Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod aliquod sacramentum sit tantum in remedium, scilicet matrimonium. Solus enim consensus mutuus matrimonium facit. Sed consensus non potest esse causa gratiae, quia gratia non est ex actibus nostris. Ergo in matrimonio gratia non confertur; et sic est in remedium tantum. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one sacrament is a remedy only, namely, marriage. For mutual consent alone makes a marriage. But consent cannot be a cause of grace, for grace is not from our acts. Therefore, in marriage grace is not conferred, and so it is only a remedy. Praeterea, secundum Hugonem, sacramenta ex sanctificatione invisibilem gratiam continent. Sed sanctificatio quae fit per ministros ecclesiae, non est de essentia matrimonii quantum ad sacramenti necessitatem, sed solum est de solemnitate ipsius. Ergo non confertur ibi gratia; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Hugh, sacraments, by their sanctification, contain invisible grace. But the sanctification done by the ministers of the Church is not of the essence of marriage as necessary for the sacrament, but belongs only to its solemnity. Therefore, no grace is conferred there, and so the same as above. Praeterea, hoc Magister expresse in littera dicit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Master expressly says this in the text. Sed contra, definitio generis debet omnibus speciebus convenire. Sed in definitione sacramenti novae legis ponitur: ut causa gratiae existat. Ergo convenit matrimonio; et sic non est tantum in remedium. On the contrary, the definition of the genus must apply to all species. But in the definition of sacrament of the New Law is included that it exists as a cause of grace. Therefore, it belongs to marriage; and so it is not a remedy only. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod sacramenta non sint in remedium contra poenam, sed solum contra culpam. Sacramenta enim efficaciam habent ex hoc quod gratiam continent. Sed gratia non opponitur poenae, sed culpae. Ergo sacramenta non ordinantur in remedium contra poenam. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that sacraments are not a remedy against punishment, but only against the fault itself. For sacraments have efficacy from the fact that they contain grace. But grace is not opposed to punishment, but to fault. Therefore, sacraments are not ordained as a remedy against punishment. Praeterea, sapientis medici est per causam curare effectum. Sed causa poenae est culpa. Ergo cum Christus sit sapientissimus medicus, non instituit aliqua sacramenta ad curandum poenam, nisi ea quae curant et culpam. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the effect of a wise physician is to cure something through its cause. But the cause of punishment is fault. Therefore, since Christ is the wisest physician, he did not institute certain sacraments to cure punishment, except those that also cure the fault. Sed contra, extrema unctio contra infirmitatem videtur ordinari, ut patet Jac. ult. Sed infirmitas poena est. Cum ergo extrema unctio sit sacramentum, aliquod sacramentum ordinabitur contra poenam, et non tantum contra culpam. On the contrary, extreme unction seems to be ordained against illness, as is clear from the end of the letter of James. But illness is a punishment. Therefore, since extreme unction is a sacrament, there is a sacrament that is ordained against a punishment, and not only against fault. Quaestiuncula 4 Quaestiuncula 4 Ulterius. Videtur quod aliquod sacramentum ordinetur contra culpam venialem. Quaedam enim sacramenta sunt nociva, nisi deposito mortali accipiantur, sicut patet de Eucharistia et de ordine. Sed dantur in remedium alicujus culpae. Ergo dantur contra venialem. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that there is a sacrament ordained against venial sin. For certain sacraments are harmful unless they are received by someone free from mortal sin, as is evident in the Eucharist and holy orders. But these are given to remedy some fault. Therefore, they are given against venial sin. Praeterea, medicina spiritualis magis debet apponi contra culpam quam contra poenam. Sed peccatum veniale culpa aliqua est. Cum ergo aliqua sacramenta ordinentur contra poenam, multo fortius videtur quod aliquod possit ordinari contra culpam venialem. Obj. 2: Furthermore, spiritual medicine should be applied against fault rather than against punishment. But venial sin is a certain fault. Since, then, certain sacraments are ordered against punishment, it seems that much more should some sacrament be ordered against venial sin. Sed contra, poenitentia ordinatur contra mortale et veniale peccatum; quod patet per Magistrum qui infra, dist. 6, determinat de poenitentia venialium, et Augustinum in Lib. de Poenitentia. Sed poenitentia sufficit contra mortale nec aliud sacramentum contra mortale ordinatur. Ergo multo magis sufficit contra veniale; nec oportet aliquod sacramentum speciale contra veniale ordinari. On the contrary, penance is ordered against mortal and venial sin, which is clear from what the Master says below (Dist. 6), where he discusses the confession of venial sins, and from Augustine in the book On Penance. But penance suffices against mortal sin, nor is there any other sacrament ordained against mortal sin. Therefore, much more does it suffice against venial sin; nor is it necessary for any special sacrament to be ordained against venial sin. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum, ad primam quaestionem, quod quandocumque ad perfectionem alicujus rei oportet aliquid apponere ultra id quod requirit ordo illius naturae secundum se consideratae hoc accidit ad subveniendum alicui defectui illius rei; sicut quando ad sustentationem corporis non sufficit cibum ministrare, nisi addantur aliqua digestiva, signum est defectus in virtute digerente. Ex ordine autem humanae naturae nihil aliud requiritur ad ejus perfectionem spiritualem, nisi Deus influens, et gratia, et virtutes influxae. Unde cum aliquae res corporales adhibentur ad hominis sanctificationem ex quibus secundum ordinem naturae sanctificatio hominis non dependet, signum est quod hoc sit ad subveniendum alicui defectui ipsius; et ideo cum hoc inveniatur in omnibus sacramentis, omnia sacramenta in remedium alicujus spiritualis defectus instituta sunt. To the first question, I answer that whenever the perfection of some thing necessitates applying something beyond what the order of its nature requires, considered in itself, this happens to supply some defect of the thing; as when, for the sustenance of the body, it is insufficient to administer food unless some kind of digestives are added, this is a sign of a defect in the power of digestion. But by the order of human nature nothing else is required for its spiritual perfection, except God flowing in, and grace, and the infused virtues. Hence when certain corporeal things are applied for man’s sanctification on which, according to the order of nature, man’s sanctification does not depend, it is a sign that this is for the repairing of some defect in him; and thus, since this is found in all the sacraments, all the sacraments were instituted as a remedy for some spiritual defect. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod ad sanctitatem homo perducitur per ea quae naturae secundum se consideratae ordo non requirit, signum est quod alicui defectui remedium adhibetur. Unde quamvis sacramenta ex ratione sanctificationis non habeant quod sint in remedium, habent tamen hoc ex officio, sive ex modo sanctificandi. Reply Obj. 1: The very fact that man is led to sanctity by things that the order of nature considered in itself does not require is a sign that a remedy is applied for some defect. Hence although sacraments are not considered remedies under the account of sanctification, they are nevertheless considered such ex officio, or in their mode of sanctifying. Ad secundum dicendum, quod defectus spiritualis dupliciter contingit, sicut et corporalis. Uno modo ex positione contrarii, sicut quando corpus est aegrum, et quando in anima est peccatum. Alio modo ex subtractione ejus quod ad perfectionem necessarium erat vel corporis vel animae; sicut quando corpus est debile ad exercenda corporalia opera, et similiter quando spiritus ad exequenda spiritualia. Remedia ergo quae dantur contra primum defectum, aliquid realiter tollunt; et ideo purgationis rationem habent. Remedia autem quae sunt contra defectum secundum, non tollunt aliquid secundum rem, sed solum aliquid adjiciunt ad perfectionem; et ideo talia remedia non dicuntur purgare, sed perficere. Et haec eadem sunt quae Magister dicit nos gratia et virtute fulcire inquantum perfectiva sunt; nihilominus tamen in remedium alicujus defectus sunt. Reply Obj. 2: A spiritual defect happens in two ways, just as a physical one does. One way is by the intrusion of a contrary, as when a body is sick, and when there is sin in the soul. The other way is by the removal of something that was necessary for the perfection of either the body or the soul; as when a body is weak in carrying out physical work, and likewise when the spirit is weak in accomplishing spiritual things. Therefore, the remedies that are given against the first kind of defect remove something in reality; and thus they have the account of purgation. But the remedies that are against the second defect do not remove anything according to reality, but only contribute something toward perfection; and so remedies like this are not said to purge but to perfect. And these are the same that the Master says bolster us in grace and virtue, as they are perfective; but they are a remedy for some defect nevertheless. Unde patet solutio ad tertium. And thus the solution to the third objection is clear. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod circa hoc sunt duae opiniones. Una est quod in matrimonio gratia aliqua non confertur; sed tantummodo sit in remedium contra concupiscentiam. To the second question, it should be said that concerning this there are two opinions. One is that in marriage no grace is conferred, but it is merely a remedy against concupiscence. Hoc autem non videtur convenienter dictum: quia aut intelligitur esse in remedium concupiscentiae, quasi concupiscentiam reprimens, quod sine gratia esse non potest: aut quasi concupiscentiae in parte satisfaciens, quod quidem facit ex ipsa natura actus, non intellecta etiam ratione sacramenti; et praeterea concupiscentia non reprimitur per hoc quod ei satisfit, sed magis augetur, ut Philosophus dicit in 3 Ethic.: aut inquantum excusat concupiscentiae actum; quod sine matrimonio deformis esset; et