Sed contra est quod in littera dicitur, quod caelibatus Joannis non praefertur conjugio Abrahae. On the contrary, it says in the text that the celibacy of John is not preferred to the marriage of Abraham. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit super Evangelium missus est, quod plus placuit (Deo scilicet) humilitas Mariae, quam ipsius virginitas. Ergo virginitas non est maxima virtutum. Furthermore, Bernard, in his homily on the Gospel of the Annunciation, says that the humility of Mary was more pleasing (to God, that is) than her virginity. Therefore, virginity is not the greatest of virtues. Respondeo dicendum, quod una virtus, et quantum ad actum et quantum ad habitum, potest dici excellentior alia dupliciter; scilicet per se, et per accidens. Per se quidem mensuratur actus virtutum ex ratione objecti sui, ex quo speciem habent; sed per accidens ex parte subjecti: sicut actus etiam in parvis rebus dicitur melior, si fiat ex magis prompta voluntate, vel tempore magis opportuno, et aliis infinitis modis; quia causae per accidens infinitae sunt; et propter hoc relinquuntur ab arte. I answer that, one virtue, both as concerns its act and as concerns its habit, can be said to be more excellent than another in two ways: namely, per se and per accidens. Indeed, an act of virtue is measured per se by reason of its object, from which it has its species, but per accidens on the part of its subject, as an act is called better even in small things, if it is done with a more prompt will, or at a more opportune time, and so on infinitely in other ways, for per accidens causes are infinite. And because of this art does not deal with them. Unde hac comparatione omissa, sciendum est, quod cum bonum spirituale sit nobilius et melius quam bonum corporis; virtutes illae quae habent pro objecto bonum spirituale, sunt simpliciter meliores quam illae quae habent aliquod corporale aut corporali adjunctum; et ideo virtutes intellectuales et theologicae sunt digniores quam virtutes morales, quae sunt circa actus et passiones aliquo modo corporales; et inter virtutes morales illa per se loquendo est melior quae magis appropinquat ad praedictas; quae quidem appropinquatio potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad convenientiam subjecti; et sic justitia, quae est in voluntate, est propinquissima et dignissima; et post hoc fortitudo, quae est in irascibili, quae est quasi quoddam confinium rationis et sensualitatis, ut in 3 Lib., dist. 26, qu. 1, art. 1, in corp., dictum est; et ultimo temperantia, quae est in concupiscibili. Alio modo potest attendi propinquitas virtutis moralis ad intellectualem prout disponit ad ipsam; et sic inter omnes morales propinquissima est temperantia, quia per delectationes, quae sunt ejus materia, maxime nata est ratio enervari; et inter partes temperantiae praecipue castitas, quia in delectationibus circa quas est, ratio totaliter obruitur. Unde Commentator dicit in 7 Physic., quod castitas maxime valet ad scientias speculativas; et in genere castitatis praecipue virginitas. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod virginitas non est dignior omnibus aliis virtutibus; sed est dignior aliquo modo omnibus virtutibus moralibus, et simpliciter et per se loquendo, omnibus speciebus temperantiae. Therefore, having omitted this comparison, it must be known that since spiritual good is nobler and better than the good of the body, those virtues that have as their object a spiritual good are simply speaking better than those that have something bodily or related to the body as their object. And thus intellectual and theological virtues are nobler than moral virtues, which in a certain way deal with physical acts and passions; and among moral virtues, that one is better, speaking per se, which approaches most closely to the intellectual virtues, and this closeness occurs in two different ways. In one way, as to the suitability of the subject, and thus justice, which is in the will, is the highest and most noble; and after this, fortitude, which is in the irascible appetite, which is like a kind of border between reason and sensuality, as was said in Book III, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 1; and, lastly, temperance, which is in the concupiscible appetite. In another way the closeness of a moral virtue to intellectual virtue can be seen in the degree to which it is disposed to it. And thus among the other moral virtues, the closest is temperance, because by pleasures, which are its matter, reason is bound to be weakened the most; and among the parts of temperance, particularly chastity, because in the pleasures that it deals with, reason is completely overcome. For this reason the Commentator comments on Book 7 of the Physics that chastity is worth the most to the speculative sciences, and in the genus of chastity, especially virginity. So, therefore, it must be said that virginity is not nobler than all the other virtues, but it is nobler in a certain way than all the moral virtues, and, per se and simply speaking, than all the other species of temperance. