Respondeo dicendum, quod natura inclinat ad aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ad id quod est necessarium ad perfectionem unius; et talis inclinatio quemlibet obligat; quia naturales perfectiones omnibus sunt communes. Alio modo inclinat ad aliquid quod est necessarium ad perfectionem multitudinis: et cum multa sint hujusmodi, quorum unum impedit aliud; ex tali inclinatione non obligatur quilibet homo per modum praecepti; alias quilibet homo obligaretur ad agriculturam et aedificatoriam, et hujusmodi officia, quae sunt necessaria communitati humanae: sed inclinationi naturae satisfit cum per diversos diversa complentur de praedictis. Cum ergo ad perfectionem humanae multitudinis sit necessarium aliquos contemplativae vitae inservire, quae maxime per matrimonium impeditur; inclinatio naturae ad matrimonium non obligat per modum praecepti, etiam secundum philosophos; unde Theophrastus, probat quod sapienti non expedit nubere. I answer that, nature inclines to something in two ways. In one way, as toward something that is necessary for the perfection of the individual; and such an inclination obliges everyone, for natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to what is necessary for the perfection of the multitude: and since there are many things like this which would impede each other, every person is not obliged by this kind of inclination in the manner of a precept. Otherwise everyone would be obliged to farming and building and duties like this, which are necessary to human community. But for the inclination of nature it is enough if different tasks are completed by different men. Since, then, it is necessary for the perfection of the human multitude that some be in service to the contemplative life, which is most greatly impeded by marriage, the inclination of nature to marriage does not oblige by the mode of a precept, even according to the philosophers; for this reason Theophrastus proves that for a wise man it is not expedient to marry. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod praeceptum illud non est revocatum; nec tamen obligat unumquemque ratione jam dicta, nisi illo tempore quo paucitas hominum exigebat ut quilibet generationi vacaret. Reply Obj. 1: That precept has not been revoked; but neither does it oblige each and every person, for the reason just given, except back in the days when the scarcity of human beings required everyone to be available for generation. Ad secundum et tertium patet solutio ex dictis. The solutions to the second and third are evident from what has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod natura humana communiter ad diversa officia et actus inclinat, ut dictum est. Sed quia est diversimode in diversis, secundum quod individuatur in hoc vel illo; unum magis inclinat ad unum illorum officiorum, alium ad aliud: et ex hac diversitate simul cum divina providentia, quae omnia moderatur, contingit quod unus eligit unum officium, ut agriculturam, alius aliud; et sic etiam contingit quod quidam eligunt matrimonialem vitam, et quidam contemplativam. Unde nullum periculum imminet. Reply Obj. 4: Human nature commonly inclines to diverse offices and acts, as was said. But since it exists in diverse ways in different men, according to how it is individuated in this man or that man, one man inclines more to one of those offices, another to another. And from this diversity together with divine providence, which moderates all things, it happens that one man chooses one task, like farming, while another chooses something else. And so it also happens that certain men choose matrimonial life and others choose contemplative life. So no danger threatens. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum actus ejus sit licitus Whether its act is licit Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus matrimonialis semper sit peccatum. 1 Corinth. 7, 29: qui nubunt, sint tamquam non nubentes. Sed non nubentes non habent actum matrimonialem. Ergo etiam nubentes peccant in actu illo. Obj 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that the marital act is always a sin. For 1 Corinthians 7:29 says, let those who marry be as if they were unmarried. But the unmarried do not have the marital act. Therefore, even married people would sin in that act. Praeterea, Isaiae 59, 2: iniquitates vestrae diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum. Sed actus matrimonialis dividit hominem a Deo; unde Exod. 19, praecipitur populo qui debebat Deum videre, quod non accedant ad uxores suas; et Hieronymus dicit, quod in actu matrimoniali Spiritus Sanctus prophetarum corda non tangit. Ergo est iniquitas. Obj. 2: Furthermore: your iniquities have made a division between you and your God (Is 59:2). But the marital act divides man from God; and this is why in Exodus 19 it is commanded to the people who had to see God that they not approach their wives. And Jerome says that in the marital act the Holy Spirit did not touch the hearts of the prophets. Therefore, it is iniquity. Praeterea, illud quod secundum se est turpe, nullo modo potest bene fieri. Sed actus matrimonialis habet concupiscentiam adjunctam, quae semper turpis est. Ergo semper est peccatum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is base in itself cannot be made good in any way. But the marital act has concupiscence attached to it, which is always base. Therefore, it is always a sin. Praeterea, nihil excusatur nisi peccatum. Sed