Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum maleficium Whether a curse does Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod maleficium non possit matrimonium impedire. Hujusmodi enim maleficia fiunt operatione daemonum. Sed daemones non habent potestatem impediendi matrimonii actum magis quam alios corporales actus, quos impedire non possunt; quia sic totum mundum perverterent; si comestionem et gressum et alia hujusmodi impedirent. Ergo per maleficia non potest impediri matrimonium. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that a curse cannot impede marriage. For evil spells of this kind are the work of demons. But demons do not have the power of impeding the marital act any more than other bodily acts, which they cannot impede. For if this were so, the whole world could be disturbed—if eating and walking and other things like this were impeded. Therefore, marriage cannot be impeded by evil spells. Praeterea, opus Dei est fortius quam opus diaboli. Sed maleficium est opus diaboli. Ergo non potest impedire matrimonium, quod est opus Dei. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the work of God is stronger than the work of the devil. But an evil spell is a work of the devil. Therefore it cannot impede marriage, which is a work of God. Praeterea, nullum impedimentum dirimit contractum matrimonii, nisi sit perpetuum. Sed maleficium non potest esse impedimentum perpetuum: quia cum diabolus non habeat potestatem nisi super peccatores, expulso peccato tolletur maleficium; vel etiam per aliud maleficium, vel per exorcismos Ecclesiae, qui sunt ordinati ad reprimendam vim daemonum. Ergo maleficium non potest impedire matrimonium. Obj. 3: Furthermore, no impediment voids the marriage contract unless it is a perpetual impediment. But an evil spell cannot be a perpetual impediment: for since the devil only has power over sinners, when the sin was driven out it would remove the spell; or it could also be removed through another spell, or through the exorcisms of the Church, which are ordained to repressing the force of the demons. Therefore, an evil spell cannot impede marriage. Praeterea, carnalis copula non potest impediri nisi impediatur potentia generandi, quae est principium ejus. Sed unius viri potentia generativa se habet ad omnes mulieres aequaliter. Ergo per maleficium non potest esse impedimentum respectu unius viri, nisi sit respectu omnium. Obj. 4: Furthermore, physical intimacy cannot be impeded unless the power of generation, which is its principle, is also impeded. But the reproductive power of one man has the same capacity toward all women. Therefore, by an evil spell there cannot be an impediment in a man with respect to one woman, unless it were with respect to all women. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Decret. 33, qu. 1: si per sortiarias vel maleficas; et infra: si sanari non potuerint, separari valebunt. On the contrary (1), it says in the Decretals: if through sorcery or evil spells, and further: if they are not able to be cured, it is worthwhile that they be separated. Praeterea, potestas daemonis est major quam hominis. Job 40, 24: non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei. Sed opere humano potest aliquis vir fieri impotens ad carnalem copulam per aliquam potestatem, vel castraturam; et ex hoc matrimonium impediri. Ergo multo fortius hoc virtute daemonis fieri potest. Furthermore (2), the power of the demons is greater than that of man: there is no power upon the earth which compares to it (Job 41:33). But by a human deed some man might be made incapable of carnal intimacy through some drink or through castration, and by this marriage is impeded. Therefore, much more can this be done by the power of the demons. Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt, quod maleficium nihil erat in mundo, nisi in aestimatione hominum, qui effectus naturales, quorum causae sunt occultae, maleficiis imputabant. Sed hoc est contra auctoritates sanctorum, qui dicunt, quod daemones habent potestatem supra corpora, et supra imaginationem hominum, quando a Deo permittuntur; unde per eos malefici signa aliqua facere possunt. Procedit autem haec opinio ex radice infidelitatis, sive incredulitatis, quia non credunt esse daemones nisi in aestimatione vulgi tantum, ut terrores quos homo sibi ipsi facit ex sua aestimatione, imputet daemoni; et quia etiam ex imaginatione vehementi aliquae figurae apparent in sensu tales quales homo cogitat, et tunc creduntur daemones videri. Sed haec vera fides repudiat, per quam angelos de caelo cecidisse, et daemones esse credimus, et ex subtilitate suae naturae multa posse quae nos non possumus; et ideo illi qui eos ad talia facienda inducunt, malefici