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod delectationes circa quas est temperantia, sunt turpissimae, ut in 7 Ethic. patet, eo quod sunt in communibus nobis et brutis; unde temperantia, quae has cohibet, praecipue vindicat sibi pulchritudinem communem omnibus virtutibus, sicut fortitudo vindicat sibi difficultatem, justitia rectitudinem; et propter hoc virginitas, quae est summus temperantiae gradus, summum decorem sibi vindicat; non tamen sequitur quod sit dignissima virtus. Reply Obj. 1: Those pleasures that temperance is concerned with are the basest because they are shared by us and animals, as is clear in Ethics 7. This is why temperance, which controls them, especially assumes that beauty which is shared by all the virtues, as fortitude assumes difficulty, and justice rectitude. And because of this, virginity, which is the highest level of temperance, earns for itself the highest beauty; though it does not follow that it is the noblest virtue. Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnia verba praedicta Cypriani, quae excellentiam ostendunt virginitatis, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; unde eodem modo dicendum est sicut ad primum. Vel dicendum, quod virgines habent cum virginitate alias virtutes: alii autem non habent virginitatem cum aliis virtutibus; et ideo non est eadem ratio comparandi virginitatem cum aliis virtutibus, et virgines aliis omnibus. Reply Obj. 2: All the words of Cyprian cited above, which display the excellence of virginity, pertain to its beauty; thus they must be answered in the same way as the first objection. Or they should be addressed by saying that virgins have other virtues with virginity: but other people do not have virginity along with other virtues; and therefore there is not the same basis for comparing virginity and other virtues, and virgins and other people. Ad tertium dicendum, quod aureola est praemium accidentale, et fructus similiter. Praemium autem essentiale est dignius accidentali; ideo simpliciter loquendo, illae virtutes sunt potiores quibus majus praemium essentiale debetur: praemium autem accidentale non tam respicit virtutis radicem quam statum virtutis. Et praeterea aureola non solum virginibus debetur, sed et martyribus et doctoribus; fructus autem soli continentiae debetur, in qua summum locum tenet virginitas; et quia per continentiam reprimuntur illae delectationes quae maxime gustum spiritualis dulcedinis impediunt, quem fructus suo nomine importat. Reply Obj. 3: The crown of special distinction is an accidental prize, and so is the fruit. But an essential prize is nobler than an accidental one; therefore, simply speaking, those virtues are more powerful to which the greater essential prize is due. Yet the accidental prize does not have as much to do with the root of virtue as the state of virtue. And furthermore, the crown of distinction is not only due to virgins, but also to martyrs and doctors; but the fruit is only due to continence, in which virginity holds the highest place, because through continence those pleasures are repressed which most greatly impede the taste of spiritual sweetness, which the fruit implies by its name. Ad quartum dicendum, quod incorruptio facit esse proximum Deo, in quem corruptio non cadit, per quamdam similitudinem imitationis: et quia Deo magis possumus esse similes mente quam carne; ideo incorruptio mentis, quae omni peccato opponitur, et per omnem virtutem est, facit Deo esse proximum. Sed virginitas habet utramque incorruptionem; et ideo quantum ad plura facit Deo similem, scilicet in corpore et anima, ratione cujus dicitur quod sequitur agnum quocumque ierit; et Ambrosius dicit quod nihil ei deest. Nec tamen sequitur quod magis facit virginitas Deo proximum quam omnes virtutes, sed secundum plura. Reply Obj. 4: Incorruption makes something close to God in whom there is no corruption, by a certain resemblance of imitation. And since we are more able to be