Praeterea, formae quae suscipiunt magis et minus, non inducuntur subito in subjecto. Sed gratia suscipit magis et minus. Ergo successive infunditur in subjecto; et sic justificatio est successiva. Obj. 4: Furthermore, forms that are received more and less are not introduced all at once into their subject. But grace is received more and less. Therefore, it is successively infused into its subject, and so justification is successive. Sed contra, efficacior est virtus divina ad agendum quam virtus naturae. Sed virtute naturae generatio, qua fit ignis, est in instanti. Ergo multo fortius aliquis fit justus virtute divina in instanti. On the contrary, divine power is more efficacious for acting than the power of nature. But by the power of nature the generation by which a fire comes to be is in an instant. Therefore, much more is someone made just in an instant by divine power. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod de ratione miraculi secundum se sumpti tria sunt: quorum primum est, quod illud quod fit per miraculum, fit supra virtutem naturae creatae agentis; secundum, ut in natura recipiente non sit ordo naturalis ad illius susceptionem, sed solum potentia obedientiae ad Deum; tertium, ut praeter motum consuetum tali effectui ipse effectus inducatur. Exemplum primi est de gloria corporum in resurrectione, ad quam natura non attingit: exemplum secundi est de illuminatione caeci, in quo non est potentia naturalis ad suscipiendum visum: exemplum tertii est de conversione aquae in vinum praeter cursum naturae. To the first question, I answer that three things are included in the essential definition of a miracle, of which the first is that whatever happens by a miracle is done above the power of a created agent’s nature; second, that in the receiving nature there is no natural order to receiving it, but only obediential potency to God; third, that the effect itself is brought about outside the motion customary for such an effect. An example of the first is the glory of bodies in the resurrection, to which nature cannot attain; an example of the second is the illumination of the blind, in whom there is no natural potency to receive vision; an example of the third is the conversion of water into wine outside the course of nature. Et haec tria aliquo modo semper concurrunt ad actum miraculosum: quia etsi visiva potentia non excedat vires naturae absolute loquendo, quia eam per generationem inducit; excedit tamen vires naturae considerata impotentia recipientis; et si adsit potentia absolute aliquando, sicut in conversione aquae in vinum, tamen per comparationem ad modum fiendi, neutrum adest; et ideo in definitione miraculi ponitur arduum quantum ad primum; praeter spem, scilicet naturae, quantum ad secundum; insolitum quantum ad tertium. And these three always coincide in some way in a miraculous act; for even if visual potency does not exceed the powers of nature, speaking absolutely, since it is introduced by generation, nevertheless it does exceed the powers of nature given the lack of potency in the recipient. And if the potency is present absolutely at a certain time, as in the conversion of water into wine, nevertheless, by comparison with the manner of its happening, neither is present. And so in the definition of a miracle is included difficult, as to the first characteristic; beyond hope, namely, of nature, as to the second; unaccustomed, as to the third. Et ideo ille effectus qui immediate est a Deo tantum, et tamen inest recipienti ordo naturalis ad recipiendum illum effectum non per alium modum quam per istum, non erit miraculosus; sicut patet de infusione animae rationalis. And so that effect which is directly from God alone, and yet a natural order exists in the recipient for receiving that effect, by no other manner but this one, will not be miraculous; as is clear with the infusion of the rational soul. Et similiter est de justificatione impii: quia ordo naturalis inest animae ad justitiae rectitudinem consequendam: nec alio modo eam consequi potest quam a Deo immediate; et ideo justificatio impii de se non est miraculosa; sed potest habere aliquid miraculosum adjunctum, quod justificationi viam parat. And it is the same way with the justification of the impious, for a natural order to obtaining the rectitude of justice is in the soul: nor can it be obtained by any other mode than directly from God; and so the justification of the impious is not miraculous in itself; but it can have a something miraculous attached to it, which prepares the way for justification. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Augustini intelligendum est quantum ad id quod fit: quia in creatione fit res secundum esse naturae, quod est minus quam esse gratiae, quod datur in justificatione: sed quantum ad modum faciendi difficilior est creationis actus, qui potentiam non praesupponit; et tamen de creatione quidam dicunt quod non est miraculosa, eo quod non est alius modus producendi illas res in esse. Reply Obj. 1: The word of Augustine is to be understood as to what happens, for in creation it happens according to the being of a nature, which is less than the being of grace, which is given in justification. But as to the mode of doing it, the act of creation is more difficult, which does not presuppose any potency, and yet some people say that creation is not miraculous, by the fact that there is no other mode of bringing these things into being. Ad secundum dicendum, quod contrarium inventum in subjecto resistit actioni dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum agit in ipsum agentem, quod patet in mutuo agentibus et patientibus; alio modo impedimentum praestando in ipso susceptibili ad receptionem formae. Primo modo non potest esse aliqua resistentia ad divinam actionem; quia ipse est agens nullo modo patiens; et ideo resistentia in actione ejus non est nisi ex parte effectus recipiendi; contrarium autem impedit ne suum contrarium in subjectum recipiatur formaliter, non active, inquantum scilicet facit potentiam non esse propriam illi formae. Unde patet quod plus resistit isto modo illud quod omnino subtrahit potentiam, quam quod posita potentia facit eam non esse propriam; et ideo difficilius est aliquid facere ex nihilo quam ex contrario. Hoc autem potest natura, primum autem non potest. Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways that a contrary found in a subject can resist an action. In one way inasmuch as it acts against the one acting, which is seen among things mutually acting and acted upon. In another way, by presenting an impediment in what is susceptible to the reception of the form. There cannot be any resistance to divine action in the first way, because he is the agent who is in no way acted upon. And so resistance against his action can exist only on the part of the effect of the receiving; but a contrary impedes its own contrary from being received into a subject formally, but not actively, inasmuch as it makes the potency no longer proper to that form. And so it is clear that what takes away all potency in this way resists more than what makes a given potency no longer proper. And so it is more difficult to make something out of nothing than out of a contrary. But nature can do this, while it cannot do the first. Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas non trahitur in justificationem per modum coactionis; sed ut libere velit illud ad quod Deus eam movet. Reply Obj. 3: The will is not drawn in justification by the mode of force, but so that it chooses freely what God moves it to. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod expulsio formae dicit terminum motus illius qui est ad corruptionem ordinatus; et introductio formae dicit similiter terminum motus illius qui praecedit generationem; quia tam generatio quam corruptio sunt termini motus. Omne autem quod movetur, quando est in termino motus, disponitur secundum illud ad quod motus ordinatur; et ideo, cum motus corruptionis tendat in non esse, generationis vero ad esse; quando forma introducitur, forma est; quando autem expellitur, non est. Et quia introduci dicitur forma quando primo est; expelli autem, quando primo non est; non potest esse materia sine forma hac vel illa; ideo simul est ibi expulsio unius formae et introductio alterius. Cum ergo similiter anima non possit esse sine culpa vel gratia; simul est infusio gratiae et remissio culpae. To the second question, it should be said that the expulsion of a form means the terminus of that movement that is directed to corruption; and the introduction of a form likewise means the terminus of that motion that precedes generation, for generation and corruption are equally terms of motion. Now everything that is moved, when it is in the term of motion, is disposed according to what the motion is ordered toward. And so, since the motion of corruption tends toward non-being, but generation tends toward being, when a form is introduced, a form exists; but when it is expelled, it does not. And since a form is said to be introduced when it first exists, but expelled when it first does not exist, there cannot be matter without this or that form. So at the same time there is the expulsion of one form and the introduction of another. Therefore, since similarly the soul cannot exist without either guilt or grace, the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are simultaneous. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut albedo nunquam est in non albo, quia sua praesentia facit album; ita gratia nunquam est in indigno, quia sua praesentia facit dignum; et propter hoc non oportet quod prius sit dignus quam gratiam habeat. Reply Obj. 1: Just as whiteness is never in something not white, because its very presence makes something white, so also grace is never in someone unworthy, because its very presence makes one worthy. And because of this it is not necessary that someone be worthy of grace before he has it. Ad secundum dicendum, quod gratia non agit ad destructionem culpae per modum causae efficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, quae simul est cum suo effectu formali, qui est esse hoc, et non esse contrarium. Reply Obj. 2: Grace does not act for the destruction of guilt like an efficient cause, but like a formal cause, which is simultaneous with its formal effect, which is to be this, and not to be the contrary. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis anima secundum se sit supra tempus, ut dicitur in Lib. de Causis; tamen actus ejus per accidens mensuratur tempore quod est mensura primi motus, inquantum scilicet motus animae intellectivae habent connexionem cum motibus animae sensitivae, qui exercentur corporalibus organis, et dependent quodammodo ex eis. Unde non videtur dicendum quod ejus alterationes secundum vitam quam nunc agit, alio tempore mensurentur quam illo quod mensurat motum caeli, sicut dicebatur in 1 Lib. de motu angeli: et propter hoc inter quodlibet instans sui temporis et aliud instans est accipere tempus medium. Et ideo dicendum est, quod non est assignare ultimum instans in quo est culpa, sed primum in quo non est; sed est assignare primum instans in quod est gratia; et quomodo hoc sit verum, patet ex his quae dicta sunt supra, dist. 11, qu. 1, art. 3, qu. 2, de transubstantiatione panis in corpus Christi. Reply Obj. 3: Although the soul in itself is above time, as it says in the Book of Causes, nevertheless its act is measured incidentally by time, which is the measure of the first motion, inasmuch as, namely, the motion of the intellective soul is intertwined with the movements of the sensitive soul, which are executed by the physical organs, and depend in a certain way on them. And so it does not seem that it should be said that its changes according to the life that it now leads should be measured by another time than the one that measures the movement of the heaven, as was said about the motion of the angels in Book 1. And because of this, between any instant of its time and another, a middle time can be taken. And so it should be said that a last moment cannot be assigned in which guilt exists, but a first moment in which it does not; but a first instant can be assigned in which grace exists. And how this is true is clear from what was said above in Distinction 11, Question 1, Article 3, Question 2, about the transubstantiation of the bread into the body of Christ. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod duplex est modus formarum. Quaedam enim formae sunt quae recipiunt magis et minus secundum elongationem a contrario, et secundum accessum ad causam propriam, sicut albedo; et ideo talis forma etiam successive in subjecto recipitur; et postquam recepta est, intenditur et remittitur. Quaedam autem forma est quae non recipit magis nec minus, neque sic neque sic: quia impositio ejus est in indivisibili; sicut forma substantialis; et talis forma neque recipitur successive in subjecto, neque intenditur neque remittitur postquam suscepta fuerit. Quaedam autem forma medio modo se habet; quia non recipit magis aut minus secundum elongationem a contrario, eo quod nullo modo suo contrario commiscibile est, et in hoc convenit cum forma substantiali; sed tamen suscipit magis et minus secundum accessum ad suam causam; sicut patet de luce; et ideo talis forma non recipitur successive in subjecto, sicut nec forma substantialis; sed tamen postquam inest, potest intendi et remitti, sicut forma accidentalis contrarium habens. To the third question, it should be said that forms have two modes. For there are some forms that receive more and less according to their distance from their opposite, and according to their closeness to their cause, like whiteness. And so this kind of form is also received successively in its subject; and after it is received, it is intensified or lessened. And there is another kind of form that does not admit of more or less, nor of this way or that way, for its imposition is in something indivisible, like substantial form; and a form like this is neither received successively in the subject, nor intensified or lessened after it has been received. But there is another kind of form that stands in the middle, for it does not admit of more or less according to its distance from its contrary, precisely because it can in no way mingle with its contrary, and in this it shares with substantial form. But nevertheless it is susceptible to more and less according to its closeness to its cause, as is seen in the case of light. And so a form like this is not received successively in its subject, just as neither is substantial form; but still after it is in it, it can be intensified and lessened, like an accidental form that has a contrary. Et talis forma est gratia, quia nullam commixtionem patitur cum suo opposito, eo quod suum oppositum magis habet naturam privationis quam alicujus positionis, sicut et tenebra; et ideo oportet quod recipiatur subito in subjecto; et tamen potest intendi et remitti secundum accessum ad causam gratiae; et ideo sicut in instanti est introductio formae substantialis in materiam, et in eodem instanti expulsio alterius formae, et in eodem instanti completa dispositio, quae est necessitas ad formam, et per se terminus alterationis; ita infusio gratiae est in instanti, et in eodem instanti est remissio culpae, et motus liberi arbitrii, qui est quasi dispositio completa ad suscipiendam gratiam; et sic totum quod ad justificationem requiritur, est in instanti; unde justificatio non est successiva, sed subita. And this is the kind of form that grace is, for it can endure no mingling with its opposite, because its opposite has more the nature of a privation than of something positive, like darkness. And therefore it must be received all at once in its subject; and nevertheless it can be intensified and lessened according to its closeness to the cause of grace. And thus, just as the introduction of a substantial form into matter is instantaneous, and in the same instant is the expulsion of the other form, and in the same instant the complete disposition, which is a necessity for the form, and the per se terminus of alteration; so also the infusion of grace is instantaneous, and in the same instant there is the remission of sin, and the motion of the free will, which is like a complete disposition to receiving grace. And so all that is required for justification exists in an instant; and so justification is not successive, but all at once. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motus dupliciter dicitur, ut patet in 3 de Anima. Est enim quidam motus qui est actus imperfecti, qui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet quod sit successivus, quia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad perfectionem suae speciei, eo quod pars motus est alterius speciei a toto motu, ut dicitur in 10 Ethic.; sicut patet in alteratione de motu qui est ad albedinem, cujus pars est motus ad medium colorem specie differens, si divisim accipiatur. Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of motion, as is clear from On the Soul 3. For there is a certain motion that is an act of something imperfect, which is a departure from potency to act; and it is necessary that this kind of motion be successive, for it always looks toward something in the future for the perfection of its own species, precisely because a part of this motion belongs to another species than the whole motion, as it says in the Ethics 10. This is clear in the change of the motion to whiteness, one part of which is the motion to a medium color differing in species, if it be taken piecemeal. Alius motus est actus perfecti, qui magis operatio dicitur, qui non expectat aliquid in futurum ad complementum suae speciei, sicut sentire; et talis motus non est successivus, sed subitus; et si contingat quod talis motus sit in tempore, hoc erit per accidens, quia mensuratur in quolibet instanti illius temporis in quo dicitur esse; sicut esse hominem, in tempore est et in instanti; et talis motus est motus liberi arbitrii, de quo loquimur; et ideo est in instanti. Secus autem esset, si esset motus collativus; quia tunc non posset esse in instanti, propter discursum de uno in aliud. Another motion is the act of something perfect, which is rather called an operation, which does not look to anything in the future for the completion of its own species, like sensing; and a motion like this is not successive, but immediate. And if it happened that such a motion were in time, this would be incidental, for it is measured by whatever instant of time in which it is said to exist; like being a man is in time and in an instant; and such a motion is the motion of the free will, of which we are speaking. And therefore it is in an instant. But it would be different if it were a conferring motion, for then it could not be in an instant, because of the transfer of one thing into another. Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus quando intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud, intelligit utrumque. Non tamen sequitur quod plura intelligat, quia intelligit ea ut unum, sicut cum intelligit relationem unius ad alterum. Similiter etiam liberum arbitrium potest simul moveri in diversa, ita quod in unum per ordinem ad aliud; et propter hoc motus virtutis imperatae est simul cum motu virtutis imperantis, quia motus virtutis imperatae ordinatur ad finem virtutis imperantis: sicut qui vult sustinere mortem propter Deum, simul movetur liberum arbitrium ejus motu fortitudinis, et motu caritatis, qui actum fortitudinis imperat. Unde cum motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum elicitus a poenitentia, imperatus a caritate sit, quia propter Deum detestatur quis peccatum quod commisit; simul uterque motus esse potest. Reply Obj. 2: When the intellect understands something as in an order to another, it understands both things. But it does not follow that it understands many things when it understands them as one, as when it understands the relation of one to another. Likewise, the free will also can be moved at the same time toward different things if one is ordered to another. And because of this the movement of commanded virtue is simultaneous with the movement of commanding virtue, for the movement of commanded virtue is ordered to the end of commanding virtue, as when someone wishes to undergo death for God’s sake, his free will is moved by a movement of fortitude at the same time as a motion of charity, which commands the act of fortitude. And so since a movement of free will against sin elicited by penance is commanded by charity, for someone detests the sin he has committed for God’s sake, both movements can be at the same time. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in mutationibus quae sunt termini motus, idem secundum rem est fieri et factum esse, sicut terminari et terminatum esse; sed diversimode significatur in fieri, scilicet secundum respectum ad motum praecedentem, cujus est terminus in facto esse secundum se; et ideo non sequitur quod simul sit et non sit, sed quod habeat esse post non esse. Reply Obj. 3: In changes that are the terminus of a motion, coming to be and having come to be are the same in reality, just as being terminated and to have been terminated. But it is signified in different ways in becoming, namely, according to its relation to the preceding motion, whose terminus is essentially in having been done. And therefore it does not follow that it is and is not at the same time, but that it has being after not having being. Ad quartum patet solutio ex praedictis. The solution to the fourth objection is clear from what has been said. Quaestio 2 Question 2 De contritione On contrition Deinde quaeritur de contritione; et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque: Next contrition is asked about; and concerning this, five questions arise: primo, quid sit; first, what it is; secundo, de quo esse debeat; second, what it should be about; tertio, quanta esse debeat; third, how much there should be; quarto, de duratione ipsius; fourth, its duration; quinto, de effectu ejus. fifth, its effect. Articulus 1 Article 1 Quid sit What contrition is Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contritio non sit dolor pro peccatis assumptus cum proposito confitendi et satisfaciendi, ut quidam definiunt. Dolor enim in hoc a timore differt, quod dolor est de malo praesenti, timor de malo futuro. Sed peccata de quibus homo conteritur, non sunt quando est contritio, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo de eis non potest esse dolor. Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. It seems that contrition is not sorrow for sins assumed with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction, as some people define it. For sorrow differs from fear in that sorrow is about present evil, but fear is about future evil. But the sins that a man is contrite for do not exist when the contrition exists, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, there cannot be sorrow for them. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in Lib. de Civ. Dei, dolor est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. Sed peccata non sunt hujusmodi. Ergo, etc. Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the City of God, sorrow is for those things that happen to us against our will. But sins are not like that. Therefore, etc.