Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis non sit facta melioratio per sacramenta veteris legis quantum ad alium effectum in genere, scilicet causare; facta est tamen quantum ad eumdem effectum qui est significare, inquantum expressius et pluribus modis futura gratiae significabantur sacramenta. Reply Obj. 2: Although the Old Law did not improve anything by having a new kind of effect, namely, by being a cause, nonetheless it did make an improvement with regard to the same effect, which is to signify, inasmuch as it signified the future sacraments of grace more expressly and in more ways. Quaestiuncula 5 Response to Quaestiuncula 5 Ad quintam quaestionem dicendum, quod eadem fides est modernorum et antiquorum, ut Augustinus dicit, quia quem illi credebant venturum, nos credimus jam venisse; et ideo cum sacramenta fidei correspondeant, sicut protestationes ipsius, et ab ea virtutem habentia, oportet quod sicut antiqui patres redemptionis Christi participes effecti sunt per sacramenta quae erant signa futuri ita et in nos redemptio ejus perveniat mediantibus aliquibus sacramentis significantibus quod jam factum est, quae sunt sacramenta novae legis. To the fifth question, it should be said that the faith of modern men and of the ancients is the same, as Augustine says, because the one whom the ancients believed was coming, we believe now to have come. And thus, since sacraments correspond to faith, as protestations of it and having power from it, it is fitting that just as the ancient patriarchs were made partakers of the redemption of Christ by sacraments which were signs of the future, so also among us his redemption is accomplished by the mediation of certain sacraments that signify what has already happened, which are the sacraments of the New Law. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Dionysius in Eccles. Hier., status novae legis medius est inter statum veteris legis et statum caelestis patriae; et ideo etiam ea quae sunt novae legis, et sunt veritas respectu signorum veteris legis, et sunt figurae respectu manifestae et plenae cognitionis veritatis, quae erit in patria; et ideo adhuc oportet in nova lege quod maneant aliquae figurae, quae scilicet in patria, ubi erit plenaria perceptio veritatis, omnes cessabunt. Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the state of the New Law is a middle one between the state of the Old Law and the state of the heavenly fatherland; and therefore also those things that are of the New Law are both the truth in relation to the significations of the Old Law and figures in relation to the manifest and full understanding of truth that will be in heaven; and thus for now it is necessary that certain figures remain in the New Law, but in heaven, where there will be an absolute perception of truth, all figures will cease. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sacramenta legalia gratiam non continebant; et ideo apostolus ibidem nominat ea egena et vacua; et propter hoc qui eis subdebantur, erant sub elementis pure corporalibus. Sed non est simile de sacramentis quae gratiam invisibilem continent. Reply Obj. 2: The sacraments of the Law did not contain grace; and thus the Apostle in the same place calls them impoverished and empty; and because of this, all those who were subjected to them were under purely corporeal elements. But it is not the same with sacraments that contain invisible grace. Articulus 3 Article 3 Ex quibus consistat sacramentum What a sacrament consists of Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramenta non consistant in verbis et rebus. Sacramentum enim est aliquid unum. Sed ex duobus quae non sunt conjuncta, non potest aliquid unum fieri, nec unum potest esse forma alterius. Cum ergo verba et res sint omnino separata, videtur quod ex eis non possit constare sacramentum, ut habeat pro forma verba, et res pro materia. Obj. 1: To the third we proceed thus. It seems that sacraments do not consist of words and things. For a sacrament is one thing. But one thing cannot be made from two things that are not united, nor can one be the form of the other. Since, then, the words and things are entirely separate, it seems that a sacrament could not be composed from them, such that it would have words for its form and things for its matter. Praeterea, sicut in sacramentis requiruntur verba, ita et facta quaedam, ut dicit Hugo de sancto Victore. Sed facta non ponuntur de integritate sacramenti. Ergo nec verba. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as words are required in the sacraments, so also are certain actions, as Hugh of St. Victor says. But actions are not set down as necessary for the integrity of the sacrament. Therefore, neither should words. Praeterea, sacramenta sunt ad significandum et causandum. Sed utrumque horum potest fieri per res sine verbis. Ergo sacramenta non consistunt in his duobus. Obj. 3: Furthermore, sacraments are for signifying and causing. But both of these can be done by things without words. Therefore, sacraments do not consist of these two things. Praeterea, sacramenta veteris legis erant signa nostrorum sacramentorum. Sed in illis non erant aliqua verba determinata. Ergo nec in nostris esse debent. