Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum quando est sine eis, semper sit peccatum mortale Whether when it is without them it is always a mortal sin Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod quandocumque aliquis uxorem cognoscit non intendens aliquod matrimonii bonum, sed solam delectationem, mortaliter peccet. Quia Hieronymus dicit, et habetur in littera: voluptates quae de meretricum amplexibus capiuntur, in uxore damnandae sunt. Sed non dicitur esse damnabile nisi peccatum mortale. Ergo cognoscere uxorem propter solam voluptatem, est peccatum mortale semper. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that whenever someone knows his wife without intending any good of marriage, but only pleasure, he sins mortally. For Jerome says, and the text quotes him: pleasures that are taken from the embraces of prostitutes are condemned in a wife. But something is not said to be condemned unless it is a mortal sin. Therefore, to know one’s wife for the sake of sensuality alone is always a mortal sin. Praeterea, consensus in delectationem est peccatum mortale, ut in 2 Lib., dist. 24, qu. 2, art. 2, in corp., dictum est. Sed quicumque cognoscit uxorem suam causa delectationis, consentit in delectationem. Ergo mortaliter peccat. Obj. 2: Furthermore, consenting to pleasure is a mortal sin, as was stated in Book II, Distinction 23, Question 2, Article 2. But whoever knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents to pleasure. Therefore, he sins mortally. Praeterea, quicumque usum creaturae non refert in Deum, creatura fruitur; quod est peccatum mortale. Sed quicumque uxore propter solam delectationem utitur, hunc usum non refert in Deum. Ergo mortaliter peccat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever does not refer the use of creation to God enjoys the creation, which is a mortal sin. But whoever avails himself of his wife for the sake of pleasure alone, does not refer this use to God. Therefore, he sins mortally. Praeterea, nullus debet excommunicari nisi pro peccato mortali. Sed aliquis sola libidine uxorem cognoscens arcetur ab introitu Ecclesiae, ut in littera dicitur, quasi sit excommunicatus. Ergo omnis talis peccat mortaliter. Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one should be excommunicated except for mortal sin. But someone who knows his wife out of sexual desire alone is prevented from entering the Church as if he were excommunicated, as is said in the text. Therefore, anyone like this sins mortally. Sed contra est, secundum Augustinum, quod talis concubitus ponitur inter peccata quotidiana, pro quibus dicitur pater noster, ut habetur in littera. Sed talia non sunt peccata mortalia. Ergo, etc. On the contrary (1), according to Augustine, such intercourse is counted among daily sins, for which one may say a Pater Noster, as the text has it. But that kind of sin is not a mortal sin. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, qui cibo utitur propter delectationem tantum, non peccat mortaliter. Ergo pari ratione qui utitur uxore tantum causa libidinis. Furthermore (2), someone who uses food for pleasure alone does not sin mortally. Therefore, the same reasoning applies to someone who avails himself of his wife only out of sensual desire. Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod quandocumque ad actum conjugalem libido principaliter movet, est peccatum mortale; sed quando movet ex latere, tunc est peccatum veniale; quando autem delectationem omnino respuit, et displicet ei; tunc est omnino absque veniali peccato: ut sic delectationem in actu illo quaerere, sit peccatum mortale; delectationem oblatam acceptare, sit peccatum veniale; sed eam odire, sit perfectionis. I answer that, certain people say that whenever sensual desire principally moves someone to the conjugal act, it is a mortal sin. But when it is a side motive, then it is a venial sin. However, when someone rejects the pleasure altogether, and it displeases him, then it is without any venial sin at all. So in this way, to seek pleasure in the act would be mortal sin, to accept the pleasure offered would be venial sin, but to hate it would belong to perfection. Sed hoc non potest esse: quia, secundum Philosophum in 10 Ethic., idem est judicium de delectatione et operatione: quia operationis bonae est delectatio bona, et malae mala. Unde cum actus matrimonialis non sit per se malus; nec quaerere delectationem erit peccatum mortale semper. Et ideo dicendum, quod si delectatio quaeratur ultra honestatem matrimonii, ut scilicet quia aliquis in conjuge non attendat quod conjux est, sed solum quod mulier est, idem paratus facere cum ea etsi non esset conjux, est peccatum mortale; et talis dicitur ardentior amator uxoris, quia scilicet ardor ille extra bona matrimonii effertur. Si autem quaeratur delectatio infra limites matrimonii, ut scilicet talis delectatio in alia non quaereretur quam in conjuge, sic est veniale peccatum. But this cannot be: for according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 10, the judgment of a pleasure and an activity is the same: for the pleasure of a good activity is good, and a bad activity carries bad pleasure. Consequently, since the marital act is not evil per se, neither will seeking its pleasure always be a mortal sin. And therefore it should be said that if pleasure were sought outside the dignity of marriage, such that, for example, someone did not turn to his wife because she was his wife, but only because she was a woman, prepared to do the same with her as if she were not his wife, that is a mortal sin. And such a man is called a too ardent lover of his wife, for in fact that ardor is borne outside the goods of marriage. If, on the other hand, pleasure were sought within the limits of marriage, namely so that such pleasure were not sought in any woman but one’s wife, then it would be a venial sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod tunc voluptates meretricias vir in uxore quaerit quando nihil aliud in ea attendit quam quod in meretrice attenderet. Reply Obj. 1: A man seeks a harlot’s pleasures in his own wife whenever he sees nothing else in her than what he might look for in a prostitute. Ad secundum dicendum, quod consensus in delectationem concubitus qui est mortale peccatum, est mortale peccatum; non autem talis est delectatio matrimonialis actus. Reply Obj. 2: Consenting to pleasure in the kind of intercourse that is a mortal sin, is a mortal sin. However, the pleasure of the marital act is not so. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis delectationem non referat actu in Deum, tamen non ponit in ea ultimum voluntatis finem; alias eam ubicumque indifferenter quaereret; et ideo non oportet quod creatura fruatur, sed utitur creatura propter se; se autem habitualiter propter Deum, quamvis non actu. Reply Obj. 3: Although he does not refer this pleasure to God in act, nevertheless, he does not place in it the final end of his will; otherwise he would seek it indifferently wherever he could find it. Therefore, he does not necessarily rest in the enjoyment of a created thing, but in act he uses a created thing for himself—and himself habitually, if not actually, for God’s sake. Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur propter hoc quod ex hoc peccato homo excommunicationem mereatur; sed quia spiritualibus se reddit inhabilem, propter hoc quod in actu illo homo efficitur totus caro. Reply Obj. 4: This is not said because a man deserves excommunication for this sin, but because he renders himself unfit for spiritual things, by the fact that in this act a man is made to be entirely flesh. Expositio textus Exposition of the Text Solet quaeri, cum masculus et femina, nec ille maritus nec illa uxor alterius . . . pro incontinentia solius concubitus causa copulantur. De hoc in praecedenti dist. dictum est, quoniam malus finis bonitatem matrimonii non tollit. It is usual to ask: when a man and a woman, who are not the husband and wife of anyone else, join together . . . for the sake of sexual intercourse alone on account of incontinence. This was discussed in the preceding distinction, since a bad end does not remove the goodness of marriage. Qui vero venena sterilitatis procurant, non conjuges, sed fornicarii sunt. Hoc peccatum quamvis sit grave, et inter maleficia computandum, et contra naturam, quia etiam bestiae fetus expectant; tamen est minus quam homicidium; quia adhuc poterat alio modo impediri conceptus. Nec est judicandus talis irregularis, nisi jam formato puerperio abortum procuret. As for those who procure poisons to induce sterility, they are not marriage partners, but fornicators. Although this sin is grave, and to be counted among wicked deeds, and against nature (for even beasts desire offspring), nevertheless it is less grave than murder, since a child conceived could be prevented in another way. Nor is such a person to be judged irregular, unless he should now procure an abortion for the child about to be born. Semina paulatim formantur, etc. De hoc habitum est in tertio, dist. 3. “The seeds are gradually formed in the womb.” There is discussion of this in Book III, Distinction 3. Et postquam venter uxoris intumuerit, non perdant filios. Quamvis enim matrix post impraegnationem claudatur; tamen ex delectatione, ut Avicenna dicit, movetur et aperitur; et ex hoc imminet periculum abortus; et ideo Hieronymus vituperat accessum viri ad uxorem impraegnatam; non tamen ita quod semper sit peccatum mortale; nisi forte quando probabiliter timetur de periculo abortus. “Men . . . should at least imitate animals, and not destroy their offspring, once the wife’s womb has become swollen.” For although the womb is closed after impregnation, yet it is moved and opened by sensual pleasure, as Avicenna says, and because of this there is a danger of miscarriage. And this is why Jerome censures a man’s approaching his pregnant wife. Not, however, that such a thing would always be a mortal sin, unless perhaps when there is fear of a probable danger of miscarriage. Nec immutetur in eum usum qui est contra naturam. Usus contra naturam conjugis est, quando debitum vas praetermittit, vel debitum modum