Quaestio 2 Question 2 De eleemosyna Almsgiving Deinde quaeritur de eleemosyna; et circa hoc quaeruntur sex: Next we ask about almsgiving. And concerning this, six questions arise: primo, quid sit; first, what it is; secundo, de effectu sive fructu ejus; second, its effect or fruit; tertio, de partibus ejus; third, its parts; quarto, de quo sit danda eleemosyna; fourth, what alms should be given from; quinto, quis possit eam dare; fifth, who can give them; sexto, cui debeat dari. sixth, to whom they should be given. Articulus 1 Article 1 Quid sit What almsgiving is Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod definitio eleemosynae, quam quidam assignant, scilicet: eleemosyna est opus in quo datur aliquid indigenti ex compassione propter Deum, sit inconvenienter assignata. Visitare enim infirmos ponitur species eleemosynae. Sed in hoc opere non datur aliquid. Ergo datio non debet poni in definitione eleemosynae. Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that the definition of almsgiving that some people assign, almsgiving is a work in which something is given to the needy out of compassion for God’s sake, is unfittingly assigned. For visiting the sick is set down as a species of almsgiving. But in this work, nothing is given. Therefore, giving should not be included in the definition of almsgiving. Praeterea, ipsum datum eleemosyna dicitur, quia dicimur eleemosynam dare. Sed ipsum datum non est opus, sed res quaedam. Ergo eleemosyna non est opus. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the very thing given is called alms, for we say ‘to give alms.’ But what is given is not a work, but a certain thing. Therefore, alms is not a work. Praeterea, in eleemosynis aliquid quandoque datur clericis praebendatis, qui tamen non indigent, sed divites sunt. Ergo non est de ratione eleemosynae quod indigenti detur. Obj. 3: Furthermore, in almsgiving something is given sometimes to prebendary clerics, who are, however, not needy, but rich. Therefore, it is not of the nature of alms that they be given to the needy. Praeterea, opus quod fit ex electione, est magis laudabile quam opus quod fit ex passione; quia est Deo conformius, qui nihil ex passione operatur. Sed compassio est passio quaedam; quia nullus compatitur nisi patiatur. Ergo non est ex necessitate eleemosynae quod ex compassione detur. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a work that is done by choice is more praiseworthy than a work that is done from emotion, for it is more like God, who does nothing from emotion. But compassion is a certain emotion, for no one has compassion unless he suffers. Therefore, alms are not necessarily given out of compassion. Praeterea, actus non recipit speciem a fine ultimo, sed a proximo; alias omnes actus virtutum essent unius speciei. Sed ultimum quod ponitur in definitione debet esse differentia specifica. Cum ergo Deus sit ultimus finis omnium actionum nostrarum, videtur quod non debeat poni in definitione eleemosynae quasi finalis differentia. Obj. 5: Furthermore, an act does not get its species by its last end, but by its proximate end; otherwise all acts of virtue would be of one species. But the last thing set down in a definition should be the specific difference. Therefore, since God is the last end of all of our actions, it seems that he should not be included in the definition of almsgiving as though he were the final difference. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod eleemosyna non sit satisfactionis pars. Non enim est necessarium satisfacere nisi ei qui peccavit. Sed si nunquam homo peccasset, necesse haberet eleemosynas dare. Ergo non est satisfactionis pars. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that almsgiving is not a part of satisfaction. For making satisfaction is not necessary unless one has sinned. But if a man never sinned, he would still have need of giving alms. Therefore, it is not a part of satisfaction. Praeterea, totum non potest esse perfectum, si pars ei subtrahatur. Sed potest aliquis perfecte satisfacere de aliquo peccato, etiam si nullam eleemosynam det. Ergo satisfactionis pars non est eleemosyna. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the whole cannot be perfect if part of it is taken away. But someone can perfectly make satisfaction for a certain sin, even if he never gives alms. Therefore, almsgiving is not a part of satisfaction. Praeterea, nihil potest esse pars totius nisi differat ab aliis ejus partibus. Sed eleemosyna non differt a jejunio et oratione secundum quod ad poenitentiam pertinet, quia hoc eis omnibus competit inquantum sunt poenalia, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo eleemosyna non est satisfactionis pars. Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing can be a part of a whole unless it differs from the other parts. But almsgiving does not differ from fasting and prayer as it pertains to penance, for it belongs to all of them to be penal acts, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, almsgiving is not a part of satisfaction. Praeterea, in sacramentis necessitatis, sicut patet in baptismo, adhibetur remedium quod nulli possit deesse, sicut aqua. Sed poenitentia est sacramentum necessitatis, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo, cum dare eleemosynam non possit cuilibet competere qui peccare potest, quia non est nisi possidentium aliquid; videtur quod non debeat poni poenitentiae et satisfactionis pars. Obj. 4: Furthermore, in sacraments of necessity, as is clear in baptism, a remedy is applied that no one can do without, like water. But penance is a sacrament of necessity, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, since almsgiving cannot be done by just any given sinner, because it is only for those who possess something, it seems that it should not be included as a part of penance and satisfaction. Sed contra, Luc. 3, super illud: facite fructus dignos poenitentiae, dicit Glossa Bedae quod dare eleemosynam sit pars poenitentiae. Sed non nisi ratione satisfactionis. Ergo est pars satisfactionis. On the contrary (1), commenting on Luke 3:8, bear fruits worthy of repentance, Bede’s Gloss says that to give alms is a part of penance. But this would only be by reason of satisfaction. Therefore, it is a part of satisfaction. Praeterea, in foro saeculari non solum punitur aliquis per corporis laesionem, sed etiam per bonorum subtractionem. Sed satisfactio in foro poenitentiae fit per opera poenalia. Ergo debet non solum jejunium, quo affligitur corpus, sed etiam eleemosyna, in qua subtrahuntur res temporales, pars poenitentiae esse. Furthermore (2), in the secular forum someone is not only punished by injury to the body, but also by taking away his goods. But in the forum of penance satisfaction happens by penal works. Therefore, not only should fasting be a part of penance, by which the body is afflicted, but also almsgiving, in which temporal things are taken away. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod eleemosyna non sit actus virtutis. Quia 1 Timoth. 4, ubi dicitur quod pietas ad omnia valet, exponitur pro eleemosynarum largitione. Sed pietas non est virtus, sed donum. Ergo eleemosyna non est actus virtutis. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that almsgiving is not an act of virtue. For in 1 Timothy 4:8, where it says that piety is profitable for all things, it is explained as generous almsgiving. But piety is not a virtue, but a gift. Therefore, almsgiving is not an act of virtue. Praeterea, nulla passio est virtus, ut Philosophus probat in 2 Ethica. Sed eleemosyna ex misericordia procedit, quae passio est, ut patet per Glossam super illud Psal. 36: tota die miseretur: eleemosyna a misericordia incipit. Ergo non est actus virtutis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no emotion is a virtue, as the Philosopher proves in the Ethics 2. But almsgiving proceeds from mercy, which is an emotion, as the Gloss on Psalm 37(36):26 proves: he shows mercy all the day long: almsgiving begins from mercy. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue. Praeterea, nihil est in genere quod non sit in aliqua ejus specie. Sed non potest reduci, ut videtur, ad aliquam speciem virtutis: quia tantum tres virtutes inveniuntur circa exteriora bona operari, in quibus est eleemosyna: scilicet justitia, liberalitas, magnificentia. Eleemosyna autem non est actus justitiae, quia non reddit alienum, sed dat suum: similiter nec actus liberalitatis, quia liberalitas non attendit indigentiam, quam attendit eleemosyna: similiter nec magnificentiae, quia potest esse in parvis et in magnis. Ergo non est actus virtutis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is nothing in a genus that is not in one of its species. But it seems that almsgiving cannot be reduced to any species of virtue: for only three virtues are found whose work concerns outward goods, and almsgiving is not among them; namely, justice, liberality, and magnificence. Now almsgiving is not an act of justice, because it is not returning someone else’s things, but giving one’s own; likewise neither is it liberality, because liberality does not require neediness, which almsgiving does; likewise neither is it magnificence, because it can be in small things and in large things. Therefore, it is not an act of virtue. Sed contra est quod subvenire miseris est actus justitiae, ut patet per Augustinum, et habitum est in 3 Lib., dist. 33, quaest. 