Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod ablatum non semper debeat restitui. Fama enim restitui non potest. Sed fama aufertur. Ergo non de omni ablato potest fieri restitutio. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that what has been taken need not always be restored. For good reputation cannot be restored. But reputation can be taken away. Therefore, restitution cannot be made of everything taken. Praeterea, damna in personam illata, sunt maxima. Sed hujusmodi damna non possunt restitui, ut ablatio virginitatis, abscissio membri alicujus. Ergo non omne ablatum potest restitui. Obj. 2: Furthermore, losses inflicted on one’s person are the greatest. But this kind of loss cannot be restored, like the loss of virginity, or cutting off one’s limbs. Therefore, not everything taken away can be restored. Praeterea, qui impedit aliquem a consecutione alicujus, videtur hoc sibi auferre. Sed hoc non debet ei restituere vel recompensare, sicut si quis impedit aliquem ne praebendam consequatur. Ergo videtur quod non omne ablatum debeat restitui. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever prevents someone from obtaining something seems to have taken it from him. But this need not be restored or compensated, as when someone prevents another from obtaining a prebend. Therefore, it seems that not everything taken away must be restored. Praeterea, qui occasionem damni dat, damnum dedisse videtur. Sed ille qui subvertit semina in campo projecta, dat occasionem damni de toto fructu qui inde sequi posset; et similiter de illo qui detinet pecuniam creditoris ultra terminum praefixum, ex qua ille poterat lucrari, de toto lucro quod accidere potuisset: nec tamen videtur quod teneatur ad restitutionem totius lucri quod accidere potuisset, vel fructus qui percipiendus foret. Ergo non oportet quod semper fiat ablatorum restitutio. Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever gives the occasion of loss seems to have given the loss. But someone who digs under the seed sown on the ground gives the occasion of loss concerning the whole crop that could have followed from it. And likewise whoever keeps the money of his lender past the fixed time, when the other could have been profiting from it, seems to have caused the loss of the whole profit that he could have had. Yet it does not seem that he is bound to the restoration of the whole profit that could have been had, or of the crop that could have been harvested. Therefore, it is not necessary that there always be a restoration of what has been taken. Sed contra, videtur quod homo debet plus restituere quam abstulerit. Quia praeceptum legis veteris est, ut patet in Exod. 22, quod ovis reddatur in quadruplum, et bos in quintuplum; et hoc praeceptum, cum sit de moribus, videtur esse morale. Ergo adhuc manet: ergo tenetur homo in quintuplum vel quadruplum restituere. On the contrary (5), it seems that a man must restore more than he has taken away. For the precept of the old law is, as is clear from Exodus 22:1, that four sheep are to be rendered for every one, and five cows; and this precept, since it is about moral acts, seems to be a moral one. Therefore, it is still in effect; therefore, a man is bound to fourfold or fivefold restitution. Praeterea, ea quae in Scriptura ponuntur, nobis in exemplum dantur. Sed Luc. 10 dicitur, quod Zachaeus se obtulit ad restitutionem in quadruplum eorum quae acceperat per fraudem. Ergo et talis debet esse apud nos restitutionis modus. Furthermore (6), the things that are written in Scripture are given to us for an example. But in Luke 19:8 it says that Zacchaeus offered to restore fourfold whatever he had received by fraud. Therefore, this should also be the mode of restitution for us. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod solus ille qui accipit, ad restitutionem teneatur. Quia non exigitur plus in restitutione quam illatum est in damno. Si ergo unus solus damnum intulit, ille solus ad restitutionem tenetur: alias multo plura reciperet damnificatus quam ea quae amisit, si a quolibet consentiente deberet sibi in solidum restitutio fieri. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that only someone who takes is bound to restitution. For no more is required in restitution than was inflicted in loss. Therefore, if only one person inflicted the loss, he alone is bound to restitution: otherwise the injured party would receive much more than what he lost, if restitution had to be made to him in cash by anyone who consented. Praeterea, nulli debetur restitutio nisi ei qui damnum passus est. Sed contingit quod aliquis praecipiat damnificari aliquem, vel consulat, aut consentiat; et tamen ille non damnificatur. Ergo tales non semper ad restitutionem tenentur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, restitution is made to no one but the one who suffered the loss. But it happens that someone might command, or counsel, or agree to another’s loss, and yet the other does not suffer loss. Therefore, such as these are not always bound to make restitution. Praeterea, nullus tenetur incurrere damnum personae pro evitando damno pecuniae alterius: quia caritas debet esse ordinata. Sed quandoque si aliquis raptorem manifestaret, incurreret personae suae periculum. Ergo non est verum quod teneatur ille qui non manifestat, ad restitutionem, ut quidam dicunt. Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one is bound to incur personal loss for the sake of averting another’s monetary loss: for charity should be ordered. But sometimes if someone has exposed a robber, he might incur danger to his person. Therefore, it is not true that someone who does not expose a robber is bound to restitution, as some people say. Praeterea, multi etiam boni viri non reprehendunt eos quos vident injuste accipere aliena; tamen durum esset dicere, quod tenerentur ad restitutionem omnium. Ergo etiam ille qui non reprehendit, non tenetur, ut a quibusdam dicitur, restituere. Similiter etiam potest objici de illis qui non obstant, et tamen obstare possunt. Obj. 4: Furthermore, even many good men do not stop those whom they see unjustly taking the belongings of another; nevertheless, it would be hard to say that they were bound to the restitution of everything. Therefore, even someone who does not stop thievery is not bound to restitution, as some people say. The same thing can also be objected about those who do not oppose it, but who could oppose it. Quaestiuncula 4 Quaestiuncula 4 Ulterius. Videtur quod non sit semper restitutio facienda ei qui damnum passus est. Nullus enim potest restituere ei quem non cognoscit. Sed quandoque fur nescit cujus sit res quam furto accepit. Ergo videtur quod non teneatur ei restituere. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that restitution does not always have to be made to the one who suffered the loss. For no one can make restitution to someone he does not know. But sometimes a thief does not know whose things he stole. Therefore, it seems he is not bound to make restitution to him. Praeterea, ille qui accepit, non tenetur nisi ad restitutionem. Sed aliquando ad eum cui debetur fieri restitutio, non posset pervenire sine magno damno; forte etiam cum majori quam sit pretium rei restituendae. Ergo videtur quod in tali casu non teneatur ei restituere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, someone who takes something is not bound to anything but restoring it. But sometimes he cannot reach the one to whom restitution must be made without great loss; perhaps even with the loss of more than the worth of the thing to be restored. Therefore, it seems that in such a case he is not bound to restore it. Praeterea, aliquis in depraedatione civitatum injusta accipit aliqua. Sed non potest ei cujus fuit, restituere: quia vel nescit eum, vel mortuus est. Ergo videtur quod non teneatur restituere. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a person may take something unjust in the pillaging of a state. But he cannot restore it to its owner since either he does not know who he is, or he is dead. Therefore, it seems that he is not bound to make restitution. Praeterea, aliquis praelatus Ecclesiae injuste aliquas res Ecclesiae concedit. Sed iste non tenetur reddere Ecclesiae, ut videtur, quia venirent ad manus illius praelati, qui non est dignus ea recipere. Ergo videtur quod non semper ei qui damnum passus est, sit restitutio facienda. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a certain prelate of the Church may unjustly grant some of the Church’s property. But that man is not bound to return it to the Church, as it seems, since they would come to the hands of that prelate, who is not worthy to receive them. Therefore, it seems that restitution is not always to be made to the one who suffered the loss. Sed contra est, quia per restitutionem integratur aequalitas justitiae. Sed aequalitas justitiae est ut quod aufertur a lucro, apponatur ad damnum, ut dicitur in 5 Ethic. Ergo videtur quod restitutio sit semper facienda ei qui damnum passus est. On the contrary, by restitution the equality of justice is made whole. But the equality of justice is that what is taken from the gain is applied to the loss, as is said in the Ethics 5. Therefore, it seems that restitution is always to be made to the one who has suffered the loss. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod inaequalitas justitiae opposita duobus modis contingit. Uno modo in rebus exterioribus, ut quando unus rem alienam detinet; alio modo in actionibus et passionibus, sicut cum quis alium per violentiam reverberat; et haec duo aliquando separata sunt, ut per se patet; aliquando autem conjunguntur, ut cum quis per violentiam accepit, in quo ei a quo accepit, injuriam et contumeliam infert; et secundum hoc reparatio aequalitatis justitiae dupliciter significatur. Reparatio enim inaequalitatis existentis in rebus, restitutio dicitur; reparatio autem inaequalitatis existentis in actionibus et passionibus, satisfactio nominatur; et ideo quandoque est satisfactio sine restitutione aliqua, ut cum quis se proximo humiliat de aliquibus contumeliis ei dictis; aliquando autem restitutio sine satisfactione, ut cum quis mutuum reddit; aliquando autem utrumque exigitur; ut cum quis alicui per violentiam rem suam subtraxit: et sic loquimur hic de restitutione rei male ablatae, in quo homo proximum et Deum offendit. To the first question, I answer that the inequality opposed to justice happens in two ways. In one way in external things, like when one person keeps the belongings of another; in another way in actions and sufferings, like when someone beats another in violence. And these two are sometimes separate, as is evident in itself; but sometimes they are united, as when someone takes something by violence, and inflicts injury and abuse on the one from whom he took it. And according to this repairing the equality of justice means two things. For repairing the inequality existing in things is called restitution; but repairing the inequality existing in actions and sufferings is named satisfaction. And this is why sometimes there is satisfaction without any restitution, as when someone humiliates his neighbor by saying certain insults to him; but sometimes there is restitution without satisfaction, as when someone returns what has been loaned. But sometimes both are required, as when a person takes away someone’s belongings by violence, and then we speak of the restitution of the thing wrongly taken, in which a man offended God and his neighbor. Quidam ergo dicunt, quod talis restitutio non est pars satisfactionis, quia non debetur Deo tantum; nec est ad arbitrium sacerdotis, sed est ad satisfactionem praeambulum. Sed hoc nihil est: quia omne peccatum quod in proximum committitur, etiam in Deum commissum est; sicut et in dilectione proximi dilectio Dei includitur; unde et satisfactio proximi conjunctam habet satisfactionem Dei. Nec obstat quod non est ad arbitrium sacerdotis: quia sacerdos non est ibi vicarius proximi, sicut est vicarius Dei; et ideo satisfactio quae est Deo facienda, dependet ex arbitrio ejus; sed satisfactio quae est proximo et Deo simul facienda, non. Therefore, some people say that this kind of restitution is not a part of satisfaction, because it is not due to God alone; nor is it for the priest’s judgment, but it is a preliminary to satisfaction. But this amounts nothing: for every sin that is committed against one’s neighbor is also committed against God; and just as love of God is included in the love of neighbor, so also making satisfaction to one’s neighbor has satisfaction to God joined to it. Nor is it any objection that this does not fall under the judgment of a priest, for a priest is not there in place of our neighbor, but in place of God, and so the satisfaction that must be made to God depends on his judgment, but not the satisfaction that is to be made to God and neighbor together. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod est satisfactionis pars. Sed hoc etiam verum non est: quia satisfactio offensam removet, et a poena liberat. Nullus autem ex hoc ipso quod offendere desistit, consequitur hoc quod de offensa praecedenti reconciliationem inveniat, vel poenam pro illa debitam evadat; sed hoc solum consequitur, quod majorem offensam et poenam non cumulat; et sic cessare ab offensa nulla pars satisfactionis est, sed est praeambulum ad satisfactionem. And so others say that it is a part of satisfaction. But this, too, is not true: for satisfaction removes an offense, and frees from punishment. But no one by the very fact that he stops offending thereby obtains reconciliation for a previous offense or escapes the punishment due to it. But he obtains this alone, that greater offense and punishment do not accumulate. And this is why stopping the offense is no part of satisfaction, but it is a preliminary to satisfaction. Et ideo, cum restitutio nihil aliud sit quam ab offensa cessare, quia ex hoc ipso quod rem alienam detinet eo invito, offendit; constat quod non est pars satisfactionis proprie acceptae, sed est praeambulum ad satisfactionem; non tamen propter rationem prius assignatam: quia bene concedimus quod satisfactio proximo facta, est pars satisfactionis Deo factae; sed restitutio non est pars satisfactionis neque Deo neque proximo factae. And so since restitution is nothing other than to stop the offense, since one offends by the fact that he keeps the belongings of another against his will, it is clear that it is not a part of satisfaction, properly taken, but a precondition for satisfaction. But it is not for the reason given before: because we do concede that satisfaction made to one’s neighbor is a part of the satisfaction made to God; but restitution is not a part of satisfaction whether it is made to God or one’s neighbor. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod de offensa homo proximo non reconciliatur per hoc quod sua ei restituit, sed per hoc quod supra hoc aliquid humilitatis ei exhibet; et ita non sequitur quod restitutio sit satisfactionis pars. Reply Obj. 1: Man is not reconciled for an offense against his neighbor by restoring his things to him, but by showing a certain humility to him beyond that; and so it does not follow that restitution is a part of satisfaction. Ad secundum dicendum, quod restitutio non est contrarium ad acceptionem vel detentionem injustam; sed magis est negatio vel privatio ipsius; et ideo non oportet quod hoc sufficiat ad satisfactionem, sicut nec est satisfactorium pro gula ut quis non immoderate comedat, sed ut etiam a moderatis abstineat. Reply Obj. 2: Restitution is not contrary to taking or keeping unjustly, but rather it is the negation or absence of it; and so it is not fitting that this suffice for satisfaction, as neither does it make satisfaction for gluttony that someone does not eat immoderately, but that he abstain even from moderate eating. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cessare a peccato dicitur esse pars poenitentiae, non quidem desistendo a peccato praeterito sicut praeambulum ad poenitentiam, sed praecidendo causas futurorum peccatorum, ut dictum est prius. Reply Obj. 3: Ceasing from sin is said to be a part of penance, not indeed by stopping past sins, except as the preliminary for penance, but by cutting off the causes of future sins, as was said before. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod per satisfactionem oportet quod homo sicut Deo, ita proximo reconcilietur. Reconciliatio autem nihil aliud est quam amicitiae reparatio. Manente autem causa dissolutionis amicitiae, amicitia reparari non potest; quae quidem causa fuit inaequalitas ex injusta acceptione vel detentione causata; et ideo ille satisfacere non potest, nec Deo reconciliari, qui rem male ablatam, vel detentam male, non restituit. Sed sciendum, quod amicitia, ut Philosophus dicit in 8 Ethica, non requirit semper aequale, sed quod possibile; et ideo si aliqua sunt ablata quae omnino restitui non possunt, sufficit voluntas restituendi cum tanta restitutione quanta possibilis est secundum conditionem utriusque ad arbitrium bonorum. To the second question, it should be said that for satisfaction a man must be reconciled to his neighbor, just as to God. Now reconciliation is nothing other than the repairing of friendship. But while the cause of friendship’s dissolution remains, friendship cannot be repaired; which cause indeed was the inequality caused by an unjust taking or keeping. And so the person who does not restore what was wrongly taken or kept cannot make satisfaction, nor be reconciled to God. But it should be known that, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, friendship does not always require the equal, but what is possible. And so if anything has been taken that cannot possibly be restored, the will of restoring it with as much restitution as is possible suffices according to the condition of both to the judgment of good men. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ille qui malitiam alicujus manifestat ei qui habet corrigere, vel etiam, si sit incorrigibilis, in conspectu Ecclesiae, ut confusus a peccato desistat, vel saltem alii ab ejus consortio corruptivo discedant, servato ordine caritatis fraternae, non injuste famam aufert; unde non tenetur ad famae restitutionem. Si autem intentione diffamandi hoc fecerit, injuste aufert, etiam si verum sit quod dicit; et tunc tenetur ad famae restitutionem vel dicendo se falsum dixisse, si falsum dixit; vel quocumque alio modo, non mentiendo, si verum dixit, sine hoc tamen quod se verum dixisse dicat; quia non debet alterius famam cum mendacio restituere. Reply Obj. 1: Someone who exposes the wickedness of another to him who has the authority to correct—or even, if the wicked one be incorrigible, exposes him in the sight of the whole Church, that being put to shame he may desist from sin, or at least that they may depart from his corrupting company, provided the exposer preserve the order of fraternal charity—does not unjustly strip away that other’s good reputation; hence he is not bound to the restitution of his reputation. But if he did it with the intention of defaming, he does take it unjustly, even if what he says is true. And then he is bound to restore the man’s reputation, either by admitting he spoke falsely, if he spoke falsely, or in any other way, by not lying if he spoke truly, yet without saying that he had spoken truly, for he should not restore another’s good reputation with a lie. Ad secundum dicendum, quod restitutio principaliter inventa est in damnis quae inferuntur in rebus fortunae, quae restitui possunt: in his autem quae objectio tangit, quae non possunt ad simile bonum restitui, debet fieri restitutio qualis possibilis est, scilicet ad arbitrium bonorum. Reply Obj. 2: Restitution is chiefly found in losses that were inflicted on matters of fortune, which can be restored. But in those matters that the objection refers to, which cannot be restored to the same good, restitution must be made as it is possible, namely, according to the judgment of good men. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui impedit aliquem ne praebendam consequatur, si hoc faciat quia indignus est, vel ut de alio melius provideatur, non injuste facit; unde non tenetur ad restitutionem; si autem animo laedendi ipsum, tenetur ad restitutionem, non quidem tanti quantum valebat praebenda, quia ipse eam non bene erat consecutus; sed pensatis conditionibus utriusque secundum arbitrium bonorum. Reply Obj. 3: The person who prevents someone from obtaining a living, if he does this because the man is unworthy, or so that he may be provided for better by another, does not act unjustly; and so he is not bound to restitution. But if it is for the sake of wounding him in the soul, he is bound to restitution, not indeed as much as the living was valued at, for he himself did not obtain it, but having considered the conditions of each according to the judgment of good men. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ille qui subfodit semina, non tenetur ad tantum quantum agri fructus valituri erant, sed quantum ager sic seminatus valere consuevit; quia multis de causis potest impediri agrorum fructus. Et similiter dicendum est de eo cui debitum non restituitur suo tempore; quia non tenetur restituere tantum quantum lucrari potuisset; sed secundum aestimationem lucri quod accidere consuevit, pensato labore, et infortuniis etiam, quae in lucro accidere alias possent; quia lucrum non causatur tantum ex pecunia, sed ex industria et labore. Reply Obj. 4: Someone who digs under the seed is not bound to as much grain as the field could produce, but as much as the field customarily did produce when sowed this way; for the crop of a field can be impeded by many things. And something similar should be said about someone who did not pay his debt on time, because he is not bound to restore as much as could possibly have been earned with it, but according to the estimation of the profit that typically came from it, having considered the labor, and misfortunes too, that may otherwise happen in profit; for profit does not arise from money alone, but from industry and labor. Ad quintum dicendum, quod illud praeceptum legis quamvis sit de moribus, non tamen est morale, sed judiciale. Talia enim praecepta pro