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the sacraments of the Old Law were signs of our sacraments. But in them there were no certain determined words. Therefore, there should not be in ours. Praeterea, poenitentia et matrimonium sunt quaedam sacramenta. Sed de integritate eorum non sunt verba aliqua. Ergo hoc quod Magister dicit, non est verum de omnibus sacramentis. Obj. 5: Furthermore, penance and marriage are sacraments. But there are no particular words required for their integrity. Therefore, what the Master says is not true of all the sacraments. Sed contra, sacramenta ex similitudine repraesentant ea quae circa Christum sunt gesta. Ergo cum in Christo fuerit verbum rei sensibili adjunctum, oportet quod hoc etiam sit in sacramentis. On the contrary (1), sacraments represent by a likeness the things that were done concerning Christ. Therefore, since in Christ the Word was joined to a sensible thing, it is fitting that this also be the case in the sacraments. Praeterea, medicina debet proportionari morbo. Sed morbus peccati hominem quantum ad animam et corpus infecerat. Ergo oportet in sacramentis esse verba quae respondeant animae, et res quae respondeant corpori. Furthermore (2), medicine must be proportioned to the disease. But the disease of sin infected man in his soul and body. Therefore, it is fitting that there be words in the sacraments that correspond to the soul, and things that correspond to the body. Praeterea, secundum Hugonem, sacramenta ex sanctificatione invisibilem gratiam continent. Sed creatura sanctificatur per verbum Dei; 2 Tim., 3. Ergo oportet in sacramentis non solum res sed etiam verba esse. Furthermore (3), according to Hugh of St. Victor, sacraments contain invisible grace by their sanctification. But creation is sanctified by the Word of God. Therefore, it is necessary that in the sacraments there be not only things but also words. Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc est commune in omnibus sacramentis quod consistant in rebus sensibilibus invisibilem gratiam significantibus. Sed hoc est speciale in sacramentis novae legis quod rebus verba addantur, propter tres rationes. Prima est, quia haec sacramenta non solum significant opus redemptionis quae per Christum est facta, sicut alia sacramenta, sed etiam ab ipsa Christi passione fluxerunt; et ideo sicut effectus proximi, habent suae causae imaginem quantum possunt, ut scilicet ex rebus et verbis consistant, sicut Christus ex Verbo et carne. Secunda ratio est, quia non solum sunt signa futurorum, sicut sacramenta veteris legis, sed praesentium et praeteritorum, ut prius dictum est, quae possunt expressius significari quam futura, sicut et certius cognosci; et ideo, significatio verborum, quae est expressissima, adjungitur significationi rerum. Tertia ratio est, quia gratiam continent ex sanctificatione quae fit per Verbum Dei, ut dictum est. I answer that, it is common to all sacraments that they consist in sensible things signifying invisible grace. But this is particular to the sacraments of the New Law, that they have words added to the things, for three reasons. The first is because these sacraments not only signify the work of redemption that was done by Christ, as the other sacraments do, but they also flowed from the Passion of Christ itself. And therefore, as the closest effects, they have the image of their cause as much as possible, so that namely they consist of words and things, as Christ consists of the Word and flesh. The second reason is that they are signs not only of future things, like the sacraments of the Old Law, but of present and past things, as was said before, which can be more explicitly signified than future things, just as they can be known with more certainty. And therefore, the signification of words, which is most explicit, is added to the signification of things. The third reason is that they contain grace by the sanctification that happens through the Word of God, as was said. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sacramentum est aliquid unum in genere signi vel causae, quorum utrumque relationem importat. Non est autem inconveniens ut quae sunt in se distincta uniantur in relatione ad aliquid unum, sicut accidit de multis trahentibus navim qui sunt una causa tractus navis. Et sicut pater et mater sunt unum in generatione; sic etiam verba et res sunt unum in causando et significando, et per consequens efficiunt unum sacramentum. Et quia virtus causandi est in rebus ex verbis significantibus, ut dictum est, ideo verba sunt formalia, et res materiales, per modum quo omne completivum forma dicitur. Reply Obj. 1: A sacrament is something one in the genus of sign or cause, both of which imply relation. For it is not unfitting that things that are distinct in themselves be united in relation to something else, as happens when many men rowing a ship are one cause of the ship’s being rowed. And just as a father and mother are one in generation, so also words and things are one in causing and signifying, and as a result they bring about one sacrament. And because the power of causing is in the things by the words signifying, as was said, therefore words are the formal component and things are the material component, in the way that everything completive is called a form. Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Hugo de sancto Victore dicit, ad sacramenta concurrunt verba et res et facta: sed facta pertinent ad usum vel dispensationem sacramentorum; verba autem et res sunt de essentia sacramenti. Et ideo Magister in his duobus dicit constare sacramenta, et non in factis. Vel dicendum, quod facta ad res reducuntur. Reply Obj. 2: As Hugh of St. Victor says, for sacraments words and things and actions must converge; but actions pertain to the use or administering of the sacraments, while words and things are of the essence of the sacrament. And thus the Master says that sacraments consist in these two things, and not in actions. Or it could be said that actions fall under the heading of things. Ad tertium dicendum, quod nec efficacia causandi nec expressio significandi poterat esse in rebus, nisi verba adjungerentur, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Things can have neither effectiveness in causing nor explicitness in signifying unless words are added to them, as has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod non est similis ratio de sacramentis veteris et novae legis, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 4: The nature of the sacraments of the Old Law and of the New Law is not the same, as is clear from what has been said. Ad quintum dicendum, quod matrimonium secundum quod est in officium, et poenitentia secundum quod est virtus, non habent aliquam formam verborum; sed secundum quod utrumque est sacramentum in dispensatione ministrorum ecclesiae consistens, utrumque habet aliqua verba; sicut in matrimonio sunt verba exprimentia consensum, et iterum benedictiones ab ecclesia institutae; in poenitentia autem est absolutio sacerdotis verbotenus facta. Reply Obj. 5: Marriage as an office and penance as a virtue do not have any form of words, but according as each is a sacrament to be administered by the ministry of the Church, they both have particular words; as in marriage there are words expressing consent, as well as blessings instituted by the Church, while in penance there is the absolution given verbally by the priest. Articulus 4 Article 4 De efficacia sacramentorum Novae Legis On the efficacy of the sacraments of the New Law Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacramenta Novae Legis non sint causa gratiae. Dicit enim Bernardus: sicut investitur canonicus per librum, abbas per baculum, episcopus per anulum; sic divisiones gratiarum diversis sunt tradita sacramentis. Sed liber non est causa canonicatus, nec anulus episcopatus. Ergo nec sacramenta gratiae. Obj. 1: To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that sacraments of the New Law are not a cause of grace. For Bernard says: Just as the canon is invested with a book, an abbot with a crozier, a bishop by a ring, so also divisions of different graces are handed on in the sacraments. But a book is not a cause of someone becoming a canon, nor is a ring the cause of someone becoming bishop. Therefore, neither are the sacraments causes of grace. Praeterea, si sunt causae gratiae, oportet quod sint secundum aliquod genus causae. Sed constat quod non sunt materiales nec formales, cum sint extra essentiam gratiae; nec iterum sunt causae finales, quia magis sacramenta propter gratiam habendam quaeruntur quam e converso: nec iterum causae efficientes, quia solus Deus efficit gratiam, adeo quod nec angelis, qui sunt nobiliores sensibilibus creaturis, hoc communicatur. Ergo nullo modo sacramenta sunt causa gratiae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, if they are causes of grace, they must belong to some genus of causes. But it is clear that they are neither material causes nor formal causes, since they are outside the essence of grace. Nor are they the final cause of grace, for sacraments are sought for the sake of having grace, rather than vice versa. Nor are they efficient causes of grace, for only God causes grace, as evident from the fact that this causality is not even shared with the angels, who are more noble than sensible creatures. Therefore, in no way are sacraments the cause of grace. Praeterea, nobilius est agens patiente, secundum Augustinum in 12 super Gen.; et secundum Philosophum, in 3 de Anima; et iterum causa dignior est effectu. Sed tam anima rationalis quam gratia praevalent sensibilibus elementis. Ergo sacramentum, quod est materiale elementum, ut prius dictum est, non potest agere in animam ad causandum gratiam in ipsa. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the one acting is nobler than the one acted upon, according to Augustine in Book 12 of the Commentary on Genesis, and according to the Philosopher in Book 3 of On the Soul, and a cause is more worthy than an effect. But both the rational soul and grace itself have greater worth than sensible elements. Therefore, a sacrament, which is a material element, as was previously said, cannot act in the soul to cause grace in it. Praeterea, omnis causa vel est univoca vel aequivoca. In causa autem aequivoca est aliquid nobiliori modo quam in causatis, sicut calor in sole quam in aere; in causa autem univoca est aliquid eodem modo. Sed gratia non est in sacramentis neque eodem modo ut in anima, neque nobiliori modo. Ergo non sunt causa gratiae nec univoce nec aequivoce; et ita nullo modo. Obj. 4: Furthermore, every cause is either univocal or equivocal. Now in an equivocal cause something exists in a nobler way than in the things caused, as heat exists in the sun in a nobler way than in the air; in a univocal cause, something exists in the same way as in the thing caused. But grace is not in the sacraments in the same way as it is in the soul, nor is it in them in a nobler way. Therefore, they are neither univocal causes of grace nor equivocal ones, and thus they they are not causes of grace in any way. Praeterea, sacramenta non causant gratiam in anima per modum influentiae, quia