vocantur. I answer that, certain people have said that witchcraft did not exist in the world, except in the impressions of men, who attribute to evil spells those natural effects whose causes are hidden. But this is against the authorities of the saints, who say that demons have power over bodies and over the imaginations of men, when they are permitted to by God. And this is how sorcerers can do certain works of magic through them. Now the opinion mentioned above proceeds from a root of lack of faith, or disbelief, for they do not believe that the demons exist except in the imagination of the common people alone, such that the terrors that a man makes for himself out of his own mind, he imputes to a demon; and also because from a vigorous imagination certain figures may appear to the senses just as a man thinks them, and then he believes that he sees demons. But these notions are repudiated by the true faith, by which we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that demons exist, and are capable from the subtlety of their nature of many things which we cannot do. Therefore, those men who summon them for doing these kinds of things are called sorcerers. Et ideo dixerunt alii, quod per maleficia praestari potest impedimentum carnali copulae; sed nullum tale est perpetuum; unde non dirimit matrimonium contractum; et dicunt, jura quae hoc dicebant, esse revocata. Sed hoc est contra experimentum, et contra nova jura, quae antiquis concordant. And therefore, others have said that through evil spells an impediment to carnal intimacy can be established, but nothing of this kind is perpetual, so that it does not void the marital contract, and they say that the laws that said so were revoked. But this is against experience, and against the new laws, which agree with the old ones. Et ideo distinguendum est: quia impotentia coeundi ex maleficio aut est perpetua, et tunc matrimonium dirimit; aut non est perpetua, et tunc non dirimit. Et ad hoc experiendum eodem modo Ecclesia tempus praefixit, triennium scilicet, sicut de frigiditate dictum est. Tamen haec est differentia inter maleficium et frigiditatem: quia qui est impotens ex frigiditate, sicut est impotens ad unam, ita ad aliam; et ideo quando matrimonium dirimitur, non datur ei licentia ut alteri conjungatur: sed ex maleficio homo potest esse impotens ad unam, et non ad aliam; et ideo quando judicio Ecclesiae matrimonium dirimitur, utrique datur licentia quod alteram copulam quaerat. And therefore a distinction must be drawn: for inability to have intercourse because of an evil spell is either perpetual, and then it invalidates the marriage, or it is not perpetual, and then it does not invalidate it. And to test this the Church has fixed a period of time in the same way, namely three years, just as was stated for impotence. Still, there is this difference between being under an evil spell and impotence, that someone who is incapacitated by impotence is just as incapable with one woman as with another. And therefore when the marriage is nullified, he is not granted permission to unite with another. But under a curse a man can be unable to unite with one woman and not with another; and therefore when by the judgment of the Church the marriage is nullified, both parties are granted permission to seek union with another. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia corruptio peccati prima, per quam homo servus est factus diaboli, in nos per actum generantem devenit, ideo maleficii potestas permittitur diabolo a Deo in hoc actu magis quam in aliis; sicut in serpentibus magis ostenditur virtus maleficiorum, ut dicitur, quam in aliis animalibus, quia per serpentem diabolus mulierem tentavit. Reply Obj. 1: Since the first corruption of sin, by which man was made slave to the devil, is passed on to us by the generative act, this is why the power of sorcery is permitted to the devil by God in this act more than in others; just as the power of witchcraft is displayed more in serpents than in other animals, as is said, since through the serpent the devil tempted the woman. Ad secundum dicendum, quod opus Dei potest opere diaboli impediri divina permissione; non quod diabolus Deo sit fortior, ut per violentiam opera ejus destruat. Reply Obj. 2: The work of God can be impeded by the work of the devil by divine permission; not that the devil could be stronger than God such that he could destroy God’s work through violence. Ad tertium dicendum, quod maleficium est ita perpetuum quod non potest habere remedium humano opere; quamvis Deus posset remedium praestare daemonem cogendo, vel etiam daemon desistendo. Non enim oportet semper ut id quod per maleficium factum est, possit per maleficium aliud