like God in our minds than in our flesh, therefore incorruption of the mind, which is opposed to all sin and exists through every virtue, makes someone to be like God. But virginity has both kinds of incorruption; and therefore with regard to many things, it makes us like God, namely in body and soul, by which reason it is said that it follows the Lamb wherever he may go; and Ambrose says that nothing is lacking from it. Nonetheless, it does not follow that virginity makes someone more like God than other virtues do, but like him according to more things. Ad quintum dicendum, quod in littera matrimonium Abrahae aequiparatur caelibatui Joannis quantum ad meritum personarum: quia tantum merebatur Abraham in conjugio sicut Joannes in virginitate; quia ex aequali promptitudine serviebat Deo secundum statum sui temporis; et haec comparatio est per accidentalia virtutum. Reply Obj. 5: In the text the marriage of Abraham is equated with the celibacy of John as far as personal merit is concerned, since Abraham merited as much in marital union as John did in virginity. For he served God with the same promptness according to the state of his time; and this comparison is made through things accidental to virtue. Ad sextum dicendum, quod humilitas videtur virtutibus propinquissima esse, quia per eam homo se ex reverentia Deo subjicit, et per consequens aliis propter Deum; et ideo, simpliciter loquendo, virginitatem humilitas excedit. Reply Obj. 6: Humility seems to be most closely related to the virtues, since by it man subjects himself to God out of reverence, and as a result, to others because of God. Therefore, simply speaking, humility surpasses virginity. Expositio textus Exposition of the text Maledicta erat sterilis, quae non relinquebat semen super terram. Haec maledictio non est culpae, sed poenae; non tamen quantum ad defectum naturae quem habet virginitas in prolis defectu; sed quantum ad infamiam, quia opprobrio habebatur. The sterile woman was cursed who did not leave seed on the earth. This is not a curse of guilt, but of punishment, though not as to the defect of nature which virginity causes in the lack of children, but as to the disrepute, since it was held to be a reproach. Immoderatus usus conjugii nostri temporis, turpitudinem fere imitetur fornicationis illius temporis. Hoc dicitur quantum ad intentionem eorum qui nunc ut plurimum contrahunt matrimonium propter infirmitatem libidinis, qua ratione antiquitus fornicabantur; et ideo addit fere, quia fornicatio omnis erat peccatum mortale; non autem omnis immoderatus usus conjugum. The immoderate use of marriage in our day nearly imitates the turpitude of fornication of that time. This is said as to the intention of those people nowadays who contract marriage mostly because they are sick with sensual desire, which is the same reason the ancients used to fornicate. Therefore, he adds, nearly, since all fornication was a mortal sin, but not every immoderate use of marriage is. Facilius continere possent, quam nos scilicet possumus, propter magnitudinem virtutis quae in eis erat; vel quam ipsi possent matrimonio conjungi, considerata vi honestatis, quae justos trahit; ut difficile sit eis peccare, vel in aliquo a perfecto statu virtutis declinare. “They could and would have much more easily practiced continence,” namely than we can, because of the greatness of virtue which was in them; or they could be joined in marriage, considering the force of decency which draws the just, so that it would be difficult for them to sin, or to decline from the perfect state of virtue in anything. Publici muneris gratia privatam culpam praetexit. Sciendum, quod quamvis Loth credatur immunis a peccato mortali fuisse; filiae tamen ejus non omnino excusantur a peccato mortali, sed ex pietate intentionis minus peccaverunt. Fuit enim levis aestimatio super quam se fundaverunt. Et praeterea si eis pro certo constitisset totum genus humanum periisse, debuissent divinum consilium et patris expetere in tam horribili facto, quod erat contra primam institutionem matrimonii, ubi pater et mater prohibentur Genes. 