Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum dulia habeat diversas species Whether dulia has diverse species Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dulia non habeat diversas species. To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that dulia does not have diverse species. Dulia enim dividitur contra latriam. Sed latria non dividitur per species. Ergo nec dulia. Obj. 1: For dulia is not divided from latria. But latria is not divided by species. Therefore neither is latria. Praeterea. Dulia attendit bonitatem vel excellentiam creatam. Sed hoc invenitur communiter in omnibus quibus debetur dulia. Ergo non habet diversas species. Obj. 2: Furthermore, dulia attends to created goodness and excellence. But this is found commonly in all the things to which dulia is owed. Therefore it does not have diverse species. Praeterea. Sicut dulia respicit debitum honoris; ita etiam obedientia debitum praecepti. Sed obedientia non differt specie secundum diversos quibus debetur. Ergo nec dulia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as dulia has to do with a debt of honor, so does obedience has to do with a debt of command. But obedience does not differ in species in virtue of the diverse ones to whom it is owed. Therefore neither does dulia. Praeterea. Cum dulia debeatur diversis secundum infinitos gradus excellentiae, si secundum diversos quibus debetur, diversas species haberet, essent infinitae species duliae. Sed hoc est impossibile. Ergo dulia non habet plures species. Obj. 4: Furthermore, since dulia is owed to diverse ones according to the infinity of grades of excellence, if it has diverse species according to the diverse ones to whom it is owed, there would an infinity of species of dulia. But this is impossible. Therefore dulia does not have many species. Sed contra. Dulia debetur Deo et creaturae, ut ex dictis patet. Sed non est eadem ratio honoris in utroque. Ergo est ibi diversa species duliae. On the contrary, dulia is owed to God and the created thing, as is clear from things said. But there is not the same notion of honor in both. Therefore there are diverse species of dulia. Praeterea. Dulia exhibetur rebus inanimatis, sicut cruci et reliquiis et etiam hominibus. Sed in his non potest esse una ratio honoris. Ergo dulia habet diversas species. Furthermore, dulia is shown to inanimate things, such as the cross, relics, and also men. But there cannot be one notion of honor in them. Therefore dulia has diverse species. Responsio. Dicendum quod habitus diversificantur per actus et actus per objecta. Unde ubi invenitur diversa ratio objecti, oportet quod sint actus et etiam habitus specie differentes. Cum ergo honor debeatur alicui ratione excellentiae quam habet, et non sit ejusdem rationis excellentia in diversis; ideo oportet quod sit alia ratio honoris, et alia virtus secundum speciem quae diversos honores exhibet. Non enim idem honor debetur patri et regi et magistro, et sic de aliis, ut dicit Philosophus in 9 Eth. Inter omnes autem alias rationes excellentiae illa est praecipua qua creatura honoratur ratione unionis ad Creatorem, sicut humanitas Christi et quae ad ipsam pertinent. Et ideo speciali nomine "hyperdulia" nominatur, quasi super duliam ad latriam accedens. I answer that habits are divided through their acts, and acts through their objects. Whence, where one finds a diverse notion of the object, there must be acts and habits differing in species. Therefore, since honor is owed someone by some reason of excellence that he has, and the excellence is not of the same notion in diverse things, therefore it must be that there is a different notion of honor for them, and specifically different virtues that show diverse honors. For it is not the same honor that is owed to a father, to a king, and to a teacher, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9. However, among all the other notions of excellence, that by which a created thing is honored by reason of its union to its Creator is the chief one, as is Christ’s humanity and the things that pertain to it. And therefore it is named with the special name “hyperdulia,” as though it were above dulia and approaching latria. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod excellentia Creatoris est unius rationis; et ideo latria quae hoc attendit est una tantum. Nec est simile de dulia, cum in creaturis sint diversae rationes excellentiae. Reply Obj. 1: The excellence of the Creator is of one notion, and therefore there is only one latria, which attends to this excellence. Nor is it the same for dulia, since in created things there are diverse notions of excellence. Ad secundum dicendum quod excellentia creata non est unius rationis in specie, licet sit una secundum genus. Ideo et dulia per species dividitur. Reply Obj. 2: Created excellence is not of specifically one notion, although it is one in genus. And therefore also dulia is divided into species. Ad tertium dicendum quod obedientia respicit dominum, secundum hoc quod servus est quasi instrumentum domini et movetur ad imperium ejus. Sed dulia non considerat unam rationem excellentiae tantum, sed omnes. Reply Obj. 3: Obedience has to do with lordship, insofar as the servant is, as it were, an instrument of the lord, and is moved at his command. But dulia does not consider only one notion of excellence, but all. Ad quartum dicendum quod gradus excellentiae possunt accipi dupliciter: vel secundum quantitatem tantum, et