Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poena temporalis cujus reatus post poenitentiam manet, non taxetur secundum quantitatem culpae. Taxatur enim secundum quantitatem delectationis quae fuit in peccato, ut patet Apoc. 18, 7: quantum glorificavit se, et in deliciis fuit, tantum date illi tormentum et luctum. Sed quandoque ubi est major delectatio, est minor culpa: quia peccata carnalia quae plus habent delectationis quam spiritualia, minus habent de culpa, secundum Gregorium. Ergo poena non taxatur secundum quantitatem culpae. Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that the temporal punishment whose obligation remains after penance is not reckoned according to one’s guilt. For it is reckoned according to the quantity of pleasure that was taken in sin, as is clear from Revelation 18:7: as she glorified herself and lived in pleasures, so give her a like measure of torment and grief. But sometimes where there is more pleasure, there is less guilt: for according to Gregory, carnal sins, which contain more pleasure than spiritual ones, have less guilt. Therefore, the punishment is not reckoned according to the amount of guilt. Praeterea, eodem modo aliquis obligatur ad praecepta moralia in nova lege sicut in veteri. Sed in veteri lege debebatur pro peccatis poenitentia septem dierum, ut scilicet septem diebus immundi essent. Cum ergo in novo testamento imponatur poena septennis pro uno peccato mortali, videtur quod quantitas poenae non respiciat quantitatem culpae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, a person is obliged to the moral precepts in the same way in the new law as in the old. But in the old law the penance due for sins was seven days, so that, namely, they were unclean for seven days. Therefore, since a seven-year punishment is imposed in the New Testament for one mortal sin, it seems that the amount of punishment does not have to do with the amount of guilt. Praeterea, majus est peccatum homicidii in laico quam peccatum fornicationis in sacerdote: quia circumstantia quae sumitur ex specie peccati, magis aggravat quam quae sumitur ex conditione personae. Sed laico pro homicidio imponitur septennis poenitentia; sacerdoti pro fornicatione decem annorum, secundum canones. Ergo poena non taxatur secundum quantitatem culpae. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sin of murder is greater in a layman than the sin of fornication in a priest, for the circumstance that is taken from the sin’s species makes it more serious than the circumstance taken from the condition of the person. But a seven-year penance is imposed on a lay person for murder, while ten years is imposed on a priest for fornication, according to the canons. Therefore, punishment is not reckoned according to the amount of guilt. Praeterea, maximum peccatum est quod in ipsum corpus Christi committitur: quia tanto gravius quis peccat, quanto major est in quem peccatur. Sed pro effusione sanguinis Christi in sacramento altaris contenti, injungitur poenitentia quadraginta dierum, vel parum amplius; pro fornicatione autem simplici injungitur poena septennis secundum canones. Ergo quantitas poenae non respondet quantitati culpae. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the greatest sin is one committed against the body of Christ itself, for the greater the person who is sinned against, the more gravely someone sins. But for spilling the blood of Christ contained in the sacrament of the altar a penance of forty days is imposed, or even less; while for simple fornication a punishment of seven years is imposed, according to the canons. Therefore, the amount of punishment does not correspond to the amount of guilt. Sed contra, Isai. 27, 8: in mensura contra mensuram, cum abjecta fuerit, judicabo eam. Ergo quantitas judicii punitionis peccati est secundum quantitatem culpae. On the contrary (1), in measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, I will judge it (Isa 27:8). Therefore, the amount of punishment adjudicated for a sin is according to the amount of guilt. Praeterea, homo reducitur ad aequalitatem justitiae per poenam inflictam. Sed hoc non esset, si quantitas culpae et poenae non sibi responderet. Ergo unum alteri respondet. Furthermore (2), a man is brought back to the equality of justice by punishment inflicted. But this would not be the case if the amount of guilt and punishment did not correspond to each other. Therefore, one corresponds to the other. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod poenitens non sit debitor majoris poenae quam illius quae a sacerdote est sibi injuncta. Sacramentum enim semper consequitur suum effectum, nisi sit defectus ex parte recipientis, vel ex parte conferentis. Sed quandoque imponitur minor poenitentia quam sit condigna; et non est defectus ex parte recipientis, quia paratus esset omnem poenitentiam sibi injunctam facere; nec est defectus ex parte conferentis sacramentum, quia secundum conscientiam suam et discretionem talem poenam taxat. Ergo videtur, cum sacramentum poenitentiae sit ordinatum contra peccatum totaliter destruendum, et quantum ad poenam et quantum ad culpam; quod non remaneat debitor alicujus poenae, poenitentia injuncta peracta. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the penitent does not have to pay a greater debt of punishment than what the priest has imposed on him. For the sacrament always accomplishes its own effect, unless there is a defect on the part of the one receiving or conferring it. But sometimes less penance is imposed than is befitting. And this is not a defect on the part of the recipient, for he was prepared to do any penance imposed on him; nor is it a defect on the part of the one conferring the sacrament, for he assigned the penance according to his conscience and discretion. Therefore, since the sacrament of penance is ordered toward the total destruction of sin, both as to fault and as to punishment, it seems that there is no punishment left to pay once the penance enjoined has been performed. Praeterea, Deus est pronior ad remittendum poenam quam ad exigendum. Sed si iste sacerdos majorem poenam satisfactoriam injunxisset, poenitens obligaretur ad eam faciendam. Ergo videtur quod si insufficientem poenam injungat, non exigatur aliquid amplius ab eo. Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is more likely to forgive punishment than to demand it. But if some priest had imposed a greater punishment in satisfaction, the penitent would be obliged to do it. Therefore, it seems that if he imposes insufficient punishment, nothing more will be demanded from the penitent. Praeterea, in purgatorio aliquis gravius punitur quam in hac vita. Si ergo post peractam poenitentiam a sacerdote injunctam, adhuc manet poena purgatorii, videtur quod multum noceat sacerdos poenitenti levem poenitentiam injungendo: et ita videtur quod sit valde periculosum confessiones audire, cum non de facili possit sciri quantitas poenae debitae pro peccato; immo sit impossibile, quia sacerdos non potest scire neque quantitatem contritionis neque quantitatem affectionis quam peccator habuit in peccando. Obj. 3: Furthermore, in purgatory a person is punished more severely than in this life. Therefore, if after having performed the penance imposed by the priest, the punishment of purgatory still remains, it seems that the priest harms the penitent greatly by imposing a light penance. And so it seems that it is extremely dangerous to hear confessions, since the amount of punishment due to a sin cannot easily be known. Or rather, it is impossible, for a priest can know neither the amount of contrition nor the amount of affection that a sinner had in sinning. Sed contra, secundum quantitatem delicti debet esse plagarum modus ex praecepto legis. Si ergo minus imponatur, residuum ab eo in purgatorio exigetur. On the contrary (1), the measure of blows should be according to the quantity of the offense, by the precept of the law (Deut 25:2). Therefore, if less is imposed, the remaining will be demanded from someone in purgatory. Praeterea, error sacerdotis non potest poenitenti prodesse. Prodesset autem, si non teneretur ad plus quam sibi per errorem imponit. Ergo videtur quod sit adhuc debitor majoris poenae. Furthermore (2), the error of the priest cannot benefit the penitent. But it would benefit him, if he were not bound to more than was imposed on him by error. Therefore, it seems that he would still have more punishment to pay. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod poenam satisfactoriam non possit unus pro alio explere. Quia ad satisfactionem meritum requiritur. Sed unus pro altero non potest mereri vel demereri, cum sit scriptum: tu reddis unicuique secundum opera sua. Ergo unus pro alio non potest satisfacere. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that one person cannot fulfill the punishment satisfying for another. For merit is required for satisfaction. But one person cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written: you will render to each according to his works (Ps 62:12). Therefore, one person cannot make satisfaction for another. Praeterea, satisfactio contra contritionem et confessionem dividitur. Sed unus pro alio non potest conteri aut confiteri. Ergo nec satisfacere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, satisfaction is divided against contrition and confession. But one person cannot have contrition or make a confession for another. Therefore, neither can he make satisfaction. Praeterea, unus orando pro alio etiam sibi meretur. Si ergo aliquis pro alio satisfacere potest; satisfaciendo pro alio, pro se satisfacit; et ita ab eo qui pro altero satisfacit non exigitur alia satisfactio pro peccatis propriis. Obj. 3: Furthermore, one person praying for another also merits for himself. Therefore, if someone can do satisfaction for another, he does satisfaction for himself by doing satisfaction for another; and anyone who does satisfaction for another is not required to do any other satisfaction for his own sins. Praeterea, si unus pro alio satisfacere potest; ergo ex quo unus sibi suscipit debitum poenae, alius statim a debito liberatur; ergo si moriatur postquam tota poena sibi debita ab alio suscepta est, statim evolabit; vel si adhuc puniatur, duplex poena reddetur pro eodem peccato: scilicet illius qui satisfacere incipit, et illius qui punitur in purgatorio. Obj. 4: Furthermore, if one person can make satisfaction for another, then as soon as one person takes on the debt of punishment, the other is immediately freed from this debt. Therefore, if he dies after the whole punishment due to him has been taken by another, he will go right to heaven; or if he is still punished, two punishments will be rendered for the same sin, namely, that of the person who began to make satisfaction, and that of the one who is punished in purgatory. Sed contra, Galat. 6, 2 dicitur: alter alterius onera portate. Ergo videtur quod unus possit onus poenitentiae impositae pro alio suscipere. On the contrary (1), it is said, bear one another’s burdens (Gal 6:2). Therefore, it seems that one person can take on the burden of penance imposed on another. Praeterea, caritas magis potest apud Deum quam apud homines. Sed unus potest apud homines pro alterius amore debitum ejus solvere. Ergo multo fortius hoc in divino judicio fieri potest. Furthermore (2), charity is able to do more with God than among men. But among men, one man can pay the debt of another out of love. Therefore, much more can this happen in divine judgment. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod poena post dimissionem culpae exigitur ad duo; scilicet ad debitum solvendum, et ad remedium praestandum. Potest ergo taxatio poenae considerari quantum ad duo. Primo quantum ad debitum; et sic quantitas poenae radicaliter respondet quantitati culpae, antequam de ea aliquid dimittatur. Sed tamen quod per primum eorum quae nata sunt remittere poenam, plus remittitur, secundum hoc per aliud minus remittendum vel solvendum restat; quia quanto per contritionem plus de poena dimissum est, tanto per confessionem minus dimittendum restat. Secundo quantum ad remedium vel illius qui peccavit, vel aliorum; et sic quandoque pro minori peccato major injungitur poena: vel quia peccato unius difficilius potest resisti quam peccato alterius; sicut juveni pro fornicatione imponitur major poenitentia quam seni, quamvis minus peccet; vel quia in uno peccatum est periculosius, sicut in sacerdote, quam in alio; vel quia multitudo magis prona est ad illud peccatum; et ideo per poenam unius alii sunt exterrendi. Poena ergo in foro poenitentiae quantum ad utrumque taxanda est; et ideo non semper pro majori peccato major poenitentia imponitur. Sed poena purgatorii solum est ad solvendum debitum, quia jam ulterius non manet locus peccandi; et ideo illa poena taxatur solum secundum quantitatem peccati, considerata tamen contritionis quantitate, et confessione, et absolutione; quia per omnia haec aliquid de poena dimittitur. Unde etiam a sacerdote, injungendo satisfactionem, sunt consideranda. To the first question, I answer that punishment is required after faults are forgiven for two reasons, namely, to resolve a debt and to offer a remedy. Therefore, the reckoning of punishment is considered as to two things. First, as to the debt; and then the amount of the punishment fundamentally corresponds to the amount of guilt before any of it is forgiven. But nevertheless, what is forgiven by the first of those things that are apt to forgive punishment is more remitted according to this, that less remains to be remitted or to be loosed; for however much more of the penalty has been forgiven by contrition, that much less remains to be forgiven by confession. Second, as to the remedy either of the person who sinned or others; and this is how sometimes a greater penalty is imposed for a lesser sin, either because it can be more difficult to resist one person’s sin than another’s, as a greater penance is imposed on a young person for fornication than on