Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum habere concubinam sit contra legem naturae Whether having a concubine is against the law of nature Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod habere concubinam non sit contra legem naturae. Legis enim caeremonialia non sunt de lege naturae. Sed fornicatio prohibetur, Act. 15, inter alia caeremonialia legis quae ad tempus credentibus ex gentibus imponebantur. Ergo fornicatio simplex, quae est accessus ad concubinam, non est contra legem naturae. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that to have a concubine is not against the law of nature. For ceremonial matters of law are not of natural law. But the prohibition of fornication is included with the other ceremonials of the law which were imposed for a time on believers who had come from the Gentiles in Acts 15. Therefore, simple fornication, which means approaching a concubine, is not against the law of nature. Praeterea, jus positivum a naturali jure profectum est, ut Tullius dicit. Sed secundum jus positivum fornicatio simplex non prohibetur, immo potius in poenam secundum antiquas leges mulieres lupanaribus tradendae condemnabantur. Ergo habere concubinam non est contra legem naturae. Obj. 2: Furthermore, positive law is a development from natural law, as Cicero states. But according to positive law, simple fornication is not prohibited, but rather to the contrary, according to the ancient laws women were condemned to be handed over to brothels as a punishment. Therefore, to have a concubine is not against the law of nature. Praeterea, naturalis lex non prohibet quin illud quod datur simpliciter, possit dari ad tempus et secundum quid. Sed una mulier soluta potest dare viro soluto in perpetuum sui corporis potestatem, ut utatur ea licite, cum voluerit. Ergo non est contra legem naturae, si dederit ei potestatem sui corporis ad horam. Obj. 3: Furthermore, natural law does not prohibit that what is given simply may be given for a time and under a certain respect. But an unbound woman could give an unbound man power over her body for always, so that he could avail himself of her licitly, if she wanted. Therefore it is not against the law of nature if she gives him power over her body for an hour. Praeterea, quicumque utitur re sua ut vult, nemini facit injuriam. Sed ancilla est res domini. Ergo si dominus ea utatur ad libitum, non facit injuriam alicui; et ita habere concubinam non est contra legem naturae. Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever makes use of his own things as he wishes injures no one. But a slave-girl is the possession of her master. Therefore, if the master makes use of her at will, he does not injure anyone. And thus to have a concubine is not against the law of nature. Praeterea, quilibet potest dare alteri quod suum est. Sed uxor habet potestatem in corpore viri, ut patet 1 Corinth. 7. Ergo si uxor velit, vir poterit alii mulieri conjungi sine peccato. Obj. 5: Furthermore, anyone can give to another what is his own. But a wife has power over the body of her husband, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7:4. Therefore, if the wife wished, the man could be joined with other women without sin. Sed contra, secundum omnes leges, filii qui de concubinis nascuntur, sunt vituperabiles. Sed hoc non esset, nisi concubitus ex quo oriuntur, esset naturaliter turpis. Ergo habere concubinam est contra legem naturae. On the contrary (1), according to all laws, children who are born of concubines are looked down upon. But this would not be the case unless the intercourse from which they arose were naturally shameful. Therefore, to have a concubine is against the law of nature. Praeterea, sicut supra, distinct. 26, dictum est, matrimonium est naturale. Sed hoc non esset, si sine praejudicio legis naturae homo posset conjungi mulieri praeter matrimonium. Ergo contra legem naturae est concubinam habere. Furthermore (2), as was said above in Distinction 26, marriage is natural. But this would not be true if without prejudice to natural law a man could be joined with a woman outside of marriage. Therefore, it is against the law of nature to have a concubine. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod accedere ad concubinam non sit peccatum mortale. Majus enim peccatum est mendacium quam fornicatio simplex: quod patet ex hoc quod Judas, qui fornicationem non horruit cum Thamar committere, recusavit mendacium, dicens: certe mendacii nos arguere non poterit. Sed mendacium non semper est mortale peccatum. Ergo neque fornicatio simplex. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that to approach a concubine is not a mortal sin. For to tell a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication: which is evident from the fact that Judah, who was not loath to fornicate with Tamar, balked at telling a lie, saying, he will certainly not be able to charge us with lying (Gen 38:23). But to lie is not always a mortal sin. Therefore, neither is simple fornication. Praeterea, peccatum mortale morte puniri debet. Sed lex vetus non puniebat concubitum concubinae morte, nisi in aliquo casu, ut patet Deuteron. 