actus matrimonialis indiget excusari per bona matrimonii, ut Magister dicit. Ergo est peccatum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing is excused if it is not a sin. But the marital act needs to be excused by the goods of marriage, as the Master says. Therefore, it is a sin. Praeterea, de similibus specie idem est judicium. Sed concubitus matrimonialis est ejusdem speciei cum actu adulterii, quia ad idem terminatur, scilicet speciem humanam. Ergo cum actus adulterii sit peccatum, et actus matrimonii. Obj. 5: Furthermore, the judgment of things identical in species, is the same. But intercourse in marriage is of the same species as the act of adultery, since it results in the same thing, namely, the human species. Therefore, since the act of adultery is a sin, the marital act is as well. Praeterea, superfluum in passionibus corrumpit virtutem. Sed semper in actu matrimonii est superfluitas delectationis, adeo quod absorbet rationem, quae est principale hominis bonum; unde Philosophus in 7 Ethic., dicit, quod impossibile est hominem aliquid in ipsa intelligere. Ergo semper actus matrimonialis est peccatum. Obj. 6: Furthermore, excess in passions corrupts virtue. But there is always an excess of pleasure in the marital act to the extent that it absorbs reason, which is the principal good in man; and this is why the Philosopher says in Ethics 7 that during that pleasure it is impossible for a person to understand anything. Therefore, the marital act is always a sin. Sed contra; 1 Corinth. 7, 36: virgo non peccat, si nubat, et 1 Timoth. 5, 14: volo juvenculas nubere, filios procreare. Sed procreatio filiorum non potest fieri sine carnali conjunctione. Ergo actus matrimonialis non est peccatum; alias apostolus non voluisset illud. On the contrary, a virgin does not sin if she marries (1 Cor 7:36); and I would like for the young ones to marry, in order to bear children (1 Tim 5:14). But procreation of children cannot happen except by physical union. Therefore, the marital act is not a sin; otherwise, the Apostle would not have wished it. Praeterea, nullum peccatum est in praecepto. Sed actus matrimonialis est in praecepto; 1 Corinth. 7, 3: uxori vir debitum reddat. Ergo non est peccatum. Furthermore, no sin is commanded. But the marital act is commanded: a man should render the debt to his wife (1 Cor 7:3). Therefore, it is not a sin. Respondeo dicendum, quod supposito quod natura corporalis sit a Deo bono instituta; impossibile est dicere, quod ea quae pertinent ad conservationem naturae corporalis, et ad quae natura inclinat, sint universaliter mala; et ideo, cum inclinatio sit naturae ad prolis procreationem, per quam natura speciei conservatur, impossibile est dicere, quod actus quo procreatur proles, sit universaliter illicitus, ut in eo medium virtutis inveniri non possit; nisi ponatur secundum quorumdam insaniam, quod res corporales causatae sunt a Deo malo; ex quo forte ista opinio derivatur quae in littera tangitur; et ideo est pessima haeresis. I answer that, given that bodily nature was instituted by God, it is impossible to say that those things pertaining to the conservation of bodily nature, and to which that nature is inclined, are universally bad. And therefore, since the inclination to the procreation of children, by which the nature of the species is conserved, is natural, it is impossible to say that the act by which children are procreated is universally illicit, so that the mean of virtue could not be found in it; unless it were argued according to the insanity of certain people, that corporeal things were caused by an evil god; from which perhaps is derived that opinion that is referred to in the text. And this is why it is the worst heresy. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod apostolus in verbis illis non prohibuit matrimonii actum, sicut nec rerum possessionem, cum dixit: qui utuntur hoc mundo, sint quasi non utentes. Sed in utroque fruitionem prohibuit; quod patet ex ipso modo loquendi: non enim dixit: sint non utentes, vel non habentes: sed quasi non utentes, vel non habentes. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not prohibit the marital act in those words, as neither the possession of things when he said, those who make use of this world, as though not using it (1 Cor 7:31). But in both he prohibits resting in their enjoyment: which is clear from his very manner of speaking: for he did not say, “let them not use,” or, “let them not have,” but as though not using, or not having. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deo conjungimur et secundum habitum gratiae, et secundum actum contemplationis et amoris. Quod ergo primam conjunctionem separat, semper est peccatum; non autem quod separat secundam: quia aliqua occupatio licita circa res inferiores animum distrahit, ut actu Deo conjungi non sit idoneus; et hoc praecipue accidit in carnali conjunctione, in qua detinetur mens propter delectationem intensam; et propter hoc, illis quibus competit divina contemplari, aut sacra tractare, indicitur pro tempore illo continentia ab uxoribus; et secundum hoc etiam dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus quantum ad actum revelationis secretorum non tangebat mentes prophetarum in usu matrimonii. Reply Obj. 2: We are joined to God both by the habit of grace, and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore, anything that separates the first union is always a sin. But not what separates