Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum frigiditas impediat matrimonium Whether impotence impedes matrimony Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod frigiditas matrimonium contrahendum non impediat. Copula enim carnalis non est de essentia matrimonii; quia perfectiora sunt matrimonia pari voto continentium, ut supra, dist. 26, dictum est. Sed frigiditas nihil tollit de matrimonio nisi carnalem copulam. Ergo non est impedimentum dirimens contractum matrimonium. Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that impotence does not impede marriage from being contracted. For physical intimacy is not of the essence of marriage; since those marriages are more perfect in which the spouses take a mutual vow of continence, as was said above in Distinction 26. But impotence takes away nothing from marriage except physical intimacy. Therefore, it is not a diriment impediment to contracting marriage. Praeterea, sicut nimia frigiditas impedit carnalem copulam, ita et nimia caliditas, quae hominem exsiccat. Sed caliditas non ponitur matrimonii impedimentum. Ergo nec frigiditas poni debet. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as extreme frigidity impedes physical intimacy, so also does extreme heat, which dries a man out. But heat is not counted among the impediments to marriage. Therefore, neither should the frigidity that causes impotence be counted as an impediment. Praeterea, omnes vetuli sunt frigidi. Sed vetuli possunt matrimonium contrahere. Ergo frigiditas non impedit matrimonium. Obj. 3: Furthermore, all old men are impotent. But old men can contract marriage. Therefore, impotence does not impede marriage. Praeterea, si scit mulier virum esse frigidum, quando cum eo contrahit, verum est matrimonium. Ergo frigiditas, quantum est de se, matrimonium non impedit. Obj. 4: Furthermore, if a woman knows a man to be impotent when she contracts marriage with him, it is a valid marriage. Therefore, impotence in itself does not impede marriage. Praeterea, contingit in aliquo esse siccitatem sufficienter moventem ad carnalem copulam cum aliqua corrupta, non autem cum aliqua virgine; quia cito calidum evaporat ratione suae debilitatis, ut ad corrumpendum virginem non sufficiat. Et similiter in aliquo est sufficiens caliditas movens ad pulchram, quae magis concupiscentiam inflammat, quae non sufficienter movet ad turpem. Ergo videtur quod frigiditas etsi impediat respectu unius, non tamen simpliciter. Obj. 5: Furthermore, it sometimes happens that a man can have a healthy dryness sufficiently moving him to sexual intimacy with an experienced woman, but not with a virgin; for immediately the heat evaporates because of its own weakness, so that it is not sufficient for penetrating a virgin. And likewise, in a certain man there may be sufficient heat to move him with respect to a pretty girl, who inflames more his concupiscence, but not sufficient to move him toward an ugly girl. Therefore, it seems that impotence also may impede with respect to one person, but not simply speaking. Praeterea, mulier universaliter est frigidior viro. Sed mulieres non impediuntur a matrimonio. Ergo nec viri frigidi. Obj. 6: Furthermore, a woman is universally more frigid than a man. But women are not impeded from marriage by this fact. Therefore, neither should impotent men be impeded. Sed contra est quod dicitur Extra. de frigidis et maleficiatis: sicut puer, qui non potest reddere debitum, non est aptus conjugio; sic qui impotentes sunt, minime apti ad contrahenda matrimonia reputantur. Tales autem sunt frigidi. Ergo, etc. On the contrary (1), it says in the Decretals, concerning the impotent and those under a spell: just as a child, who cannot render the debt, is not suited to this union, so also those who are incapable are considered least suited to contracting marriage. But the impotent are among these. