Respondeo dicendum, quod virginitas, ut ex dictis Ambrosii patet, integritas quaedam est; unde per privationem corruptionis dicitur, quae in actu generationis accidit; ubi triplex corruptio est. Una corporalis tantum, in hoc quod claustra pudoris franguntur. Alia spiritualis et corporalis simul, ex hoc quod per decisionem et motum seminis, in sensu delectatio generatur. Tertia est spiritualis tantum, ex hoc quod ratio huic delectationi se subjicit, in qua integritatem perdit quantum ad actum: quia impossibile est aliquid intelligere in ipsa, ut Philosophus dicit in libro 7 Ethicor.; unde ipsa rationis absorptio corruptio dicitur. Haec autem tertia corruptio non est rationis actus, sed quaedam passio, per accidens ei conveniens ex passione inferioris partis, sicut per somnum vel phrenesim et alias passiones corporales contingit rationis actum impediri per accidens. I answer that, virginity, as is clear from the words of Ambrose, is a certain integrity; for which reason it is named from the absence of the corruption that occurs in the act of generation, where there are three kinds of corruption. First, a merely bodily corruption, in the fact that the hymen is broken. Another is both spiritual and physical, from the fact that the release and movement of semen generates pleasure in the senses. The third is spiritual alone, from the fact that reason subjects itself to this pleasure, in which it loses integrity as far as its own act goes, since in that act it is impossible to understand anything, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 7. For this reason, the very absorption of reason is called a corruption. However, this third corruption is not an act of reason, but a certain passion, coming to it per accidens from the passion of the inferior parts, just as by sleep or madness or other bodily passions it happens that the act of reason is impeded per accidens. Cum ergo virtus et vitium in actu rationis consentientis et dissentientis perficiatur; in omnibus praedictis corruptionibus non invenitur sufficiens ratio vitii aut virtutis; sed oportet addere rationis consensum vel dissensum. Et quia virginitas in genere moris est pertinens ad virtutem; ideo dicit Lucia, quod non inquinatur corpus nisi de consensu mentis, inquinatione scilicet quae virginitatis puritati opponitur. Prima ergo corruptio, quae est corporalis tantum, non est materia virtutis vel vitii, nisi per accidens mediante aliqua animae passione; unde si per aliquam incisionem claustra pudoris rumpantur, non majus detrimentum virginitati inerit quam si pes aut manus gladio incideretur. Sed secunda et tertia corruptio sunt materia virginitatis et oppositi ejus, sicut et aliae passiones animae sunt materia virtutum moralium et oppositorum vitiorum. Sed in actu rationis eligentis vel repudiantis corruptiones praedictas finaliter perficitur inquinatio quam virginitas privat, et per consequens ipsa virginitas; et ideo Augustinus in definitione praedicta posuit hoc quod ex parte rationis se habet; scilicet meditationem, quasi virginitatis genus, ponens actum pro habitu, sicut frequenter fieri solet; incorruptionem autem posuit quasi objectum sive materiam; sed addit subjectum determinatum per hoc quod dicit: in carne corruptibili; quia privatio et habitus nata sunt fieri circa idem. Since, therefore, virtue and vice arise from reason’s act of consenting and dissenting, sufficient reason for virtue or vice is not found in any of the corruptions mentioned above, but it is necessary to add the consent or dissent of reason. And because virginity in the genus of moral acts belongs to virtue, St. Lucy said that the body is not defiled without consent of the mind, namely, by that defilement which is opposed to the purity of virginity. Therefore, the first corruption, which is only bodily, is not a matter of virtue or vice, unless per accidens by some mediating passion of the soul; for which reason, if the hymen were ruptured by some incision, there would not be in this a greater detriment to virginity than if a foot or hand were cut off by a sword. But the second and third kinds of corruption are matters of virginity and its opposite, as also other passions of the soul are matters of moral virtue and the opposed vices. But the defilement that virginity opposes, and consequently virginity itself, are finally completed in reason’s act of choosing or repudiating the corruptions mentioned. This is why Augustine included in the definition above that it is rooted in the reason: namely, meditation, as the genus of virginity, taking the act in place of the habit, as is often done; and he included incorruption as the object or matter; but he adds a determinate subject by saying in corruptible flesh; for privation and possession are such as to happen in the same thing. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis post resurrectionem sancti carnis corruptionem non habeant; habent tamen naturam carnis, quae corruptibilis fuit; et ideo in eis esse poterit virginitas sicut in subjecto; non autem in angelis, in quibus corruptio quam virginitas privat, nata esse non fuit; et praecipue hoc ad rationem virginitatis sufficit, quae non solum respicit quod praesens est, sed quod praeteritum est. Non enim est virgo ex hoc solum quod non corrumpitur, sed ex hoc etiam quod nunquam corrupta fuit. Reply Obj. 1: Although after the resurrection, the saints may not have corruption of the flesh, still they will have the nature of the flesh, which was corruptible. This is why virginity will be able to exist in them as in a subject, but not in the angels, who are not such as to suffer the corruption that virginity opposes. And this is enough especially for the notion of virginity, which not only concerns what is present, but what is past. For someone is not a virgin simply by the fact that he is not corrupted, but also by the fact that he never was corrupted. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis actus moralis virtutis in voluntate perficiatur, tamen ratio formam virtutis in ea ponit, ut dicitur in 6 Ethic.; et ideo quidam Socratici omnes virtutes scientias dicebant; et hoc modo loquendi utitur hic Augustinus meditationem pro electione ponens. Reply Obj. 2: Although an act of moral virtue is completed in the will, nonetheless reason puts the form of virtue in it, as is said in Ethics 6; indeed, this is why the Socratics called all the virtues ‘knowledge.’ And Augustine uses this way of speaking here by setting down meditation in place of choice. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in actu virtutis non solum requiritur discretio ex parte rationis, sed etiam firmitas quaedam ex habitu inclinante ad actum per modum naturae. Et sicut causae naturales, quantum est de se, ordinatae sunt immobiliter ad effectus proprios; ratione cujus dicere possumus, lapis perpetuo descendit deorsum, quamvis hoc quandoque impediri possit: ita et habitus virtutis, quantum est de se, immobiliter ordinatur ad actum proprium, quamvis quandoque habens actum virtutis contrarium agat; et ratione perpetuae immobilitatis consuevit poni perpetuum in definitionibus virtutum; sicut in princ. Digestorum dicitur, quod justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas; et sic etiam Augustinus ponit perpetuum in definitione virginitatis, quamvis virginitatem quandoque habentes, eam amittant; ut sic in praedicta definitione discretio electionis, quae est actus virginitatis, secundum quod ad genus pertinet moris, ex meditatione intelligatur; sed immobilitas ex perpetuitate. Reply Obj. 3: In the act of virtue not only is discernment required on the part of reason, but also a certain firmness from a habit tending toward the act after the manner of nature. And just as natural causes, in and of themselves, are immovably ordained to their proper effects, by reason of which we can say that a stone always descends downward, even though this can sometimes be impeded; so also the habit of virtue, in and of itself, is immovably ordained to its proper act, although sometimes the one having it performs a contrary act. And by reason of this lasting immovability, permanence is usually included in the definitions of virtues, as is stated in the beginning of the Digests, that justice is a constant and perpetual will. And this is also how Augustine includes perpetuity in the definition of virginity, even though sometimes those who have virginity lose it; as also in the definition the discretion of choice, which the act of virginity has as far as it belongs to the genus of morals, is understood by meditation, but immobility is understood from perpetuity. Ad quartum dicendum, quod corruptio mentis, ut ex dictis accipi potest, est duplex. Una quae est quasi passio mentis, quando mens subditur delectationi quae in coitu solet accidere; et quia haec delectatio completur in seminis distillatione, ideo talis corruptio mentis non potest accidere sine aliqua corruptione carnis, quae dicta est fieri per seminis decisionem. Alia autem est corruptio mentis, quae est actus ejus, scilicet consensus, aut electio praedictae corruptionis. Sed quia vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum; ideo quandoque contingit quod ex actu mentis cogitantis de corruptione carnis, et intendentis delectationem ipsius experiri, calor excitatur in corpore, et semen distillat, et causatur delectatio, qua mens suffocatur sicut in coitu; et tunc absque dubio virginitas est amissa. Si autem corruptio sistat in actu mentis consentientis, amittitur quidem virginitas secundum illud formale quod habet in mente, non