the second: for any licit occupation dealing with inferior things distracts the soul, so that it is not capable of being joined to God actually. And this particularly happens in carnal union, in which the mind is absorbed because of intense pleasure. And because of this, for those men whose task is to contemplate divine things or to handle sacred things, abstinence from their wives is enjoined for that time. And also according to this it is said that the Holy Spirit did not touch the minds of the prophets with the act of revelation of secrets when they were availing themselves of their marital rights. Ad tertium dicendum, quod turpitudo illa concupiscentiae quae actum matrimonii semper concomitatur, non est turpitudo culpae, sed poenae, ex peccato primo proveniens; ut scilicet inferiores vires et membra corporis rationi non obediant; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 3: That baseness of concupiscence which always accompanies the marital act is not the baseness of fault, but of punishment, coming from the first sin, namely that the lower powers and members of the body do not obey reason; and because of this the argument does not follow. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud proprie dicitur excusari quod aliquam similitudinem mali habet, et tamen non est malum, vel non tantum quantum apparet: quia quaedam excusantur a toto, quaedam a tanto; et quia actus matrimonialis propter corruptionem concupiscentiae habet similitudinem actus inordinati, ideo pro bono matrimonii excusatur a toto, ut non sit peccatum. Reply Obj. 4: Something is properly said to be excused which has a resemblance to evil, and yet is not evil, or not as much as it seems; for some things are excused entirely, and some to a certain degree. And since the marital act has likeness to an inordinate act because of the corruption of concupiscence, therefore, for the good of marriage it is excused entirely, so that it is not a sin. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis sint idem specie naturae, tamen differunt in specie moris, quam una circumstantia variat, scilicet accedere ad suam vel non suam; sicut etiam occidere hominem per violentiam vel per justitiam, facit diversam speciem moris, quamvis sit una species naturae; et tamen unum est licitum, aliud illicitum. Reply Obj. 5: Although they are the same in natural species, nevertheless they differ in species of moral act, which may differ by one circumstance, for example approaching one’s own wife or someone who is not one’s wife; just as also killing a man by violence or by justice makes different species of moral act, although it is one natural species; and yet one is licit and the other illicit. Ad sextum dicendum, quod superfluum passionis quod virtutem corrumpit, non solum impedit rationis actum, sed tollit rationis ordinem; quod non facit delectationis intensio in actu matrimoniali, quia etiam si tunc non ordinetur homo, tamen est a ratione praeordinatus. Reply Obj. 6: The excess of passion which corrupts virtue not only impedes the act of reason, but takes away the ordering of reason, which the intensity of pleasure in the marital act does not do, for even if man is not ordered at that moment, nevertheless he is pre-ordered by reason. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum possit esse meritorius Whether it can be meritorious Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus matrimonialis non sit meritorius. Chrysostomus enim dicit super Matth.: matrimonium etsi utentibus se poenam non infert, mercedem tamen non praestat. Sed meritum respectu mercedis dicitur. Ergo actus matrimonialis non est meritorius. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the marital act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom comments on Matthew: even if marriage does not carry a punishment for those availing themselves of it, nevertheless, it does not furnish a reward. But merit is said in relation to reward. Therefore, the marital act is not meritorious. Praeterea, illud quod est meritorium, dimittere non est laudabile. Sed laudabilis est virginitas, per quam matrimonium dimittitur. Ergo matrimonialis actus non est meritorius. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is not praiseworthy to give up what is meritorious. But virginity is praiseworthy, and because of it marriage is given up. Therefore, the marital act is not meritorious. Praeterea, qui utitur indulgentia sibi facta, beneficio recepto utitur. Sed ex hoc quod alicui praestatur beneficium, non meretur. Ergo actus matrimonialis non est meritorius. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever takes advantage of indulgences granted him, enjoys a benefit received. But no one merits by being granted a benefit. Therefore, the marital act is not meritorious. Praeterea, meritum in difficultate consistit, sicut et virtus. Sed actus matrimonialis non habet difficultatem, sed delectationem. Ergo non est meritorius. Obj. 4: Furthermore, merit consists in difficulty, as does virtue. But the marital act contains no difficulty, but rather pleasure. Therefore, it is not meritorious. Praeterea, illud quod non potest fieri sine peccato veniali, nunquam est meritorium; quia non potest homo simul mereri et demereri. Sed in actu matrimoniali semper est peccatum veniale: quia etiam primus motus in hujusmodi delectatione est peccatum veniale. Ergo actus praedictus non potest esse meritorius. Obj. 5: Furthermore, what cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious; for man cannot simultaneously merit and demerit. But in the marital act there is always venial sin: for even the first movement in this kind of pleasure is a venial sin. Therefore, the act mentioned cannot be meritorious. Sed contra, omnis actus in quo impletur praeceptum, est meritorius, si ex caritate fiat. Sed actus matrimonialis est hujusmodi: quia dicitur 1 Corinth. 