sic crearent ipsam, nec iterum educunt eam de potentia materiae, quia gratia non est in potentia naturali materiae. Ergo nullo modo gratiam causant. Obj. 5: Furthermore, sacraments do not cause grace in the soul by pouring it in, for in that way they would create it; nor do they draw it forth from the potency of matter, for grace is not in the natural potency of matter. Therefore, in no way do they cause grace. Praeterea, in sacramento altaris transubstantiatur panis in corpus Christi; quod non potest fieri nisi virtute infinita, qualis non est virtus formae illius sacramenti. Ergo virtus illa non causat dictam transubstantiationem, et eadem ratione nec alia sacramenta causant quod significant. Obj. 6: Furthermore, in the sacrament of the altar, bread is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, which could only happen by an infinite power, such a power as this sacrament’s form does not have. Therefore, that power does not cause the transubstantiation, and by the same reasoning neither do other sacraments cause what they signify. Sed contra, haec differentia assignatur communiter inter sacramenta novae legis et veteris, quod sacramenta novae legis efficiunt quod figurant, quod sacramentis veteris legis non competit. Figurant autem sacramenta invisibilem gratiam. Si ergo sacramenta novae legis gratiam non causant, non differunt in aliquo a sacramentis veteris legis. On the contrary (1), this difference is commonly drawn between the sacraments of the New Law and of the Old Law, that the sacraments of the New Law effect what they represent, which the sacraments of the Old Law are not capable of doing. But sacraments represent invisible grace. If, therefore, sacraments of the New Law do not cause grace, then they are no different from the sacraments of the Old Law. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod aqua baptismi corpus tangit, et cor abluit. Sed cor non abluitur nisi per gratiam. Ergo sacramenta novae legis gratiam causant. Furthermore (2), Augustine says that the water of baptism touches the body and cleanses the heart. But the heart is only cleansed by grace. Therefore, sacraments of the New Law cause grace. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod in sacramentis non sit aliqua virtus specialis ad gratiam inducendam. Quod enim non est in aliquo genere entium, non est ens. Sed hujusmodi virtus non potest reduci ad aliquod decem generum: quia non est forma substantialis, ut per se patet: neque in aliquod aliorum generum praeter qualitatem, nec etiam in qualitatem, ut patet discurrenti per quattuor species qualitatis. Ergo non est ens. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the sacraments there is no spiritual power for instilling grace. For anything that is not in a certain genus of being is not a being. But this power cannot be reduced to any of the ten categories of being: for it is not a substantial form, as is self-evident; nor is it in any of the categories outside of quality, nor is it in quality, as is clear to anyone considering the four species of quality. Therefore, it is not a being. Praeterea, constat quod sacramenta non habent a seipsis hujusmodi virtutem. Si ergo est in eis, oportet quod a Deo habeant eam: nec est assignare, ut videtur, quando eis data sit. Non enim in ista institutione sacramentorum dari eis potuit: quia res istae et haec verba tunc non erant, et non enti nihil datur: nec iterum quotidie eis dat hanc virtutem: quia creatio dicitur esse hoc tempore solum quantum ad animas rationales et quantum ad gratiam: nec alio modo potest eis dari, nisi in eis creetur: nec iterum est probabile quod tam nobilis virtus creetur in verbis, quae statim esse desinunt; et res etiam in brevi corrumpuntur. Ergo nullo modo hujusmodi virtus est in sacramentis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is apparent that sacraments do not have this power from themselves. Therefore, if it exists in them, they must have it from God; nor is it possible to specify, as it seems, when they were given it. For he could not have given it to them in the sacraments’ institution, for those things and these words did not exist at that time, and nothing is given to a non-being; nor again does he give this power to them daily, for creation is said to be occurring at this moment only with respect to rational souls and grace. Nor can it be given to them in another way, unless it were created in them. Nor again is it probable that such a noble power was created in words, which immediately stop existing; and things likewise are quickly corrupted. Therefore there is no way for a power like this to exist in the sacraments. Praeterea, dicta virtus non potest computari inter minima bona: quia sic ad gratiam inducendam, quae est de maximis bonis, efficaciam non haberet: nec iterum inter media, cujusmodi sunt animae potentiae, quibus homo bene et male utitur: eadem ratione nec iterum inter maxima, cum neque sit gratia, neque virtus mentis. Ergo non est aliquod bonum, et ita nihil est. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power mentioned cannot be counted among lesser goods, for then it would not have efficacy for instilling grace, which is among the greatest goods. Nor again among neutral things, like the powers of the soul, which man can use well or ill; and by the same reasoning, neither is it counted among the greatest goods, since it is neither grace nor a power of the mind. Therefore, it is not something good, and so it is nothing.