autem ratione ejus quod est materiale in ipsa; unde talis non potest dici virgo nisi materialiter. Et ideo haec virginitatis amissio potest recuperari; non autem illa virginitatis amissio in qua etiam illud quod est materiale subtrahitur; quia virginitas ex parte sui actus respicit tantum praesens aut futurum, sicut est in qualibet virtute; electio enim aut praesens aut futurum respicit, non autem praeteritum; sed ex parte materiae non solum praesens, sed praeteritum respicit. Dicitur enim virgo quae elegit incorruptionem, quae est materialis in virginitate, quam nunquam amisit, et habere et conservare intendit. Non autem exigitur quod nunquam contrariam electionem habuerit, sed quod nunquam contrariam corruptionem. Ex hoc autem virginitas amissa recuperari non potest, quia illud quod in praeteritum transit, recuperari non potest. Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of corruption of the mind, as can be gathered from what has been said. One corruption is like a passion of the mind, when the mind is subject to the pleasure which usually occurs in intercourse. And since this pleasure is completed in the release of semen, such a corruption of mind cannot happen without a corruption of the flesh, which is said to occur by the release of semen. However, there is another corruption of mind, which is its act: namely, the consent to or the choice of the corruption described above. But since the inferior powers follow the movement of the superior ones, it sometimes happens that by the act of the mind thinking about the corruption of the flesh, and intending to experience its pleasure, heat is excited in the body, semen is released, and pleasure is caused in which the mind is suffocated just as in intercourse. And then, without a doubt, virginity is lost. If, though, the corruption remains in the mind’s act of consenting, virginity is indeed lost according to what is formally held in the mind, but not by reason of what is materially in it. For this reason such a person can only be called a virgin materially. And therefore, this loss of virginity can be restored, but not that loss of virginity in which also what is material is taken away. For virginity on the part of its act has to do only with the present or the future, as it is in any other virtue. For choice has to do with the present or the future, but not past. But on the part of the matter, it does not just have to do with the present, but also the past. For someone is called a virgin who has chosen incorruption, which is the matter in virginity, which he has never lost and does possess and intends to preserve. But it is not required that he had never made the opposite choice, but that he never had the opposite corruption. For this reason, lost virginity can never be restored, since what transpired in the past cannot be recovered. Ad quintum dicendum, quod illae quae sine concubitu se corrumpunt, non est dubium quod virginitatem amittunt, etiam quantum ad id quod est materiale in ipsa; quia etsi concubitus non adsit, adest tamen delectatio, quae in concubitu corruptionem virginitatis facit. Si autem luxuria contra naturam tempus perfectae aetatis praeveniat, cum non adsit seminis decisio, et per consequens nec delectatio completa mentem suffocans, non amittitur virginitas quantum ad id quod est materiale in ipsa. Reply Obj. 5: As for those who corrupt themselves without sleeping together, there is no doubt that they lose their virginity, even as concerns what is material in it. For even if sleeping together does not take place, still the pleasure is present that causes the corruption of virginity in sleeping together. If, however, lust contrary to nature occurs before adulthood is reached, since there is no release of semen, and as a result neither does complete pleasure suffocate the mind, virginity is not lost as to what is material in it. Ad sextum dicendum, quod passiones partis sensitivae non possunt esse materia virtutis nisi secundum quod sunt ordinabiles a ratione in eis medium ponente, prout concupiscibilis et irascibilis obediunt rationi; et ideo delectatio quae in somnis accidit cum seminis decisione, non est materia virtutis; et propter hoc nec talis corruptio incorruptionem tollit, quae est virginitatis materia; et ideo ratione talis pollutionis virginitas non perditur. Et similis ratio est de mulieribus quae dormientes et inebriatae aut amentes a viris cognoscuntur, nisi forte hac intentione dormitum irent, ut a viro cognoscerentur. Reply Obj. 6: The passions of the sensitive part cannot be the matter of virtue unless according as they are ordered by reason establishing a mean in them, just as the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite obey reason. And therefore the pleasure that occurs during sleep with the