destrui, ut ipsi malefici confitentur, et tamen si posset per maleficium remedium adhiberi, nihilominus perpetuum reputaretur: quia nullo modo debet aliquis daemonis auxilium per maleficia invocare. Similiter non oportet quod si propter peccatum aliquod data est diabolo potestas in aliquem, cessante peccato cesset potestas: quia poena interdum remanet culpa transeunte. Similiter etiam exorcismi Ecclesiae non valent ad reprimendum daemones semper quantum ad omnes molestias corporales, judicio divino hoc exigente; semper tamen valent contra illas infestationes daemonum contra quas principaliter instituta sunt. Reply Obj. 3: Witchcraft is so enduring that it may not have a remedy in human action, although God may furnish the remedy by forcing out the demon, or the demon might even stop. For it is not always the case that what was done by one spell could be destroyed by another spell, as sorcerers themselves admit. But if the remedy could be applied by witchcraft, nevertheless it would be considered perpetual, since in no way should someone invoke the help of a demon through witchcraft. Likewise, it is not necessary that if because of some sin power was given to the devil over someone, this power should end when the sin ends: for sometimes punishment remains once guilt has passed away. Likewise also, the exorcisms of the Church are not strong enough to repress demons all the time as regards all corporeal troubles, when divine judgment requires this; but they are always strong enough against those infestations of demons that they were principally instituted against. Ad quartum dicendum, quod maleficium quandoque potest praestare impedimentum ad omnes, quandoque ad unam tantum: quia diabolus voluntaria causa est, non ex necessitate naturae agens. Et praeterea impedimentum maleficii potest esse ex impressione daemonis in imaginatione hominis, ex qua tollitur viro concupiscentia movens ad talem mulierem, et non ad aliam. Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes witchcraft can establish an impediment with everyone, sometimes with just one person, since the devil is a voluntary cause, not acting from the necessity of nature. And furthermore the impediment of witchcraft can occur from the impression of a demon on the imagination of a man, removing the concupiscence that moves him toward a certain woman but not the concupiscence moving him toward another. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum furia, vel amentia Whether insanity or mental handicap does Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod furia non impediat matrimonium. Matrimonium enim spirituale, quod in baptismo contrahitur, est dignius quam carnale. Sed furiosi possunt baptizari. Ergo et matrimonium contrahere. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that insanity does not impede marriage. For spiritual marriage, which is contracted in baptism, is nobler than physical marriage. But the insane can be baptized. Therefore, they can also marry. Praeterea, frigiditas impedit matrimonium, inquantum impedit carnalem copulam, quae non impeditur per furiam. Ergo nec matrimonium. Obj. 2: Furthermore, impotence impedes matrimony inasmuch as it impedes physical intimacy, which is not impeded by insanity. Therefore, neither is marriage. Praeterea, matrimonium non dirimitur nisi per aliquod impedimentum perpetuum. Sed de furia non potest sciri quod sit impedimentum perpetuum. Ergo non dirimit matrimonium. Obj. 3: Furthermore, marriage is only invalidated by a perpetual impediment. But concerning insanity it is impossible to know if the impediment is perpetual. Therefore, it does not invalidate the marriage. Praeterea, in versibus praedictis sufficienter continentur impedimenta dirimentia matrimonium. Sed ibi non fit mentio de furia. Ergo, etc. Obj. 4: Furthermore, these verses sufficiently contain the diriment impediments to matrimony. But no mention is made there of insanity. Therefore, etc. Sed contra, plus tollit rationis usum furia quam error. Sed error impedit matrimonium. Ergo et furia. On the contrary (1), insanity takes away the use of reason more than error. But error impedes marriage. Therefore, so does insanity. Praeterea, furiosi non sunt idonei ad aliquem contractum faciendum. Sed matrimonium est contractus quidam. Ergo, etc. Furthermore (2), the insane are not fit for making any contract. But marriage is a contract. Therefore, etc. Respondeo dicendum, quod furia aut praecedit matrimonium, aut sequitur. Si sequitur, nullo modo dirimit matrimonium. Si autem praecedit; aut furiosus habet lucida intervalla, aut non. Si habet, tunc quamvis dum est in illo intervallo non sit tutum quod matrimonium contrahat, quia nescit prolem educare; tamen si