Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sexus femineus non impediat ordinis susceptionem. Quia officium prophetiae est majus quam sacerdotis officium: quia propheta est medius inter Deum et sacerdotem, sicut sacerdos inter Deum et populum. Sed prophetiae officium aliquando mulieribus est concessum, ut patet 4 Reg. Ergo et sacerdotii officium eis competere potest. Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that the feminine sex does not impede the reception of holy orders. For the office of prophecy is greater than the office of priest, since a prophet is an intermediary between God and a priest, just as a priest is between God and the people. But the office of prophecy was sometimes granted to women, as is clear from 2 Kings 22:14. Therefore, the office of priest can also apply to them. Praeterea, sicut ordo ad quamdam perfectionem pertinet, ita et praelationis officium, et martyrium, et religionis status. Sed praelatio committitur mulieribus in novo testamento, ut patet de abbatissis, et in veteri, ut patet de Debora quae judicavit Israel, judicum 4: competit etiam eis martyrium, et religionis status. Ergo et ordo Ecclesiae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as holy orders pertains to a certain perfection, so does the office of governance, and martyrdom, and religious life. But governance is committed to women in the New Testament, as is seen in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as is seen in Deborah who judged Israel, Judges 4:4; and martyrdom and religious life also apply to them. Therefore, so do the orders of the Church. Praeterea, ordinum potestas in anima fundatur. Sed sexus non est in anima. Ergo diversitas sexuum non facit distinctionem in receptione ordinum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power of holy orders is based in the soul. But gender is not in the soul. Therefore, difference in gender does not cause a distinction in the reception of holy orders. Sed contra est quod dicitur 1 Tim. 2, 12: mulierem docere in Ecclesia non permitto, nec dominari in virum. On the contrary (1), it is said in 1 Timothy 2:12: I do not permit a woman to teach in the Church, nor to rule over men. Praeterea, in ordinandis praeexigitur corona, quamvis non de necessitate sacramenti. Sed corona et tonsura non competit mulieribus, ut patet 1 Corinth. 11. Ergo nec ordinum susceptio. Furthermore (2), the crown-shaped tonsure is required in those to be ordained, even though it is not necessary to the sacrament. But the crown and the tonsure do not befit women, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 11:6. Therefore, neither does the reception of holy orders. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod pueri, et qui carent usu rationis, non possint ordines suscipere. Quia, ut in littera dicitur, sacri canones in suscipientibus ordines certum aetatis tempus determinaverunt. Sed hoc non esset, si pueri recipere possent ordinis sacramentum. Ergo, etc. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that children and those who lack the use of reason cannot receive holy orders. For as it says in the text, the sacred canons have determined a certain age for receiving holy orders. But this would not be the case if children could receive the sacrament of holy orders. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, sacramentum ordinis est dignius quam matrimonium. Sed pueri, et alii carentes usu rationis, non possunt contrahere matrimonium. Ergo nec ordines suscipere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sacrament of holy orders is nobler than marriage. But children and others lacking the use of reason cannot contract marriage. Therefore, neither can they receive holy orders. Praeterea, cujus est potentia, ejus est actus, secundum Philosophum in Lib. de Somno et vigilia. Sed actus ordinis requirit usum rationis. Ergo et ordinis potestas. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the one who has the power also has the act, according to the Philosopher in his book On Sleep and Wakefulness. But the act of holy orders requires the use of reason. Therefore, so does the power of holy orders. Sed contra, ille qui ante annos discretionis est promotus ad ordines, sine iteratione ipsorum quandoque in eis conceditur ministrare, ut patet Extra, de clerico ordinato per saltum. Hoc autem non esset, si ordinem non suscepisset. Ergo puer potest ordinem suscipere. On the contrary (1), it is sometimes granted to a person who is promoted to holy orders before the years of discretion to minister without his ordination being repeated, as is clear from the canons on clerics ordained by a leap. But this would not be the case if he had not received holy orders. Therefore, a child can receive holy orders. Praeterea, alia sacramenta in quibus character imprimitur, possunt pueri suscipere, ut baptismum et confirmationem. Ergo pari ratione ordinem. Furthermore (2), children can receive other sacraments in which a character is imprinted, like baptism and confirmation. Therefore, by the same argument, holy orders. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod quaedam requiruntur in recipiente sacramentum quasi de necessitate sacramenti, quae si desint, non potest aliquis suscipere neque sacramentum neque rem sacramenti; quaedam vero requiruntur non de necessitate sacramenti, sed de necessitate praecepti propter congruitatem ad sacramentum; et sine talibus aliquis suscipit sacramentum, sed non rem sacramenti. Dicendum ergo, quod sexus virilis requiritur ad susceptionem ordinis non solum secundo modo, sed etiam primo. Unde etsi mulieri exhibeantur omnia quae in ordinibus fiunt, ordinem non suscipit: quia cum sacramentum sit signum, in his quae in sacramento aguntur, requiritur non solum res, sed significatio rei; sicut dictum est, quod in extrema unctione exigitur quod sit infirmus, ut significetur curatione indigens. Cum ergo in sexu femineo non possit significari aliqua eminentia gradus, quia mulier statum subjectionis habet; ideo non potest ordinis sacramentum suscipere. Quidam autem dixerunt, quod sexus virilis est de necessitate praecepti, sed non de necessitate sacramenti: quia etiam in decretis fit mentio de diaconissa et presbytera. Sed diaconissa dicitur quae in aliquo actu diaconi participat, sicut quae legit homiliam in Ecclesia; presbytera autem dicitur vidua, quia presbyter idem est quod senior. To the first question, I answer that certain things are required in someone who receives a sacrament as necessary to the sacrament, and if they are missing, the person cannot receive the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. But some things are required not as necessary to the sacrament, but by the necessity of a precept for the fittingness of the sacrament; and without these things someone receives the sacrament but not the reality of the sacrament. Therefore it should be said that the male sex is required for receiving holy orders, not only in the second way, but also in the first. And so even if all the things were presented to a woman that are done in holy orders, she would not receive holy orders, for since the sacrament is a sign, in those things that are done in the sacrament there is required not only the reality but also the signification of the reality; as it was said that in extreme unction it is required that someone be sick, so that a person needing healing might be signified. Therefore, since in the feminine sex no eminence of degree can be signified, for a woman, by the very fact that she is a woman, has a state of subjection, this is why she cannot receive the sacrament of holy orders. Now some have said that the male sex is necessary by precept, but not necessary to the sacrament, for also in the decrees a deaconess and a ‘presbytera’ are mentioned. But a woman who partakes in some act of a deacon, like reading a homily in the Church, is called a deaconess; while a ‘presbytera’ means a widow, for a presbyter is the same thing as ‘elder’. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod prophetia non est sacramentum, sed donum Dei; unde non exigitur ibi significatio, sed solum res. Et quia secundum rem, in his quae sunt animae, mulier non differt a viro, cum quandoque mulier inveniatur melior quantum ad animam multis viris; ideo donum prophetiae et alia hujusmodi potest accipere, sed non ordinis sacramentum. Reply Obj. 1: Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God; and so no signification is required, but only the reality. And since according to the reality, in those things that belong to the soul, a woman is no different from a man, since sometimes a woman is found to be better than many men with respect to her soul, this is why she can receive the gift of prophecy and others like it, but not the sacrament of holy orders. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum et tertium. De abbatissis tamen dicitur, quod non habent praelationem ordinariam, sed quasi ex commissione propter periculum cohabitationis virorum ad mulieres. Debora autem praefuit in temporalibus, non in sacerdotalibus, sicut et nunc mulieres possunt temporaliter dominari. And by this the answer is clear to the second and third objections. But concerning abbesses, it is said that they do not have ordinary governance, but governance as by commission because of the danger of cohabitation of men and women. But Deborah had governance in temporal matters, not priestly ones, just as now women can have temporal positions of rule. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod per pueritiam, et alios defectus quibus tollitur usus rationis, praestatur impedimentum actui; et ideo omnia illa sacramenta quae actum requirunt suscipientis, talibus non competunt, sicut poenitentia, matrimonium, et hujusmodi. Sed quia potestates infusae sunt priores actibus, sicut et naturales, quamvis acquisitae sint posteriores; remoto autem posteriori non tollitur prius; ideo omnia sacramenta in quibus non requiritur actus suscipientis de necessitate sacramenti, sed potestas aliqua spiritualis divinitus datur, possunt pueri suscipere et alii qui usu rationis carent; hac tamen distinctione habita, quod in minoribus ordinibus requiritur discretionis tempus de honestate propter dignitatem sacramenti, sed non de necessitate praecepti, neque de necessitate sacramenti. To the second question, it should be said that youth and other defects that take away the use of reason present impediments to acting, and so all the sacraments that require an act of the one receiving them, like penance, marriage, and the like, do not apply to such people. But infused powers come before acts, as is the case with natural powers, even though aquired powers are come after acts, Now, if what comes after is removed, what comes before is not taken away. Consequently, children and others who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in which no act is required of the recipient as necessary to the sacrament, but a spiritual power is divinely given. This distinction being granted, however, the age of discretion is required in minor orders out of respect for the dignity of the sacrament, but not out of the necessity of a precept, nor as necessary to the sacrament. Unde aliqui, si necessitas adsit, et spes profectus, ad minores ordines possunt ante annos discretionis promoveri sine peccato, et suscipient ordinem: quia quamvis tunc non sint idonei ad officia quae eis committuntur, tamen per assuetudinem idonei reddentur. Sed ad majores ordines requiritur usus rationis et de honestate, et de necessitate praecepti propter votum continentiae quod habent annexum; et quia etiam eis sacramenta tractanda committuntur. Sed ad episcopatum, ubi in corpus mysticum accipitur potestas, requiritur actus suscipientis curam pastoralem; et ideo est etiam de necessitate consecrationis episcopalis quod usum rationis habeat. Quidam autem dicunt, quod ad omnes ordines requiritur usus rationis de necessitate sacramenti; sed eorum dictum ratione vel auctoritate non confirmatur. Therefore some people, if there is a need and hope of their advancement, can be promoted to minor orders before the years of discretion without sin, and they do receive holy orders; for although they are not fit at that time for the offices that are committed to them, nevertheless they will be rendered fit by experience. But for major orders the use of reason is required, both out of respect and out of the necessity of a precept because of the vow of continence that is attached; and also because handling the sacraments is committed to them. But for the episcopate, where power is received over the mystical body, the act of the one receiving pastoral responsibility is required. And so it is also necessary to episcopal consecration that one have the use of reason. Now some people say that the use of reason is required for all orders as necessary to the sacrament; but their claim is not confirmed by reason or authoritative text. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non omne quod est de necessitate praecepti, est de necessitate sacramenti, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Not all that comes from the necessity of a precept is necessary to the sacrament, as has been said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod matrimonium causat consensus, qui sine usu rationis esse non potest; sed in receptione ordinis non requiritur aliquis actus ex parte recipientis: quod patet ex hoc quod nullus actus ex parte eorum exprimitur in eorum consecratione; et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 2: Consent, which cannot exist without the use of reason, causes marriage. But in the reception of holy orders no act is required on the part of the recipient, which is clear from the fact that no act on their part is expressed in their consecration; and thus it is not the same. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ejusdem est actus et potentia; sed tamen aliquando potentia praecedit, sicut liberum arbitrium usum suum; et sic est in proposito. Reply Obj. 3: Act and power belong to the same thing; but nevertheless sometimes power precedes, as free will precedes its use; and this is how it is in this case. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum impediatur propter conditionem fortunae exterioris Whether anyone is impeded because of a condition of external fortune Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod servitus non impediat aliquem a susceptione ordinis. Subjectio enim corporalis non repugnat praelationi spirituali. Sed in servo est subjectio corporalis. Ergo non impeditur quin debeat suscipere praelationem spiritualem, quae in ordine datur. Obj. 1: To the second question we proceed thus. It seems that slavery does not impede anyone from receiving holy orders. For physical subjection is not opposed to spiritual eminence. But in a slave there is physical subjection. Therefore, it does not prevent one from receiving spiritual eminence, which is given in holy orders. Praeterea, illud quod est occasio humilitatis non debet impedire susceptionem alicujus sacramenti. Sed servitus est hujusmodi; unde apostolus consulit quod si aliquis possit, utatur servitute, 1 Corinth. 7. Ergo non debet impedire a promotione ordinis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, an occasion of humility should not prevent the reception of any sacrament. But this is what slavery is, which is why the Apostle counseled that if someone was able, he should make use of his slavery (1 Cor 7:21). Therefore, it should not prevent one’s promotion to holy orders. Praeterea, magis est turpe clericum in servum vendi quam servum in clericum promoveri. Sed licite clericus in servum vendi potest: quia episcopus Nolanus, scilicet beatus Paulinus, seipsum in servum vendidit, ut in Dialogis legitur. Ergo multo fortius potest servus in clericum promoveri. Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is more disgraceful for a cleric to be sold into slavery than for a slave to be ordained a cleric. But a cleric may licitly be sold into slavery, for the bishop of Nola, namely, blessed Paulinus, sold himself into slavery, as we read in the Dialogues. Therefore, much more can a slave be ordained a cleric. Sed contra, videtur quod impediat quantum ad necessitatem sacramenti. Quia mulier non potest suscipere sacramentum ratione subjectionis. Sed major subjectio est in servo; quia mulier non datur viro in ancillam, propter quod non est de pedibus sumpta. Ergo et servus sacramentum non suscipit. On the contrary (4), it seems that it would impede what is necessary to the sacrament. For a woman cannot receive this sacrament by reason of her subjection. But there is more subjection in a slave, for a woman is not given to a man as his slave, which is why she was not taken from his feet. Therefore, neither does a slave receive this sacrament. Praeterea, aliquis, ex quo suscipit ordinem, tenetur in ordine ministrare. Sed non potest simul ministrare domino suo carnali, et in spirituali ministerio. Ergo videtur quod non possit ordinem suscipere, quia dominus debet conservari indemnis. Furthermore (5), by the fact that someone receives holy orders, he is bound to minister in his level of orders. But no one can minister to a physical master and in a spiritual ministry at the same time. Therefore, it seems that he cannot receive holy orders, because his master should suffer no loss of property. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod propter homicidium aliquis non debeat prohiberi a sacris ordinibus. Quia ordines nostri sumpserunt initium a Levitarum officiis, ut in praecedenti dist. dictum est. Sed Levitae consecraverunt manus suas in sanguinis effusione fratrum suorum, ut patet Exod. 32. Ergo et in novo testamento non debent aliqui a susceptione ordinum prohiberi propter sanguinis effusionem. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that a person should not be forbidden from sacred orders because of homicide. For our orders took their beginning from the offices of the Levites, as was said in the previous distinction. But the Levites consecrated their hands in shedding their brothers’ blood, as is seen in Exodus 32:26. Therefore, in the New Testament none should be prohibited from the reception of holy orders because of bloodshed. Praeterea, propter actum virtutis nullus debet impediri ab aliquo sacramento. Sed aliquando sanguis effunditur per justitiam, sicut a judice; et peccaret habens officium, si non effunderet. Ergo non impeditur propter hoc a sacramenti susceptione. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one should be impeded from this sacrament because of an act of virtue. But sometimes blood is shed by justice, like by a judge, and the person holding this office would sin if it were not shed. Therefore, he is not impeded because of this from the reception of the sacrament. Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi culpae. Sed aliquis sine culpa quandoque homicidium committit, sicut se defendendo, vel etiam casualiter. Ergo non debet incurrere irregularitatis poenam. Obj. 3: Furthermore, there should be no penalty unless there is fault. But sometimes someone commits homicide without fault, as by self-defense, or even by accident. Therefore, it should incur no penalty of irregularity. Sed contra hoc sunt plura canonum statuta, et Ecclesiae consuetudo. On the contrary, are the many statutes of the canons, and the Church’s custom. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3