release of semen is not a matter of virtue, and because of this neither does such corruption destroy the incorruption that is the matter of virginity; and therefore such pollution does not cause the loss of virginity. And the same reasoning holds true of women who, while sleeping and drunk or senseless, are known by men, unless perhaps they went to sleep with this intention, that they should be known by a man. Ad septimum dicendum, quod illud cujus principium totaliter est extra, non est ordinabile a ratione; et ideo eadem ratione nec illae quae per violentiam corrumpuntur sive ab homine, sive a daemone incubo, virginitatem amittunt, si quantum possunt renitantur, ut conservent corpus a corruptione immune, vel saltem mentem contrariam consensui. Quia tamen in significationibus sacramentorum magis attenditur quod exterius geritur quam quod interius fit; irregularitas quae ex defectu significationis in sacramento causatur, nihilominus induceretur in illum qui virginem defloratam violenter duceret in uxorem; et praecipue cum propter delectationem nimiam ratio in actu illo suffocetur, difficillimum est tali delectationi dissentire in statu illo; et ideo praesumptio videtur esse quod consenserit. Reply Obj. 7: Something whose principle is completely outside it is not orderable by reason; and thus, by the same token, neither do those women lose their virginity who are corrupted through violence either by a man, or by an incubus, if they resist as much as they can, so that they keep their bodies free from corruption, or at least their minds opposed to consenting. Nonetheless, because the fact that something external is done matters more in the signification of the sacraments than that something happens interiorly, a man who took a violently deflowered virgin as his wife would incur that irregularity caused by a defect in the signification of the sacrament. And this is particularly the case because it is most difficult to dissent from such pleasure in that state, because reason is suffocated due to the extreme pleasure of that act; and therefore the presumption seems to be that she consented. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum sit virtus Whether it is a virtue Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas non sit virtus. Omnis enim virtus consistit in medio. Sed virginitas non consistit in medio, sed maxime in extremo; quia consistit in abstinendo ab omni delectabili, circa quod est castitas. Ergo non est virtus. Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that virginity is not a virtue. For all virtue consists in a mean. But virginity does not consist in a mean, but precisely in an extreme. For it consists in abstaining from everything delectable, which chastity governs. Therefore, it is not a virtue. Praeterea, virtutum usus, cum sint de jure naturali, omni tempore licuerunt. Sed in statu naturae conditae non licuisset virginitatem servare, quia esset contra praeceptum, ut habetur Gen. 1, 28: crescite et multiplicamini; similiter nec tempore legis Moysi, quando qui non relinquebat semen super terram, maledictioni legis subjacebat. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the use of a virtue, since it is from natural law, was allowed in every age. But in the state of created nature it was not permitted to keep one’s virginity, for that was against the precept, as Genesis 1:28 has it: increase and multiply; likewise, neither in the time of the law of Moses, when whoever did not leave behind on the earth any of his progeny was subject to the curse of the law. Therefore, virginity is not a virtue. Praeterea, nulla virtus est quae amitti possit sine peccato, et quae per poenitentiam non recuperetur. Sed virginitas amittitur sine peccato in actu matrimoniali, nec per poenitentiam potest recuperari. Ergo non est virtus. Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is no virtue which can be lost without sin, and which cannot be recovered by repentance. But virginity is lost without sin in the marital act, nor can it be restored by repentance. Therefore, it is not a virtue. Praeterea, omnis virtus est habitus acquisitus vel infusus. Sed virginitas est in illis qui non habent aliquem habitum acquisitum vel infusum, sicut in pueris non baptizatis. Ergo non est virtus. Obj. 4: Furthermore, every virtue is an acquired or infused habit. But virginity exists in those who have no acquired or infused habit, as in unbaptized children. Therefore, it is not a virtue. Praeterea, omnis virtus ordinatur ad actum aliquem. Non autem virginitas; sed magis importat privationem actus. Ergo non est virtus. Obj. 5: Furthermore, every virtue is ordained to some act. Virginity, however, is not, but implies rather the privation of an act. Therefore, it is not a virtue. Praeterea, qui habet unam virtutem, habet omnes. Sed qui caret virginitate, quandoque habet alias virtutes. Ergo virginitas non est virtus. Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever has one virtue has all virtues. But someone who lacks virginity sometimes has other virtues. Therefore, virginity is not a virtue. Praeterea, virtute nullus male utitur. Sed virginitate aliquis male utitur, ut patet de virginibus fatuis, Matth. 25. Ergo non est virtus. Obj. 7: Furthermore, no one uses virtue badly. But some people use virginity badly, as is clear in the case of the foolish virgins in Matthew 25. Therefore, it is not a virtue. Praeterea, continentia virginalis dividitur contra matrimonialem et vidualem. Sed matrimonium non ponitur virtus, neque viduitas. Ergo neque virginitas est virtus. Obj. 8: Furthermore, virginal continence is divided against marital continence and that of widows. But marriage is not considered a virtue, nor is widowhood. Therefore, neither is virginity a virtue. Sed contra est quod dicitur 1 Corinth. 7, 7: unusquisque proprium donum habet ex Deo; et loquitur de virginitate. Dona autem Dei spiritualia virtutes sunt. Ergo virginitas est virtus. On the contrary, it says in 1 Corinthians 7:7: each has his proper gift from God, and he is speaking of virginity. But the spiritual gifts of God are virtues. Therefore, virginity is a virtue. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit in Lib. de Virginitate: invitat virginitatis amor ut de virginitate aliquid dicamus, ne velut transitu quodam praeterita videatur quae principalis est virtus. Furthermore, Ambrose states in his book On Virginity: the love of virginity invites us to say something about virginity, lest as if by a certain omission, we should seem to pass by what is the chief virtue. Praeterea, nihil meretur praemium nisi virtus. Sed virginitati debetur praemium, scilicet fructus centesimus, ut sancti dicunt, et aureola. Ergo est virtus. Furthermore, only a virtue merits a reward. But a reward is owed to virginity, namely the hundredfold fruit, as the saints say, and the crown of distinction. Therefore, it is a virtue. Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut dationes et sumptus sunt materia liberalitatis, ita delectationes in venereis sunt materia castitatis et continentiae. In genere autem dationum magnitudo sumptuum exigit specialem virtutem, quae magnificentia vocatur, propter sui difficultatem. Et quia temperantia vel castitas in cohibendis delectationibus magnam habet difficultatem, ideo illud quod est praecipuum in ista materia, maximam habens difficultatem, scilicet ab omni corruptione carnalis delectationis immunitas, specialem virtutem exigit, quae virginitas dicitur; unde si virginitas pro sui completa ratione, ut dictum est, accipiatur, sic virginitas est specialis virtus; sic enim nihil aliud importat quam electionem conservandi incorruptionem; et haec electio, si sit perfecta, ex aliquo habitu virtutis procedere debet. Tamen virginitas super hoc ponit statum virtutis, in quo habitus in actum exire possit. Non autem potest exire in actum electionis incorruptionem servandi, nisi sit incorrupta; quia electio impossibilium non est; impossibile autem est incorruptionem amissam recuperare. Sed materiam magnificentiae amissam possibile est recuperare; et quantum ad hoc est dissimile de magnificentia et virginitate. Alii autem dicunt, quod virginitas non nominat virtutem, sed statum perfectum virtutis; et hac ratione sancti quandoque eam virtutem nominant; et secundum hanc opinionem facile est respondere ad objecta. Sustinendo tamen primam opinionem, respondendum est ad objecta. I answer that, just as giving and expenses are the matter of liberality, so are sexual pleasures the matter of chastity and continence. However, within the genus of giving, an abundance of expense requires a special virtue, which is called magnificence, because of its difficulty. And since temperance or chastity involves great difficulty in restraining pleasures, for this reason what particularly contains the most difficulty in this area, namely fortification against every corruption of carnal pleasure, requires a special virtue, which is called virginity. Therefore if virginity is taken for its complete notion, as was said, then virginity is a special virtue. For then it implies nothing else but the choice of preserving incorruption; and this choice, if it is carried out, must proceed from some habit of virtue. Nonetheless, virginity adds beyond this a state of the virtue, the state in which the habit can issue in its act. But it can only issue in the act of choosing to preserve one’s incorruption if one is incorrupt; for there is no choosing an impossible thing, and it is impossible to recover incorruption once lost. But it is possible to recover the matter of magnificence once lost, and in this regard magnificence and virginity are dissimilar. Others say, however, that virginity does not name a virtue, but a perfect state of virtue, and with this understanding the saints sometimes call it a virtue; and according to this opinion it is easy to answer the objections. However, maintaining the first opinion, we must reply to the objections. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod apud theologos, ut quidam dicunt, virtus non semper est in medio. Sed hoc dicentes ignorant quid sit medium virtutis. Cum enim medium virtutis accipiatur secundum rationem rectam; si aliquid non sit in medio, non est secundum rationem rectam; et sic non potest esse laudabile neque virtuosum. Et ideo dicendum est, quod virginitas est in medio rationis rectae; quod quidem medium non accipitur semper secundum quantitatem ejus circa quod est virtus, quae quantitas est inter superfluum et diminutum, cum sint aliquae virtutes quae perveniant ad maximam quantitatem in propria materia, sicut nullus majoribus se dignificat quam magnanimus, nec aliquis majores sumptus facit quam magnificus, ut patet in 4 Ethic.; sed accipitur secundum proportionem omnium circumstantiarum vestientium actum; et sic ille qui maxima dona dat, in medio consistit in eo quod mediocritas servatur in dando cui debet et quod debet et propter quod debet; et superfluum est in eo quod datur ubi non debet vel propter quod non debet, etiam si majora dentur. Similiter etiam virginitas, quamvis sit in ultimo extremi quantum ad id circa quod est, quia ab omni corrumpente delectatione abstinet; tamen est in medio, inquantum alias debitas circumstantias mediocriter servat; et superfluum esset, si aliquis servare vellet virginitatem quando non deberet, sicut tempore legis Moysi, vel propter quod non deberet, sicut virgines Vestales; similiter secundum alias circumstantias. Reply Obj. 1: Among theologians, some say that virtue is not always a mean. But those saying this do not know what the mean of virtue is. For since the mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, if something is not in the mean, it is not according to right reason. And thus it can be neither praiseworthy nor virtuous. And therefore it is to be said that virginity is in the mean of right reason, because indeed the mean is not always taken according to the quantity of whatever the virtue deals with, which quantity is between too much and too little. For certain virtues exist which attain the maximum quantity in their proper matter, as, for example, no one dignifies himself in greater ways than the magnanimous man, nor does anyone make greater expenditures than the magnificent man, as is evident from Ethics 4. But it is taken according to the proportion of all circumstances attending the act. And thus that man who gives the most gifts attains the mean by preserving moderation in giving to whom he should and what he should and for the correct reason; and there is excess in what is given where it should not be or for a reason for which it should not be, even if greater things were given. It is the same way also with virginity: although it lies at the extreme as far as what it deals with, since it abstains from every corrupting pleasure, yet it is in the mean inasmuch as it observes the other due circumstances in a moderate way; and it would be excess if someone wanted virginity when he should not, as in the time of the law of Moses, or for a reason for which he should not, as with the vestal virgins; and similarly according to the other circumstances. Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, medium virtutis accipitur secundum proportionem circumstantiarum ad rationem rectam; et quia tempus est una de circumstantiis, non est inconveniens aliquid non esse licitum uno tempore, quod est licitum vel virtuosum si alio tempore fiat; et ideo, si in tempore quo Deus ad multiplicationem generis humani vel cultus divini homines operi conjugali insistere volebat, aliquis proprio motu incorruptionem servasset, fuisset in extremo diminutionis; quia abstinuisset a delectabili omni quando non debuisset; sed postea, facta multiplicatione humani generis vel colentium Deum sufficienti, non peccasset virginitatem servans etiam in lege Moysi, vel in statu naturae integrae, si homo non peccasset; nec fecisset contra praeceptum, quia multiplicatio poterat fieri per alios, sed super praeceptum. Reply Obj. 2: As was said, the mean of virtue is taken according to the relation of circumstances to right reason. And since time is one of the circumstances, it is not unfitting that something is not allowed at one time, which is permitted or virtuous if it is done at another time. And therefore, if at the time when God wished men to pursue