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, nullus potest se obligare ad impossibile. Sed in matrimonio homo se obligat ad carnalem copulam, quia ad hoc dat alteri sui corporis potestatem. Ergo frigidus, qui non potest carnaliter copulari, non potest matrimonium contrahere. Furthermore (2), no one can oblige himself to the impossible. But in marriage man obliges himself to carnal intimacy, since he gives another power over his own body to this end. Therefore, the impotent, who cannot engage in sexual intercourse, cannot contract marriage. Respondeo dicendum, quod in matrimonio est contractus quidam, quo unus alteri obligatur ad debitum carnale solvendum; unde sicut in aliis contractibus non est conveniens obligatio si aliquis se obliget ad hoc quod non potest dare vel facere; ita non est conveniens matrimonii contractus, si fiat ab aliquo qui debitum carnale solvere non possit; et hoc impedimentum vocatur impotentia coeundi nomine generali, quae quidem potest esse vel ex causa intrinseca et naturali, vel ex causa extrinseca accidentali, sicut per maleficium, de qua post dicetur. Si autem sit ex causa naturali, hoc potest esse dupliciter; quia vel est temporalis, cui potest subveniri beneficio medicinae, vel processu aetatis; et tunc non solvit matrimonium; vel est perpetua, et tunc solvit matrimonium; ita quod ille ex cujus parte allegatur impedimentum, perpetuo maneat absque spe conjugii, alius nubat cui vult in domino. I answer that, in marriage there is a certain contract, by which one person is obliged to the other to discharge the physical debt. Therefore just as in other contracts there is no fitting obligation if someone obliges himself to something that he cannot give or do, so it does not befit the marriage contract if it is made by someone who cannot discharge the marital obligation. And this impediment is called inability to have intercourse by the general name, which indeed can occur either by intrinsic and natural causes, or from extrinsic accidental causes, such as by a curse, which we will speak about later. If, however, it is from natural causes, this can be in two ways: either it is temporary, which can be remedied by the benefits of medicine or the progress of time, and then it does not dissolve the marriage; or it is perpetual, and then it does dissolve the marriage, so that the one who is alleged to have the impediment remains perpetually without hope of marrying, while the other may marry whom he or she wills in the Lord. Ad hoc autem cognoscendum, utrum sit impedimentum perpetuum vel non perpetuum, Ecclesia tempus determinatum adhibuit, in quo hujus rei posset esse experimentum, scilicet triennium; ita quod si post triennium, in quo fideliter ex utraque parte dederunt operam carnali copulae implendae, inveniatur matrimonium non esse consummatum, judicio Ecclesiae dissolvitur. Tamen in hoc Ecclesia quandoque errat; quia per triennium quandoque non sufficienter potest experiri perpetuitas impotentiae. Unde si Ecclesia se deceptam inveniat per hoc quod ille in quo erat impedimentum, invenitur carnalem copulam cum eadem vel alia perfecisse, reintegrat praecedens matrimonium, et dirimit secundum, quamvis de ejus licentia sit factum. However, in order to know whether the impediment is perpetual or not perpetual, the Church has employed a determined time in which this matter can be tested, namely, three years. Thus, if after three years in which both parties have faithfully applied themselves to the accomplishment of carnal intimacy, the marriage is found not to have been consummated, it is dissolved by the judgment of the Church. However, in this the Church sometimes errs, since sometimes three years is not enough to prove perpetual impotence. Therefore, if the Church finds itself deceived by the fact that a certain man in whom there was formerly this impediment, is found to have accomplished carnal intimacy with the same woman or another woman, it may restore the preceding marriage and annul the second, even though it was made with the Church’s permission. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis actus carnalis copulae non sit de essentia matrimonii, tamen potentia ad hoc est de essentia ejus; quia per matrimonium datur utrique conjugum potestas in corpore alterius respectu carnalis copulae. Reply Obj. 1: Although the act of physical intimacy is not of the essence of matrimony, nevertheless the power for it belongs to marriage’s essence. For through marriage the power over the body of the other is given to both of the spouses with respect to physical intimacy. Ad secundum dicendum, quod caliditas superflua vix potest esse impedimentum perpetuum. Si tamen inveniretur quod per triennium impediret carnalem copulam, judicaretur perpetuum. Tamen quia frigiditas magis et frequentius impedit (tollit enim non solum commixtionem seminum, sed etiam rigorem membrorum, quo fit conjunctio corporum); ideo frigiditas magis hic ponitur impedimentum quam caliditas, cum omnis defectus naturalis ad frigiditatem reducatur. Reply Obj. 2: An excessive heat can scarcely be a perpetual impediment. Yet if it were