Distinctio 17 Distinction 17 Comparatio partium poenitentiae Comparing the parts of penance Postquam distinxit Magister poenitentiae partes, hic movet quasdam quaestiones de partibus illis; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima movet quaestiones; in secunda prosequitur eas, ibi: dicunt enim quidam sine confessione oris et satisfactione operis neminem a peccato mundari. After the Master has distinguished the parts of penance, here he raises some questions about those parts; and it is divided into two parts: in the first he raises the questions; in the second, he pursues them in detail, at: for some say that no one is cleansed from sin without confession by the mouth and satisfaction in deed. Et haec pars dividitur in duas: in prima prosequitur unam quaestionem de comparatione contritionis ad confessionem, utrum scilicet per solam contritionem aut confessionem peccatum dimittatur; in secunda prosequitur quaestiones de ipsa confessione, ibi: jam secundum quaestionis articulum inspiciamus. And this part is divided into two: in the first, he details one question about the relation of contrition to confession, namely, whether by contrition alone or confession sin is forgiven; in the second, he pursues the questions about confession itself at: let us now examine the second part of the question. Circa primum tria facit: primo ponit rationes ad partem affirmativam; secundo ad negativam, ibi: quod qui negant, eas determinare laborant; tertio determinat veritatem, ibi: quid igitur super his sentiendum sit, quid tenendum? Concerning the first he does three things: first, he gives the reasons on the affirmative side; second, the negative side, at: but those who deny it struggle with the determination of the authorities; third, he determines the truth, at: what, then, is to be felt concerning this? What to be held? Jam secundum quaestionis articulum inspiciamus. Hic prosequitur quaestiones de ipsa confessione secundum se; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima prosequitur quaestiones superius motas de confessione ex parte ejus cui facienda est confessio; in secunda concludit ex dictis responsionem ad quamdam quaestionem de necessitate confessionis, ibi: si ergo quaeritur ad quid confessio sit necessaria . . . dicimus, quia punitio peccati est. Let us now examine the second part of the question. Here he pursues questions about confession in itself. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he pursues questions raised above about confession on the side of the person to whom the confession is made; in the second, he concludes from what has been said an answer to a certain question about the necessity of confession, at: and so, if it is asked for what is confession necessary . . . we say: because it is a kind of punishment for the sin. Prima in tres: in prima prosequitur secundam quaestionem superius motam, scilicet utrum oporteat homini confiteri, et an sufficiat confessio Deo facta, ponendo rationes ad veritatem, et contra veritatem; in secunda prosequitur tertiam quaestionem, scilicet an oporteat sacerdoti confiteri, vel possit fieri cuicumque, ibi: nunc priusquam praemissis auctoritatibus . . . respondeamus, tertiam quaestionem intueamur; in tertia respondet ad objectiones secundae quaestionis contra veritatem factas, ibi: cum igitur ex his aliisque pluribus testimoniis perspicuum fiat . . . peccata primum Deo, deinde sacerdoti esse confitenda . . . illud Joannis Chrysostomi non est ita intelligendum, etc. The first is in three parts: in the first he pursues the second question raised above, namely, whether it is necessary to confess to a man, and whether a confession made to God would suffice, citing arguments for the truth and against the truth. In the second, he pursues the third question, namely, whether it is necessary to confess to a priest, or could it be made to anyone, at: now, before we respond to the aforesaid authorities . . . let us examine a third question. In the third, he answers the objections to the second question that are made against the truth, at: and so, from these and many other testimonies, it is made very clear . . . that sins are to be confessed first to God, then to a priest . . . the statement of John Chrysostom . . . is not to be understood in that sense, etc. Prima in duas: in prima objicit contra veritatem; in secunda pro ipsa, ibi: sed quod sacerdotibus confiteri oporteat, non solum illa auctoritate Jacobi . . . sed etiam aliorum pluribus testimoniis comprobatur. The first is in two parts; in the first, he objects against the truth; in the second, in favor of it, at: but that it is necessary to confess to priests is proven not only by that authority of James . . . but