a natura institutum quantum ad situm; et in primo semper est peccatum mortale, quia proles sequi non potest, unde totaliter intentio naturae frustratur; sed in secundo modo non semper est peccatum mortale, ut quidam dicunt, sed potest esse signum mortalis concupiscentiae; quandoque etiam sine peccato esse potest, quando dispositio corporis alium modum non patitur; alias tanto est gravius, quanto magis a naturali modo receditur. “And it does not become the kind of practice which is against nature.” The use of one’s wife against nature is when one neglects the right aperture, or the right mode instituted by nature as to the position. And in the first case it is always a mortal sin, for children cannot possibly follow, and so the intention of nature is totally thwarted. But in the second instance it is not always a mortal sin, as certain men say, but it can be a sign of mortal concupiscence. Sometimes it can even be without sin, when the disposition of the body does not permit another mode. Otherwise it becomes more serious, the more one recedes from the natural mode. Distinctio 32 Distinction 32 De debito matrimonii The marital debt Postquam determinavit Magister de bonis conjugii quibus actus matrimonialis excusatur; hic determinat de actu ipso secundum quod ulterius accipit rationem debiti per bona conjugii; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima ostendit quod uterque conjugum alteri debitum reddere tenetur; in secunda ostendit quod petitio debiti propter solemnitatem temporis impeditur, ibi: et licet debitum poscenti semper sit solvendum, non licet tamen qualibet die poscere. After the Master has considered the goods of the union by which the marital act is excused, here he considers the act itself according as it takes on the character of something owed through the goods of the union; and this is divided into two parts: in the first he shows that both of the spouses are bound to render the debt to each other; and in the second he shows that requesting the debt is impeded by a solemn time, at: and although the debt is always to be satisfied to one asking for it, yet it is not lawful to ask every day. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit quod vir et uxor sunt aequales in debiti redditione; secundo probat quoddam quod supposuerat, ibi: quod probatur testimoniis. The first part is divided into two: in the first part he shows that husband and wife are equals in the rendering of the debt; second, he proves a certain thing which had been supposed, at: that the husband may not practice continence without the wife’s consent is proved by the testimonies below. Et licet debitum poscenti semper sit solvendum, non licet tamen qualibet die poscere. Hic determinat de temporibus in quibus actus matrimonii interdicitur; et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod aliquod tempus impedit petitionem debiti; secundo ostendit quod etiam aliquod impedit celebrationem nuptiarum, ibi: nec solum in opere carnali servanda sunt tempora, sed etiam in celebrandis nuptiis. And although the debt is always to be satisfied to one asking for it, yet it is not lawful to ask every day. Here he considers the times in which the marital act is forbidden, and regarding this he does two things: first, he shows that a certain time impedes the requesting of the debt; second, he shows that something may also impede the celebration of marriage, at: times are to be observed not only with regard to the work of the flesh, but also in the celebration of nuptials. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit veritatem; secundo excludit quamdam objectionem, ibi: illi autem quod dictum est, reddere debitum non esse peccatum, videtur obviare quod ait Hieronymus. About the first he does two things: first, he shows the truth; second, he excludes a certain objection, at: as for what was said earlier, that to render the debt is not a sin, it seems to be contradicted by what Jerome says. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De debito The marital debt Hic quaeruntur quinque: Here five questions arise: primo, utrum uterque conjugum teneatur ex necessitate praecepti alteri debitum reddere semper; first, whether both spouses are always bound to render the debt to each other by the necessity of a precept; secundo, utrum debeat aliquando reddere non poscenti; second, whether one should sometimes not render to the one asking; tertio, utrum in redditione debiti vir et uxor sint aequales; third, whether in rendering the debt husband and wife are equals; quarto, utrum unus sine consensu alterius possit votum emittere per quod impediatur redditio debiti; fourth, whether one party without consent of the other could take a vow by which rendering of the debt would be impeded; quinto, utrum tempus impediat redditionem debiti. fifth, whether a time impedes the rendering of the debt. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum uterque conjugum teneatur ex necessitate praecepti alteri debitum reddere semper Whether both spouses are always bound to render the debt to each other by the necessity of a precept