the increase of the human race or of divine worship by the conjugal act, someone preserved incorruption by his own idea, he would have been at the extreme of defect, for he would have abstained from pleasurable things when he should not have. But afterward, once the multiplication of the human race or of those worshiping God was sufficiently completed, he would not have sinned by keeping his virginity even under the law of Moses, or in the state of unfallen nature, if man had not sinned. Nor would he have acted against a precept, but above a precept, since multiplication could have occurred through others. Ad tertium dicendum, quod status ille virtutis quo virtus in actum suum exire possit, potest amitti sine peccato et cum peccato indifferenter; tamen recuperatur per poenitentiam; sicut aliquis ditissimus magnificus potest dare omnia sua pauperibus; et sic sine peccato suo ei eveniret quod in actum exteriorem virtutis exire non poterit. Si autem in turpes usus facultates suas consumat, hoc erit cum peccato; nec tamen per poenitentiam statum primum recuperabit. Et ideo virginitas, quae statum illum dicit virtutis in quo virtus possit exire in actum; et per peccatum amittitur in fornicatione, et sine peccato in actu matrimoniali; nec unquam per poenitentiam recuperatur. Reply Obj. 3: That state of a virtue in which a virtue can issue in its act can be lost, never to be recovered by penance, with or without sin indifferently. For example, the richest, most generous person can give all his belongings to the poor, and thus without any sin of his own, it happens to him that he will not be able to continue in an external act of this virtue. If, however, he consumes his own resources in base uses, this will involve sin; nor will he recover the first state by penance. And likewise virginity, which names that state of the virtue in which virtue can issue in its act, is lost both by sin in fornication, and without sin in the marital act; nor is it ever recovered by penance. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud quod est materia virginitatis, potest esse in illis qui nullum habitum virtutis habent, sicut in pueris ante baptismum, in quibus est primus virginitatis gradus quem natura dedit; et sicut in illis qui ad tempus incorruptionem praedictam servare volunt, tamen cum proposito nubendi suo tempore, qui habent secundum virginitatis gradum, nec tamen dicuntur virgines nisi materialiter. Sed completa ratio virginitatis, prout est virtus, non est nisi in illis qui habent electionem conservandi integritatem hactenus custoditam usque in finem, sive sine voto, vel cum voto; et haec electio perfecta esse non potest sine habitu informante ipsam. Si autem sit informis, erit actus virtutis sicut virtutem praecedens, sicut et de aliis actibus virtutum contingit. Reply Obj. 4: The matter of virginity can exist in those people who have no habit of virtue, as in children before baptism, in whom there is the first level of virginity which nature has given; and also in those who wish to preserve the aforesaid incorruption for a time, but with the design of marrying in its own time, who have the second level of virginity, though they are only called virgins materially. But the complete account of virginity, insofar as it is a virtue, only exists in those who have made a choice of preserving the integrity guarded thus far until the end, either with a vow or without a vow. And this choice cannot be perfect without a habit informing it. But if it be unformed, then it will be the kind of act of virtue that precedes virtue, just as also happens with other acts of virtue. Ad quintum dicendum, quod temperantia, sicut in 3 Lib. dist. 33, qu. 3, art. 2 quaestiunc. 1 dictum est, principaliter consistit in cohibendo delectationes; unde de principali intentione sua habet quemdam actum interiorem, scilicet electionem refrenandi concupiscentias; sed exteriorem non habet quantum ad id quod est principale in ipsa, nisi per accidens et ex consequenti, in hoc scilicet quod aliquos actus exteriores adhibet ad cohibendum a delectationibus, quos magis imperat quam eliciat; sicut recedendo ab aspectibus concupiscibilium; uti enim delectationibus secundum mensuram rationis, est de secundaria intentione temperantiae. Et quia virginitas est principalissimum in temperantia; ideo non habet actum exteriorem nisi ex consequenti; sed omnino usum exteriorem concupiscentiae cohibet. Reply Obj. 5: Temperance, as was stated in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 2, Quaestiuncula 1, consists chiefly in controlling pleasures, for which reason it has as its principal intention a certain interior act, namely the choice of restraining concupiscence. But it does not have an external act as concerns what is principal in it, except