loco et tempore populo illi dabantur; unde tunc non obligant nisi de novo statuerentur ab aliquo qui statuendi haberet potestatem. Nihilominus tamen inquantum habebant aliquid significationis per Christum, impleta sunt hujusmodi praecepta, sicut et caeremonialia. Reply Obj. 5: That precept of the law, although it had to do with morals, nevertheless is not a moral precept, but a judicial one. For such precepts were given to that people for their place and time; and so they would not oblige now unless they were newly established by someone who had the power of establishing them. Nevertheless, inasmuch as they contained something of signification through Christ, precepts like these were fulfilled, as also the ceremonial ones. Ad sextum dicendum, quod Zachaeus non dixit hoc quasi necessarium, sed ex abundanti. Reply Obj. 6: Zacchaeus did not say this as if it were a necessary thing, but rather out of abundance. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod quidam versus dantur de illis qui tenentur ad restitutionem, tales: jussio, consilium, consensus, palpo, recursus, participans, mutus, non obstans, non manifestans. Sed tantum quinque istorum sunt quae ad restitutionem semper obligant; quorum primum est jussio, quando aliquis jubet aliquem depraedari: alias tyranni non tenerentur ad restitutionem. Secundus est consensus ad rapinam perpetrandam in eo sine quo rapina fieri non poterat. Tertium est recursus, quando scilicet aliquis receptator latronum est, et eis patrocinium praestat. Quartum est participatio, quando aliquis latroni se sociat ad spoliandum, et partem spoliorum accipit. Quintum est non obstans, cum scilicet ex officio obstare tenetur, ut principes terrae, qui justitiam conservare debent, si non obstant cum obstare possint, ad restitutionem tenentur. In aliis autem causis enumeratis non obligatur semper quis ad restitutionem, nisi in certis casibus, quando probabiliter credit quod consilium suum fuit efficax, et quod alias injusta ablatio commissa non fuisset. Similiter etiam non omnis palpo, idest adulator, ad restitutionem tenetur; sed ille qui adulando ad auferendum incitat, dicens hoc signum strenuitatis esse. Similiter etiam mutus dicitur qui ex officio reclamare tenetur et non reclamat; nec tunc semper tenetur ad restitutionem, nisi operetur ut fiat injusta ablatio; sed debet inducere eum qui abstulit, ut reddat. Similiter etiam non omnis qui non manifestat, tenetur ad restitutionem; sed ille qui pro latrocinio zelat, et particeps est lucri. In omnibus autem his, si principalis restituit, alii deobligantur a debito restitutionis. To the third question, it should be said certain verses were given about those who are bound to restitution: command, counsel, consent, flatterer, shelterer, participant, am silent, not preventing, not exposing. But only five of these are always obliged to restitution; and the first of these is command, when someone orders another to be despoiled: otherwise tyrants would not be bound to restitution. Second is consenting to commit a robbery in someone without whom the robbery could not be done. Third is recourse, namely, when someone provides shelter for thieves, and offers them protection. Fourth is participation, when someone joins a thief in robbing, and receives a part of the spoils. Fifth is not preventing, namely, when one is bound to prevent it by his office, like the rulers of a land, who should preserve justice, if they do not prevent it when they can, they are bound to restitution. But among the other causes enumerated, a person is not always bound to restitution, except in certain cases, when he believes that his counsel was probably effective, and that otherwise the unjust taking would not have been committed. Likewise too, not every flatterer, that is, sycophant, is bound to restitution, but the one who incites someone to take things by his wheedling, saying that it would be a sign of his strength and energy. Likewise too, someone is said to be silent who is bound by his office to speak out and who does not speak out; and then he is not always bound to restitution, unless he arranges that an unjust taking be done; but he should bring in the one who took it so that he may return it. Likewise too, not everyone who does not expose a thief is bound to restitution, but the one who is jealous of the theft, and takes part in the profit. But in all of these, if the main perpetrator makes restitution, the others are acquitted of the debt of restitution.