Expositio textus
Exposition of the Text
Post haec de poenitentia agendum est. Videtur quod de poenitentia ante confirmationem et Eucharistiam debuerit tractari; quia prius est recedere a malo, quod pertinet ad poenitentiam, quam perfici in bono, quod pertinet ad illa duo sacramenta. Et dicendum, quod confirmatio et Eucharistia sunt de prima intentione sanctificationis; sed poenitentia est de secunda intentione; quia si homo nunquam a gratia baptismali caderet, non indigeret poenitentia; indigeret tamen confirmatione, et Eucharistia.
After these matters we must treat of penance. It seems that penance should be considered before confirmation and the Eucharist; for withdrawing from evil, which pertains to penance, happens before being perfected in good, which pertains to those two sacraments. And it should be said that confirmation and the Eucharist are about the first intention of sanctification, but penance is about the second intention, for if a man never fell from baptismal grace, he would never need penance, though he would need confirmation and the Eucharist.
Est enim poenitentia interior, et est exterior. Secundum hoc etiam videtur quod baptismus sit virtus; quia etiam est baptismus interior, scilicet baptismus flaminis. Et dicendum, quod interior baptismus non dicitur baptismus nisi metaphorice; sed interior poenitentia dicitur poenitentia vere. Et praeterea interior actus non est de necessitate baptismi, alias pueri non possent baptizari; sed interior actus est de necessitate poenitentiae.
For there is an inner penance, and an outward one. According to this it also seems that baptism is a virtue, for there is also an inner baptism, namely, baptism of spirit. And it should be said that inner baptism is only called baptism metaphorically; but inner penance is truly called penance. And furthermore, the inner act is not necessary to baptism, otherwise children could not be baptized. But the inner act is necessary to penance.
Nihil prosunt lamenta, si replicantur peccata. Hoc intelligendum est de illis qui voluntate habituali replicant. Vel intelligendum, quod nihil prosint ad vitam consequendam: quia qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit; Matth. 24, 13. Baptismus tamen ratione characteris quem imprimit, aliquid valet, etiam si homo fictus accedat.
Lamentations are of no profit, if the sins are repeated. This is to be understood of those who repeat them with a habitual will. Or it could be understood as meaning that they will not be of any use for obtaining life: for the one who perseveres until the end, he shall be saved (Matt 24:13). Nevertheless, baptism, by reason of the character that it imprints, is worth something, even if a man receives it falsely.
Poenae graviori se subjicit. Hoc intelligendum est de illis qui exterius per poenitentiam hypocrisim praetendunt; quia simulata aequitas est duplex iniquitas, ut Augustinus dicit. Vel hoc dicitur, quia tollitur excusatio de ignorantia vel surreptione in eo quod peccatum advertit, de eo poenitens.
One who cries over sins . . . committed, but does not abandon them, subjects himself to a greater punishment. This is to be understood about those who outwardly put on a show through hypocritical penance; for, as Augustine says, a feigned justice is twofold iniquity. Or this is said because the excuse of ignorance or surprise is taken away in the one who directs his attention to his sins in repenting of them.
Vera poenitentia est cessare a peccato. Sciendum, quod cessare a peccato non dicit simplicem negationem peccati; quia qui intermittit actum peccati, non dicitur a peccato cessare; sed cessare a peccato proprie dicitur, cui peccatum displicet, et peccatum dimittere intendit; et haec est vera poenitentia.
This is true penance: to cease from sin. It should be known that ceasing from sin does not mean simply the negation of sin; for not just anyone who leaves off an act of sin is said to cease sinning. But to cease from sin is properly said about someone whom sin displeases, and who exerts himself to give up sinning; and this is true penitence.
Cum emendationis proposito. Sed contra, unius habitus unus est actus; hic autem ponuntur quatuor actus poenitentiae, scilicet propositum emendationis, plangere peccata praeterita, et odire, et iterum nolle ulterius committere. Et dicendum, quod ista quatuor se consequuntur in poenitentia, et ideo quasi pro uno actu computantur; quia sicut amor delectationem parit in consideratione amati, ita odium peccati tristitiam de ipso parit, et tristitia ad destructionem ipsius movet; et ideo inter quatuor praedicta primum est odire peccata; secundo ea plangere, tertio ea destruere, quantum ad praeterita cum proposito emendationis, et quantum ad futurum per hoc quod homo plangenda committere nolit, quod est quartum.
