Praeterea, quilibet potest dimittere alteri quod in se peccavit. Sed uxor fornicando peccat in virum. Ergo vir potest ei parcere, ut non dimittat eam. Furthermore (6), anyone can forgive another a sin that person has committed against him. But a wife sins against her husband by fornicating. Therefore, the man can spare her, such that he does not send her away. Respondeo dicendum, quod dimissio uxoris fornicantis introducta est ad corrigendum uxoris crimen per talem poenam. Poena autem corrigens non requiritur ubi emendatio jam praecessit; et ideo si mulier de peccato poeniteat, vir non tenetur eam dimittere; si autem non poeniteat, tenetur, ne peccato ejus consentire videatur, dum correctionem debitam non apponit. I answer that, the dismissal of a fornicating wife was introduced as a penalty to correct the wife’s misdeed. However, a corrective penalty is not required where emendation has already taken place, and therefore if the wife repents of her sin, the husband is not bound to send her away; but if she does not repent, he is bound, lest he seem to consent to her sin while he does not employ the due correction. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccatum fornicationis in uxore potest corrigi non tantum tali poena, sed etiam verbis et verbere; et ideo si alias ad correctionem sit parata, non tenetur vir praedictam poenam ad ejus correctionem adhibere. Reply Obj. 1: The sin of fornication in a wife can be corrected not only by such a penalty, but also by words and by blows. And therefore, if she were provided with correction in some other way, the husband would not be bound to apply this penalty for her correction. Ad secundum dicendum, quod tunc vir uxori consentire videtur quando eam tenet non cessantem a peccato praeterito; si autem emendata fuerit, non ei consentit. Reply Obj. 2: The man seems to consent to his wife when he does not restrain her to refrain from her past sin; but if she has amended, he does not consent to her sin. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex quo de peccato fornicationis poenituit, meretrix dici non potest; et ideo vir se ei conjungendo, membrum meretricis non fit. Vel dicendum, quod non conjungitur ei quasi meretrici, sed quasi uxori. Reply Obj. 3: By the fact that she has repented of the sin of fornication, she cannot be called a harlot; and therefore, the man uniting himself with her does not become the member of a harlot. Or it may be said that he is not joined to her as harlot, but as wife. Ad quartum dicendum, quod non est simile; quia consanguinitas facit ut non sit inter eos matrimoniale vinculum, et ideo carnalis copula esset illicita; sed fornicatio non tollit vinculum praedictum; et ideo actus remanet, quantum est de se, licitus, nisi per accidens illicitus fiat, inquantum vir consentire turpitudini uxoris videtur. Reply Obj. 4: It is not the same, for consanguinity makes it so that there will be no marriage bond between them, and for this reason physical intimacy would be illicit. But fornication does not remove the bond mentioned above; and for this reason the act remains licit in itself, unless it should become illicit by some added circumstance—if, for example, it should seem that the man consents to the disgrace of his wife. Ad quintum dicendum, quod permissio illa est intelligenda per prohibitionis privationem; et sic contra praeceptum non dividitur; quia etiam quod cadit sub praecepto, non est prohibitum. Reply Obj. 5: That permission is to be gathered from the lack of a prohibition, and thus it is not divided against a precept; for what falls under a precept is also not prohibited. Ad sextum dicendum, quod uxor non tantum peccat in virum, sed etiam in seipsam, et in Deum; et ideo vir non totaliter potest poenam dimittere, nisi emendatio sequatur. Reply Obj. 6: The wife does not only sin against her husband, but against herself, and against God; and for this reason the man cannot totally forego a penalty unless amendment should follow. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum possit dimittere proprio judicio, vel judicium Ecclesiae requiratur Whether he may send her away by his own judgment or whether the judgment of the Church is required Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod proprio judicio potest vir uxorem fornicantem dimittere. Sententiam enim a judice latam absque alio judicio exequi licet. Sed Deus justus judex dedit hanc sententiam, ut propter fornicationem vir uxorem dimittere possit. Ergo non requiritur ad hoc aliud judicium. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that a man can dismiss his fornicating wife by his own judgment. For an automatic sentence (latae sententiae) from the court may be carried out without a trial. But God, the just judge, gave this sentence, that because of fornication a man may dismiss his wife. Therefore, another judgment is not required for this. Praeterea, Matth. 1, dicitur, quod Joseph, cum esset justus, cogitavit occulte dimittere Mariam. Ergo videtur quod occulte vir possit divortium celebrare absque Ecclesiae judicio. Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Matthew 1:19, it says that Joseph, since he was a just man, thought about sending Mary away secretly. Therefore, it seems that a man may seek a separation secretly without the judgment of the Church. Praeterea, si vir post fornicationem uxoris cognitam debitum ei reddit, amittit etiam actionem quam contra fornicariam habebat. Ergo denegatio debiti quae ad divortium pertinet, debet Ecclesiae judicium praecedere. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if a man after having known about the fornication of his wife renders the debt to her, he loses the legal recourse that he had against the fornicator. Therefore, refusing the debt, which pertains to the separation, should precede the judgment of the Church. Praeterea, illud quod non potest probari, non debet ad judicium Ecclesiae adduci. Sed fornicationis crimen non potest probari, quia oculus adulteri observat caliginem, ut dicit Job 24, 15. Ergo non debet judicio Ecclesiae praedictum divortium fieri. Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which cannot be proved should not be brought before the judgment of the Church. But the offense of fornication cannot be proved, since the eye of the adulterer waits for the darkness, as Job 24:15 says. Therefore, the separation mentioned should not be made by the judgment of the Church. Praeterea, accusationem debet inscriptio praecedere, qua aliquis se ad talionem obliget, si in probatione deficiat. Sed hoc non potest esse in ista materia; quia tunc qualitercumque res iret, vir consequeretur intentum suum, sive ipse uxorem dimitteret, sive uxor eum. Ergo non debet ad judicium Ecclesiae per accusationem adduci. Obj. 5: Furthermore, a formal charge should precede an accusation, by which someone may oblige himself to damages, if he should fail to prove his case. But this cannot happen in this matter, for then, however the thing should go, the man would attain his own aim: either he would dismiss his wife or she would dismiss him. Therefore, it should not be brought before the judgment of the Church by an accusation. Praeterea, plus tenetur homo uxori quam extraneo. Sed homo crimen alterius, etiam extranei, non debet Ecclesiae deferre, nisi monitione praemissa in secreto, ut patet Matth. 19. Ergo multo minus potest crimen uxoris ad Ecclesiam deferre, si eam prius occulte non corripuit. Obj. 6: Furthermore, a man is more bound to his wife than to strangers. But a man should not bring to the Church another’s offense, even a stranger’s offense, unless he has already admonished him in secret, as is evident from Matthew 18:15. Therefore, much less can he bring his wife’s offense to the Church, if he has not already privately rebuked her. Sed contra, nullus debet seipsum vindicare. Sed si vir uxorem fornicantem proprio arbitrio dimitteret, ipse se vindicaret. Ergo hoc non debet fieri. On the contrary (1), no one should avenge himself. But if a husband dismisses his fornicating wife by his own decision, he avenges himself. Therefore, this should not be done. Praeterea, nullus in eadem causa est actor et judex. Sed vir est actor impetens uxorem de offensa in se commissa. Ergo ipse non potest esse judex; et sic non debet eam proprio arbitrio dimittere. Furthermore (2), no one is both a prosecutor and a judge in his own cause. But the man is prosecuting his wife for the offense she committed against him. Therefore, he cannot be the judge; and thus he should not dismiss her by his own decision. Respondeo dicendum, quod vir potest dimittere uxorem dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad torum tantum; et sic potest eam dimittere quam cito sibi constat de fornicatione uxoris, proprio arbitrio; nec tenetur reddere debitum exigenti, nisi per Ecclesiam compellatur; et taliter reddens nullum sibi praejudicium facit. Alio modo quantum ad torum et cohabitationem; et hoc modo non potest dimitti nisi judicio Ecclesiae; et si alias dimissa fuerit, debet cogi ad cohabitandum, nisi possit ei vir incontinenti fornicationem probare. Haec autem dimissio divortium dicitur; et ideo concedendum est quod divortium non potest celebrari nisi judicio Ecclesiae. I answer that, the man can send away his wife in two ways. In one way, only from the bed; and in this way he can dismiss her by his own judgment as soon as he discovers the fornication of his wife; nor is he bound to render the debt to her when she requires it, unless he is compelled by the Church, and in that case rendering the debt prejudices none of his rights. In another way, both from the bed and from the house; and in this way she cannot be sent away except by the Church’s verdict. And if she has been dismissed in any other way, her husband should be forced to cohabit with her, unless he can prove the incontinent woman’s fornication. Now this dismissal is called separation (divortium); and therefore it must be admitted that separation can only be granted by the judgment of the Church. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sententia est applicatio juris communis ad particulare factum; unde dominus jus promulgavit, secundum quod sententia in judicio formari debet. Reply Obj. 1: A sentence is the application of a general law to a particular fact; and thus the Lord promulgated the law, according to which the sentence should be rendered in the court. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Joseph non volebat virginem dimittere quasi suspectam de fornicatione, sed ob reverentiam sanctitatis ejus, timens ei cohabitare, ut supra dictum est; nec tamen est simile, quia tunc ex adulterio non solum procedebatur ad divortium, sed ulterius ad lapidationem; non autem nunc quando agitur in judicio Ecclesiae. Reply Obj. 2: Joseph did not want to send away the Virgin as though he suspected her of fornication, but out of reverence for her holiness, fearing to cohabit with her, as was said above; nor is it similar, for at that time the crime of adultery did not lead simply to separation, but rather to stoning; however, that is not what happens in the judgment of the Church today. Ad tertium patet solutio ex dictis. The answer to the third objection is evident from what has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quandoque vir uxorem suspectam habens ei insidiatur, et deprehendere eam potest cum testibus in crimine fornicationis; et sic potest ad accusationem procedere. Et praeterea, si de facto isto non constat, possunt esse violentae suspiciones fornicationis; quibus probatis, videtur fornicatio esse probata, ut si inveniatur solus cum sola horis et locis suspectis, et nudus cum nuda. Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man, having suspicions about his wife, may lie in wait for her, and he can apprehend her in the crime of fornication in front of witnesses, and in this way he can proceed to the accusation. And furthermore, if he cannot establish the fact, there can be forceful suspicions of fornication, which, when they are proved, it seems that fornication is proved, for example, if a man and a woman are found alone together at suspect times and places, and if they are found naked together. Ad quintum dicendum, quod maritus potest accusare uxorem de adulterio dupliciter. Uno modo ad tori separationem coram judice spirituali, et tunc inscriptio debet fieri sine obligatione ad legem talionis: quia sic vir consequeretur intentum suum, ut objecto probat. Alio modo ad punitionem criminis in judicio saeculari; et sic oportet quod praecedat inscriptio, per quam ad poenam talionis se obliget, si in probatione deficiat. Reply Obj. 5: A husband can accuse his wife of adultery in two ways. In one way, for a separation from the bed before an ecclesiastical judge, and then charges should be brought without obligation to the law of damages. For the husband attains his aim, as the objection proves. In another way, for the punishment of the crime in the secular court; and for this it is necessary that charges be brought first, by which the man obliges himself to the payment of damages if he should lose the trial. Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut decretalis dicit, tribus modis in criminibus procedi potest. Primo per inquisitionem, quam debet praecedere clamosa insinuatio quae locum accusationis tenet. Secundo per accusationem, quam debet praecedere inscriptio. Tertio per denuntiationem, quam debet praecedere fraterna correptio. Verbum ergo domini intelligitur quando agitur per viam denuntiationis, non quando agitur per viam accusationis: quia tunc non agitur solum ad correptionem delinquentis, sed ad punitionem propter bonum commune conservandum, quod justitia deficiente periret. Reply Obj. 6: As a decretal says, in criminal matters things can proceed in three ways. First, by inquiry, which must be preceded by public infamy, which takes the place of accusation. Second, by accusation, which must be preceded by filing suit. Third, by denunciation, which must be preceded by fraternal admonition. Thus the word of the Lord is understood as concerning the way of denunciation, not the way of accusation; for in that case, it is not only a question of correcting the delinquent, but of punishing him for the sake of preserving the common good, which perishes when justice is lacking. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum vir et uxor quantum ad hoc sint aequalis conditionis Whether husband and wife are of equal condition in this matter Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vir et uxor non debeant in causa divortii ad paria judicari. Divortium enim conceditur in lege nova loco repudii, quod erat in lege veteri, ut patet Matth. 5. Sed in repudio vir et uxor non judicabantur ad paria: quia vir poterat repudiare uxorem, et non e converso. Ergo nec in divortio debent ad paria judicari. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that a husband and wife should not be judged equals in the matter of separation. For separation is conceded in the New Law in place of divorce, which existed under the Old Law, as is evident from Matthew 5:31–32. But in divorce the husband and wife were not judged equals: for the man could divorce his wife, but not the reverse. Therefore, neither should they be judged equals in separation. Praeterea, plus est contra legem naturae quod uxor plures viros habeat quam quod vir plures mulieres: unde hoc quandoque licuit, illud vero nunquam, ut supra, dist. 33, quaest. 1, art. 1, ad 7, dictum est. Ergo plus peccat mulier in adulterio quam vir; et ita non debent ad paria judicari. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is more against the law of nature that a wife should have several husbands than that a man should have several wives: for the latter was allowed at certain times, but the former never at all, as was said in Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 1, response to the seventh objection. Therefore, the wife sins more in adultery than the husband, and so they should not be judged equals. Praeterea, ubi est majus nocumentum proximi, ibi est majus peccatum. Sed plus nocet adultera uxor viro quam vir adulter uxori: quia adulterium uxoris facit incertitudinem prolis, non autem adulterium viri. Ergo majus est peccatum uxoris; et sic non debent ad paria judicari. Obj. 3: Furthermore, where there is greater harm to one’s neighbor, there is a greater sin. But an adulterous wife harms her husband more than