also by many testimonies of others. Nunc prius quam praemissis auctoritatibus . . . respondeamus, tertiam quaestionem intueamur. Hic duo facit: primo ostendit quod quando facultas adest, confessio facienda est sacerdoti; secundo distinguit in hoc de confessione venialium vel mortalium, secundum Bedam, ibi: Beda vero inter confessionem venialium et mortalium distinguit. Now, before we respond to the aforesaid authorities . . . let us examine a third question. Here he does two things: first, he shows that when the possibility is present, confession is to be made to a priest; second, he distinguishes in this between mortal and venial sin, in accord with St. Bede, at: but Bede draws a distinction between the confession of venial and mortal sins. Hic est triplex quaestio. Prima de justificatione impii. Secunda de contritione. Tertia de confessione. De satisfactione autem in 15 dist. dictum est. Here there are three questions. The first concerns the justification of unbelievers. The second, contrition. Third, confession. But satisfaction was discussed in Distinction 15. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De justificatione impii The justification of sinners Circa primum quaeruntur quinque: Concerning the first, five questions arise: primo, quid sit justificatio impii; first, what is the justification of sinners; secundo, quae praeexiguntur ad ipsam; second, what is prerequisite for it; tertio, quae concurrunt ad ipsam; third, what else must be present for it; quarto, de ordine ipsorum; fourth, the order of these things; quinto, qualis sit. fifth, how they exist. Articulus 1 Article 1 Quid sit justificatio impii What is the justification of sinners Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec assignatio quae ponitur Rom. 8, in Glossa interlineali sit incompetens, scilicet: justificatio est remissio peccatorum, et consummatio bonorum operum. Peccata enim inficiunt omnes potentias. Sed justificatio est in sola voluntate; quia secundum Anselmum, justitia est rectitudo voluntatis pro se servata. Ergo cum justificatio nihil aliud sit quam justitiae adeptio, videtur quod non sit remissio omnium peccatorum. Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. It seems that this description that is set down in the interlinear Gloss on Romans 8 is inadequate, namely: justification is the remission of sins, and the consummation of good works. For sins infect all the powers. But justification is only in the will, for according to Anselm, justice is rectitude of the will kept for its own sake. Therefore, since justification is nothing else than the acquisition of justice, it seems that it is not the remisson of all sins. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod justificatio est revelatio divini consilii. Sed divinum consilium revelatur aliquando eis quibus non dimittitur peccatum, sicut patet de Nabuchodonosor, Dan. 2. Ergo justificatio non est peccatorum remissio. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Bernard says that justification is the revelation of divine counsel. But the divine counsel is revealed sometimes to those whose sins are not forgiven, as is clear from the case of Nebuchadnezzar (cf. Dan 2). Therefore, justification is not the remission of sins. Praeterea, justificatio, ut quidam dicunt, est effectus justitiae generalis qua de impio fit pius. Remissio autem peccatorum non est effectus justitiae, sed gratiae. Ergo justificatio non est remissio peccatorum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, justification, as some people say, is the effect of general justice, by which a faithful person is made from an impious one. But the remission of sins is not an effect of justice, but of grace. Therefore, justification is not the remission of sins. Praeterea, consummatio bonorum operum in poenitente fit per satisfactionem. Sed homo justificatur per solam contritionem ante satisfactionem, ut ex littera habetur. Ergo justificatio non est consummatio bonorum operum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, consummation of good works in a penitent happens through satisfaction. But a man is justified by contrition alone before satisfaction, as is found in the text. Therefore, justification is not the consummation of good works. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod justificatio sit aliud quam vocatio. Quia, Rom. 8, quatuor per ordinem recitantur: scilicet praedestinatio, vocatio, justificatio, magnificatio. Sed secundum horum distat a primo. Ergo et tertium differt a secundo. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that justification is something different from calling. For in Romans 8, four things are listed in order: namely, predestination, calling, justification, glorification. But the second of these stands apart from the first. Therefore, the third also differs from the second. Praeterea, vocatio etiam est in peccato existentium. Prov. 1, 24: vocavi et renuistis. Sed justificatio non, cum sit peccatorum remissio. Ergo justificatio non est vocatio. Obj. 2: Furthermore, calling also happens among those remaining in sin: I have called you and you have refused (Prov 1:24). But justification does not, since it is the remission of sins. Therefore, justification is not calling. Praeterea, vocatio importat distantiam in eo qui vocatur. Sed justificatio importat approximationem ad Deum in eo qui justificatur. Ergo justificatio non est vocatio. Obj. 3: Furthermore, calling implies distance in the one who is called. But justification implies a drawing near to God in the one who is justified. Therefore, justification is not calling. Sed contra, Glossa, Rom. 8, dicit, quod vocare est cognitionem de fide adjuvare. Sed istud adjutorium non est per gratiam gratis datam; quia sic esset etiam malorum; quod est contra intentionem Glossae, ibidem. Ergo est per gratiam gratum facientem. Sed infusio gratiae gratum facientis est justificatio. Ergo vocatio est idem quod justificatio. On the contrary (1), the Gloss on Romans 8:30 says that to call is to help the understanding of the faith. But that help is not through gratuitous grace; for then it would be also for the wicked, which is against the intention of the Gloss there. Therefore, it is by sanctifying grace. But the infusion of sanctifying grace is justification. Therefore, calling is the same as justification. Praeterea, idem per essentiam est motus a termino et ad terminum oppositum, sicut de albedine ad nigredinem. Sed vocatio dicit motum a termino, scilicet a peccato; justificatio dicit accessum ad terminum, scilicet justitiam. Ergo justificatio et vocatio sunt idem. Furthermore (2), a motion from one term to the opposite term, like from whiteness to blackness, is the same thing in essence. But calling names a motion from one term, namely, sin; justification names the approach to another term, namely, justice. Therefore, justification and calling are the same thing. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod justificatio non sit idem quod renovatio mentis, et sanatio. Quia justificari potest aliquis in hac vita, non autem renovari vel sanari. Ergo justificatio neutrum illorum est. Probatio mediae quantum ad justificationem est ex hoc quod dicitur Roman. 3, 24: justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius. Quantum ad sanationem patet per id quod dicitur in Glossa super illud Psalm. 102, 3: qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas, quod in fine sanabit languores, quando corruptibile hoc induet incorruptionem; quod non erit in hac vita. Quantum ad renovationem autem ex hoc quod dicitur in Glossa super illud Rom. 6: in novitate vitae ambulemus; quod in futuro in immortalitate perficitur. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that justification is not the same as the renewal and healing of the mind. For someone can be justified in this life, but not renewed or healed. Therefore, justification is neither of these. The proof of the middle term as to justification is from the fact that it says: they are justified freely by his grace (Rom 3:24). The proof as to the healing is clear from what is said in the Gloss about Psalm 103(102):3: who heals all your diseases, that in the end he will heal weaknesses, when this corruptible thing puts on incorruption—which will not happen in this life. The proof as to renewal: the Gloss on Romans 6:4, so that we may walk in newness of life, says that it is perfected in our future immortality. Praeterea, quorum opposita differunt, ipsa etiam differunt. Sed opposita horum sunt diversa et nomine et ratione; quia justificationi opponitur impietas, renovationi vetustas, sanationi infirmitas. Ergo non sunt idem. Obj. 2: Furthermore, things that have different opposites are themselves different. But the opposites of these things are different both in name and in definition. For impiety is opposed to justification, oldness to renewal, infirmity to healing. Therefore, they are not the same. Sed contra, renovatio mentis et sanatio fit per peccatorum dimissionem. Sed justificatio nihil aliud est quam peccatorum remissio. Ergo videtur quod justificatio sit idem quod renovatio vel sanatio mentis. On the contrary, renewal of the mind and healing happen by the remission of sins. But justification is nothing other than the remission of sins. Therefore, it seems that justification is the same as renewal and healing of the mind. Quaestiuncula 4 Quaestiuncula 4