an old person, although he may sin less; or because in one person, like a priest, a sin is more dangerous than in another. Or because the multitude tends more to that sin, and so by the punishment of one person, the others may be frightened away from it. Therefore, in the penitential forum punishment must be reckoned for both reasons. And so a greater penance is not always imposed for a greater sin. But the punishment of purgatory is only for paying the debt, for at that point there is no further room for sinning. And so that punishment is allotted only according to the quantity of sin, considering as well the quantity of contrition, and confession, and absolution. For by all these things some of the punishment is remitted. Therefore, these things must also be considered by a priest when imposing satisfaction. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in verbis illis duo tanguntur ex parte culpae, scilicet glorificatio, et deliciae; quorum primum pertinet ad elationem peccantis, qua Deo resistit; secundum ad delectationem peccati. Quamvis autem sit minor delectatio quandoque in culpa majori, tamen est ibi semper major elatio; et ideo ratio non procedit. Reply Obj. 1: In those words two things are touched upon on the side of guilt, namely, glorification and delight. The first of these pertains to the sinner’s hubris, by which he resists God; the second, to the pleasure he takes in sin. Now although sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, nevertheless there is always a greater hubris in it; and so the argument does not proceed. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa poena septem dierum non erat expiativa a poena debita peccato; unde etiam si post illos dies moreretur, in purgatorio puniretur; sed expiabatur ab irregularitate, a qua omnia sacrificia legalia expiabant. Nihilominus tamen ceteris paribus plus peccat homo in nova lege quam in veteri propter sanctificationem ampliorem qua sanctificatur in baptismo, et propter beneficia Dei potiora humano generi exhibita; et hoc patet ex hoc quod dicitur Hebr. 10, 29: quanto putatis deteriora mereri supplicia qui filium Dei conculcaverit, et sanguinem testamenti pollutum duxerit, in quo sanctificatus est? Nec tamen hoc est universaliter verum quod exigatur pro quolibet peccato mortali septennis poenitentia; sed hoc est quasi quaedam regula communis, ut in pluribus competens: quam tamen oportet dimittere, consideratis diversis peccatorum circumstantiis. Reply Obj. 2: That penalty of seven days was not expiative of the punishment due to sin; therefore, even if he died after those days, he would be punished in purgatory; but it was expiated of irregularity, from which all the sacrifices of the law expiated. Nevertheless, all other things being equal, man still sins more under the new law than in the old, because of the fuller sanctification by which he is sanctified in baptism, and because of the more powerful benefits God has shown to the human race. And this is clear from the fact that it says, how much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by those who spurn the Son of God and profaned the blood of the covenant in which they were sanctified? (Heb 10:29). Nor, however, is it universally true that seven years’ penance is required for any mortal sin; but this is like a certain general rule, as it applies in many cases, which nevertheless may be dismissed when the different circumstances of sins are considered. Ad tertium dicendum, quod episcopus vel sacerdos cum majori periculo suo et aliorum peccat; et ideo solicitius retrahunt ipsum canones a peccato quam alios, majorem poenam injungendo, secundum quod est in remedium, quamvis quandoque non debeatur tanta ex debito: unde et in purgatorio non tota ab eo exigitur. Reply Obj. 3: When a bishop or priest sins there is more danger to himself and others, and therefore the canons are more concerned to withdraw him from sin than others, by imposing a greater penalty on him as a remedy, although sometimes he might not owe so much from his debt, which is why the whole of it is also not demanded of him in purgatory. Ad quartum dicendum, quod poena illa est intelligenda, quando nolente sacerdote hoc accidit; si enim sponte effunderet, multo graviori poena dignus esset. Reply Obj. 4: That punishment is to be understood when this happens against a priest’s will; but if he spilled it willingly, it would be deserving of a much greater punishment. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod actus ministri bonus vel malus nihil diversificat in efficacia sacramentorum. Unde sive sacerdos discrete se habeat in injunctione poenitentiae, sive non; nihil diversificatur quantum ad efficaciam absolutionis et confessionis et contritionis; et ideo sive discrete poenitentiam injungat, sive non; semper remanet reatus ad quantitatis ejusdem poenam; et ideo si eam hic non explet, ab eo in purgatorio exigetur. To the second question, It should be said that the good or bad action of a minister makes no difference to the efficacy of the sacraments. Therefore, either a priest carries himself discerningly in the imposition of penance, or not; it makes no difference to the efficacy of the absolution and confession and contrition. And therefore whether he imposes a penance discerningly or not, the guilt always remains of the same amount for punishment. And therefore if the penitent does not fulfill this, it will be required of him in purgatory. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quandocumque injungitur poenitentia minor condigno, defectus est ex parte imponentis, vel ex parte recipientis. Sed quandoque potest esse sine culpa utriusque; sicut quando imponens debitam diligentiam adhibet, et recipiens paratus est ad implendum; et propter hoc non est inconveniens, si totaliter a reatu poenae non liberetur. Reply Obj. 1: Whenever a smaller penance is imposed than is appropriate, it is a defect on the part of the one imposing it, or on the part of the recipient. But sometimes it can be without the fault of either one, as when the one imposing it applies due diligence, and the one receiving it is ready to fulfill it; and because of this it is not unfitting if is not completely freed from liability to punishment. Ad secundum dicendum, quod poenitens cum major condigno poenitentia injuncta est, tenetur eam explere ex sacerdotis injunctione, qui non solum debitum poenae considerat, sed peccato remedium adhibet; unde post hanc vitam non exigitur ab eo tota, sed solum quantum sufficit ad debitum solvendum. Reply Obj. 2: When a greater penance is enjoined than is appropriate, the penitent is bound to fulfill it by the injunction of the priest, who not only considers the debt of punishment but applies the remedy for sin. And therefore after this life the whole punishment will not be required, but only as much as suffices to pay the debt. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sacerdos minorem condigno poenitentiam injungens, non semper peccat; tum quia non potest determinate quantitatem poenae debitae cognoscere, quamvis aliquid proprie consideratis regulis patrum determinare possit; tum quia quandoque etiam ex industria minorem poenitentiam imponens, plus prodest poenitenti quam noceat, qui forte magnitudine poenae posset a poenitentia peragenda impediri propter debilitatem virtutis adhuc in eo de novo recuperatae; et ideo negligit minus damnum, ut majus evitet; et iterum paulatim confortatus in eo divinus amor ad plura poenitentiae opera peragenda ipsum incitabit propria sponte quam sacerdos sibi secundum quantitatem peccatorum injungere potuisset. Reply Obj. 3: The priest imposing a less-fitting penance does not always sin, both because he cannot know determinately the amount of punishment owing, although he could determine something properly by considering the rules laid down by the fathers; or because sometimes also because, imposing a lesser penalty out of diligance, he benefits the penitent more than he hurts him, because perhaps he could be impeded from performing the penance by its quantity, because of the weakness of virtue still recovering in him. And so he disregards in a small loss so as to avoid a greater one. And again the divine love strengthened gradually in him will incite him to complete more works of penance of his own will than the priest could have imposed on him according to the quantity of his sins. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod poena satisfactoria est ad duo; scilicet ad solutionem debiti, et ad medicinam pro peccato vitando. Inquantum ergo est ad remedium sequentis peccati, sic satisfactio unius non prodest alteri; quia ex jejunio unius caro alterius non domatur, nec ex actibus unius alius bene agere consuevit, nisi secundum accidens, inquantum aliquis per bona opera potest alteri mereri augmentum gratiae, quae efficacissimum remedium est ad peccatum vitandum. Sed hoc est per modum meriti magis quam per modum satisfactionis. To the third question, it should be said that satisfactory punishment is for two things; namely, the resolution of a debt, and a medicine for avoiding sin. To the extent, therefore, that it is a remedy for subsequent sin, the satisfaction of one person cannot benefit another; for one person’s fasting does not tame another’s flesh, nor from the acts of one person does another grow accustomed to acting well, except accidentally, to