sic sunt infiniti et non diversificant speciem duliae; vel secundum rationem, et sic diversificant et non sunt infiniti. Reply Obj. 4: The grades of excellence can be taken in two ways: either with respect to quantity only—and thus they are infinite and do not cause diverse species of dulia—or with respect to notion—and thus they do make diverse species, and are not infinite. Articulus 3 Articule 3 Utrum peccatores debeant honorari dulia Whether sinners should be honored with dulia Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatores non debeant honorari dulia. To the third we proceed thus. It appears that sinners should not be honored with dulia. Honor enim duliae ut dicit Philosophus in 1 Eth. est reverentia exhibita alicui in testimonium virtutis. Sed peccatores, etiam praelati, non habent virtutem. Ergo qui eos honorant, falsum testimonium perhibent: quod est peccatum. Obj. 1: For the honor of dulia, as the Philosopher says, is the reverence shown to someone in testimony of his virtue. But sinners, even prelates, do not have virtue. Therefore those who honor them offer a false testimony, which is a sin. Praeterea. Gregorius in Pastorali dicit quod in exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, dum pro reverentia ordinis peccator honoratur. Hoc autem fieri non debet ut in exemplum culpa trahatur. Ergo nec praelatus peccator debet honorari. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: the example of a fault is powerfully enlarged when a sinner is honored for the reverence of the order. However, it should not happen that a fault be presented as an example. Therefore neither should a prelate who is a sinner be honored. Praeterea. Subditus bonus magis est Deo similis quam praelatus malus. Sed honor non exhibetur homini, nisi inquantum habet Dei similitudinem; quia rebus divinis debetur, ut dicitur in 1 Eth. Ergo minus honorandus est praelatus malus quam subditus bonus. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a good subject is more like God than is an evil prelate. But honor is shown a man only insofar as he has a likeness with God, since honor is owed only to divine things, as the Philosopher says. Therefore an evil prelate should be honored less than a good subject. Sed contra est quod Abraham honoravit peccatores habitantes in Sichem, quando voluit emere speluncam duplicem. On the contrary (4), Abraham honored the sinners inhabiting Shechem, when he wanted to buy the double cave (Gen 23:17). Item. Videtur quod daemonibus dulia debeat exhiberi. Quia in eis manet divina imago, quia bona naturalia eis data manent lucidissima, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed ratione imaginis, homini dulia exhibetur. Ergo et daemoni est exhibenda. Furthermore (5), it appears that dulia should be shown to the demons. For the divine image remains in them, since the natural goods given to them remain most luminous, as Dionysius says. But dulia is shown to a man by reason of the image. Therefore it should be shown even to demons. Item. Videtur quod irrationabilibus. Quia in eis est vestigium, quod est similitudo Dei sicut imago, etsi non adeo expressa. Magis autem et minus non diversificant speciem. Ergo debetur eis dulia. Furthermore (6), it appears that it is shown to irrational things. For in them there is a vestige that is God’s likeness, like an image, although it is not as expressive. However, degrees of more and less do not distinguish species. Therefore dulia is owed to them. Sed contra. Videtur quod nec etiam hominibus bonis. Quia dulia servitus est. Sed non omnibus bonis hominibus servitutem debemus. Ergo nec duliam. On the contrary (7), it appears that it should not even be shown to all good men. For dulia is servitude, but we do not owe servitude to all good men. Therefore neither do we owe dulia. Responsio. Dicendum quod dulia reverentiam et honorem importat quae creaturae exhiberi potest. Cum autem honor, ut dicit Philosophus, 1 Eth., non debeatur nisi rebus divinis, non debetur proprie et directe nisi habenti gratiam et virtutem quae divinos facit. Sed habet aliquis virtutem multipliciter. Vel sicut actu virtuosus. Et huic directe debetur et proprie et secundum se honor. Vel sicut habens aptitudinem naturalem ad virtutem. Et sic cuilibet habenti imaginem est exhibendus honor, nisi sit confirmatus in malo, quia ligatus est in illo ordo ad virtutem. Vel sicut ordinatus ad inducendum vel conservandum virtutem. Et sic debetur omnibus praelatis, qui ad hoc ordinati sunt ut alios dirigant in virtutem. I answer that dulia indicates the reverence and honor that can be shown to a created thing. However, since honor, as the Philosopher says, is owed only to things divine, it is owed properly and directly only to one has the grace and virtue that does divine things. But someone has virtue in many ways: either as actually virtuous, and honor is owed to this one directly and properly and according to himself; or as having a natural aptitude to virtue, and in this way honor should be shown to anyone possessing the image—unless he be confirmed in evil, since in such a one the order to virtue is in bondage; or as ordered toward one who leads to and preserves virtue, and in this way it is owed to all prelates, who are ordained for the sake of directing others to virtue. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatores quamvis non habeant virtutem in actu, tamen habent in habilitate. Et praelati habent etiam in hoc quod sunt ordinati ad ipsam causandam vel conservandam. Reply Obj. 1: Sinners, although they do not have virtue in act, still have it in ability. And prelates have it even insofar as they are ordered toward causing it or preserving it. Ad secundum dicendum quod praelato, dum est in actu peccati, non debet exhiberi dulia, quia apparet in eo aliquid contrarium honori. Sed ante vel post potest sibi exhiberi, quia nescitur in quo statu sit. Reply Obj. 2: Dulia should not be shown to a prelate when he is in the act of the sin, since something contrary to the honor is apparent in him. But dulia should be shown to him before and after, since one does not know what state he is in. Ad tertium dicendum quod subdito bono secundum se debetur major reverentia; sed ratione praelationis debetur major malo praelato. Et est triplex ratio.—Primo, quia praelatus gerit vicem Dei, unde Deus in ipso honoratur.—Secundo, quia ipse est persona publica, et honoratur in ipso bonitas Ecclesiae vel reipublicae, quae est major quam merita unius singularis personae.—Tertio, quia praelatio se habet ad virtutem sicut causa faciens in aliis virtutem. Et dignius est alterius virtutis causam existere, inquantum hujusmodi, quam virtuosum esse, ut dicit Philosophus, 9 Eth. Reply Obj. 3: In virtue of itself a greater reverence is owed to a good subject, but a greater one is owed to an evil prelate in the notion of being placed above others. This is for three reasons: first, because a prelate bears the position of God, so God is being honored in him; second, because he is a public person, and the goodness of the Church or republic is being honored in him, which is greater than the merit of an individual person; third, because being placed above others stands to virtue as an efficient cause of virtue in others, and it is a greater dignity to be the cause of another’s virtue than to be virtuous, as the Philosopher says. Quartum concedimus. Reply Sed Contra 4: We grant the fourth argument. Ad quintum dicendum quod in daemonibus est ligata aptitudo naturalis ad virtutem; et ideo non debet eis dulia exhiberi. Reply Sed Contra 5: In the demons the natural aptitude to virtue is tied off, and therefore dulia should not be shown to them. Ad sextum dicendum quod similitudo vestigii non ponit aptitudinem ad virtutem, sicut similitudo imaginis; et ideo dulia non debetur ei. Reply Sed Contra 6: A likeness of vestige does not indicate an aptitude for virtue, the way the likeness of an image does, so dulia is not owed to it. Ad septimum dicendum quod sanctis non servimus quasi obnoxii eis, sed servitute reverentiae; quia sunt nostri ductores vel per doctrinam vel per administrationem vel per intercessionem et exemplum. Et salvatur in hoc ratio servitutis quantum ad hoc quod est causa alterius agere, sicut finis; non autem sicut moventis per coactionem vel imperium. Reply Sed Contra 7: We do not serve the saints as obligated to them, but with a servitude of reverence, since they are our leaders, either by teaching, or by leadership, or by intercession and example. And the notion of servitude is preserved in this, insofar as one acts for the sake of another as one’s end, but not as one acts on account of another who moves us by coercion or command. Expositio textus Exposition of the text In dilectione, sacrificii exhibitione et reverentia. "Dilectio" refertur ad honorem interiorem Deo exhibitum; "sacrificia" ad bona exteriora quae in ejus honorem assumuntur; "reverentia," secundum quod corpus nostrum ei in obsequium damus, sicut in prostrationibus et hujusmodi. In love, the offer of sacrifice, and reverence. The “love” refers to the interior honor shown to God, “sacrifice” to the exterior goods that are taken up unto the honor of him; and “reverence” insofar as we give our body to him in submission, as in prostrations and things of this sort. Una adoratione cum incontaminata carne ejus. etc. Ergo videtur quod Filius sit magis adorandus quam Pater vel ipsemet ante Incarnationem. Et dicendum quod humanitas ejus non adoratur latria nisi propter divinitatem: ideo non facit ipsum magis adorabilem, sed plura in ipso adorari; quia hoc quod additur, ut supra dictum est, non additur ad bonitatem divinam. In one adoration with his untainted flesh. Therefore it appears that the Son should be adored more than the Father or than even himself before the Incarnation. It should be said that his humanity is adored with latria only on account of the divinity, and therefore it does not make him more adorable, but rather there are more things in him to be adored. For what is added, as was said above, does not add to the divine goodness. Nemo carnem ejus manducat, nisi prius adoret. Loquitur de manducatione spirituali, quae sine reverentia esse non potest; non autem de sacramentali, quia potest aliquis irreverenter manducare. Vel dicendum quod loquitur quantum ad id quod debet fieri secundum institutionem Ecclesiae, quae prius proponit carnem Christi adorandam quam tribuat manducandam; et non secundum quod abusive potest fieri. No one eats of his flesh without first adoring it. This is speaking of spiritual eating, which cannot be done without reverence, not of sacramental, since someone can eat it irreverently. Or it should be said that he is speaking with respect to what ought to occur according to the institution of the Church, which proposes Christ’s flesh for adoration before it offers it for eating, and not insofar as this can be done in an abusive way.