With purpose of amendment. But to the contrary, a single habit has a single act; but here four acts of repentance are listed, namely, the purpose of amendment, weeping over past sins, hating them, and willing not to do them again. And it should be said that these four happen one after another in penance, and therefore are considered almost as a single act; for just as love produces delight in the consideration of the beloved, so also the hatred of sin produces sadness about it, and the sadness moves one toward its destruction. And this is why among the four things listed, the first is to hate sins; the second is to weep over them; the third is to destroy them as regards past sins with the purpose of amendment; and as regards future sins by willing not to commit things to be wept over, which is fourth.
Semper puniens in se, habitu vel proposito, sed non semper actu; quia quandoque etiam motibus aliarum virtutum debet commoveri.
One may always punish in oneself, habitually or in intention, but not always actually, for sometimes he should be moved by the motions of the other virtues.
De poenitentia perfectorum, vel ad salutem sufficienti, intelligendum est quod supra dixit. Perfectos hic vocat qui in poenitentia sunt perfecti, eam usque ad finem vitae continuantes.
What he said above . . . are to be understood of the penance of the perfect, or of the penance sufficient for salvation. Here he calls ‘perfect’ those who are perfect in penance, continuing in it until the end of life.
Si nos aliqua culpa mortalis invenerit quae non in crimine mortali vel in morum vitio consistat, haec culpa semper reparari potest. Sciendum, quod culpa mortalis est quae gratiam tollit, per quam est vita animae; et sic omnis culpa mortalis est contra gratiam; sed quaedam est contra rationem, ut perjurium; quaedam etiam contra naturam, ut sodomia; quaedam autem est crimen, quae est digna accusatione in judicio; quaedam autem est blasphemia, quae est impositio alicujus falsi in Deum, vel ei subtrahendo quod inest, vel attribuendo quod non inest.
If some mortal fault should sometimes find us, which does not consist in a mortal crime or in blasphemy against the faith, but only in a vice of word or behavior, this fault may always be repaired. It should be known that a mortal fault is one that takes away grace, by which the soul’s life exists; and this is why every mortal fault is against grace; but some are against reason, like perjury; some are also against nature, like sodomy; some, however, are crimes that deserve accusation in court; while some are blasphemy, which is the imposition of something false on God, or taking away from him what exists in him, or attributing to him what is not in him.
Quod tamen in quibusdam Ecclesiis non servatur. Hoc intelligitur de poenitentia publica; sed solemnis, ut quidam dicunt, nunquam iteratur.
And yet this practice is not observed in some churches. This is understood as referring to public penance; but solemn penance, as some people say, is never repeated.
Nec minus tribuit quam ante tribuerat, largissima munera vitae et salutis, videlicet quantum in ipso est, dummodo aequaliter se homo ad gratiam habendam praeparet. Non tamen oportet quod semper in aequali caritate resurgat, ut in 3 Lib., dist. 31, qu. 1, art. 4, quaestiunc. 3, dictum est.
Nor does he grant them any less than he did before, his most generous gifts of life and salvation: namely, on his side, when a man equally prepares himself for possessing grace. Yet it is not necessary that someone always return to equal charity, as was said in Book III, Distinction 31, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 3.
Etiam si ad summum perveniat malorum. Hoc intelligendum est quantum ad actum, non quantum ad potentiam; quia aliquis est ita malus quod nullus alius est pejor, non autem ita quod nullus alius possit esse pejor.
Even if one should have reached the height of evils. This is to be understood as to actuality, not as to potency; for a person may be so wicked that no one else is worse, but no one is so wicked that no one else could be worse.
Et tamen graviter postea deliquit. Sed contra: Moyses etiam numeravit, nec tamen dicitur peccasse. Et dicendum, quod Moyses numeravit ex praecepto Domini, sed David ut in populo gloriaretur. Ideo autem eo peccante populus percussus est propter ostendendam habitudinem populi ad principem, sicut Augustinus dicit in Josue de Acham. Ostenditur enim in ipsa poena Acham quantum sit bonum in populo ipsa unitas, ut non in seipsis singula, sed in toto partes aestimentur.