2, art. 2, quaestiunc. 3. Sed subvenire miseris pertinet ad eleemosynam. Ergo eleemosyna est actus justitiae, et sic est actus virtutis. On the contrary (4), succoring the wretched is an act of justice, as is clear from Augustine, and was held in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 2, Article 2, Subquestion 3. But to succor the wretched pertains to almsgiving. Therefore, almsgiving is an act of justice, and thus it is an act of virtue. Praeterea, nihil est meritorium nisi actus virtutis: quia felicitas est virtutis praemium, ut etiam Philosophus dicit. Sed eleemosyna est maxime meritoria. Ergo est actus virtutis. Furthermore (5), nothing is meritorious unless it is an act of virtue: for happiness is virtue’s reward, as even the Philosopher says. But almsgiving is extremely meritorious. Therefore, it is an act of virtue. Quaestiuncula 4 Quaestiuncula 4 Ulterius. Videtur quod eleemosyna non cadat in praecepto, Luc. 3, super illud: interrogaverunt eum turbae, dicit Glossa interlinealis: ex verbis Joannis terrore perculsi consilium quaerunt. Sed Joannes respondit quod intenderent eleemosynis. Ergo dare eleemosynas est consilium, et non praeceptum. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that almsgiving does not come under precept. For commenting on the text, the crowds asked him, ‘what then shall we do?’ (Luke 3:10), the interlineal Gloss says, stricken with terror, they seek counsel from John’s words. But John answers that they should distribute alms. Therefore, to give alms is a counsel, not a precept. Praeterea, quilibet potest licite sua retinere. Sed retinendo sua non dat aliquis eleemosynam. Ergo dare eleemosynam non est in praecepto. Obj. 2: Furthermore, anyone can licitly keep his own things. But keeping one’s own things means not giving alms. Therefore, giving alms is not under precept. Praeterea, si cadit eleemosyna sub praecepto, non cadit nisi sub praecepto negativo: quia Ambrosius dicit: pasce fame morientem: si non pavisti, occidisti. Non occidere autem est praeceptum negativum. Sed non cadit sub praecepto negativo; alioquin homo teneretur semper eleemosynam dare: quia praecepta negativa obligant semper, et ad semper. Ergo dare eleemosynam non cadit sub aliquo praecepto. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if almsgiving comes under precept, it only comes under a negative precept: for Ambrose says, feed the man dying of hunger: if you do not feed him, you have killed him. Now, do not kill is a negative precept. But it does not fall under a negative precept; otherwise a man is always bound to give alms, for negative precepts oblige always and at all times. Therefore, giving alms does not fall under any precept. Praeterea, omne quod cadit sub praecepto, aliquo tempore obligat transgressores ad peccatum mortale. Sed hoc non est de eleemosyna: quia semper potest probabilis opinio alicui remanere, quod si ipse non subvenit, alius subvenire possit; non enim unus posset omnibus subvenire. Ergo dare eleemosynam non cadit sub praecepto. Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that falls under precept at some time imposes mortal sin on those who transgress. But this is not the case with almsgiving: because the probable opinion can always remain to someone, that if he does not help, another person would, for one person could not help everyone. Therefore, to give alms does not come under precept. Sed contra est quod dicit Glossa Matth. 6: te autem faciente eleemosynam: conscientiae facienti eleemosynam pro praecepto adimplendo miscet se laudis appetitus. Ergo dare eleemosynam cadit sub praecepto. On the contrary (1), the Gloss on the text: so whenever you give alms (Matthew 6:2) says, the desire for praise of oneself mingles with the conscience giving alms in order to fulfill the precept. Therefore, giving alms does fall under a precept.