Praeterea, in 8 Ethic., cap. 12, dicit Philosophus, quod homo magis est naturaliter conjugale animal quam politicum. Sed homo est naturaliter animal politicum et gregale, ut ipse dicit. Ergo naturaliter est conjugale; et sic conjugium, sive matrimonium, est naturale. Furthermore (2), in the Ethics 8, the Philosopher says that a human being is more naturally a conjugal animal than a political one. But man is naturally political and social, as he himself says. Therefore, man is naturally conjugal, and thus wedlock, or marriage, is natural. Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse naturale dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ex principiis naturae ex necessitate causatum, ut moveri sursum est naturale igni etc.; et sic matrimonium non est naturale, nec aliquid eorum quae mediante libero arbitrio complentur. Alio modo dicitur naturale ad quod natura inclinat, sed mediante libero arbitrio completur, sicut actus virtutum dicuntur naturales; et hoc modo etiam matrimonium est naturale, quia ratio naturalis ad ipsum inclinat dupliciter. Primo quantum ad principalem ejus finem, qui est bonum prolis: non enim intendit natura solum generationem ejus, sed traductionem, et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis, inquantum homo est, qui est virtutis status. Unde, secundum Philosophum, tria a parentibus habemus: scilicet esse, nutrimentum, et disciplinam. Filius autem a parente educari et instrui non posset, nisi determinatos et certos parentes haberet: quod non esset, nisi esset aliqua obligatio viri ad mulierem determinatam, quae matrimonium facit. Secundo quantum ad secundarium finem matrimonii, qui est mutuum obsequium sibi a conjugibus in rebus domesticis impensum. Sicut enim naturalis ratio dictat ut homines simul cohabitent, quia unus homo non sufficit sibi in omnibus quae ad vitam pertinent, ratione cujus dicitur homo naturaliter politicus; ita etiam eorum quibus indigetur ad humanam vitam, quaedam opera sunt competentia viris quaedam mulieribus; unde natura movet ut sit quaedam associatio viri ad mulierem, in qua est matrimonium. Et has duas causas ponit Philosophus in 8 Ethic. I answer that, something is said to be natural in two ways. In one way, as caused by necessity from the principles of nature, like being moved upward is natural to fire, etc.; and in this way marriage is not natural, nor are any of those things that are completed by means of free will. In another way, ‘natural’ is said of what nature inclines to, but is completed by means of free will, as acts of virtues are called natural. And this is the way that marriage is natural, for natural reason is inclined to it in two ways. First, as concerns its principal end, which is the good of children: for nature does not intend only their generation, but their upbringing, and their advancement to the perfect state of a human being as human, which is the state of virtue. Therefore, according to the Philosopher, we have three things from our parents: namely, being, nourishment, and learning. But a child could not be educated and instructed by a parent unless he had certain, definite parents, which would not be the case unless there were some obligation of a man to a particular woman, which constitutes marriage. Second, as to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual service that the spouses devote to each other in domestic matters. For as natural reason dictates that humans live together, because one person is not sufficient to himself in all things that pertain to life, which is the reason a man is said to be naturally political; in the same way, certain works of those things that are needed for human life are suited to men and certain to women. And this is why nature moves that there be that association of a man with a woman, in which marriage consists. And the Philosopher sets forth these two reasons in Book 8 of the Ethics. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod natura hominis ad aliquod inclinat dupliciter. Uno modo quia est conveniens naturae generis; et hoc est commune omnibus animalibus: alio modo quia est conveniens naturae differentiae qua species humana abundat a genere, inquantum est rationalis; sicut actus prudentiae et temperantiae. Et sicut natura generis quamvis sit una in omnibus animalibus, non tamen est eodem modo in omnibus; ita etiam non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus, sed secundum quod unicuique competit. Ad matrimonium ergo inclinat natura hominis ex parte differentiae quantum ad secundam rationem assignatam; unde Philosophus hanc rationem assignat hominibus supra alia animalia. Sed quantum ad primam rationem inclinat ex parte generis; unde dicit, quod filiorum procreatio communis est omnibus animalibus. Tamen ad hoc non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus animalibus, quia quaedam animalia sunt quorum filii statim nati possunt sibi sufficienter victum quaerere, vel ad quorum sustentationem mater sufficit: et in his non est aliqua determinatio masculi ad feminam. In illis autem quorum filii indigent utriusque sustentatione, sed ad parvum tempus, invenitur aliqua determinatio quantum ad tempus illud; sicut in avibus quibusdam patet. Sed in homine, quia indiget filius cura parentum usque ad magnum tempus, est maxima determinatio masculi ad feminam, ad quam etiam natura generis inclinat. Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a human being inclines to something in two ways. In one way, because it befits the nature of his genus: and then it is common to all animals. In another way, because it befits the nature of the difference by which the human species surpasses its genus, inasmuch as it is rational; like acts of prudence and temperance. And as the nature of the genus is one among all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, similarly it does not cause inclination in all in the same way, but according to what befits each species. Therefore, the nature of man inclines to marriage on the part of the difference, as to the second reason given; which is why the Philosopher assigns this reason to men above all animals. But as to the first reason, it inclines on the part of the genus; and so he says that the procreation of children is common to all animals. Nevertheless, it does not incline to this in the same way in all animals, for with certain animals, the children are sufficiently able to seek their own food immediately after birth, or the mother suffices for their sustenance; and among these animals there is no determination of male to female. Among those animals whose children need the sustenance of both, but only for a little time, some determination is found corresponding to that time, as is seen among certain birds. But in human beings, since the child needs the care of parents for a long time, there is the greatest determination of male to female, to which the nature of the genus also inclines. Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum Tullii potest esse verum quantum ad aliquam gentem; si tamen accipiatur principium proprium ipsius gentis per quod ab aliis gentibus est distincta, quia non in omnibus perducitur ad effectum hoc ad quod naturalis ratio inclinat: non autem est verum universaliter, quia a principio humani generis Sacra Scriptura recitat fuisse conjugia. Reply Obj. 2: The words of Cicero can be true as regards some particular people, if we consider that nation’s unique origin by which it is distinct from all other nations. For the effect that natural reason inclines to is not attained by all nations. But Cicero’s statement is not true universally, for from the beginning of the human race Sacred Scripture reports that there were marriages. Ad tertium dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum, in 6 Ethicor., natura humana non est immobilis sicut divina; et ideo diversificantur ea quae sunt de jure naturali, secundum diversos status et conditiones hominum; quamvis ea quae sunt in rebus divinis naturaliter nullo modo varientur. Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, human nature is not unmovable like the divine nature. And thus those things that belong to natural law are diversified according to the diverse states and conditions of man; even though in divine matters things do not naturally vary at all. Ad quartum dicendum, quod natura non tantum intendit esse in prole, sed esse perfectum, ad quod exigitur matrimonium, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 4: Nature intends not only the being of the children, but their perfect being, for which marriage is required, as is clear from what has been said. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum nunc sit in praecepto Whether it is now under precept Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod matrimonium adhuc maneat sub praecepto. Quia praeceptum obligat quamdiu non revocatur. Sed prima institutio matrimonii fuit sub praecepto, ut in littera dicitur, nec unquam hoc praeceptum legitur revocatum, immo confirmatum, Matth. 19, 6: quos Deus conjunxit, homo non separet. Ergo adhuc matrimonium est sub praecepto. Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage still remains under precept. For a command obliges as long as it is not revoked. But the first institution of marriage was under precept, as it says in the text, nor do we read that this precept was ever revoked, but rather confirmed: what God has joined together, let no man put asunder (Matt 19:6). Therefore, even now marriage is under precept. Praeterea, praecepta juris naturalis secundum omne tempus obligant. Sed matrimonium est de jure naturali, ut dictum est. Ergo, etc. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the precepts of natural law oblige in every age. But marriage is of natural law, as was said. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, bonum speciei melius est quam individui: quia bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis, ut dicitur in 1 Ethic. Sed praeceptum primo homini datum ad conservationem individui per actum nutritivae, adhuc obligat. Ergo multo magis praeceptum de matrimonio, quod pertinet ad conservationem speciei. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the good of a species is better than the good of the individual: for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man, as is said in the Ethics 1. But the precept given to the first man for the conservation of the individual by the nutritive act, obliges even now. Therefore, much more does the precept of marriage, which pertains to the conservation of the species. Praeterea, ubi manet eadem ratio obligans, eadem obligatio manere debet. Sed propter hoc obligabantur homines ad matrimonium antiquo tempore, ne multiplicatio generis humani cessaret. Cum ergo hoc idem sequatur, si quilibet libere potest a matrimonio abstinere; videtur quod matrimonium sit in praecepto. Obj. 4: Furthermore, where the obligating reason remains, the same obligation must remain. But men were obliged to marry in ancient times for this reason: so that the multiplication of the human race should not cease. Therefore, since the same thing would result if anyone could freely abstain from marriage, it seems that marriage is still under precept. Sed contra est quod dicitur 1 Corinth. 7, 37: qui non jungit matrimonio virginem suam, melius facit, scilicet quam qui jungit. Ergo contractus matrimonii nunc non est sub praecepto. On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians: he who does not give his virgin in marriage, does better (1 Cor 7:38)—that is, than someone who does give her away in marriage. Therefore, the contract of marriage is not now under precept. Praeterea, nulli debetur praemium pro transgressione praecepti. Sed virginibus debetur speciale praemium, scilicet aureola. Ergo matrimonium non est sub praecepto. Furthermore (2), no one should be given a reward for transgressing a precept. But a special reward is due to virgins, namely the golden crown. Therefore, marriage is not under precept. Respondeo dicendum, quod natura inclinat ad aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ad id quod est necessarium ad perfectionem unius; et talis inclinatio quemlibet obligat; quia naturales perfectiones omnibus sunt communes. Alio modo inclinat ad aliquid quod est necessarium ad perfectionem multitudinis: et cum multa sint hujusmodi, quorum unum impedit aliud; ex tali inclinatione non obligatur quilibet homo per modum praecepti; alias quilibet homo obligaretur ad agriculturam et aedificatoriam, et hujusmodi officia, quae sunt necessaria communitati humanae: sed inclinationi naturae satisfit cum per diversos diversa complentur de praedictis. Cum ergo ad perfectionem humanae multitudinis sit necessarium aliquos contemplativae vitae inservire, quae maxime per matrimonium impeditur; inclinatio naturae ad matrimonium non obligat per modum praecepti, etiam secundum philosophos; unde Theophrastus, probat quod sapienti non expedit nubere. I answer that, nature inclines to something in two ways. In one way, as toward something that is necessary for the perfection of the individual; and such an inclination obliges everyone, for natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to what is necessary for the perfection of the multitude: and since there are many things like this which would impede each other, every person is not obliged by this kind of inclination in the manner of a precept. Otherwise everyone would be obliged to farming and building and duties like this, which are necessary to human community. But for the inclination of nature it is enough if different tasks are completed by different men. Since, then, it is necessary for the perfection of the human multitude that some be in service to the contemplative life, which is most greatly impeded by marriage, the inclination of nature to marriage does not oblige by the mode of a precept, even according to the philosophers; for this reason Theophrastus proves that for a wise man it is not expedient to marry. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod praeceptum illud non est revocatum; nec tamen obligat unumquemque ratione jam dicta, nisi illo tempore quo paucitas hominum exigebat ut quilibet generationi vacaret. Reply Obj. 1: That precept has not been revoked; but neither does it oblige each and every person, for the reason just given, except back in the days when the scarcity of human beings required everyone to be available for generation. Ad secundum et tertium patet solutio ex dictis. The solutions to the second and third are evident from what has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod natura humana communiter ad diversa officia et actus inclinat, ut dictum est. Sed quia est diversimode in diversis, secundum quod individuatur in hoc vel illo; unum magis inclinat ad unum illorum officiorum, alium ad aliud: et ex hac diversitate simul cum divina providentia, quae omnia moderatur, contingit quod unus eligit unum officium, ut agriculturam, alius aliud; et sic etiam contingit quod quidam eligunt matrimonialem vitam, et quidam contemplativam. Unde nullum periculum imminet. Reply Obj. 4: Human nature commonly inclines to diverse offices and acts, as was said. But since it exists in diverse ways in different men, according to how it is individuated in this man or that man, one man inclines more to one of those offices, another to another. And from this diversity together with divine providence, which moderates all things, it happens that one man chooses one task, like farming, while another chooses something else. And so it also happens that certain men choose matrimonial life and others choose contemplative life. So no danger threatens. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum actus ejus sit licitus Whether its act is licit Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus matrimonialis semper sit peccatum. 1 Corinth. 7, 29: qui nubunt, sint tamquam non nubentes. Sed non nubentes non habent actum matrimonialem. Ergo etiam nubentes peccant in actu illo. Obj 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that the marital act is always a sin. For 1 Corinthians 7:29 says, let those who marry be as if they were unmarried. But the unmarried do not have the marital act. Therefore, even married people would sin in that act. Praeterea, Isaiae 59, 2: iniquitates vestrae diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum. Sed actus matrimonialis dividit hominem a Deo; unde Exod. 19, praecipitur populo qui debebat Deum videre, quod non accedant ad uxores suas; et Hieronymus dicit, quod in actu matrimoniali Spiritus Sanctus prophetarum corda non tangit. Ergo est iniquitas. Obj. 2: Furthermore: your iniquities have made a division between you and your God (Is 59:2). But the marital act divides man from God; and this is why in Exodus 19 it is commanded to the people who had to see God that they not approach their wives. And Jerome says that in the marital act the Holy Spirit did not touch the hearts of the prophets. Therefore, it is iniquity. Praeterea, illud quod secundum se est turpe, nullo modo potest bene fieri. Sed actus matrimonialis habet concupiscentiam adjunctam, quae semper turpis est. Ergo semper est peccatum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is base in itself cannot be made good in any way. But the marital act has concupiscence attached to it, which is always base. Therefore, it is always a sin. Praeterea, nihil excusatur nisi peccatum. Sed actus matrimonialis indiget excusari per bona matrimonii, ut Magister dicit. Ergo est peccatum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing is excused if it is not a sin. But the marital act needs to be excused by the goods of marriage, as the Master says. Therefore, it is a sin. Praeterea, de similibus specie idem est judicium. Sed concubitus matrimonialis est ejusdem speciei cum actu adulterii, quia ad idem terminatur, scilicet speciem humanam. Ergo cum actus adulterii sit peccatum, et actus matrimonii. Obj. 5: Furthermore, the judgment of things identical in species, is the same. But intercourse in marriage is of the same species as the act of adultery, since it results in the same thing, namely, the human species. Therefore, since the act of adultery is a sin, the marital act is as well. Praeterea, superfluum in passionibus corrumpit virtutem. Sed semper in actu matrimonii est superfluitas delectationis, adeo quod absorbet rationem, quae est principale hominis bonum; unde Philosophus in 7 Ethic., dicit, quod impossibile est hominem aliquid in ipsa intelligere. Ergo semper actus matrimonialis est peccatum. Obj. 6: Furthermore, excess in passions corrupts virtue. But there is always an excess of pleasure in the marital act to the extent that it absorbs reason, which is the principal good in man; and this is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 that during that pleasure it is impossible for a person to understand anything. Therefore, the marital act is always a sin. Sed contra; 1 Corinth. 7, 36: virgo non peccat, si nubat, et 1 Timoth. 5, 14: volo juvenculas nubere, filios procreare. Sed procreatio filiorum non potest fieri sine carnali conjunctione. Ergo actus matrimonialis non est peccatum; alias apostolus non voluisset illud. On the contrary (1), a virgin does not sin if she marries (1 Cor 7:36); and I would like for the young ones to marry, in order to bear children (1 Tim 5:14). But procreation of children cannot happen except by physical union. Therefore, the marital act is not a sin; otherwise, the Apostle would not have wished it. Praeterea, nullum peccatum est in praecepto. Sed actus matrimonialis est in praecepto; 1 Corinth. 7, 3: uxori vir debitum reddat. Ergo non est peccatum. Furthermore (2), no sin is commanded. But the marital act is commanded: a man should render the debt to his wife (1 Cor 7:3). Therefore, it is not a sin. Respondeo dicendum, quod supposito quod natura corporalis sit a Deo bono instituta; impossibile est dicere, quod ea quae pertinent ad conservationem naturae corporalis, et ad quae natura inclinat, sint universaliter mala; et ideo, cum inclinatio sit naturae ad prolis procreationem, per quam natura speciei conservatur, impossibile est dicere, quod actus quo procreatur proles, sit universaliter illicitus, ut in eo medium virtutis inveniri non possit; nisi ponatur secundum quorumdam insaniam, quod res corporales causatae sunt a Deo malo; ex quo forte ista opinio derivatur quae in littera tangitur; et ideo est pessima haeresis. I answer that, given that bodily nature was instituted by God, it is impossible to say that those things pertaining to the conservation of bodily nature, and to which that nature is inclined, are universally bad. And therefore, since the inclination to the procreation of children, by which the nature of the species is conserved, is natural, it is impossible to say that the act by which children are procreated is universally illicit, so that the mean of virtue could not be found in it; unless it were argued according to the insanity of certain people, that corporeal things were caused by an evil god; from which perhaps is derived that opinion that is referred to in the text. And this is why it is the worst heresy. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod apostolus in verbis illis non prohibuit matrimonii actum, sicut nec rerum possessionem, cum dixit: qui utuntur hoc mundo, sint quasi non utentes. Sed in utroque fruitionem prohibuit; quod patet ex ipso modo loquendi: non enim dixit: sint non utentes, vel non habentes: sed quasi non utentes, vel non habentes. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not prohibit the marital act in those words, as neither the possession of things when he said, those who make use of this world, as though not using it (1 Cor 7:31). But in both he prohibits resting in their enjoyment: which is clear from his very manner of speaking: for he did not say, “let them not use,” or, “let them not have,” but as though not using, or not having. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deo conjungimur et secundum habitum gratiae, et secundum actum contemplationis et amoris. Quod ergo primam conjunctionem separat, semper est peccatum; non autem quod separat secundam: quia aliqua occupatio licita circa res inferiores animum distrahit, ut actu Deo conjungi non sit idoneus; et hoc praecipue accidit in carnali conjunctione, in qua detinetur mens propter delectationem intensam; et propter hoc, illis quibus competit divina contemplari, aut sacra tractare, indicitur pro tempore illo continentia ab uxoribus; et secundum hoc etiam dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus quantum ad actum revelationis secretorum non tangebat mentes prophetarum in usu matrimonii. Reply Obj. 2: We are joined to God both by the habit of grace, and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore, anything that separates the first union is always a sin. But not what separates the second: for any licit occupation dealing with inferior things distracts the soul, so that it is not capable of being joined to God actually. And this particularly happens in carnal union, in which the mind is absorbed because of intense pleasure. And because of this, for those men whose task is to contemplate divine things or to handle sacred things, abstinence from their wives is enjoined for that time. And also according to this it is said that the Holy Spirit did not touch the minds of the prophets with the act of revelation of secrets when they were availing themselves of their marital rights. Ad tertium dicendum, quod turpitudo illa concupiscentiae quae actum matrimonii semper concomitatur, non est turpitudo culpae, sed poenae, ex peccato primo proveniens; ut scilicet inferiores vires et membra corporis rationi non obediant; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 3: That baseness of concupiscence which always accompanies the marital act is not the baseness of fault, but of punishment, coming from the first sin, namely that the lower powers and members of the body do not obey reason; and because of this the argument does not follow. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud proprie dicitur excusari quod aliquam similitudinem mali habet, et tamen non est malum, vel non tantum quantum apparet: quia quaedam excusantur a toto, quaedam a tanto; et quia actus matrimonialis propter corruptionem concupiscentiae habet similitudinem actus inordinati, ideo pro bono matrimonii excusatur a toto, ut non sit peccatum. Reply Obj. 4: Something is properly said to be excused which has a resemblance to evil, and yet is not evil, or not as much as it seems; for some things are excused entirely, and some to a certain degree. And since the marital act has likeness to an inordinate act because of the corruption of concupiscence, therefore, for the good of marriage it is excused entirely, so that it is not a sin. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis sint idem specie naturae, tamen differunt in specie moris, quam una circumstantia variat, scilicet accedere ad suam vel non suam; sicut etiam occidere hominem per violentiam vel per justitiam, facit diversam speciem moris, quamvis sit una species naturae; et tamen unum est licitum, aliud illicitum. Reply Obj. 5: Although they are the same in natural species, nevertheless they differ in species of moral act, which may differ by one circumstance, for example approaching one’s own wife or someone who is not one’s wife; just as also killing a man by violence or by justice makes different species of moral act, although it is one natural species; and yet one is licit and the other illicit. Ad sextum dicendum, quod superfluum passionis quod virtutem corrumpit, non solum impedit rationis actum, sed tollit rationis ordinem; quod non facit delectationis intensio in actu matrimoniali, quia etiam si tunc non ordinetur homo, tamen est a ratione praeordinatus. Reply Obj. 6: The excess of passion which corrupts virtue not only impedes the act of reason, but takes away the ordering of reason, which the intensity of pleasure in the marital act does not do, for even if man is not ordered at that moment, nevertheless he is pre-ordered by reason. Articulus 4 Article 4