Distinctio 26 Distinction 26 De matrimonio Matrimony Postquam determinavit Magister de sacramento ordinis, quod ordinatur ad spiritualem multiplicationem Ecclesiae, hic incipit determinare de matrimonio, quod ordinatur ad materialem, multiplicationem fidelium; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de matrimonio; in secunda de personis contrahentibus matrimonium, 34 distinct., ibi nunc superest attendere quae personae sint legitimae ad contrahendum matrimonium. After the Master has discussed the sacrament of holy orders, which is ordered to the spiritual multiplication of the Church, here he begins to consider matrimony, which is ordered to the material multiplication of the faithful. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers matrimony; in the second, persons contracting matrimony, at Distinction 34: Now it remains to note what persons are lawful to contract marriage. Prima in duas: in prima determinat ea quae pertinent ad matrimonium, inquantum est sacramentum; in secunda determinat causas matrimonii, 27 distinct., ibi: post hoc advertendum est quid sit conjugium. The first is in two parts: in the first he determines those things that pertain to marriage as it is a sacrament; in the second he determines the causes of marriage, at Distinction 27: After these matters it is to be considered what marriage is. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de institutione matrimonii; in secunda significationem ipsius: haec enim duo omnibus sacramentis communia sunt, ibi: cum alia sacramenta, etc. The first is in two parts: in the first he considers marriage’s institution; in the second, its signification, for these two things are common to all the sacraments: While the other sacraments took their origin after sin and because of sin, etc. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit duas matrimonii institutiones; secundo ostendit differentiam illarum, ibi: prima institutio habuit praeceptum; tertio excludit quemdam errorem qui potest ex praedictis habere occasionem, ibi: fuerunt autem nonnulli haeretici nuptias detestantes. Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows the two institutions of matrimony; second, he shows the difference between them, where he states: the first institution had a precept; third, he excludes a certain error which can be occasioned by what has been said, where he says: There were a few heretics who detested nuptials. Circa secundum duo facit: primo ostendit differentiam inter secundam institutionem et primam, per hoc quod prima fuit in praecepto, secunda habuit indulgentiam; secundo ostendit qualiter haec indulgentia sumatur, ibi: indulgentia autem diversis modis accipitur. Concerning the second, he does two things; first, he shows the difference between the second institution and the first, by the fact that the first was under precept, the second was granted as an indulgence; second, he shows how this indulgence should be taken, where he says: Indulgence is understood in different ways. Cum ergo conjugium sacramentum sit, sacrum signum est, et sacrae rei. Hic determinat de significatione matrimonii; et circa hoc duo facit: primo determinat matrimonii significationem; secundo excludit quamdam falsam opinionem, quae ex praedictis ortum habuit, ibi: inde est quod quidam doctorum dixerunt, illam mulierem non pertinere ad matrimonium quae non experitur carnalem copulam. And so, since marriage is a sacrament, it is both a sacred sign and the sign of a sacred thing. Here he considers the signification of matrimony; and concerning this he does two things: first, he determines the signification of matrimony; second, he excludes a certain false opinion, which arose from those things said before, when he says: That is why some teachers said that a woman has no part in marriage who does not experience carnal joining. Circa quod tria facit: primo ponit illa quae videntur esse pro dicta opinione; secundo ostendit opinionem esse falsam, ibi: hoc ergo si secundum verborum superficiem quis acceperit, inducitur in errorem; tertio respondet ad probationem, ibi: sed superius posita, ea ratione dicta intelligendum est, etc. Concerning this he does three things: first, he sets forth those things that seem to favor the opinion stated; second, he shows the opinion to be false, where he says: If one should take this according to the superficial meaning of the words, he would be induced into so great an error; third, he responds to the proof, where he says: But what has been said above is to be understood in this sense, etc. Hic est duplex quaestio. Prima de matrimonio secundum quod est in officium naturae. Secunda de eo secundum quod est sacramentum. There are two questions here. First, concerning marriage according as it is an office of nature. The second, according as it is a sacrament. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De essentia matrimonii The Essence of Marriage Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor: Concerning the first, four questions arise: primo, utrum matrimonium sit naturale; first, whether marriage is natural; secundo, utrum nunc sit in praecepto; second, whether it is now under precept; tertio, utrum actus ejus sit licitus; third, whether its act is licit; quarto, utrum possit esse meritorius. fourth, whether it can be meritorious. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum matrimonium sit naturale Whether marriage is natural Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod matrimonium non sit naturale. Quia jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Sed in aliis animalibus est conjunctio sexuum absque matrimonio. Ergo matrimonium non est de jure naturali. Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage is not natural. For natural law is what nature has taught all animals. But in other animals there is sexual union without marriage. Therefore, matrimony is not of natural law. Praeterea, id quod est de jure naturali, invenitur in hominibus secundum quemlibet eorum statum. Sed matrimonium non fuit in quolibet statu hominum: quia, sicut dicit Tullius in principio Rhetor., homines a principio silvestres erant, et tunc nemo scivit proprios liberos, nec certas nuptias, in quibus matrimonium consistit. Ergo non est naturale. Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is of natural law is found among people no matter what their state. But marriage has not existed in every state of man, for, as Cicero says in the beginning of his Rhetoric: Men were living in the woods in the beginning, and back then no one knew his own children, nor were there any particular wedding ceremonies in which marriage consisted. Therefore, it is not natural. Praeterea, naturalia sunt eadem apud omnes. Sed non eodem modo est matrimonium apud omnes, cum pro diversis legibus diversimode matrimonium celebretur. Ergo non est naturale. Obj. 3: Furthermore, natural things are the same among all people. But marriage is not the same among all people, since it is celebrated in different ways under diverse laws. Therefore, it is not natural. Praeterea, illa sine quibus potest salvari naturae intentio, non videntur esse naturalia. Sed natura intendit conservationem speciei per generationem, quae potest esse sine matrimonio, ut patet in fornicariis. Ergo matrimonium non est naturale. Obj. 4: Furthermore, those things without which nature’s intention can be preserved do not seem to be natural. But nature intends the conservation of the species by generation, which can happen without marriage, as is clear in the case of fornicators. Therefore, marriage is not natural. Sed contra est quod in principio Digestorum dicitur: jus naturale est maris et feminae conjunctio quam nos matrimonium appellamus. On the contrary, it says in the beginning of the Digests: The union of a husband and wife, which we call marriage, is a natural right. Praeterea, in 8 Ethic., cap. 12, dicit Philosophus, quod homo magis est naturaliter conjugale animal quam politicum. Sed homo est naturaliter animal politicum et gregale, ut ipse dicit. Ergo naturaliter est conjugale; et sic conjugium, sive matrimonium, est naturale. Furthermore, in Ethics 8, the Philosopher says that a human being is more naturally a conjugal animal than a political one. But man is naturally political and social, as he himself says. Therefore, man is naturally conjugal, and thus wedlock, or marriage, is natural. Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse naturale dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ex principiis naturae ex necessitate causatum, ut moveri sursum est naturale igni etc.; et sic matrimonium non est naturale, nec aliquid eorum quae mediante libero arbitrio complentur. Alio modo dicitur naturale ad quod natura inclinat, sed mediante libero arbitrio completur, sicut actus virtutum dicuntur naturales; et hoc modo etiam matrimonium est naturale, quia ratio naturalis ad ipsum inclinat dupliciter. Primo quantum ad principalem ejus finem, qui est bonum prolis: non enim intendit natura solum generationem ejus, sed traductionem, et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis, inquantum homo est, qui est virtutis status. Unde, secundum Philosophum, tria a parentibus habemus: scilicet esse, nutrimentum, et disciplinam. Filius autem a parente educari et instrui non posset, nisi determinatos et certos parentes haberet: quod non esset, nisi esset aliqua obligatio viri ad mulierem determinatam, quae matrimonium facit. Secundo quantum ad secundarium finem matrimonii, qui est mutuum obsequium sibi a