hoc quidem facit per bona matrimonii quae ei conveniunt etiam inquantum est in officium, et ratione suae sanctificationis, cum qua communicat cum sacramentis veteris legis; et ita per hoc non haberet aliquid prae illis, ut cum sacramentis novae legis computari debeat. But this does not seem to be fittingly said: for it is understood to be a remedy against concupiscence either by repressing it, which cannot happen without grace; or by satisfying concupiscence in part, which the act does indeed by its very nature, even when not understood under the account of sacrament (and furthermore, concupiscence is not repressed by satisfying it, but rather it is increased, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3); or else it excuses the act of concupiscence, which would be deformed without marriage; and this it does indeed through the goods of marriage which belong to it even as it is an office of nature, as well as under the account of its signification, which it shares with the sacraments of the Old Law. And in this way it would not have anything above those sacraments so that it should be counted among the sacraments of the New Law. Et propter hoc alii dicunt, quod matrimonium consideratur in triplici statu. Primo ante peccatum et tunc erat tantum in officium. Secundo sub lege, ubi ex ipsa sanctificatione sua excusabilem reddebat matrimonii actum, qui absque hoc turpis fuisset. Tertio sub statu gratiae, ubi ulterius gratiam confert ad concupiscentiam reprimendam, ut scilicet unusquisque possideat vas suum in honorem, et non in contumeliam, sicut et gentes quae ignorant Deum, 1 Thessal. 4, et Tob. 6, dicitur, quod in illis qui in timore Dei uxores accipiunt et amore filiorum ad cultum Dei magis quam amore libidinis, daemon potestatem non habet. And because of this, others say that marriage is considered in three states. The first was before sin, and at that time it was only an office. The second was under the law, when by its own sanctification it rendered the marriage act excusable, which would have been disgraceful otherwise. The third is under the state of grace, where, moreover, it confers the grace to repress concupiscence so that each one may possess his own vessel in honor, not in reproach, like the gentiles who do not know God (cf. 1 Thess 4); and it is said (cf. Tob 6:17) that among those who, in the fear of God, take wives from the desire for children to raise to the worship of God rather than the love of sexual pleasure, the devil does not have power. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut res corporales quae sunt in aliis sacramentis non habent ut propria virtute gratiam conferre possint, sed ex institutione divina, ita etiam est de illis quae matrimonium causant, quae ex ipsa institutione divina habent quod ad gratiam instrumentaliter disponant, nisi sit defectus ex parte nostra. Reply Obj. 1: Just as the physical things that are in the other sacraments do not have the power to confer grace by their own strength, but by divine institution, so it is also with those that cause marriage, which have from that very divine institution the ability to distribute grace instrumentally, unless there is a defect on our part. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quaedam sacramenta sunt ad quorum efficaciam praeexigitur sanctificatio materiae, ut patet in confirmatione vel extrema unctione; quaedam vero non praeexigunt praedictam sanctificationem, sicut patet in baptismo. Unde benedictio materiae quae fit a ministro, non est de necessitate, sed de solemnitate sacramenti; et similiter est etiam de matrimonio. Reply Obj. 2: There are certain sacraments whose efficacy requires a prior sanctification of the matter, as is evident in confirmation and extreme unction; but certain ones do not require such a sanctification, as is evident in baptism. Hence the blessing of the matter done by the minister is not of necessity for the sacrament, but is rather for the sacrament’s solemnity; and it is the same way with marriage. Ad tertium dicendum, quod unumquodque denominatur ab eo ad quod est. Gratia autem quae in matrimonio confertur, secundum quod est sacramentum ecclesiae in fide Christi celebratum, ordinatur directe ad reprimendum concupiscentiam, quae concurrit ad actum matrimonii; et ideo Magister dicit, quod matrimonium est tantum in remedium; sed hoc est per gratiam quae in eo confertur. Reply Obj. 3: Each thing is named from what it is for. But the grace that is conferred in marriage, according as it is a sacrament of the Church celebrated in the faith of Christ, is ordered directly to repressing concupiscence, which coincides with the marital act; and this is why the Master says that marriage is a remedy only, but this through the grace that is conferred in it. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod duplex est poena peccati. Quaedam quae pro peccato infligitur, sicut poena inferni, et flagella quibus a Deo temporaliter punimur; quaedam ex ipso peccato consequens immediate, et per consequens ad peccatum ordinans, sicut est debilitatio naturae ad resistendum peccato, et hujusmodi. Contra primam ergo poenam non datur sacramentum in remedium directe, sed ex consequenti, ut scilicet curata causa, scilicet peccato, cesset effectus, scilicet poena; sed contra secundam poenam datur directe aliquod sacramentum, illa scilicet quae in remedium sunt contra defectum contingentem ex subtractione necessarii, non ex positione contrarii. To the third question, it should be said that suffering for sin is twofold. Some is imposed for sin, such as the suffering of hell and the scourges by which we are temporally punished by God; some following immediately upon the sin itself, and ordering to sin as a result, such as the weakening of nature in resisting sin, and things like that. Therefore, a sacrament is not given as a remedy against the first kind directly, but by way of consequence—namely, so that by having cured the cause, which is sin, the effect would cease, which is suffering. But against the second kind of suffering a certain sacrament is given directly, namely those that are remedies against defects occurring when something necessary is taken away, not those that introduce a contrary. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod poenae contra quas dictum est sacramentum ordinari, etiam ad gratiam contrarietatem habent: quia ex subtractione contingunt, et in contrarium gratiae ordinant. Reply Obj. 1: The sufferings against which a sacrament was said to be ordained are also contrary to grace: for they occur by taking something away and they are ordered to the contrary of grace. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut est in medicina corporali, quod curato morbo adhuc remanent aliquae reliquiae morbi ex morbo causatae, contra quas oportet specialia medicamenta dari, ita etiam est in medicina spirituali; et propter hoc contra praedictas poenas oportet esse aliqua sacramenta. Reply Obj. 2: Just as in bodily medicine, where once a disease is cured certain vestiges of the disease caused by it remain, against which special medicaments must be given, so also is it in spiritual medicine; and because of this there must be certain sacraments against the sufferings mentioned. Quaestiuncula 4 Response to Quaestiuncula 4 Ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, aliqua sacramenta in remedium venialis dari, sicut Eucharistiam, et extremam unctionem. To the fourth question, it should be said that concerning this there are two opinions. For some people say that certain sacraments are given as a remedy for venial sin, like the Eucharist, and extreme unction. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum: quia poenitentia purgativa est universaliter omnis peccati actualis, mortalis et venialis; unde ad hoc non oportebat aliquod sacramentum institui. Et praeterea etiam non existentibus venialibus, adhuc necessitas illorum sacramentorum esset ad consummandum in bonum, secundum doctrinam Dionysii. But this does not seem to be fittingly said: for penance is purgative of all actual sin, mortal and venial; hence for this end [viz., to purge venial sin], it was not necessary that a sacrament be instituted. And furthermore, even were there no venial sins, still those sacraments would be necessary for consummation in good, according to the doctrine of Dionysius. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod contra veniale non ordinatur aliquod sacramentum ad curationem ipsius principaliter institutum, quamvis ex consequenti multa sacramenta, contra venialia valeant. Veniale enim et culpa est, et dispositio ad culpam, imperfectam tamen rationem habens culpae, ita quod gratiam non excludit. Et ideo inquantum culpa est, potest tolli per omnia sacramenta quae contra culpam tollendam ordinantur; inquantum vero est dispositio ad culpam, ex ablata mortali culpa remanens, potest tolli etiam per sacramenta illa quae contra poenam ex culpa relictam et ad culpam inclinantem ordinantur. And thus it should be said otherwise that against venial sin there is not ordained any sacrament instituted chiefly for its cure, although many sacraments avail against venial sins by way of result. For venial sin is both a fault and a disposition to fault—though having an incomplete account of fault, so that it does not exclude grace. And thus, to the extent that it is a fault, it can be taken away by all the sacraments that are ordered to the removal of fault; but to the extent that it is a disposition to fault remaining from the mortal fault that has been taken away, it can be removed also by those sacraments that are ordered against the punishment left behind by fault and inclining one to fault. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa sacramenta quae gratiam in suscipiente praeexigunt, non ordinantur directe contra culpam: quia non sunt ad tollendum contrarium, sed ad supplendum defectum. Reply Obj. 1: Those sacraments that require grace to exist in the recipient are not ordered directly against fault; for they are not for removing a contrary, but for supplying a lack. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sacramentum quod tollit mortalem culpam, sufficit etiam ad tollendum venialem; et ideo contra veniale non oportet aliquod sacramentum dari, sicut contra reliquias culpae, ad quarum ablationem poenitentia non ex toto sufficit sine aliis sacramentis. Reply Obj. 2: The sacrament that takes away mortal fault suffices also for removing venial sin; and thus no sacrament needed to be given against venial sin in the way that one needed to be given against the vestiges of fault, for whose removal penance does not entirely suffice without other sacraments. Articulus 2 Article 2