7, 3: uxori vir debitum reddat. Ergo, etc. On the contrary, every act in which a precept is fulfilled is meritorious, if it is done out of charity. But this is the case with the marital act, for it says in 1 Corinthians 7:3, a man must render the debt to his wife. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, omnis actus virtutis est meritorius. Sed actus praedictus est actus justitiae, quia dicitur redditio debiti. Ergo est meritorius. Furthermore, every act of virtue is meritorious. But the act mentioned is an act of justice, since it is called the rendering of a debt. Therefore, it is meritorious. Respondeo dicendum, quod cum nullus actus ex deliberata voluntate procedens sit indifferens, ut in 2 Lib., dist. 40, quaest. unic. art. 5, dictum est, actus matrimonialis semper est peccatum, vel meritorius in eo qui gratiam habet. Si enim ad actum matrimonialem virtus inducat, vel justitiae, ut debitum reddat, vel religionis, ut proles ad cultum Dei procreetur, est meritorius. Si autem moveat libido sistens infra bona matrimonii, ut scilicet nullo modo ad aliam accedere vellet, est peccatum veniale. Si autem extra bona matrimonii efferatur, ut scilicet cum quacumque muliere id facere proponeret, est peccatum mortale. Natura autem movere non potest quin vel ordinetur ratione, et sic erit motus virtutis; vel non ordinetur, et sic erit motus libidinis. I answer that, since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as was said in Book II, the marital act is always either a sin or it is meritorious in someone who has grace. For if a virtue leads one to the marital act—whether justice, in order to render the debt, or religion, in order to procreate children for the worship of God—it is meritorious. But if sexual appetite should move one, yet remaining within the goods of marriage, so that a man in no way wants to approach some other woman, then it is a venial sin. But if it is borne outside the goods of marriage, so that one would do it with any woman whatsoever, it is a mortal sin. However, nature cannot move unless either it is ordered by reason, and then it will be motivated by virtue; or else it is not ordered, and then it will be motivated by sexual appetite. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod radix merendi quantum ad praemium substantiale est ipsa caritas: sed quantum ad aliquod accidentale praemium ratio meriti consistit in difficultate actus; et sic actus matrimonii non est meritorius, sed primo modo. Reply Obj. 1: The root of meriting as to the substantial prize is charity itself, but as to any incidental prize, the notion of merit consists in the difficulty of the act; and the marital act is not meritorious in this way, but in the first way. Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo potest mereri in minoribus bonis et in majoribus: unde quando aliquis minora bona dimittit ut majora faciat, laudandus est a minus meritorio actu discedens. Reply Obj. 2: Man can merit in lesser things and in greater things: and so when someone foregoes a lesser good so that he might do the greater, his abandoning a less meritorious act is to be praised. Ad tertium dicendum quod indulgentia quandoque est de minoribus malis; et sic indulgetur actus matrimonii prout ad ipsum movet libido infra terminos matrimonii consistens, sic enim est veniale peccatum: sed prout ad ipsum movet virtus, ut est meritorius, non habet indulgentiam nisi secundum quod est indulgentia de minoribus bonis, quae idem est quod concessio. Nec est inconveniens quod ille qui tali concessione utitur, mereatur: quia bonus usus beneficiorum Dei meritorius est. Reply Obj. 3: An indulgence sometimes has to do with lesser evils; and thus the marital act is indulged when sexual appetite moves one to it while remaining within the bounds of marriage, for then it is a venial sin. But when virtue moves one to it, so that it is meritorious, it does not require an indulgence except to the extent that there is an indulgence for lesser goods, which is the same as a concession. Nor is it unfitting that someone who takes advantage of this concession should merit: for the good use of the benefits of God is meritorious. Ad quartum dicendum, quod difficultas laboris requiritur ad meritum praemii accidentalis; sed ad meritum praemii essentialis requiritur difficultas consistens in ordinatione medii, et hoc est etiam in actu matrimoniali. Reply Obj. 4: The difficulty of a work is required to merit a special distinction, but for meriting the essential prize, the difficulty required consists in ordering to the mean, and this also exists in the marital act. Ad quintum dicendum, quod primus motus secundum quod dicitur peccatum veniale, est motus appetitus in aliquod inordinatum delectabile, quod non est in actu matrimoniali; et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 5: The first movement, according to which it is called venial sin, is the motion of the appetite toward some unordered delectable, which is not the case in the marital act; and thus the argument does not follow.