conjugibus in rebus domesticis impensum. Sicut enim naturalis ratio dictat ut homines simul cohabitent, quia unus homo non sufficit sibi in omnibus quae ad vitam pertinent, ratione cujus dicitur homo naturaliter politicus; ita etiam eorum quibus indigetur ad humanam vitam, quaedam opera sunt competentia viris quaedam mulieribus; unde natura movet ut sit quaedam associatio viri ad mulierem, in qua est matrimonium. Et has duas causas ponit Philosophus in 8 Ethic. I answer that, something is said to be natural in two ways. In one way, as caused by necessity from the principles of nature, like being moved upward is natural to fire, etc.; and in this way marriage is not natural, nor are any of those things that are completed by means of free will. In another way, ‘natural’ is said of what nature inclines to, but is completed by means of free will, as acts of virtues are called natural. And this is the way that marriage is natural, for natural reason is inclined to it in two ways. First, as concerns its principal end, which is the good of children: for nature does not intend only their generation, but their upbringing, and their advancement to the perfect state of a human being as human, which is the state of virtue. Therefore, according to the Philosopher, we have three things from our parents: namely, being, nourishment, and learning. But a child could not be educated and instructed by a parent unless he had certain, definite parents, which would not be the case unless there were some obligation of a man to a particular woman, which constitutes marriage. Second, as to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual service that the spouses devote to each other in domestic matters. For as natural reason dictates that humans live together, because one person is not sufficient to himself in all things that pertain to life, which is the reason a man is said to be naturally political; in the same way, certain works of those things that are needed for human life are suited to men and certain to women. And this is why nature moves that there be that association of a man with a woman, in which marriage consists. And the Philosopher sets forth these two reasons in Book 8 of the Ethics. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod natura hominis ad aliquod inclinat dupliciter. Uno modo quia est conveniens naturae generis; et hoc est commune omnibus animalibus: alio modo quia est conveniens naturae differentiae qua species humana abundat a genere, inquantum est rationalis; sicut actus prudentiae et temperantiae. Et sicut natura generis quamvis sit una in omnibus animalibus, non tamen est eodem modo in omnibus; ita etiam non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus, sed secundum quod unicuique competit. Ad matrimonium ergo inclinat natura hominis ex parte differentiae quantum ad secundam rationem assignatam; unde Philosophus hanc rationem assignat hominibus supra alia animalia. Sed quantum ad primam rationem inclinat ex parte generis; unde dicit, quod filiorum procreatio communis est omnibus animalibus. Tamen ad hoc non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus animalibus, quia quaedam animalia sunt quorum filii statim nati possunt sibi sufficienter victum quaerere, vel ad quorum sustentationem mater sufficit: et in his non est aliqua determinatio masculi ad feminam. In illis autem quorum filii indigent utriusque sustentatione, sed ad parvum tempus, invenitur aliqua determinatio quantum ad tempus illud; sicut in avibus quibusdam patet. Sed in homine, quia indiget filius cura parentum usque ad magnum tempus, est maxima determinatio masculi ad feminam, ad quam etiam natura generis inclinat. Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a human being inclines to something in two ways. In one way, because it befits the nature of his genus: and then it is common to all animals. In another way, because it befits the nature of the difference by which the human species surpasses its genus, inasmuch as it is rational; like acts of prudence and temperance. And as the nature of the genus is one among all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, similarly it does not cause inclination in all in the same way, but according to what befits each species. Therefore, the nature of man inclines to marriage on the part of the difference, as to the second reason given; which is why the Philosopher assigns this reason to men above all animals. But as to the first reason, it inclines on the part of the genus; and so he says that the procreation of children is common to all animals. Nevertheless, it does not incline to this in the same way in all animals, for with certain animals, the children are sufficiently able to seek their own food immediately after birth, or the mother suffices for their sustenance; and among these animals there is no determination of male to female. Among those animals whose children need the sustenance of both, but only for a little time, some determination is found corresponding to that time, as is seen among certain birds. But in human beings, since the child needs the care of parents for a long time, there is the greatest determination of male to female, to which the nature of the genus also inclines. Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum Tullii potest esse verum quantum ad aliquam gentem; si tamen accipiatur principium proprium ipsius gentis per quod ab aliis gentibus est distincta, quia non in omnibus perducitur ad effectum hoc ad quod naturalis ratio inclinat: non autem est verum universaliter, quia a principio humani generis sacra Scriptura recitat fuisse conjugia. Reply Obj. 2: The words of Cicero can be true as regards some particular people, if we consider that nation’s unique origin by which it is distinct from all other nations. For the effect that natural reason inclines to is not attained by all nations. But Cicero’s statement is not true universally, for from the beginning of the human race Sacred Scripture reports that there were marriages. Ad tertium dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum, in 6 Ethicor., natura humana non est immobilis sicut divina; et ideo diversificantur ea quae sunt de jure naturali, secundum diversos status et conditiones hominum; quamvis ea quae sunt in rebus divinis naturaliter nullo modo varientur. Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, human nature is not unmovable like the divine nature. And thus those things that belong to natural law are diversified according to the diverse states and conditions of man; even though in divine matters things do not naturally vary at all. Ad quartum dicendum, quod natura non tantum intendit esse in prole, sed esse perfectum, ad quod exigitur matrimonium, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 4: Nature intends not only the being of the children, but their perfect being, for which marriage is required, as is clear from what has been said. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum nunc sit in praecepto Whether it is now under precept Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod matrimonium adhuc maneat sub praecepto. Quia praeceptum obligat quamdiu non revocatur. Sed prima institutio matrimonii fuit sub praecepto, ut in littera dicitur, nec unquam hoc praeceptum legitur revocatum, immo confirmatum, Matth. 19, 6: quos Deus conjunxit, homo non separet. Ergo adhuc matrimonium est sub praecepto. Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage still remains under precept. For a command obliges as long as it is not revoked. But the first institution of marriage was under precept, as it says in the text, nor do we read that this precept was ever revoked, but rather confirmed: what God has joined together, let no man put asunder (Matt 19:6). Therefore, even now marriage is under precept. Praeterea, praecepta juris naturalis secundum omne tempus obligant. Sed matrimonium est de jure naturali, ut dictum est. Ergo, etc. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the precepts of natural law oblige in every age. But marriage is of natural law, as was said. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, bonum speciei melius est quam individui: quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis, ut dicitur in 1 Ethic. Sed praeceptum primo homini datum ad conservationem individui per actum nutritivae, adhuc obligat. Ergo multo magis praeceptum de matrimonio, quod pertinet ad conservationem speciei. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the good of a species is better than the good of the individual: for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man, as is said in Ethics 1. But the precept given to the first man for the conservation of the individual by the nutritive act, obliges even now. Therefore, much more does the precept of marriage, which pertains to the conservation of the species. Praeterea, ubi manet eadem ratio obligans, eadem obligatio manere debet. Sed propter hoc obligabantur homines ad matrimonium antiquo tempore, ne multiplicatio generis humani cessaret. Cum ergo hoc idem sequatur, si quilibet libere potest a matrimonio abstinere; videtur quod matrimonium sit in praecepto. Obj. 4: Furthermore, where the obligating reason remains, the same obligation must remain. But men were obliged to marry in ancient times for this reason: so that the multiplication of the human race should not cease. Therefore, since the same thing would result if anyone could freely abstain from marriage, it seems that marriage is still under precept.