an adulterous husband harms his wife: for the adultery of the wife causes uncertainty about the children, but the adultery of the man does not. Therefore, the sin of the wife is greater, and they should not be judged as equals. Praeterea, divortium inducitur ad crimen adulterii corrigendum. Sed magis pertinet ad virum, qui est caput mulieris, ut dicitur 1 Cor. 11, corrigere uxorem, quam e converso. Ergo non debent in repudio ad paria judicari, sed vir debet esse melioris conditionis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, separation is sought for the correction of the crime of adultery. But it belongs more to the husband, who is the head of the wife (1 Cor 11:3), to correct his wife than vice versa. Therefore, they should not be judged equals in divorce, but the man should have a better standing. Sed contra, videtur quod uxor in hoc debeat esse melioris conditionis. Quia quanto est major fragilitas in peccante, tanto peccatum est magis dignum venia. Sed in mulieribus est major fragilitas quam in viris, ratione cujus dicit Chrysostomus, quod propria passio mulieris luxuria est; et Philosophus in 7 Ethic., quod mulieres non dicuntur incontinentes, proprie loquendo, propter facilem inclinationem in concupiscentiam: quia nec bruta animalia possunt continere propter hoc quod non habent aliquid quod concupiscentiis obviare possit. Ergo mulieribus in poena divortii deberet magis parci. On the contrary (5), it seems that the wife should have the better standing. For the greater the fragility of the sinner, the more the sin is worthy of forgiveness. But in women there is a greater fragility than in men, by reason of which Chrysostom says that the proper passion of a woman is lust. And the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 that women are not said to be incontinent, properly speaking, because of their easy inclination to concupiscence, for neither are brute animals able to be continent because of the fact that they have nothing which could stand against their desires. Therefore, in the punishment of separation, women should be spared more. Praeterea, vir ponitur caput mulieris, ut ipsam corrigat. Ergo magis peccat quam mulier; et sic debet magis puniri. Furthermore (6), the man is considered the head of the woman, so that he might correct her. Therefore, he sins more gravely than the woman, and thus he should be punished more. Respondeo dicendum, quod in causa divortii vir et uxor ad paria judicantur, ut idem sit licitum et illicitum uni quod alteri; non tamen pariter judicantur ad illa: quia causa divortii est major in uno quam in alio, cum tamen in utroque sit causa sufficiens ad divortium. Divortium enim est poena adulterii, inquantum est contra matrimonii bona. Quantum autem ad bonum fidei, ad quam conjuges aequaliter sibi invicem tenentur, tantum peccat contra matrimonium adulterium unius sicut adulterium alterius; et haec causa in utroque sufficit ad divortium, sed quantum ad bonum prolis plus peccat adulterium uxoris quam viri; et ideo major causa divortii est in uxore quam in viro; et sic ad aequalia, sed non ex aequali causa obligantur: nec tamen injuste, quia in utroque est causa sufficiens ad hanc poenam: sic etiam est de duobus qui damnantur ad mortis ejusdem poenam; quamvis alius altero gravius peccaverit. I answer that, in cases of separation the husband and the wife are judged equals, such that the same things are licit and illicit to one as to the other. However, they are not to be judged equally in these things: for the reason for a separation is greater in one party than in the other, although there may be sufficient cause in both for separation. For separation is the penalty for adultery, inasmuch as it is against the goods of matrimony. Yet, as concerns the good of fidelity, to which both the spouses are equally bound, the adultery of one sins as much against marriage as the adultery of the other, and this reason in either is sufficient for a separation. But as concerns the good of children, the adultery of the wife is a greater sin than the adultery of the husband, and therefore it is a greater cause of separation in the wife than in the husband. And thus they are bound to equal things, but not for equal reasons; nor is this unjust, since in either one there is sufficient cause for this penalty, just as it is when two people are condemned to punishment for the same person’s death, although one may have sinned more gravely than the other. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod repudium non permittebatur nisi ad vitandum homicidium; et quia in viris magis erat de hoc periculum quam in mulieribus, ideo viro permittebatur dimittere uxorem, non autem e converso per legem repudii. Reply Obj. 1: Divorce was only permitted for the sake of avoiding homicide; and since there was greater danger of this in men than in women, this is why it was permitted for a man to send away his wife, not vice versa. Ad secundum et tertium dicendum, quod rationes illae procedunt secundum quod in comparatione ad bonum prolis major sit causa divortii in uxore adultera quam in viro; non tamen sequitur quod non judicentur ad paria, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 2 & 3: These arguments proceed from the fact that in comparison to the good of offspring there may be a greater reason for separation in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. But it does not follow that they should not be judged as equals, as is clear from what was said above.