And yet he afterward sinned gravely. But to the contrary: Moses also counted the people (Num 1:2), but he is not said to have sinned. And it should be said that Moses counted them at the Lord’s command, but David did it so that he might glory in his people. Moreover, this is why when he sinned the nation was struck, namely for the sake of showing the relation of a people toward its leader, as Augustine says concerning Achan in his commentary on Joshua. For it is shown the very punishment of Achan shows what great a good unity is in a people, that they should be esteemed not as individuals by themselves, but as parts in a whole.
Vel sicut Gregorius dicit, super illud Job 34: qui regnare facit hypocritam etc., pro qualitatibus subditorum disponuntur acta regentium, ut saepe propter demerita gregis, etiam vere boni delinquat vita pastoris; et David populum numerando peccavit, et tamen vindictam populus de peccato suscepit.
Or as Gregory says, commenting on Job: who makes a hypocrite reign? (Job 34:30), the acts of rulers are disposed for the qualities of their subjects, so that often because of the demerits of their flock, the good pastor’s life may also fall short; and David sinned by taking a census of his people, and nevertheless, the people suffered the vengeance for this sin.
Vel dicendum, quod quia de populi elatione peccavit, ideo in populi occisione punitus fuit, sicut aliquis dominus in amissione possessionis. Nec tamen populus injuste passus est, quia hoc meruerat, Absalon sequendo.
Or it could be said that because he sinned over glorying in his people, for this reason he was punished with the death of his people, like any master in the loss of his possessions. Nor, however, did the people suffer unjustly, because they deserved this for following Absalom.
Distinctio 15
Distinction 15
Integritas poenitentiae
Requirements for penance
Postquam determinavit Magister de poenitentia quantum ad sui veritatem, ostendens quid sit poenitentia secundum sui veram rationem, et removens errorem quorumdam qui ad rationem poenitentiae addere volebant futuram perseverantiam, hic intendit determinare de poenitentia quantum ad sui integritatem, quorumdam errorem removens, qui falso opinabantur posse de uno peccato poenitentiam agi, et non de alio: quod est contra integritatem poenitentiae. Et dividitur in partes duas: in prima ponit rationes quae sunt causa erroris; in secunda improbat ipsum errorem, ibi: satis arbitror illis esse responsum.
After the Master has considered penance according to its truth, showing what penance is according to its true account, and removing the error of certain people who wished to add future perseverance to the definition of penance, here he considers penance according to its integrity, removing the error of certain people who held the false opinion that it is possible to do penance for one sin and not for another, which is against the integrity of penance. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he gives the arguments that are the cause of the error; in the second, he disproves this error, at: I judge that a sufficient response has been made to those.
Prima in duas, secundum quod error praedictus duos habuit modos positionis: in prima enim parte reprobat rationes eorum qui dicebant, quod de uno peccato sine alio poterat poenitentia agi, et fructuose quantum ad praesens; in secunda illorum qui ponebant quod hoc non erat fructuosum quantum ad praesens, sed quantum ad futurum, quando de peccatis aliis poenitentiam aget, ibi: quibusdam tamen videtur fuisse satisfactio, sed infructuosa.
The first is in two parts, according as the error mentioned was posited in two ways; for in the first part he criticizes the arguments of those who said that penance may be done for one sin without the others, and be fruitful for the present time; in the second, he criticizes those who held that this was fruitful not for the present, but for the future, when one has done penance for the other sins, at: and yet it seems to some that it was satisfaction, but it is fruitless.
Prima in duas: in prima excludit probationem eorum, quae ex auctoritatibus canonis procedebat; in secunda probationes ex auctoritatibus sanctorum et ratione sumptas, ibi: alias quoque auctoritates inducunt.
The first is in two parts: in the first, he excludes the argument that proceeded from the authority of the canon; in the second, the arguments taken from the authority of the saints and from reason, at: they bring forward other authorities.
Circa primum tria facit: primo ponit objectionem; secundo solvit eam, ibi: sed de his oportet illud tantum intelligi qui praesentibus suppliciis commutantur in bonum; tertio excludit quamdam dubitationem ex praecedenti solutione ortam, ibi: attende lector his verbis.
