Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod matrimonium non sit in genere conjunctionis. Quia vinculum quo aliqua ligantur, differt a conjunctione ipsa sicut causa ab effectu. Sed matrimonium est vinculum quoddam quo matrimonio juncti ligantur. Ergo non est in genere conjunctionis. Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that marriage is not a kind of union. For the bond by which things are bound, differs from the union itself as a cause from its effect. But marriage is a kind of bond by which those joined in marriage are bound. Therefore, it is not a kind of union. Praeterea, omne sacramentum est sensibile signum. Sed nulla relatio est accidens sensibile. Ergo matrimonium, cum sit sacramentum, non erit in genere relationis; et ita nec in genere conjunctionis. Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore, marriage, since it is a sacrament, will not be in the genus of relation; and so it will also not be in the genus of union. Praeterea, conjunctio est relatio aequiparantiae, sicut aequalitas. Sed non est una numero aequalitatis relatio in utroque extremorum, ut Avicenna dicit. Ergo nec una conjunctio; et sic, si matrimonium est in genere conjunctionis, non erit unum tantum matrimonium inter duos conjuges. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a con-joining is an equal-sided relation, like equality. But the relation of equality is not one in number in both of two extremes, as Avicenna says. Therefore, neither is there one union; and thus if marriage is in the genus of union, there will not be only one marriage between two spouses. Sed contra, relatio est secundum quam aliqua ad invicem referuntur. Sed secundum matrimonium aliqua ad invicem referuntur: dicitur enim maritus vir uxoris, et uxor mariti uxor. Ergo matrimonium est in genere relationis, nec est aliud quam conjunctio. On the contrary (1), a relation is that by which two things are referred to each other. But in marriage they are referred to each other in a certain way: for it is said, a man is husband to his wife, and a wife is the wife of her husband. Therefore, marriage is a kind of relation, nor is it anything other than a union. Praeterea, unio duorum ad aliquod unum non fit nisi secundum conjunctionem. Hoc autem fit per matrimonium, ut patet Genes. 2, 24: erunt duo in carne una. Ergo matrimonium est in genere conjunctionis. Furthermore (2), the union of two into one only happens by a union. But this happens through marriage, as is evident from Genesis 2:24: they shall be two in one flesh. Therefore, marriage is a kind of union. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod matrimonium incongrue nominetur. Quia denominatio debet fieri a digniori. Sed pater dignior est matre. Ergo magis debet denominari a patre quam a matre conjunctio utriusque. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that matrimony is inappropriately named. For a thing should be named from what is more noble. But a father has greater dignity than a mother. Therefore, the union of the two should rather be named from the father than from the mother. Praeterea, res debet denominari ab eo quod est de essentia sua; quia ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in 4 Metaph. Sed nuptiae non sunt de essentia matrimonii. Ergo non debet matrimonium nuptiae appellari. Obj. 2: Furthermore, a thing should be named from what belongs to its essence; since the account that the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Book 4 of the Metaphysics. But nuptials do not belong to the essence of marriage. Therefore, matrimony should not be called nuptials. Praeterea, species non potest proprio nomine nominari ab eo quod est generis. Sed conjunctio est genus ad matrimonium. Ergo non proprie potest conjugium nominari. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a species cannot be given its proper name from something that belongs to the genus. But union is the genus of marriage. Therefore, it should not properly be called conjugal union. Sed in contrarium est communis usus loquentium. On the contrary, this is the common way that people speak. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur in littera. Quia in mariti definitione oportet quod matrimonium ponatur: quia maritus est qui est mulieri matrimonio junctus. Sed ipse ponit matrimonialem conjunctionem in definitione matrimonii. Ergo videtur quod sit circulatio in definitionibus istis. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that it is unfittingly defined in the text. For in the definition of ‘husband’, it is necessary that marriage be included: for a husband is one who is joined to a wife in marriage. But he includes marital union in the definition of matrimony. And therefore it seems that these definitions are circular. Praeterea, per matrimonium sicut vir efficitur maritus mulieris, ita mulier uxor viri. Ergo non magis deberet dici conjunctio maritalis quam uxoria. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as a man is made the husband of his wife through marriage, so also a woman is made the wife of her husband. Therefore, it should not be called a ‘marital union’ rather than an ‘uxorial union’. Praeterea, consuetudo ad genus moris pertinet. Sed frequenter matrimonio juncti sunt valde moribus diversi. Ergo non debet poni in definitione matrimonii: individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens. Obj. 3: Furthermore, custom belongs to the genus of mores. But frequently those joined in marriage are of completely different mores. Therefore, the following should not be included in the definition of marriage: retaining an undivided custom of life. Praeterea, inveniuntur aliae definitiones de matrimonio datae. Quia secundum Hugonem, matrimonium est duarum idonearum personarum legitimus de conjunctione consensus. Secundum quosdam autem matrimonium est consortium communis vitae, et communicatio divini et humani juris. Et quaeritur qualiter hae definitiones differant. Obj. 4: Furthermore, other definitions given for marriage are found. For according to Hugh, marriage is the lawful consent to union of two suitable persons. But according to some people, marriage is a consortium of shared life, and a community of divine and human law. And it must be determined how these definitions differ. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod conjunctio adunationem quamdam importat; unde ubicumque est adunatio aliquorum, ibi est aliqua conjunctio. Ea autem quae ordinantur ad aliquod unum, dicuntur in ordine ad aliud adunari; sicut multi homines adunantur ad unam militiam vel negotiationem exequendam, ex qua dicuntur commilitones ad invicem, vel socii negotiationis; et ideo, cum per matrimonium ordinentur aliqui ad unam generationem et educationem prolis, et iterum ad unam vitam domesticam; constat quod in matrimonio est aliqua conjunctio, secundum quam dicitur maritus et uxor; et talis conjunctio ex hoc quod ordinatur ad aliquod unum, est matrimonium; conjunctio autem corporum vel animorum ad matrimonium consequitur. I answer that, union conveys a certain uniting together; and thus wherever there is a uniting of certain things together, there is some kind of union. Now, things that are ordered to some one thing are said to be united together in their ordering to it; as when many men are united for carrying out one military expedition or one business affair, by that fact they are called fellow soldiers or business partners. And so, since by marriage two people are ordered to one single generation and education of children, and also to one single domestic life, it is clear that in marriage there is a union, because of which a man and a woman are called ‘husband’ and ‘wife’; and such a union, by the fact that it is ordained to some one thing, is marriage. Moreover, the union of bodies or of souls follows upon marriage. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod matrimonium est vinculum quo ligantur formaliter, non effective; et ideo non oportet quod sit aliud a conjunctione. Reply Obj. 1: Marriage is the bond by which they are bound formally, not effectively; and thus it is not necessary that it be anything other than the union. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis ipsa relatio non sit sensibile accidens, tamen causae ejus possunt esse sensibiles: nec in sacramento requiritur quod sit sensibile id quod est res et sacramentum (hoc enim modo se habet in hoc sacramento praedicta conjunctio), sed verba exprimentia consensum, quae sunt sacramentum tantum, et causa praedictae conjunctionis, sunt sensibilia. Reply Obj. 2: Although the relationship itself is not a sensible accident, nevertheless, its causes can be sensible; nor is it required in the sacrament that the reality-and-sacrament be sensible (for this is how the union is related to this sacrament), but the words expressing consent, which are the sacrament alone and the cause of this union, are sensible. Ad tertium dicendum, quod relatio fundatur in aliquo sicut in causa, ut similitudo in qualitate; et in aliquo sicut in subjecto, ut in ipsis similibus; et ex utraque parte potest attendi unitas et diversitas ipsius. Quia ergo in similitudine non est eadem qualitas numero, sed specie in utroque simili; et iterum subjecta similitudinis sunt duo numero; et similiter est de aequalitate; ideo et aequalitas et similitudo omnibus modis est alia numero in utroque similium et aequalium. Sed relatio quae est matrimonium, ex una parte habet unitatem in utroque extremorum, scilicet ex parte causae, quia ad eamdem numero generationem ordinatur; sed ex parte subjecti habet diversitatem secundum numerum; et ideo haec relatio est una et multiplex: et secundum quod est multiplex ex parte subjecti, significatur his nominibus uxor et maritus; secundum autem quod est una, significatur hoc nomine matrimonium. Reply Obj. 3: A relation is founded on something as its cause, as similarity is founded on quality, and in something as its subject, which would be the things themselves that are similar; and in these two aspects one can consider its unity and diversity. Now, in similarity quality is not the same in number in both things, but is the same in species; and the subjects of the similarity are two in number. It is the same way with equality. Thus both equality and similarity are in every way different in number in each of the two similar things or equal things. But the relation that is marriage has unity from one side of each its terms, namely on the side of the cause, because it is ordered to one and the same generation. But on the part of the subject, it has diversity of number. And consequently this relation is both one and multi-sided. The fact that it is multi-sided on the part of the subjects is signified in the names, ‘husband’ and ‘wife,’ while the fact that it is one is signified in the name ‘matrimony.’ Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod in matrimonio est tria considerare. Primo essentiam ipsius, quae est conjunctio; et secundum hoc nominatur conjugium. Secundo causam ejus, quae est desponsatio; et secundum hoc vocantur nuptiae a nubere, quia in ipsa solemnitate desponsationis qua matrimonium perficitur, capita nubentium velantur. Tertio effectum, qui est proles; et sic dicitur matrimonium, ut Augustinus dicit contra Faustum, ob hoc quod mulier non debet ad aliud nubere, nisi ut sit mater. Potest etiam dici matrimonium, quasi matris munium, idest officium: quia feminis maxime incumbit officium educandae prolis. Vel dicitur matrimonium, quasi matrem muniens: quia jam habet quod defendatur et muniatur, scilicet virum. Vel dicitur matrimonium, quasi matrem monens, ne virum relinquat, alteri adhaerens. Vel dicitur matrimonium, quasi materia unius, quia in eo fit conjunctio ad unam prolem materialiter inducendam, ut dicatur matrimonium a monos et materia. Vel dicitur matrimonium, ut Isidorus dicit, a matre et nato; quia per matrimonium efficitur aliqua mater nati. To the second question, it should be said that in marriage there are three things to consider. First, its essence, which is a union; and with regard to this it is conjugal. Second, its cause, which is the marriage promise; and with regard to this it is called nuptials from nubere, to veil, for in the ceremony of the marriage promise, which brings about the marriage, the heads of those marrying are veiled. Third, the effect, which is children; and thus it is called matrimony, as Augustine says against Faustus, on account of this, that a woman should not marry for anything else, except so that she might be a mother. It can also be called matrimony, as though from matris munium, that is, the mother’s office: for the office of educating the children falls mostly to women. Or it is called matrimony, as if matrem muniens (fortifying the mother): for now she has what will defend and fortify her, namely, a husband. Or it is called matrimony, as if matrem monens (warning the mother), lest she leave her husband, to cleave to another. Or it is called matrimony, as if materia unius (matter of one), since it brings about a union for bringing forth one offspring materially, so that it may be called matrimony from monos and materia. Or it is called matrimony, as Isidore says, from matre and nato (mother and child), for by marriage, in a certain way, someone is made the mother of a child. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis pater sit dignior quam mater, tamen circa prolem magis officiosa est mater quam pater. Vel ideo quia mulier ad hoc principaliter facta est ut sit homini in adjutorium prolis; non autem vir propter hoc factus est; unde magis pertinet ad rationem matrimonii mater quam pater. Reply Obj. 1: Although the father is nobler than the mother, nevertheless, concerning children the mother is more dutiful than the father. Or since the woman was chiefly made for being a help for the man in the area of offspring, but the man was not made for the sake of this, for this reason ‘mother’ belongs more to the notion of matrimony than ‘father.’ Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquando essentialia cognoscuntur per accidentalia; et ideo etiam per accidentalia aliqua nominari possunt, cum nomen detur causa rei innotescendae. Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, and so some things can also be named from accidentals, since the name is given for the sake of knowing the thing. Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquando species nominatur ab eo quod est generis, propter imperfectionem speciei, quando scilicet habet complete generis rationem; nec tamen aliquid addit quod ad dignitatem pertineat; sicut proprium accidentale retinet nomen proprii communis. Aliquando autem propter perfectionem, quando in una specie complete invenitur ratio generis, et non in alia; sicut animal denominatur ab anima, quae competit animato corpori, quod est genus animalis; sed animatio non invenitur perfecte in animatis quae non sunt animalia; et similiter est in proposito: quia conjunctio viri ad mulierem per matrimonium est maxima, cum sit et animarum et corporum; et ideo conjugium nominatur. Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a species is named from what belongs to the genus, because of an imperfection of the species, namely when it has completely the account of the genus yet it does not add anything that belongs to its dignity, as when the accidental characteristic retains the name of the common characteristic. But sometimes this happens because of a perfection, when the account of the genus is completely found in one species, and not in others; as animal is denominated from anima (soul), which belongs to the animated body, which is the genus of animal; but being animate is not found perfectly in animated things that are not animals. And it is the same way in this argument: for the union of man and woman by matrimony is the greatest union since it is a union of souls and of bodies; and therefore it is named conjugium. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, in matrimonio tria possunt considerari; scilicet causa ipsius, et essentia ejus, et effectus; et secundum hoc tres definitiones inveniuntur de matrimonio datae. Nam definitio Hugonis tangit causam, scilicet consensum, et per se non est. Definitio autem in littera posita tangit essentiam matrimonii, scilicet conjunctionem, et addit determinatum subjectum in hoc quod dicit: inter legitimas personas. Ponit etiam differentiam contrahentem ad speciem in hoc quod dicit, maritalis: quia cum matrimonium sit conjunctio in ordine ad aliquod unum, talis conjunctio in speciem trahitur per illud ad quod ordinatur; et hoc est quod ad maritum pertinet. Ponit etiam virtutem hujus conjunctionis, quia indissolubilis est, in hoc quod dicit: individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens. To the third question, it must be said that, as was said above, in marriage three things are to be considered: namely, its cause, its essence, and its effect. And accordingly we find three definitions given for matrimony. For the definition of Hugh touches on the cause, namely consent, and is self-evident. But the definition set forth in the text touches on the essence of marriage, namely, union, and it adds a determinate subject by saying: between eligible persons. It also establishes a specifying difference by saying marital: for since matrimony is a union that is ordered to one thing, such a union is specified by what it is ordered to; and this is what maritum (husband) refers to. It also sets out the power of this union, that it is indissoluble, in saying, retaining an indivisible custom of life. Sed alia definitio tangit effectum ad quem ordinatur matrimonium; scilicet vitam communem in rebus domesticis. Et quia omnis communicatio aliqua lege ordinatur; ideo ponitur ordinativum istius communionis, scilicet jus divinum et humanum: aliae enim communicationes, ut negotiatorum et commilitantium, solo jure humano institutae sunt. But the other definition touches on the effect to which marriage is ordered, namely, common life in domestic matters. And since any community is ordered by some law, for this reason is included the regulating principle of this communion, which is divine and human law: for other communities, such as business associations and military bodies, were instituted by human law alone. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod priora aliquando, ex quibus debet dari definitio, non sunt nominata; et ideo in definitione aliquorum ponuntur aliqua posteriora simpliciter, quae sunt priora quo ad nos, sicut in definitione qualitatis ponitur quale a Philosopho, cum dicit: qualitas est secundum quam quales dicimur; et ita etiam hic in definitione matrimonii ponitur conjunctio maritalis; ut sit sensus, quod matrimonium est conjunctio ad ea quae mariti officium requirit, quae non poterant uno nominari nomine. Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes prior things, from which a definition should be given, are not named; and therefore, in the definition of some things certain things are included which are posterior simply speaking, but which are prior with respect to us: as in the definition of quality the Philosopher includes quale (what kind), when he says: quality is that according to which we are said to be of a certain kind. And so also here in the definition of matrimony marital union is included, so that the sense is that marriage is a union for those things that require the office of a husband, which could not be named by one name. Ad secundum dicendum, quod per hanc differentiam tangitur finis conjunctionis, ut dictum est; et quia, ut dicit apostolus, 1 Corinth. 7, vir non est propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum; ideo haec differentia potius debet sumi a viro quam a muliere. Reply Obj. 2: This difference touches upon the end of the union, as was said; and since, as the Apostle says, the man is not for the sake of the woman, but the woman for the sake of the man (1 Cor 11:9), therefore this difference should be taken rather from the man than from the woman. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut vita civilis non importat actum singularem hujus vel illius, sed ea quae ad communicationem civilem pertinent; ita vita conjugalis nihil est aliud quam conversatio ad communicationem talem pertinens; et ideo quantum ad hanc vitam semper consuetudo est individua, quamvis sit diversa quantum ad actus singulares utriusque. Reply Obj. 3: Just as civil life does not convey the singular act of this person or of that person, but those things which pertain to civil community, so conjugal life is nothing other than the companionship belonging to that kind of community; and therefore, the custom of this life is always an indivisible one, however diverse may be the singular acts of each of the two. Ad quartum patet solutio ex dictis. Reply Obj. 4: The solution is evident from what has been said. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum consensus sit causa matrimonii Whether consent is the cause of matrimony Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1