incidentally and as a result, namely in the fact that it employs certain external acts to control pleasures, like turning away from the sight of concupiscible things, and these acts it commands more than it elicits. For enjoying pleasures according to the measure of reason belongs to the secondary intention of temperance. And since virginity is the chief virtue in temperance, it does not have an external act except as a consequence, but it restrains any use whatsoever of concupiscence. Ad sextum dicendum, quod ille qui habet unam virtutem, habet aliquo modo omnes; non tamen quantum ad omne id quod est in virtute; sicut qui habet liberalitatem, quandoque non habet magnificentiam quantum ad statum illum quo possit exire in actum exteriorem; et similiter qui habet temperantiam, non habet statum quem virginitas dicit propter imperfectionem; quamvis habeat id quod facit rationem virtutis in virginitate; sicut e contrario propter perfectionem Christus habet caritatem, non tamen fidem, propter statum imperfectionis quem fides importat; etsi habeat quidquid est perfectionis et virtuositatis in fide. Reply Obj. 6: That man who has one virtue has all of them in a certain way, but not as regards everything that is in a virtue; for example, someone who has liberality sometimes does not have magnificence as regards that state which could result in an external act. And likewise, not everyone who has temperance has the state that virginity signifies, because of an imperfection, although he may have what establishes the character of virtue in virginity; just as, on the other hand, because of his perfection, Christ has charity, but not faith, because of the state of imperfection that faith carries with it, even though he has whatever belongs to perfection and virtuousness in faith. Ad septimum dicendum, quod materia virginitatis, quam fatuae virgines habere possunt, aliquis male utitur; non autem virginitate accepta secundum suam completam rationem. Reply Obj. 7: Someone can employ badly the matter of virginity (which the foolish virgins can possess), but not virginity considered under its full account. Ad octavum dicendum, quod viduitas et matrimonium non important aliquem alterum gradum circa materiam temperantiae sicut virginitas; unde non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 8: Widowhood and matrimony do not imply another level in the matter of temperance, as virginity does; and so the account is not similar. Articulus 3 Article 3 De comparatione ejus ad alias virtutes Its comparison with the other virtues Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virginitas major sit omnibus virtutibus. Decor enim est de ratione virtutis. Sed virginitatis decor est maximus. Ergo ipsa est maxima virtutum. Probatio mediae. Ambrosius in Lib. de Virginitate, dicit: pulchritudinem quis potest majorem aestimare decore ejus, scilicet virginis, quae amatur a rege, probatur a judice, dedicatur domino, consecratur Deo, semper sponsa, semper innupta, ut nec amor finem habeat, nec damnum pudor? Haec autem perfecte vera pulchritudo est cui nihil deest, quae sola meretur audire a domino: tota formosa es, etc. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that virginity is greater than all virtues. For beauty belongs to the notion of virtue. But the beauty of virginity is the greatest. Therefore, it is the greatest of the virtues. Proof of the middle term: Ambrose says in his book On Virginity: who can deem a greater comeliness than this beauty, namely that of a virgin, who is loved by the king, tried by the judge, dedicated to her lord, consecrated to God, always a bride, always untouched, so that neither will her love come to an end, nor her chastity to loss. Now there is nothing lacking from this true comeliness, which alone deserves to hear from the king: you are completely lovely, etc. Praeterea, Cyprianus dicit: nunc nobis ad virgines sermo est; quarum quo sublimior gloria est, major cura. Flos est ille ecclesiastici germinis, decus atque ornamentum gratiae spiritualis, illustrior portio gregis Christi. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Cyprian states: now we must speak to the virgins; for whom we have the greater care, the more sublime is their glory. Their flower is that of the ecclesiastical seed, their splendor and adornment that of spiritual grace, their portion the more illustrious of the flock of Christ. Therefore, the same as above. Praeterea, majus praemium majori virtuti debetur. Sed virginitati debetur maximum praemium, scilicet fructus centesimus, et aureola. Ergo, etc. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the greater prize is owed to the greater virtue. But to virginity is owed the greatest prize, namely the hundredfold fruit and the crown of distinction. Therefore, etc.