2: propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem suam. “The grace of a public duty excused a private fault.” It should be known that although Lot is believed to have been protected from mortal sin, yet his daughters are not wholly excused from mortal sin, but they sinned less because of the piety of their intention. For they decided based upon a lightly-taken judgment. And furthermore, if they believed for certain that the entire human race had perished, they should have sought divine counsel and that of their father in such a horrible deed, which was against the first institution of matrimony, where union with father or mother is prohibited: because of this a man shall leave his father and mother (Gen 2:24). Quae tamen modificata, et refrenante temperantia in usum naturalem redacta, libido esse non potest. Haec modificatio non attenditur quantum ad delectationis quantitatem in actu, sed quantum ad debitam limitationem circumstantiarum. “Yet if that delight is kept within bounds and reduced to its natural use by the restraint of temperance, it cannot be lust.” This regulating does not have to do with the quantity of pleasure in the act, but with the due limiting of circumstances. Continentiam Joannes in opere . . . habebat. Continentia accipitur hic cessatio a carnali opere omnino. “John had continence in deed.” Continence is taken here as the cessation from every sexual act whatsoever. Eas enim nunc uxores appellat Scriptura, nunc concubinas. Quidam dicunt, quod non erant vere uxores; sed quia uxorio affectu et intentione prolis eis conjungebantur, quandoque uxores dicuntur. Alii dicunt, quod vere uxores erant; sed dicuntur concubinae, quia ancillae manebant, et filii non earum, sed dominarum suarum nomine nascebantur; et hoc verius videtur. Scripture at times calls them ‘wives,’ and at times ‘concubines.’ Certain people say that they were not truly wives; but because they were joined to them by spousal affection and the intention of children, sometimes they are called wives. Others say that they were truly wives, but they are called concubines since they remained slave-girls, and their sons were born not in their name but in those of their mistresses; and this seems more true. Plures habere, non plurimas. Plurimae dicuntur quibus non potest opere carnali ad praegnandum satisfieri sine mentis enervatione: frequentia enim talis actus omnino mentem enervat. “To have several, but not to multiply many wives.” They are said to be many when sexual intercourse cannot happen enough for conceiving without a weakening of his mind: for such great frequency of the act altogether weakens the mind. Non potest caro corrumpi nisi mens ante fuerit corrupta. Hoc intelligitur de corruptione ad genus moris pertinente, quam virginitas excludit. “The flesh cannot be corrupted unless the mind has already been corrupted.” This is understood in the sense of the corruption belonging to the genus of moral acts, which virginity excludes. Satius est mori fame quam idolothytis vesci. Contra, 1 Timoth. 4, 4: nihil rejiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur. Et dicendum quod debet intelligi antequam comederetur in venerationem idoli, vel cum quadam exteriori professione idolatriae, sicut si a persecutore in signum fidei Christianae fractae exigeretur. “It is more holy to die of hunger than to eat what has been offered to idols.” Against this, see 1 Timothy 4:4: nothing is to be rejected which is received with thanksgiving. And it should be said that before eating what has been offered to an idol, it must be understood whether it is with a certain external profession of idolatry, as when it was demanded by a persecutor as a sign of breaking the Christian faith. Distinctio 34 Distinction 34 De impedimentis personarum Personal Impediments Postquam determinavit Magister de matrimonio et causis ejus, hic determinat de personis contrahentibus matrimonium; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de impedimentis matrimonii, quae non faciunt personas penitus illegitimas ad contrahendum; in secunda de illis quibus personae penitus ad matrimonium illegitimae redduntur, dist. 37, ibi: sunt ergo quidam ordines in quibus nullatenus potest contrahi conjugium. After the Master has considered marriage and determined its causes, here he considers those persons contracting marriage. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the impediments to marriage that do not make the persons entirely ineligible to contract it; in the second, those by which the persons are rendered entirely ineligible for marriage, in Distinction 37, at: For there are some orders in which marriage cannot be contracted at all. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de impedimento quodam matrimonii, quod facit personam non simpliciter, sed aliquo modo, illegitimam, quod consistit in defectu naturae, scilicet frigiditate; secundo de impedimento conditionis secundum mores et statuta hominum, scilicet servitute, 36 dist., ibi: nunc de conditione videamus an valeat conjugium dividere. The first is divided into two: in the first, he considers a certain impediment to marriage which makes a person ineligible, not simply but in a certain respect. It consists in a defect of nature, namely, impotence; second, of the impediment of condition according to the customs and statutes of men, namely, servitude, in Distinction 36, at: Now let us see whether condition can divide a marriage. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de impedimento frigiditatis, quod matrimonium contrahendum impedit; in secunda de impedimento per quod actus matrimonii jam contracti impeditur, scilicet de fornicatione, prout est causa divortii, 35 dist., ibi: hoc etiam notandum est, etc. The first is divided into two: in the first part, he considers the impediment of impotence, which impedes the contracting of marriage; in the second, the impediment by which the act of a marriage already contracted is impeded, namely fornication, as it is a cause of separation, in Distinction 35, at: It is also to be noted, etc. Prima in duas: in prima prosequitur de impedimentis personarum ad contrahendum matrimonium in generali; in secunda descendit in speciali ad impedimentum de quo primo agere intendit, ibi: de his enim qui causa frigiditatis debitum reddere non possunt, consulit Gregorius ut permaneant. Et haec dividitur in duas: in prima ostendit quod frigiditas praecedens matrimonium impedit ne contrahatur; in secunda ostendit quod superveniens matrimonio ipsum dissolvere non possit, ibi: illud etiam sciendum est, etc. The first is divided into two parts. In the first, he pursues the impediments of the persons contracting marriage in general; in the second, he descends specifically to the impediment which he intends first to address, at: Concerning those who cannot render the debt because of frigidity, blessed Gregory counsels that they remain together. And this is divided into two: in the first, he shows that impotence preceding the marriage impedes it from being contracted; in the second, he shows that something occurring unexpectedly during the marriage itself cannot dissolve it, at: It is also to be known, etc. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de effectu naturae impediente matrimonium, per quem homo impotens redditur ad carnalem copulam; in secunda determinat de effectu peccati, per quem homo ineptus redditur ad idem, quod etiam matrimonium impedit, scilicet incestus, ibi: de his etiam qui cum duabus sororibus, vel quae cum duobus fratribus dormiunt, videndum est. The first in two parts: in the first, he considers a natural effect that impedes matrimony by rendering a person incapable of physical intimacy; in the second, he considers an effect of sin, which renders a person unfit for it, and which also impedes marriage, namely, incest, where he states: As for those men who sleep with two sisters, or those women who do the same with two brothers, let us see what the canons decree. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de impedimento quo natura impotens redditur ad opus carnale; in secunda de impedimento quo impotens redditur ad consentiendum in copulam conjugalem, ibi: furiosi quoque dum in amentia sunt, matrimonium contrahere non valent. The first in two parts: in the first, he considers the impediment in which a man is rendered by nature incapable of the sexual act; in the second, the impediment in which he is rendered incapable of consenting to conjugal intimacy, where it says: The insane, too, while they are in a demented state, cannot contract marriage. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de impotentia coeundi ex causa naturali, scilicet frigiditate; in secunda de impotentia quae est ex maleficio, ibi: de maleficii autem impedimento hoc tenendum decernitur. The first in two parts: In the first, he considers inability to have intercourse from natural causes, which is impotence; in the second, the inability that results from a curse, where he states: But concerning the impediment of sorcery, it is decreed that the following be observed. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De impedimentis personarum Personal Impediments Hic quaeruntur quinque: Here five questions arise: primo, de impedimentis matrimonii in generali; first, concerning the impediments of marriage in general; secundo, utrum frigiditas impediat matrimonium; second, whether impotence impedes matrimony; tertio, utrum maleficium; third, whether a curse does;