found that for three years it impeded physical intimacy, it would be judged perpetual. Still, since frigidity impedes in a greater way and more frequently (for it takes away not only the commingling of seeds but also the rigidity of the member by which the union of bodies occurs), for this reason frigidity is considered more of an impediment than excessive heat, since every natural defect may be traced back to frigidity. Ad tertium dicendum, quod vetuli quamvis quandoque non habeant caliditatem sufficientem ad generandum, tamen habent caliditatem sufficientem ad carnalem copulam; et ideo conceditur eis matrimonium, secundum quod est in remedium; quamvis non competat eis secundum quod est in officium naturae. Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes the elderly, although they may not have sufficient heat for generation, nevertheless have sufficient heat for sexual intimacy; and therefore marriage is granted to them, according as it is a remedy, although it is not their duty as an office of nature. Ad quartum dicendum, quod in quolibet contractu hoc universaliter tenetur, quod ille qui est impotens ad solvendum aliquid, non reputatur idoneus ad contractum illum quo se obligat ad ejus solutionem. Tamen impotens potest esse tripliciter. Uno modo, quia non potest solvere de jure; et sic talis impotentia omnibus modis facit contractum esse nullum, sive sciat ille cum quo facit talem contractum hanc impotentiam, sive non. Alio modo quia non sit solvendo de facto; et tunc si sciat ille cum quo contrahit, hanc impotentiam, et nihilominus contrahit, ostenditur quod alium finem ex contractu quaerit, et ideo contractus stat; si autem nescit, tunc contractus nullus est. Et ideo frigiditas, quae causat talem impotentiam ut homo non possit de facto solvere debitum, et conditio servitutis per quam homo non potest de facto libere reddere; impediunt matrimonium, quando alter conjugum ignorat hoc quod alius non potest reddere debitum. Impedimentum autem per quod aliquis non potest de jure reddere debitum, ut consanguinitas, annullat contractum matrimonium, sive sciat alter, sive non; et propter hoc Magister ponit quod haec duo faciunt personas omnino illegitimas. Reply Obj. 4: In any contract whatsoever, this is universally binding, that the person who is unable to fulfill something is not considered fit for the contract by which he obliges himself to its fulfillment. Yet someone can be incapable in three ways. In one way, if he cannot do something de jure. And in this way such an incapacity makes the contract null in every way, whether the one with whom the contract is made knows about this incapacity or not. In another way, when he cannot do it de facto; and then if the one with whom the contract is made should know about this incapability, and nevertheless agree to the contract, it reveals that in this contract the other party is seeking different end, and therefore the contract stands. However, if the other party does not know, then the contract is null. Therefore, impotence, which causes such an incapacity that a man cannot acquit his obligation de facto, and the condition of slavery, by which a man cannot render it freely de facto, both impede marriage when one spouse is ignorant that the other cannot render the debt. Yet the impediment by which someone cannot render the debt de jure, such as consanguinity, annuls the marital contract whether the other party knows or not; and because of this the Master counts these two as impediments which make persons entirely ineligible. Ad quintum dicendum, quod non potest esse perpetuum impedimentum naturale in viro respectu unius personae et non respectu alterius; sed si non possit implere carnalem actum cum virgine, et possit cum corrupta, tunc medicinaliter aliquo instrumento posset claustra pudoris frangere, et ei conjungi. Nec esset hoc contra matrimonium; quia non fieret ad delectationem, sed ad medicamentum. Abominatio autem mulieris non est causa naturalis, sed accidentalis extrinseca; et ideo de ea idem est judicium quod de maleficio, de quo post dicetur. Reply Obj. 5: There cannot be a perpetual natural impediment in the man with respect to one person and not to another; but if he were unable to complete the sexual act with a virgin, but he could with a woman who is not, then the hymen could be broken medically by some instrument, and they could be united. Nor would this be against matrimony, since it would not be done for the purpose of pleasure, but for a medical