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he raises the objection; second, he resolves it, at: but that text is only to be understood of those who are changed for the good by their present sufferings; third, he excludes a certain doubt arising from the previous resolution, at: attend, reader, to these words.
Alias quoque auctoritates inducunt. Circa hanc partem duo facit: primo ponit probationes illorum, quorum prima est ex auctoritate Gregorii; secunda ex auctoritate Ambrosii; tertia ex ratione sumpta, ut per se patet; secundo solvit eas; et primo ad auctoritatem Gregorii, ibi: hic responderi potest etc.; secundo ad auctoritatem Ambrosii, ibi: illud autem quod Ambrosius ait etc.; tertio ad rationem, ibi: ad hoc autem quod objicitur etc.
They also bring in other authorities. In this part he does two things: first, he lists the arguments of those people, the first of which is from Gregory’s authority, the second from Ambrose’s authority, and the third taken from reason, as as is clear from the argument itself. Second, he resolves them: first, the text from Gregory, at: to these people one may answer as follows, etc.; second, the text from Ambrose, at: as for what Ambrose says, etc.; third, the argument from reason, at: as to the objection, etc.
Quibusdam tamen videtur fuisse satisfactio, sed infructuosa. Hic destruit probationes alterius positionis; et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit eas; secundo solvit, ibi: sed haec dicta intelligimus de illo qui in caritate quodam tempore bona facit, et bonus est, alio vero tempore malus est.
And yet it seems to some that it was satisfaction, but it is fruitless. Here he destroys the arguments of the other position; and concerning this he does two things: first, he lists them; second, he resolves them, at: but we understand these statements as applying to one who in charity at some time does good things and is good, but at another time is wicked.
Et ponit duas solutiones, quarum secunda incipit ibi: potest etiam accipi de operibus bonis quae ab aliquo fiunt dum malus est.
And he gives two solutions, of which the second begins here: this may also be taken of the good works which are done by a man while he is wicked.
Et circa hoc duo facit; primo ostendit quod bona extra caritatem facta, etsi valeant ad tolerabilius judicium sustinendum, non tamen valent ad vitam consequendam; secundo ostendit idem de operibus in caritate factis, quae postea per peccatum mortificantur, ibi: illa etiam quae in caritate quis facit, si postea prolapsus fuerit, nec exsurrexerit, non esse in memoria Dei Ezechiel dicit.
And concerning this he does two things; first, he shows that good deeds done without charity, even if they are avail for a more tolerable judgment, nevertheless are not sufficient for obtaining eternal life. Second, he shows that it is the same with works done in charity that are afterward made dead by sin, at: Ezekiel says that even the good works which someone does in charity are not in God’s memory, if the doer falls afterwards and does not rise from his fall.
Satis arbitror illis esse responsum. Hic improbat ipsum errorem; et circa hoc duo facit: primo improbat errorem; secundo concludit veritatem, scilicet quae sit vera et sufficiens poenitentia, ibi: ex praemissis perspicua fit notitia verae poenitentiae.
I judge that a sufficient response has been made to those. Here he disproves this error; and concerning this he does two things: first, he disproves the error; second, he concludes to the truth, namely, what is true and sufficient penance, at: from the above, a very clear notion of true penance and satisfaction is presented.
Hic est quaerendum de satisfactione et de partibus ejus; unde quatuor hic quaeruntur. Primo de ipsa satisfactione. Secundo de eleemosyna. Tertio de jejunio. Quarto de oratione. His enim tribus homo satisfacit.
Here we must ask about satisfaction and its parts; and so four questions arise here. First, concerning satisfaction in itself. Second, about almsgiving. Third, about fasting. Fourth, about prayer. For a man makes satisfaction by these three things.
Quaestio 1
Question 1
Satisfactio
Satisfaction
Circa hoc quaeruntur quinque:
Concerning this, five questions arise:
primo, quid sit satisfactio;
first, what is satisfaction;
secundo, utrum possibile sit a nobis Deo satisfieri;
second, whether it is possible for us to make satisfaction to God;
tertio, qualiter homo satisfacere possit;
third, how a human being can make satisfaction;
quarto, per quae;
fourth, by what things;
quinto, utrum restitutio sit pars satisfactionis.
fifth, whether restitution is a part of satisfaction.