the extent that someone can, by his own good works, merit for another an increase of grace, which is the most efficacious remedy for avoiding sin. But this is more by the mode of merit than by the mode of satisfaction. Sed quantum ad satisfactionem debiti unus potest pro alio satisfacere, dummodo sit in caritate, ut opera ejus satisfactoria esse possint. Nec oportet quod major poena imponatur ei qui pro altero satisfacit, quam principali imponeretur, ut quidam dicunt, hac ratione moti, quia poena propria magis satisfacit quam aliena; quia poena habet vim satisfaciendi, maxime ratione caritatis qua homo ipsam sustinet. Et quia major caritas apparet in hoc quod aliquis pro altero satisfacit quam si ipse satisfaceret; ideo minor poena requiritur in eo qui pro altero satisfacit, quam in principali requireretur. Unde dicitur in Vitis patrum, quod propter caritatem unius, qui alterius fratris sui caritate ductus, poenitentiam fecit pro peccato quod non commiserat, alteri peccatum quod commiserat, dimissum est. But as to the resolution of the debt, one person can make satisfaction for another, as long as it is in charity, so that his works may be satisfactory ones. Nor is it necessary that a greater punishment be imposed on someone who makes satisfaction for another than would be imposed on the main person, as some say, moved by the fact that one’s own punishment makes satisfaction more than someone else’s. But this is nothing, for punishment has the power of making satisfaction mostly by reason of the charity with which a man endures it. And since greater charity appears in someone’s making satisfaction for another than if he himself made satisfaction, therefore less punishment is required in the one who makes satisfaction for another than would be required in the main person. Therefore it is said in the Lives of the Fathers that because of the charity of one man, who out of charity for a brother did penance for a sin that he had not committed, the other was forgiven the sin that he had committed. Nec exigitur etiam quantum ad solutionem debiti, quod ille pro quo fit satisfactio, sit impotens ad satisfaciendum; quia etiam si esset potens, alio satisfaciente pro ipso, ipse a debito immunis esset. Sed hoc requiritur inquantum poena satisfactoria est in remedium; unde non est permittendum ut aliquis pro alio poenitentiam faciat, nisi defectus aliquis appareat in poenitente; vel corporalis, per quem sit impotens ad sustinendum; vel spiritualis, per quem non sit promptus ad portandum poenam. Nor is it required for the resolution of the debt that the person for whom one does satisfaction be powerless to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were capable, when another person satisfies for him he would be cleansed from his debt. But that a person undertake it himself is required for a satisfactory penalty as a remedy. This is why it should not be permitted that anyone do penance for another, unless some defect should appear in the penitent, whether physical, by which he is incapable of enduring it, or spiritual, by which he is not ready to bear the penalty. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod praemium essentiale redditur secundum dispositionem hominis; quia secundum capacitatem videntium erit plenitudo visionis divinae; et ideo, sicut unus non disponitur per actum alterius, ita unus alteri non meretur praemium essentiale, nisi meritum ejus habeat efficaciam infinitam, sicut Christi, cujus merito solo pueri baptizati ad vitam aeternam perveniunt. Sed poena temporalis pro peccato debita post culpae remissionem non taxatur secundum dispositionem ejus cui debetur; quia quandoque ille qui est melior, habet majoris poenae reatum; et ideo quantum ad poenae dimissionem unus alteri mereri potest, et actus unius efficitur alterius, caritate mediante, per quam omnes unum sumus in Christo. Reply Obj. 1: The essential reward is granted according to a person’s disposition, for the fullness of divine vision will be according to the capacity of the ones seeing it. And therefore just as one person is not disposed by the act of another, so one does not merit for another the essential reward, unless his merit should have infinite efficacy, as Christ’s did, by whose merit alone baptized children attain eternal life. But temporal punishment for sin to be paid after the remission of guilt is not reckoned according to the disposition of the one to whom it is due, for sometimes someone who is better is liable to more punishment, and therefore as to the remission of punishment one person can merit for another, and the act of one person is done for another by means of charity, through which we are all one in Christ (Gal 3:28).