contrahit, matrimonium est. Si autem non habet, vel si quando non habet, contrahit; tunc quia non potest esse consensus ubi deest rationis usu, non erit verum matrimonium. I answer that, insanity either precedes marriage or follows it. If it follows, it cannot invalidate the marriage in any way. But if it precedes, either the insane person has lucid intervals or not. If he does, then although while he is in that interval it is not safe for him to contract matrimony, since he is unable to educate the children; yet if he did contract a marriage, it is a marriage. If, however, he does not have lucid intervals, or if he should contract marriage while he is not having one, then since there can be no consent where the use of reason is lacking, it will not be a valid marriage. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod usus rationis non exigitur ad baptismum quasi causa ipsius, sicut exigitur ad matrimonium; et ideo non est similis ratio. Tamen de baptismo furiosorum supra, distinct. 6, dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: The use of reason is not required for baptism as its cause, as it is required for matrimony. Therefore, there is no similarity. But concerning baptism of the insane, see above, Distinction 6. Ad secundum dicendum, quod furia impedit matrimonium ratione causae suae, quae est consensus, quamvis non ratione actus, ut frigiditas. Sed tamen simul cum frigiditate Magister determinat, quia utrumque est quidam naturae defectus. Reply Obj. 2: Insanity impedes marriage in its cause, which is consent, although not in its act, as is the case with impotence. But nevertheless the Master considers it at the same time as impotence because both arise from defects of nature. Ad tertium dicendum, quod momentaneum impedimentum, quod causam matrimonii, scilicet consensum, impedit, matrimonium totaliter tollit. Sed impedimentum quod impedit actum, oportet esse perpetuum ad hoc quod matrimonium tollat. Reply Obj. 3: A temporary impediment that impedes the cause of marriage, namely, consent, completely voids matrimony. But an impediment that impedes the act must be perpetual in order to void matrimony. Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc impedimentum reducitur ad errorem: quia utrobique defectus consensus ex parte rationis est. Reply Obj. 4: This impediment is reduced to that of error: for on both sides there is a defect of consent on the part of reason. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum incestus Whether incest does Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incestus quo quis cognoscit sororem uxoris suae, matrimonium non dirimat. Quia mulier non debet puniri pro peccato viri. Sed puniretur, si matrimonium solveretur. Ergo, etc. Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the incest by which someone knows the sister of his wife does not invalidate marriage. For the woman should not be punished for the sin of the man. But she would be punished if the marriage were dissolved. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, plus peccat qui propriam consanguineam cognoscit, quam qui cognoscit consanguineam uxoris. Sed primum peccatum non impedit matrimonium. Ergo nec secundum. Obj. 2: Furthermore, he sins more who knows his own relative than who knows the relative of his wife. But the first sin does not impede marriage. Therefore, neither does the second. Praeterea, si in poenam peccati hoc infligitur, videtur, etiam si mortua uxore cum alia contrahat incestuosus, quod separari debeant; quod non est verum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if this is inflicted as punishment for sin, then it seems that also if, even once his wife is dead, the incestuous husband should contract with someone else, they should be separated too, which is not the case. Praeterea, hoc etiam impedimentum non connumeratur inter alia supra enumerata. Ergo non dirimit contractum matrimonium. Obj. 4: Furthermore, this impediment is also not enumerated among the others listed above. Therefore, it does not invalidate matrimony. Sed contra, quia per hoc quod cognoscit sororem uxoris, contrahitur affinitas ad uxorem. Sed affinitas dirimit matrimonium contractum. Ergo et incestus praedictus. On the contrary (1), by the fact that he has known the sister of his wife, the man forms an affinity with his wife. But affinity does invalidate the marriage contracted. Therefore, so does the incest described. Praeterea, in quo quis peccat, in hoc punitur. Sed talis peccat contra matrimonium. Ergo debet puniri, ut matrimonio privetur. Furthermore (2), whoever sins in something is punished in that thing. But such a person sins against matrimony. Therefore, he should be punished by being deprived of his marriage.