reason. However, loathing the woman is not a natural cause, but an extrinsic, accidental cause, and therefore it is adjudged the same as a curse, which will be discussed later. Ad sextum dicendum, quod mas est agens in generatione, sed femina est patiens; et ideo major caliditas requiritur in viro ad opus generationis quam in muliere; unde frigiditas, quae facit virum impotentem, non faceret mulierem impotentem. Sed in muliere potest esse impedimentum naturale ex causa alia, scilicet arctatione; et tunc idem est judicium de arctatione mulieris, et de frigiditate viri. Reply Obj. 6: The male is the active principle in generation, but the female is the passive principle; and therefore, greater heat is required in the man than in the woman for the work of generation. This is why impotence makes a man incapable, but frigidity would not make a woman incapable. But in the woman there can be a natural impediment from another cause, namely, extreme tightness; and then the judgment of tightness in the woman is the same as that of impotence in the man. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum maleficium Whether a curse does Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod maleficium non possit matrimonium impedire. Hujusmodi enim maleficia fiunt operatione daemonum. Sed daemones non habent potestatem impediendi matrimonii actum magis quam alios corporales actus, quos impedire non possunt; quia sic totum mundum perverterent; si comestionem et gressum et alia hujusmodi impedirent. Ergo per maleficia non potest impediri matrimonium. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that a curse cannot impede marriage. For evil spells of this kind are the work of demons. But demons do not have the power of impeding the marital act any more than other bodily acts, which they cannot impede. For if this were so, the whole world could be disturbed—if eating and walking and other things like this were impeded. Therefore, marriage cannot be impeded by evil spells. Praeterea, opus Dei est fortius quam opus diaboli. Sed maleficium est opus diaboli. Ergo non potest impedire matrimonium, quod est opus Dei. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the work of God is stronger than the work of the devil. But an evil spell is a work of the devil. Therefore it cannot impede marriage, which is a work of God. Praeterea, nullum impedimentum dirimit contractum matrimonii, nisi sit perpetuum. Sed maleficium non potest esse impedimentum perpetuum: quia cum diabolus non habeat potestatem nisi super peccatores, expulso peccato tolletur maleficium; vel etiam per aliud maleficium, vel per exorcismos Ecclesiae, qui sunt ordinati ad reprimendam vim daemonum. Ergo maleficium non potest impedire matrimonium. Obj. 3: Furthermore, no impediment voids the marriage contract unless it is a perpetual impediment. But an evil spell cannot be a perpetual impediment: for since the devil only has power over sinners, when the sin was driven out it would remove the spell; or it could also be removed through another spell, or through the exorcisms of the Church, which are ordained to repressing the force of the demons. Therefore, an evil spell cannot impede marriage. Praeterea, carnalis copula non potest impediri nisi impediatur potentia generandi, quae est principium ejus. Sed unius viri potentia generativa se habet ad omnes mulieres aequaliter. Ergo per maleficium non potest esse impedimentum respectu unius viri, nisi sit respectu omnium. Obj. 4: Furthermore, physical intimacy cannot be impeded unless the power of generation, which is its principle, is also impeded. But the reproductive power of one man has the same capacity toward all women. Therefore, by an evil spell there cannot be an impediment in a man with respect to one woman, unless it were with respect to all women. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Decret. 33, qu. 1: si per sortiarias vel maleficas; et infra: si sanari non potuerint, separari valebunt. On the contrary (1), it says in the Decretals: if through sorcery or evil spells, and further: if they are not able to be cured, it is worthwhile that they be separated. Praeterea, potestas daemonis est major quam hominis. Job 40, 24: non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei. Sed opere humano potest aliquis vir fieri impotens ad carnalem copulam per aliquam potestatem, vel castraturam; et ex hoc matrimonium impediri. Ergo multo fortius hoc virtute daemonis fieri potest. Furthermore (2), the power of the demons is greater than that of man: there is no power upon the earth which compares to it (Job 41:33). But by a human deed some man might be made incapable of carnal intimacy through some drink or through castration, and by this marriage is impeded. Therefore, much more can this be done by the power of the demons. Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt, quod maleficium nihil erat in mundo, nisi in aestimatione hominum, qui effectus naturales, quorum causae sunt occultae, maleficiis imputabant. Sed hoc est contra auctoritates sanctorum, qui dicunt, quod daemones habent potestatem supra corpora, et supra imaginationem hominum, quando a Deo permittuntur; unde per eos malefici signa aliqua facere possunt. Procedit autem haec opinio ex radice infidelitatis, sive incredulitatis, quia non credunt esse daemones nisi in aestimatione vulgi tantum, ut terrores quos homo sibi ipsi facit ex sua aestimatione, imputet daemoni; et quia etiam ex imaginatione vehementi aliquae figurae apparent in sensu tales quales homo cogitat, et tunc creduntur daemones videri. Sed haec vera fides repudiat, per quam angelos de caelo cecidisse, et daemones esse credimus, et ex subtilitate suae naturae multa posse quae nos non possumus; et ideo illi qui eos ad talia facienda inducunt, malefici vocantur. I answer that, certain people have said that witchcraft did not exist in the world, except in the impressions of men, who attribute to evil spells those natural effects whose causes are hidden. But this is against the authorities of the saints, who say that demons have power over bodies and over the imaginations of men, when they are permitted to by God. And this is how sorcerers can do certain works of magic through them. Now the opinion mentioned above proceeds from a root of lack of faith, or disbelief, for they do not believe that the demons exist except in the imagination of the common people alone, such that the terrors that a man makes for himself out of his own mind, he imputes to a demon; and also because from a vigorous imagination certain figures may appear to the senses just as a man thinks them, and then he believes that he sees demons. But these notions are repudiated by the true faith, by which we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that demons exist, and are capable from the subtlety of their nature of many things which we cannot do. Therefore, those men who summon them for doing these kinds of things are called sorcerers. Et ideo dixerunt alii, quod per maleficia praestari potest impedimentum carnali copulae; sed nullum tale est perpetuum; unde non dirimit matrimonium contractum; et dicunt, jura quae hoc dicebant, esse revocata. Sed hoc est contra experimentum, et contra nova jura, quae antiquis concordant. And therefore, others have said that through evil spells an impediment to carnal intimacy can be established, but nothing of this kind is perpetual, so that it does not void the marital contract, and they say that the laws that said so were revoked. But this is against experience, and against the new laws, which agree with the old ones. Et ideo distinguendum est: quia impotentia coeundi ex maleficio aut est perpetua, et tunc matrimonium dirimit; aut non est perpetua, et tunc non dirimit. Et ad hoc experiendum eodem modo Ecclesia tempus praefixit, triennium scilicet, sicut de frigiditate dictum est. Tamen haec est differentia inter maleficium et frigiditatem: quia qui est impotens ex frigiditate, sicut est impotens ad unam, ita ad aliam; et ideo quando matrimonium dirimitur, non datur ei licentia ut alteri conjungatur: sed ex maleficio homo potest esse impotens ad unam, et non ad aliam; et ideo quando judicio Ecclesiae matrimonium dirimitur, utrique datur licentia quod alteram copulam quaerat. And therefore a distinction must be drawn: for inability to have intercourse because of an evil spell is either perpetual, and then it invalidates the marriage, or it is not perpetual, and then it does not invalidate it. And to test this the Church has fixed a period of time in the same way, namely three years, just as was stated for impotence. Still, there is this difference between being under an evil spell and impotence, that someone who is incapacitated by impotence is just as incapable with one woman as with another. And therefore when the marriage is nullified, he is not granted permission to unite with another. But under a curse a man can be unable to unite with one woman and not with another; and therefore when by the judgment of the Church the marriage is nullified, both parties are granted permission to seek union with another. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia corruptio peccati prima, per quam homo servus est factus diaboli, in nos per actum generantem devenit, ideo maleficii potestas permittitur diabolo a Deo in hoc actu magis quam in aliis; sicut in serpentibus magis ostenditur virtus maleficiorum, ut dicitur, quam in aliis animalibus, quia per serpentem diabolus mulierem tentavit. Reply Obj. 1: Since the first corruption of sin, by which man was made slave to the devil, is passed on to us by the generative act, this is why the power of sorcery is permitted to the devil by God in this act more than in others; just as the power of witchcraft is displayed more in serpents than in other animals, as is said, since through the serpent the devil tempted the woman. Ad secundum dicendum, quod opus Dei potest opere diaboli impediri divina permissione; non quod diabolus Deo sit fortior, ut per violentiam opera ejus destruat. Reply Obj. 2: The work of God can be impeded by the work of the devil by divine permission; not that the devil could be stronger than God such that he could destroy God’s work through violence. Ad tertium dicendum, quod maleficium est ita perpetuum quod non potest habere remedium humano opere; quamvis Deus posset remedium praestare daemonem cogendo, vel etiam daemon desistendo. Non enim oportet semper ut id quod per maleficium factum est, possit per maleficium aliud destrui, ut ipsi malefici confitentur, et tamen si posset per maleficium remedium adhiberi, nihilominus perpetuum reputaretur: quia nullo modo debet aliquis daemonis auxilium per maleficia invocare. Similiter non oportet quod si propter peccatum aliquod data est diabolo potestas in aliquem, cessante peccato cesset potestas: quia poena interdum remanet culpa transeunte. Similiter etiam exorcismi Ecclesiae non valent ad reprimendum daemones semper quantum ad omnes molestias corporales, judicio divino hoc exigente; semper tamen valent contra illas infestationes daemonum contra quas principaliter instituta sunt. Reply Obj. 3: Witchcraft is so enduring that it may not have a remedy in human action, although God may furnish the remedy by forcing out the demon, or the demon might even stop. For it is not always the case that what was done by one spell could be destroyed by another spell, as sorcerers themselves admit. But if the remedy could be applied by witchcraft, nevertheless it would be considered perpetual, since in no way should someone invoke the help of a demon through witchcraft. Likewise, it is not necessary that if because of some sin power was given to the devil over someone, this power should end when the sin ends: for sometimes punishment remains once guilt has passed away. Likewise also, the exorcisms of the Church are not strong enough to repress demons all the time as regards all corporeal troubles, when divine judgment requires this; but they are always strong enough against those infestations of demons that they were principally instituted against. Ad quartum dicendum, quod maleficium quandoque potest praestare impedimentum ad omnes, quandoque ad unam tantum: quia diabolus voluntaria causa est, non ex necessitate naturae agens. Et praeterea impedimentum maleficii potest esse ex impressione daemonis in imaginatione hominis, ex qua tollitur viro concupiscentia movens ad talem mulierem, et non ad aliam. Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes witchcraft can establish an impediment with everyone, sometimes with just one person, since the devil is a voluntary cause, not acting from the necessity of nature. And furthermore the impediment of witchcraft can occur from the impression of a demon on the imagination of a man, removing the concupiscence that moves him toward a certain woman but not the concupiscence moving him toward another. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum furia, vel amentia Whether insanity or mental handicap does Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod furia non impediat matrimonium. Matrimonium enim spirituale, quod in baptismo contrahitur, est dignius quam carnale. Sed furiosi possunt baptizari. Ergo et matrimonium contrahere. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that insanity does not impede marriage. For spiritual marriage, which is contracted in baptism, is nobler than physical marriage. But the insane can be baptized. Therefore, they can also marry.