13. Ergo non est peccatum mortale. Obj. 2: Furthermore, mortal sin should be punished by death. But the Old Law did not punish lying with a concubine by death, except in a certain case, as is clear from Deuteronomy 22:20–21. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, peccata carnalia sunt minoris culpae quam spiritualia. Sed non omnis superbia aut avaritia est peccatum mortale; quae sunt peccata spiritualia. Ergo nec omnis fornicatio, quae est peccatum carnale. Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Gregory, carnal sins are blamed less than spiritual sins. But not every instance of pride or avarice is a mortal sin; and these are spiritual sins. Therefore, neither is all fornication, which is a carnal sin, mortal. Praeterea, ubi est majus incitamentum, ibi est minus peccatum: quia magis peccat qui minori tentatione vincitur, ut supra, distinct. 10, dictum est. Sed concupiscentia maxime instigat ad venerea. Ergo cum actus gulae non sit semper peccatum mortale, nec fornicatio simplex erit peccatum mortale. Obj. 4: Furthermore, where there is greater incitement, there is less of a sin: for that man sins more gravely who is overcome by a lesser temptation, as was said in Distinction 10. But concupiscence most greatly incites one to sexual things. Therefore, just as an act of gluttony is not always a mortal sin, neither will simple fornication always be a mortal sin. Sed contra, nihil excludit a regno Dei nisi peccatum mortale. Sed fornicarii excluduntur a regno Dei, ut patet 1 Corinth. 6. Ergo fornicatio simplex est peccatum mortale. On the contrary (1), nothing is excluded from the kingdom of God except mortal sin. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 6:9–10. Therefore, simple fornication is a mortal sin. Praeterea, sola peccata mortalia criminalia dicuntur. Sed omnis fornicatio est crimen, ut patet Tobiae 4, 13: attende tibi ab omni fornicatione, et praeter uxorem tuam nunquam patiaris crimen scire. Furthermore (2), only mortal sins are crimes. But all fornication is a crime, as is evident in Tobit 4:13: refrain from all fornication, and beyond your wife never endure to know crime. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod aliquando fuerit licitum concubinam habere. Sicut enim habere unam uxorem est de lege naturae, ita non habere concubinam. Sed aliquando licuit plures uxores habere. Ergo et habere concubinam. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that at one time it was licit to have a concubine. For just as having one wife belongs to the law of nature, so also having no concubine. But at one time it was permitted to have many wives. Therefore, it was also permitted to have a concubine. Praeterea, non potest aliqua simul esse uxor et ancilla; unde secundum legem, ex hoc ipso quod ancilla in matrimonium ducebatur, libera reddebatur. Sed aliqui Deo amicissimi leguntur ad suas ancillas accessisse, sicut Abraham et Jacob. Ergo illae non erant uxores; et sic aliquando licuit concubinas habere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no woman can be at the same time wife and slave-girl; which is why, according to the Law, a slave-girl was rendered free by the very fact that she was taken in marriage. But some of God’s most favored are said to have approached their slave-girls, like Abraham and Jacob. Therefore, these women were not wives, and so at one time it was permitted to have concubines. Praeterea, illa quae in matrimonio ducitur, non potest ejici, et filius ejus debet esse hereditatis particeps. Sed Abraham ejecit Agar, et filius ejus non fuit heres. Ergo non fuit uxor Abrahae. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the woman who is taken in marriage cannot be sent away, and her son should take part in the inheritance. But Abraham sent away Hagar, and her son was not an heir. Therefore, Hagar was not Abraham’s wife. Sed contra, ea quae sunt contra praecepta Decalogi, nunquam licuerunt. Sed habere concubinam est contra praeceptum Decalogi, scilicet: non moechaberis. Ergo nunquam fuit licitum. On the contrary (1), those things that are against the precepts of the Decalogue were never allowed. But to have a concubine is against a precept of the Decalogue, namely: thou shalt not commit adultery. Therefore, never was it permitted. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit in Lib. de patriarchis: viro non licet quod mulieri non licet. Sed nunquam licuit mulieri ad alium virum accedere, dimisso viro proprio. Ergo nec viro unquam licuit concubinam habere. Furthermore (2), Ambrose says in the book on the patriarchs: what is not permitted to a wife is not permitted to a husband. But it was never permitted for a woman to approach another man, after having sent away her own husband. Therefore, neither was it ever allowed to have a concubine. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, illa actio dicitur esse contra legem naturae, quae non est conveniens fini debito, sive quia non ordinatur in ipsum per actionem agentis, sive quia de se est improportionata fini illi. Finis autem quem natura ex concubitu intendit, est proles procreanda et educanda; et ut hoc bonum quaereretur, posuit delectationem in coitu, ut Augustinus dicit. I answer that, as is clear from what has been said above, an action is said to be against natural law when it is not suited to the due end, either because it is not directed to it by the action of the agent, or because it is per se disproportionate to that end. However, the end that nature intends from sleeping together is the procreation and education of children. And so that this good might be sought, nature has built pleasure into intercourse, as Constantinus says. Quicumque ergo concubitu utitur propter delectationem quae in ipso est, non referendo ad finem a natura intentum, contra naturam facit; et similiter etiam nisi sit talis concubitus qui ad illum finem convenienter ordinari possit. Et quia res a fine plerumque nominantur tamquam ab optimo: sicut conjunctio matrimonii a prolis bono nomen accepit, quod per matrimonium principaliter quaeritur; ita concubinae nomen illam conjunctionem exprimit qua solus concubitus propter seipsum quaeritur; et si etiam aliquis quandoque ex tali concubitu prolem quaerat, non tamen est conveniens ad prolis bonum, in quo non solum intelligitur ipsius procreatio, per quam proles esse accipit, sed etiam educatio et instructio, per quam accipitur nutrimentum et disciplina a parentibus: in quibus tribus parentes proli tenentur, secundum Philosophum in 8 Ethicor. Therefore, whoever makes use of intercourse because of the pleasure that is in it, without referring it to the end intended by nature, acts against nature; and also if the intercourse be such that it could not fittingly be ordered to that end. And since things are commonly named from their ends as from what is best in them, the union of matrimony takes its name from the good of offspring, which principally is sought through marriage, and in the same way the name of concubine expresses a union in which only sleeping together for its own sake is sought. And even if someone should seek children at some time from this kind of sleeping together, it is still not appropriate to the good of children, which is understood not only as procreation, in which a child is conceived, but also education and instruction, which includes nourishment and discipline from the parents. In these three things parents are bound to their children, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 8. Cum autem educatio et instructio proli a parentibus debeatur per longum tempus; exigit lex naturae ut pater et mater in longum tempus commaneant ad subveniendum communiter proli; unde et aves quae communiter pullos nutriunt, ante completam nutritionem non separantur a mutua societate quae incepit a concumbendo. Haec autem obligatio ad commanendum feminam cum marito matrimonium facit. Et ideo patet quod accedere ad mulierem non junctam sibi matrimonio, quae concubina vocatur, est contra legem naturae. Since, however, education and instruction are owed to the children by their parents for a long period of time, the law of nature requires that father and mother remain together for a long time for the shared care of the children. This is also the reason that birds that nourish their chicks together are not separated from the shared partnership which began with their mating, until the nurturing of the young has been completed. But this obligation of husband and wife remaining together is what makes matrimony. And therefore it is evident that to approach a woman not joined to oneself in marriage, which is called concubinage, is against the law of nature. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in gentibus quantum ad multa lex naturae obfuscata erat; unde accedere ad concubinam malum non reputabant; sed passim fornicatione quasi re licita utebantur, sicut et aliis quae erant contra caeremonias Judaeorum, quamvis non essent contra legem naturae; et ideo apostoli immiscuerunt prohibitionem fornicationis caeremonialibus, propter discretionem quae erat in utroque inter Judaeos et gentiles. Reply Obj. 1: Among the gentiles, the law of nature was obscured regarding many things. For this reason, they did not consider it bad to approach a concubine, but they employed fornication far and wide like something licit, along with other things that were against the ceremonies of the Jews, although they were not against the law of nature. And therefore the apostles included the prohibition of fornication with ceremonials, because of the different judgments that existed about both matters among Jews and gentiles. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex praedicta obscuritate, scilicet in quam ceciderunt gentiles, Deo debitam gloriam non reddentes, ut dicitur Rom. 1, lex illa processit, et non ex instinctu legis naturae; unde praevalente Christiana religione lex illa extirpata est. Reply Obj. 2: That law arose not from the instinct of the law of nature, but from the darkness into which the gentiles had fallen, not rendering the due glory to God, as it says in Romans 1:21. For this reason, when the Christian religion prevailed, that law was extirpated. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in aliquibus sicut nullum inconveniens sequitur si rem aliquam quam quis in potestate habet, alteri simpliciter tradat; ita etiam nec si tradat ad tempus; et sic neutrum est contra legem naturae. Ita autem non est in proposito; et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 3: In some matters, when nothing unfitting follows if someone hands over completely to someone else a certain thing that is in his power, it would also not be unfitting if he handed it over for a time. So neither of these is against the law of nature. However, it is not like that in this matter. Therefore, the reasoning does not follow. Ad quartum dicendum, quod injuria justitiae opponitur. Lex autem naturalis non solum prohibet injustitiam, sed etiam opposita omnium virtutum; sicut contra legem naturae est ut aliquis immoderate comedat, quamvis talis rebus suis utens nulli injuriam faciat. Et praeterea ancilla quamvis sit res domini ad obsequium, non est tamen res sua ad concubitum; et iterum interest qualiter quisque re sua utatur. Facit etiam talis injuriam proli procreandae, ad cujus bonum non sufficienter talis conjunctio ordinatur, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: Injury is opposed to justice. However, natural law does not only prohibit injustice, but also those things opposed to any virtue, just as it is against natural law that someone eat immoderately, even though such a person using his own things does injury to no one. And furthermore, although a slave-girl is the possession of her lord as far as service goes, she is nevertheless not his possession as far as intercourse goes; and again, how someone uses his own belongings is important. Such a person also does injury to the children to be conceived, to whose good such a union is not sufficiently ordered, as was said in the response. Ad quintum dicendum, quod mulier habet potestatem in corpore viri non simpliciter quantum ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad matrimonii usum; et ideo non potest contra matrimonii bonum corpus viri alteri praebere. Reply Obj. 5: A woman has power over the body of her husband not simply-speaking with regard to all things, but only regarding the use of matrimony. Therefore, she cannot provide the body of her husband to another woman against the good of matrimony. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod, sicut in 2 Lib., dist. 42, qu. 1, art. 4, in corp. dictum est, illi actus ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia per quos foedus amicitiae hominis ad Deum et hominis ad hominem violatur. Haec enim sunt contra duo praecepta caritatis, quae est animae vita; et ideo, cum concubitus fornicarius tollat debitam ordinationem parentis ad prolem, quam natura ex concubitu intendit; non est dubium quod fornicatio simplex de sui ratione est peccatum mortale, etiam si lex scripta non esset. To the second question, it should be said, as was said in the body of Book II, Distinction 42, Question 1, Article 4, those acts that violate the covenant of friendship between man and God and man and man, are mortal sins by their genus. For these things are against the two precepts of charity, which is the life of the soul; therefore, since fornication destroys the due order of parent to child, which nature intends from intercourse, there is no doubt that simple fornication is by its own nature a mortal sin, even if there were not a written law. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod frequenter homo qui non vitat peccatum mortale, vitat aliquod peccatum veniale, ad quod non habet tantum incitamentum; et ita etiam Judas mendacium vitavit, fornicationem non vitans; quamvis illud mendacium perniciosum fuisset, injuriam habens annexam, si promissum non reddidisset. Reply Obj. 1: Frequently a man who does not avoid mortal sin avoids some venial sin, toward which he does not have so much incitement; and this is the way that Judah avoided lying, without avoiding fornication, although that lie would have been pernicious, as having injury joined to it, if he had not fulfilled his promise. Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatum non dicitur mortale quia morte temporali puniatur, sed quia punitur aeterna; unde etiam furtum, quod est mortale peccatum, et multa alia interdum non puniuntur per leges temporali morte; et similiter etiam est de fornicatione. Reply Obj. 2: A sin is not called ‘mortal’ because it is punished by temporal death, but because it is punished by eternal death. This is also why theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other things are sometimes not punished by temporal death under the laws; and the case is similar with fornication.