutuum dedi, ultra mensuram mutui ex pecunia mutuata, hoc est ex industria ejus qui sagaciter pecunia usus est: industriam autem ejus sibi vendere non debeo, sicut nec pro stultitia ejus minus habere debeo. Reply Obj. 4: From him to whom I have offered the benefit, it is licit for me to hope for, and to receive, as much as I have given and no more. However, whatever arises from the money loaned beyond the measure of the loan, due to the use of what I have loaned to him, this is due to the industry of him who sagaciously made use of the money. However, I ought not try to sell him his own industry, just as neither ought I to have less because of his own foolishness. Ad quintum dicendum, quod hoc ipso quod dominium pecuniae transfertur, est ratio quare pro usu ejus nihil accipere debeam vel sperare quasi mihi debitum. Reply Obj. 5: The very fact that the ownership of the money is transferred is the reason why I should receive or hope for nothing for its use, as though it were owed to me. Ad sextum dicendum, quod ille qui usuras dat et mutuum accipit in necessitate, non peccat, nec usurario communicat inquantum hujusmodi: quia non voluntarius usuram dat, sed quasi coactus necessitate. Reply Obj. 6: One who pays the interest and receives the loan out of necessity does not sin, nor does he participate in usury as such. For he pays the interest involuntarily, but as though coerced by necessity. Expositio textus Exposition of the text Haec Origenes dicit esse duo mandata. Sicut Origenes primum mandatum dividit in duo, ita duo ultima mandata, quae sunt de prohibitione concupiscentiae, conjungit in unum; et sic praecepta denarium non transcendunt. Origen says these are two commandments. Just as Origen divides the first commandment into two, so too the last two commandments, about the forbidding of desire, he joins into one. And thus precepts do not exceed ten. Idolum nihil est in mundo. Hoc autem multipliciter intelligi potest. Uno modo inquantum idolum est similitudo; et sic exponit Origenes, ut dicatur idolum nihil esse, quia nulla res est in mundo cujus sit similitudo. Alio modo potest intelligi de idolo secundum quod est res quaedam; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad formam quae aestimatur esse in idolo, et non est in eo, scilicet forma Divinitatis. Alio modo quantum ad effectum, quia scilicet ad peccatum inducit, quod nihil est. An idol is nothing in the world. This can be understood in many ways. In one way, insofar as an idol is a likeness, and thus Origen explains that an idol is called “nothing” because it is not a likeness of anything in the world. In other way, it can be understood of the idol insofar as it is itself a definite thing, and this is in two ways: in one way, with respect to the form that is thought to be in the idol but is not in fact in it, namely the form of Godhead. In another way, with respect to its effect, namely, because it leads to sin, which is a nothing. Non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Assumere est ad aliquid sumere. Sumitur autem nomen Dei ad alicujus veritatis confirmationem per modum juramenti. Si ergo sumatur ad confirmandum aliquod falsum, quod in se nullo modo confirmabile est, tunc in vanum assumitur, et pro nihilo juratur: quia vanum est quod est ad finem aliquem quem non inducit, ut dicitur in 2 Physic. You shall not take the name of your God in vain. “To take” here means taking it for the sake of something. Now, the name of God is taken for the sake of confirming some truth by way of an oath. Therefore, if it is taken to confirm something false, which in itself cannot in any way be confirmed, then it is taken in vain, and one makes an oath for nothing. For what is done for the sake of an end that it cannot accomplish is something vain, as is said in the Physics 2. Nomine igitur moechiae, omnis illicitus concubitus, illorumque membrorum non legitimus usus prohibitus debet intelligi. Cum peccatum contra naturam sit gravius quam moechia, videtur quod illud potius prohiberi debuerit, quasi primo tramite relinquendum. Et dicendum, quod quia legislator hominibus legem dabat, ideo in primis legis mandatis non debebat nisi peccata humana prohibere; peccatum autem contra naturam non est humanum, sed bestiale, secundum Philosophum in 7 Ethic. And so by the term adultery is to be understood every illicit union and every illegitimate and forbidden use of those members. Since a sin against nature is more grave than adultery, it appears that it should be more emphatically forbidden, as something to be avoided in the first footpath. And to this it should be said that, because the lawgiver gave the law to men, he should forbid in the first mandates of the law only human sins, whereas a sin against nature is not human, but bestial, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7. Ut si in hieme credimus decem modios, etc. Hoc est intelligendum, si plus valeant in messe quindecim modii secundum commune forum quam in hieme decem; alias si fiat commensuratio dati et accepti ad valorem pecuniae, non erit usura, sed aequalis commutatio. As if we give ten measures in winter, and take fifteen measures at harvest-time. This should be understood such that if it is valued at harvest-time, according to the common marketplace, at fifteen measures more than ten in the winter; otherwise, if what is given and what is received were commensurate with the value of the money, it would not be usury, but an equal exchange. Distinctio 38 Distinction 38 Lying Divisio textus Division of the text Distinctis quinque praeceptis secundae tabulae et expositis, hic Magister determinat de quibusdam quae praecepto quinto contrariantur, scilicet de mendacio, et perjurio. Dividitur autem haec pars in duas: Having considered and explained the five precepts of the second tablet, here the Master considers certain things opposed to the fifth precept, namely, lying and perjury. Now, this part is divided into two: in prima determinat de mendacio; in the first, he considers lying; in secunda de perjurio, 39 dist.: nunc de perjurio videamus. in the second, perjury, in Distinction 39, at now let us consider perjury. Prima in duas: The first part is divided into two: In prima distinguit diversos modos mendacii; first, he distinguishes the diverse modes of lying;